R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

# THE METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

VOLUME SIX

DOCTOR EXIMIUS ET PIUS

**R. P. FRANCISCO SUAREZ OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS**

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FROM THE PRINCE AND TREASURE OF THE SOCIETY OF JESUS

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R. P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ

# METAPHYSICAL DISPUTATIONS

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# DISPUTATION XXXIV

## ON FIRST SUBSTANCE, OR THE SUPPOSITUM, AND ITS DISTINCTION FROM NATURE

From what we said in the preceding disputation, almost everything Aristotle teaches everywhere about the category of substance has already been covered, except for certain purely dialectical points about the predication of second substances of first substances within the category of substance—points that carry little difficulty and, as I noted, belong properly to dialecticians. As for what he discusses there concerning the three properties of substance that are in some way real—namely, that substance has no contrary, does not admit of more and less, and is the subject capable of contraries—these are explained by us elsewhere. We treat the first two negative properties below in Disputations 45 and 46, while clarifying the opposed properties in the category of quality; there we also touch in passing on how the same thing can be receptive of contraries, although we principally spoke to that above in Disputation 14 when treating the material cause of accidents. Setting all of that aside, a weightier disputation now presents itself—one most proper to this doctrine and especially necessary for many mysteries of theology. In it we shall first explain the terms, then set out the proper notion of suppositum, and

declare its distinction from nature; finally, we shall apply the doctrine to second substances and conclude with the common account and coordination of the category of substance.

## SECTION I
## WHETHER FIRST SUBSTANCE IS THE SAME AS SUPPOSITUM, OR PERSON, OR HYPOSTASIS

1. I presuppose that our discussion concerns created substance. The whole of this disputation treats of that. For regarding suppositum and subsistence in the divine and uncreated nature, almost nothing can be said from purely natural principles, since understanding there depends chiefly on the mystery of the Trinity. I treated this more at length in Vol. I of Part III, Disputation 11, where I showed that in the divine nature "to be per se subsistent" and "to be a suppositum" are not altogether the same in notion; for in God one finds a nature that subsists of itself and yet is communicable to many supposita, whereas it belongs to the notion of suppositum to be incommunicable to another suppositum. In created nature it is otherwise, as will be clear from what follows. Because theological ways of speaking can shed great light on understanding these terms in creatures, certain points concerning God must briefly be presupposed.

### *The Use of These Terms in Divine Matters is Explained*

2. First, therefore, one must hold that in God there is one singular substance common in reality to the three persons, on account of which the three persons are called consubstantial; in this sense the Council of Nicaea defined the Father and the Son to be ὁμοούσιοι, that is, of the same substance, and the Athanasian Creed says: "Neither

confounding the persons nor dividing the substance." Councils and holy Fathers speak in this way throughout[1]. On the other hand, one cannot admit that in God there is one suppositum common to the three persons; that would confound the three persons into one person or hypostasis, which is contrary to the definition of faith. Hence Cajetan is rightly criticized by theologians for having in some way admitted a common suppositum of the three persons, albeit with an added qualification, speaking of an "incomplete suppositum" or "incomplete person." Such language offends the ears of theologians because it is not only unusual among the Fathers but alien to their way of speaking; taken strictly, it is false, for the notion of suppositum is inconsistent with the communicability of the divine substance—a point I argued at length in the disputation cited against Cajetan.

3. Nevertheless, although it is not as certain, it is more probable and truer, in our judgment, that the singular substance common to the three persons subsists of itself and essentially, and that it has one absolute and essential subsistence common to the three persons. This opinion is commonly received by theologians of both the Thomist and Scotist schools, and by others as well. The manner of speaking has a strong foundation also in the ancient Fathers, who say that the divine persons have unity in a nature that subsists of itself, indeed even in the subsistence of the nature, as Hilary sometimes says[2], and Pope Agatho indicates[3] according to the older reading. I reported all these and many other passages more fully in the aforesaid Disputation 11.

4. From this it seems to follow that one may and should grant that God—or this God, who is common to the three persons—is "first substance," not insofar as that word derives from "standing under," but

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[1] "VI Synodus, sect. 4 et 11; Concil. Tolet. XI; Brac. I et Wormatiense, in confessionibus fidei, et alii Patres infra referendi. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 314."

[2] "VII de Trinit."

[3] "In VI Synod., act. 4."

insofar as it signifies a singular thing subsisting of itself; nor as it implies relation to a "second substance" in the way only categorial and finite substance is called first substance; rather, it denotes the negation of any prior subject and indicates or describes such a substance as has per se being of itself in the first sense and does not in its being depend on anything else. This alone most properly is what "first substance" signifies, and all of it belongs to the divine essence precisely as conceived in its absolute and essential character, as was proved in the place cited. From this it finally follows that in God "first substance" and "suppositum" or "person" are not altogether the same notion; for first substance as such does not necessarily include incommunicability, but only that it be per se subsistent—that is, singular or undivided; suppositum, however, adds incommunicability and distinction from other supposita of the same nature, as St. Thomas noted (De Potentia q. 9, a. 5, ad 13). Therefore, although the three persons are not one suppositum, they can nonetheless be called one first substance, because they are one complete and perfect substance —singular, undivided, and subsisting of itself. You will say: each person is a first substance and is properly the subject of the predicate "this God," as when one says: "The Father is this God" and "The Son is this God"; therefore "this God" is not first substance, because it is said of a subject, which conflicts with the definition of first substance. I reply that "this God" is not predicated of the divine person as of a subject—that is, as of a lower quidditative subject—but as of one having the numerically same nature; and therefore both "this God" and the "divine person" are first substance. True, this way of speaking under the name "first substance" is not so common among the ancient Fathers; yet since, when they say the three persons are "one subsistent substance," they do not speak abstractly and confusedly, but of the singular substance of the divine nature—in which, whatever there is, is essentially singular and indivisible—therefore the locution is equivalent. Still, it is advisable either to avoid the word "first substance," since it can be equivocal and be taken for suppositum, or

to add something to remove the equivocation, as if we were to say that the three persons are a first substance "really communicable," or something of that sort.

5. The same advice should be given about the expression "In God there is one subsistence" or "The three persons are one subsistence." The noun "subsistence" is equivocal and is sometimes taken as an abstract for the mode or "account" of subsisting—even in Councils—and sometimes, and very often, as a concrete for the subsisting thing; in this latter way it is most frequently used for an incommunicably subsisting suppositum, which in Greek is called hypostasis. Thus the Latin translator of the Councils often renders hypostasis by subsistentia[4]. Hence Capreolus (In I, dist. 26, a. 3) admits in God one "absolute subsisting," but not one "absolute subsistence," because subsistence includes incommunicability, whereas "subsisting" does not. This does not seem to me consistent, since "subsistence" is derived from "to subsist." Thus anything that subsists per se may be called a subsistence, as St. Thomas says (De Potentia q. 9, a. 1, ad 4). Therefore the same ambiguity that attends "subsistence" can also affect the verb "to subsist." Thus, although in God there is not one subsistence taken absolutely for "suppositum," there is one subsistence taken absolutely for "a thing that subsists," even if it subsists communicably. This signification should always be made explicit, expressly or tacitly, to avoid the occasion or suspicion of error.

6. Finally, the same must be said of the plural "substances" in such expressions as "In God there are three substances," or "three first substances." The word "substance" is equivocal and often signifies essence, as we noted in the first section; it can also signify suppositum —especially if one adds "first substance," since suppositum most of all subsists by itself. In this sense three "substances" can be admitted in God, not in the former sense. To avoid this equivocation, many of the

[4] "V. Synod., collat. 3; VI Synod., act. 11; Conc. Ephes., can. 4. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 381."

ancient Fathers rejected such language[5], lest they appear to agree with Arius, who multiplied essences in the Trinity—on which sense Jerome wrote to Damasus: "Who would dare with sacrilegious mouth to concede three substances in God?" Thus St. Thomas (ST I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 1) says that according to the Church's usage we should not simply say "three substances," because of the equivocation of the name; but if one adds something that determines its signification, one may say it—for example, "three incommunicable" or "relative substances." So much for divine matters.

### *The Said Terms are Explained in Created Things*

7. Coming down from these points to creatures, one must say first that "first substance" is said only of a singular, individual substance that subsists of itself. This follows from what was said in the previous section. That first substance denotes a singular and individual thing is clear both from the division where it is opposed to second substance—which comprises species and genera—and from that phrase in the definition of first substance, "which is not said of a subject"; by this logical description Aristotle identified a singular substance, which is not properly and per se predicated of any subject or suppositum, because of its singularity and incommunicability. For an identical proposition is not a proper predication. Finally, the word "first," insofar as it includes the negation of any prior subject in subsisting—even notionally—sufficiently indicates that first substance must be singular and individual. That first substance also requires something per se subsistent is clear above all from what was said at the end of the preceding section, where we showed that first substance properly so called signifies a complete substance; but no singular substance is complete unless it subsists. Moreover, according

[5] Lege Hil., 1 de Syn. cont. Ari.; et Aug., V de Trinit., c. 8; Tert., lib. contra Prax., c. 12.

to Aristotle, first substance is primarily and most of all called substance; but only what subsists is most properly called substance; therefore. Finally, first substance is that which most of all "stands under," both physically and really, and also logically; and this properly belongs to a singular thing subsisting of itself. Therefore only a per se subsistent thing can properly be called first substance.

8. From this it follows that a substantial nature, insofar as it is signified in the abstract—even if it is singular, as "this humanity" or "petrinity"—is not first substance, because it is not signified as subsisting, nor is it in reality formally subsistent by force of the singular nature precisely taken, as we shall show below. Rather, it follows universally that "substance," when in creatures it signifies essence precisely—even a substantial and singular essence—is not first substance. By essence or nature alone, even as singular and individual, it is not a complete substance nor subsistent. This might scarcely be understood or believed if one restricted oneself to the light of nature; however, it has been made sufficiently manifest to us from the sacred mystery of the Incarnation, as we will explain more fully in the next section.

### *First Substance & Suppositum are Convertible in Creatures*

9. Second, one must say that in creatures "first substance" and "suppositum" are said of the same and are in reality wholly the same. The proof: in created things there cannot be a singular and individual substantial nature communicable to many persons; this is proper to infinite nature. Much less can there be a created singular nature that subsists and is really communicable to many, because subsistence in a creature is proportioned to its nature; if the individual nature is incommunicable, so too is its subsistence. Indeed, subsistence is in a way even more incommunicable, as will be clear from what follows. Therefore every created first substance is incommunicable; hence

every created first substance is a suppositum. Conversely, every created suppositum is a first substance, since it is a complete, singular substance subsisting of itself. Thus the terms are reciprocal in creatures. And they are the same in reality because created subsistence is intrinsically incommunicable to any person other than the one it constitutes, given its finitude. Thus, while it constitutes a singular subsisting thing, it constitutes it as incommunicable; therefore, when it constitutes first substance, it also constitutes suppositum. Hence in created things first substance and suppositum are the same.

10. You will object: although a created singular nature is naturally incommunicable to many persons, nonetheless it can be communicated supernaturally and subsist in many persons, according to the more probable opinion of theologians who say that several divine persons could assume the same created nature. But a created suppositum is wholly incommunicable, even by absolute power. Therefore at least for this reason first substance and suppositum will not be altogether the same in creatures. I reply by denying the consequence. Even if one created nature were assumed by several persons, that nature would not be a first substance, because it would not subsist; rather, by assumption it would be drawn into subsisting. The argument only proves that in created things nature and first substance are distinguished as nature and suppositum are; and one could draw the same argument from the Incarnation of one person alone, to whom a human nature is in a way communicated when it is united to him, whereas a created first substance or suppositum cannot be united to him.

11. You will object again: just as a nature can be assumed without created personality and subsistence, so it could also be assumed with created subsistence but without that incommunicability that belongs to the notion of suppositum. Thus the assumed nature would be subsistent and hence a first substance, and yet it would not be a suppositum, because it would not be incommunicable to some other suppositum. Therefore in a creature first substance and

suppositum are distinguished more than notionally, even if naturally joined. I reply that this is altogether impossible for two reasons. First, because finite subsistence is incommunicable precisely insofar as it is finite, and by its quasi-essential or specific character; and such a subsistence cannot remain in reality without being finite and created. Indeed, it cannot be conserved in a humanity as its own subsistence without being conserved in the same species and even numerically the same; the incommunicability of such a subsistence is not something added to it, but is its intrinsic and essential limitation. Hence it involves open contradiction to say that such a subsistence remains without incommunicability. Second, which clarifies the first, subsistence could be thought communicable to a suppositum in two ways: first, by intimate identity and quasi-inclusion in the thing or things to which it is communicated; this mode of communication is altogether repugnant to created subsistence because it contradicts its limitation; it is proper to the absolute divine subsistence, and cannot befit a correlative subsistence in relation to another because of opposition. Second, communication could be by some mode of union; but in this way every subsistence, precisely as subsistence, is incommunicable to another person, because to be communicated in this way involves an open contradiction repugnant to the very notion of subsistence, which essentially includes independence from another that sustains or subsists, as we shall explain more fully below. Therefore, since a created nature cannot be communicated or assumed by an uncreated person through intimate identity—as is self-evident—it remains that it can only be assumed by some mode of union, and consequently that it cannot be assumed precisely insofar as it subsists. In no way, then, is it possible, even by absolute divine power, that a created singular substance be conserved as a created first substance—that is, with created subsistence—without also being a created suppositum. These two are therefore altogether the same in reality with respect to created substance. I add "always with respect to created substance," because, according to a probable opinion, "this God" could

assume human nature to essential subsistence precisely, and then "that man" would be a first substance because he would be a singular man that subsists, and as such he would not be a person because he would be communicable to the three persons. Nevertheless, that man simply would not be a created first substance, for the same reason that the Lord Christ is not[6] a created person, indeed not even a creature, speaking simply.

12. But you will ask whether suppositum and first substance in created things are at least distinct in reason. I answer: in the thing conceived properly, they are not distinct even in reason, although according to our way of conceiving or of explicating some property more or less distinctly or confusedly, they can be distinct "by reason" on the part of the conceiver. This is made clear because even in notion we do not conceive that one form or mode or terminus constitutes a created thing as first substance and another as suppositum; it is one and the same, as has been explained. The thing, under the concept of first substance, is conceived under the aspect of what subsists singularly, though not so explicitly under the aspect of what is incommunicable; thus the concept "first substance," if nothing else is added, of itself abstracts from incommunicability. If, however, one adds that it is created, then its incommunicability is implicitly and as it were materially indicated, though not as formally and expressly as it is declared in the name and notion of suppositum. Here lies the proper difference between God and creatures: in God, "first substance" is so distinct in reason from the divine supposita that in God one can understand a singular and complete substance in its entire essential account, without its essential concept including incommunicability—something proper to God because of his infinity.

*How Person is compared to Suppositum & First Substance*

[6] extual note: non, 1960; others omit. "Este non falta injustificablemente en algunas ediciones." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 322.

13. I say third: "person" is the same as first substance or suppositum, but determines that notion to an intellectual or rational nature. This is the common view of theologians, based on Boethius's definition in De duabus naturis: "A person is an individual substance of rational nature," that is, first substance of such a nature, as St. Thomas rightly explains (ST I, q. 29, aa. 1–2). Hence it is often said that "person" and "suppositum" differ, as it were, materially on the part of the nature, not formally in the manner of incommunicable subsistence. This is true as regards the general notion of first substance or suppositum. Yet because an intellectual nature has a subsistence proportioned to itself and of a higher kind than lower natures, one may say that "person" differs from "suppositum" even in the account of subsisting, as a most dignified species differs from a common genus. Not that the proper ratio of genus and species is found here, but a proportional one. For an intellectual nature, if it is purely and perfectly intellectual, has an utterly immaterial subsistence; if it is rational and at once sensible and bodily, then either it has a spiritual subsistence, or at least one composed of something material and something spiritual, as we shall explain below. In this way the person differs from suppositum in general.

### *On Hypostasis*

14. I say fourth: "hypostasis," according to the more frequent usage of the word, is the same as suppositum or person. This depends only on the meaning of the Greek term ὑπόστασις, which has various senses. The word is derived from ἵστημι or ἵσταμαι with the preposition ὑπό, which can signify "to be under" or "to stand under." Thus hypostasis once meant whatever settles below other things—like dregs or dense matter that sinks to the bottom of liquids—as might be understood in Psalm 68: "I am stuck fast in deep mire and there is no foundation," in Greek hypostasis, that is, "no ground on which I may stand." It also signifies the foundation of a thing, as Paul says of faith in

Hebrews 11: "It is the substance (hypostasis) of things hoped for," that is, a foundation. But because to subsist properly belongs to substance, and it is, as it were, the foundation of every existing thing, the word hypostasis came to signify substance—either absolutely or, more particularly, a singular and incommunicable substance, as John Damascene notes (Dialectica c. 29). Hence, because the Latin word substantia is equivocal and sometimes signifies essence, the Greeks sometimes used hypostasis to signify essence, as Elias of Crete notes in his commentary on Oration 23 of Nazianzen at the words Illud item praescribe, and as is clear from Theodoret (Historia ecclesiastica II, c. 8). For this reason Jerome in the cited letter to Damasus refused to concede "three hypostases" in the Trinity; Acacius reports the same of Paulinus in his letter to Cyril of Alexandria. To remove this equivocation, the usage of Greeks and Latins fixed and distinguished the senses of these words. Thus the substantial nature, insofar as it is distinguished in thing or in notion from the suppositum, is called in Greek οὐσία, in Latin essentia. But a singular substance that subsists and is incommunicable to other like substances is called in Latin suppositum or persona, and in Greek hypostasis; hence, just as we admit "three persons," so the Greeks admit "three hypostases" in the Trinity. In this way the slight discord that arose among Catholic Latins and Greeks from the poverty of words ceased, as Gregory Nazianzen elegantly says in Oration 21, in praise of Athanasius, toward the end. Now, therefore, by common usage—including among Latins—the word hypostasis is almost always taken in this last signification. Sometimes it is taken generally, to signify a thing that subsists incommunicably in whatever nature; in that way it signifies the same as suppositum; and in this sense St. Thomas says that person adds over and above hypostasis a determinate nature, namely rational (De Potentia q. 9, a. 1, end of the body). Sometimes, however, as he adds in the reply to objection 2 in the same place, although hypostasis by the property of the Greek tongue signifies an individual substance of any nature, by usage of speakers it signifies an individual of rational

nature only. Accordingly it is clear in what way hypostasis is the same as person, according to its various significations.

15. St. Thomas adds in the same place that hypostasis and subsistence are the same in reality, though they differ in notion. The same first substance, insofar as it subsists, is called subsistence; insofar as it "stands under," it is called hypostasis. As to the name hypostasis, although perhaps it was coined from that relation, nevertheless it does not signify the relation, nor does it always require it in the thing signified; for the divine persons are in the strictest sense hypostases, although they do not "stand under" anything. Indeed, even as to the etymology, although hypostasis may be taken as "substanding," it could also be derived from "subsisting." For, as St. Thomas says elsewhere, something is said to subsist insofar as it is "under its own being," not that it has being in something as in a subject, but that, since it exists per se and is as it were sustained in itself, it is itself the primary subject or foundation of its being. As for the name subsistence, we have already said that, if it is taken as an abstract, it does not signify the subsisting thing itself, but the "account" of subsisting; if that account includes incommunicability, it is also a ratio constituting a hypostasis. If it is taken as a concrete and incommunicable subsistence, it is the same as hypostasis and suppositum. Otherwise, by signification and notion signified, subsistence is broader than hypostasis, at least in God, in whom there can be a communicable subsistence; in creatures, however, they are convertible and are related to each other just as first substance and suppositum are, for the same reasons given above.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER IN CREATURES THE SUPPOSITUM ADDS TO NATURE SOMETHING POSITIVE, REAL, AND DISTINCT FROM IT BY NATURE OF THE THING

## Section II

1. Having explained the terms, we must speak to the matter itself. What we ask about suppositum in relation to substantial nature or essence must be understood of "person" in relation to rational nature, and in the same proportion for the rest, regardless of the names used.

### *The Title of The Question is Explained & Various Questions are Proposed*

2. To understand the title of the question more precisely, note that the essence of created substance can be conceived and signified in various ways: in the concrete and the abstract (as when we say "humanity is Peter's essence," or "a man"); also commonly (as in those examples) or singularly (as when we say "this humanity belongs to the essence of this man, Christ"); and either by a simple and as it were confused concept (as when the species is said to be the essence of the individual, as "man" of Peter) or by a complex and distinct concept declared by the definition (as when we say the essence of man is rational animal). From these various modes of conceiving arise various comparisons and questions. First, the comparison of abstract to concrete in the particular and singular: how this man Peter is distinguished from this humanity. Second, the comparison of abstract to concrete in common: how "man" and "humanity" are distinguished; and similarly for other common predicates in the same proportion. Third, comparing the essence in common to the individual and particular: how "man" is distinguished from Peter or "this man." This comparison could also be varied using concrete and abstract terms—comparing the concrete common to the singular abstract (man to this humanity), or conversely the abstract common to the singular concrete (humanity to this man), or abstract to abstract, and so on. Fourth, one might compare the essence distinctly conceived to that of which it is conceived—that is, the defined to the definition. In this sense many think Aristotle treats the question in

Book VII of this work whether the "what-it-is" is the same as that of which it is.

3. This last comparison lies outside our present purpose and contains a dialectical rather than a metaphysical question, one common to accidents as well as to substances; we shall nevertheless touch on it in passing and settle it by explaining Aristotle's view. Again, the third comparison contains the proper question about the distinction of the universal nature from individuals—a question we handled above—which has the same resolution whether one compares concrete to concrete or abstract to abstract, that is, "man" to Peter or "humanity" to this humanity. The other two members of that comparison add nothing new but mix the first two with the third; hence a determination of those questions will answer them all. The first and second comparisons concern the present disputation; the difficulty is most clearly seen and commonly treated in the first of them, and we shall therefore speak of it first and from it easily determine the other at the end. Thus by "nature" we mean a singular substance containing the whole and complete essence of the individual or suppositum, taken in the abstract—what metaphysicians call the "form of the whole," as this humanity consisting of this soul and this body, that is, these flesh and these bones. What is meant by "suppositum" has already been sufficiently explained.

### *The First Opinion on the Rational Distinction of Suppositum from Nature is Treated*

4. The first opinion, then, is that nature and suppositum are distinguished only by reason, owing to our way of conceiving in abstract or concrete terms. This is thought to be Aristotle's view in Metaphysics VII, chapters 6 and 11, where he maintains that the "what-it-is" is the same as that of which it is; and in Book I, chapter 1, he says that actions belong to singulars—by singular he means the suppositum—whence the axiom is taken: "Actions belong to

supposita." The same seems to have been held by all philosophers who were ignorant of our mysteries of faith. But—what is remarkable—even among Catholic theologians this opinion was taught by Durandus (In I, dist. 34, q. 1) and Henry of Ghent (Quodlibet IV, q. 4). From this opinion it plainly follows that these locutions are true: "Man is humanity," and "Peter is his humanity"—locutions Durandus also admits. Their only foundation is that the suppositum, say Peter, is nothing other than this composite of this body and this soul, which is the same as his humanity, and anything over and above this that one might think to be in Peter's substance is unintelligible, much less provable or persuasive.

5. But although this opinion perhaps cannot be refuted by natural reason alone, once the mystery of the Incarnation is supposed, it can in no way be defended. For according to faith, in reality a singular humanity was assumed and hypostatically united to the divine Word; a created human suppositum, however, was not assumed. Therefore some real distinction must exist between this humanity and its proper suppositum, since the humanity remains in Christ while the created suppositum does not. The same is true of that humanity and of all created natures, especially material ones. Again, the humanity in Christ is a singular created nature and yet is not a created suppositum; therefore something is lacking that the suppositum adds over and above singular nature. You will say that nothing is lacking to that humanity; rather, it has something on account of which it is not a created suppositum, namely, that it is "in the Word," who is properly said to "have" the humanity; the humanity itself is said to be "in the Word" as a form is in a suppositum; and therefore that humanity cannot be called a suppositum or a "man," because it has another mode of being, on account of which it is in another rather than in itself. But this reply tends toward Scotus's opinion, soon to be treated, that the suppositum differs from nature by something negative and not by adding something positive; for the reply presupposes that to the notion of suppositum, beyond the whole

entity of nature, a negation of union to another is required—that is, a lack of the mode of existing in another. This difference, however, is no longer merely rational but real; and we shall at once prove that this difference is not only placed in negation but also includes something positive.

6. Add that the ancient Fathers often taught that heretics erred in the chief mysteries of faith—the Trinity and the Incarnation—precisely because they did not distinguish between nature and person. So Pope Vigilius implies (Contra Eutychen II, near the middle). John Damascene says so more clearly (De fide orthodoxa I, c. 3). Epiphanius, very well in the Seventh Council (act. 6, vol. III, toward the end): "Heretics err," he says, "because they do nothing other than to show that nature and hypostasis are the same, whereas the true sons of the Catholic Church know that they differ." Again, the holy Fathers often teach that it is proper to God to be essentially subsisting, and thus that "God" and "Godhead" are distinguished only by reason and our mode of signifying or conceiving: the Master and theologians treat this in I, dist. 8; St. Thomas and his commentators (ST I, q. 3, aa. 3–4); St. Leo the Great (Ep. 93, c. 5); St. Augustine (City of God XI, c. 10; De Trinitate XV, c. 17); St. Anselm (Monologion cc. 15–16); and St. Bernard, excellently (Serm. 80 on the Canticles). The Master reports other Fathers; others may be taken from what we argued in Vol. I of Part III, Disputation 11.

7. Nor does the foundation set forth to the contrary press the point. For if matter and form are taken precisely as essential parts, we deny that the suppositum is nothing other than the composite of this matter and this form; Christ's humanity is composed of this matter and this form, and yet it is not a suppositum. If matter and form are taken not only as parts of essence but also as including or bringing along subsistence, then it is true that a suppositum arises from united matter and form; but that includes subsistence in addition to nature. What this is, and how it can be understood and proved, we shall say below.

## Section II

### *The Second Opinion of Scotus is Treated*

8. The second opinion is Scotus's (In III, dist. 1, q. 1; dist. 6, q. 1; In I, dist. 13; Quodlib. q. 19, a. 3), who says that a created suppositum adds nothing positive in reality over singular nature but only a negation of actual and aptitudinal dependence upon some suppositum; for the humanity of Christ is not a suppositum only because it is substantially united to the Word and depends on him; therefore, the negation of such dependence belongs to the notion of suppositum. Scotus adds that the negation of aptitudinal dependence is also necessary because of the rational soul, which not only is not a suppositum when united to the body—since it is actually "in a suppositum"—but also, when separated, is not a suppositum, because it is apt to depend on a suppositum, or rather to compose it. If you object that even Peter's humanity cannot be called a suppositum because it is apt to be united, for example, to the Word, Scotus replies that it is not "apt" in the natural sense but only "not repugnant," that is, not apt by natural power and aptitude, but only by obediential capacity. When it is actually assumed or united, although it truly retains the same negation of natural aptitude, it loses the negation of actual dependence by the actual union and therefore ceases to be suppositum or person. Scotists follow this opinion as thus expounded (In III, dist. 1: Bassolis q. 1, a. 1; Maironis q. 11). Lychetus (ibid., q. 1), although he deems it probable, thinks Scotus did not fully adhere to it and that the arguments supporting it can easily be solved, and in the end that the opposite is in fact more probable—a view that openly departs from Scotus's mind, however much he refuses to acknowledge it. Aureolus, too, reported by Capreolus (In III, dist. 5, q. 3), argues with many reasons that a created suppositum cannot add anything positive above nature. Gabriel (In III, dist. 1, q. 1) says the same, adding other negations that belong to the ratio of suppositum—namely, that it not be actually an integral part (on account of parts of

water and the like), and that it not formally constitute something per se one (on account of the divine essence), and the like—taken from Ockham (In III, q. 1). Marsilius (In III, q. 1, a. 1) agrees.

9. The principal foundation of these authors seems to have been that such negations suffice for the constitution of a created suppositum and for explaining the Incarnation; therefore it is superfluous to invent some positive reality that the created suppositum adds. For such an entity could be neither substance (for it is neither matter nor form nor composite) nor accident (else the created suppositum would not be per se one). Scotus also adds that, if such a positive something is posited, the mystery of the Incarnation and what the Fathers teach cannot be rightly understood; for that positive would neither be assumed nor assumable by the Word, and thus the Word would not have assumed every thing that he planted in human nature, contrary to Damascene (De fide III, c. 6). It would then follow that Christ's humanity lacks some maximal perfection connatural to a man—which also seems unacceptable. Finally, it would follow that the Word could not simply dismiss the human nature without adding some new thing to it; and, in the end, that the humanity would now be in the Word "violently," since it would lack a positive perfection connatural to it.

10. If one looks attentively, this opinion differs from the former only in words. For even Durandus admits that, in a complete substantial nature, the absence of hypostatic union to another person is necessary for it to be called a suppositum. Accordingly I judge this opinion no less false for theological reasons (we shall speak of metaphysical ones later). First, the mystery of the Trinity cannot be understood if the formal ratio of "person" consists in a negation; otherwise the three divine persons would be constituted by three negations—which not only Scotus does not concede, but he even deems it probable that, beyond the three relations, there are also three absolute personal "notions" by which those persons are constituted. Sound doctrine holds that those persons are constituted by real and

positive "notions," even though relative ones. If therefore in the divine persons "person" adds to nature something positive (though distinct only by reason), then also in the creature it adds something positive—distinct in reality, however, because of the creature's imperfection. The consequence holds both because a created person is some participation of the uncreated person, and even more so because the divine nature subsists per se and essentially, and yet something positive and incommunicable (which must be relative, given God's perfection, in whom nothing absolute can be utterly incommunicable) can be added in notion to it. In a creature, however, nature does not subsist per se and essentially, since in Christ it could be assumed without its own subsistence; therefore it will all the more be possible for something positive to be added to it by which it really subsists—something absolute yet incommunicable because of its imperfection—and thus constitute a suppositum, that is, a thing subsisting incommunicably.

11. Second, the opinion is shown false from the mystery of the Incarnation, first on the part of the Word. Unless the Word were constituted by a positive personality or subsistence, one could not understand how it assumed an extrinsic nature to that personality, since a nature cannot be assumed to a negation; a negation as such cannot be the formal terminus of a real union. Abstractly and precisely considered, therefore, it is necessary that personality be a positive notion in order to understand the Incarnation. From this we draw a very probable argument, similar to the preceding, that created personality too is placed in a positive ratio. And we can argue more effectively against Scotus and the Nominalists: they hold that by divine power it can be brought about that a created suppositum terminates an alien nature. I ask: in such a case is the union terminated to a negation, or to something positive? The former cannot be said, as already shown. If the latter, then one must concede that the union is terminated to subsistence and personality; otherwise it would not be a hypostatic or personal union. Therefore created subsistence and

personality are something positive. I confirm and clarify the force of this reason: I ask whether in Christ's humanity there is now that positive which, according to these authors, enables a created person to terminate an alien nature. If not, then Christ's humanity is lacking some real positive ratio that a created person adds over nature, and by which it is formally constituted in personal being. If the very same positive—whatever it be—is in Christ's humanity, then it follows, first, that either there is in Christ's humanity a created subsistence, or else that the hypostatic union is not to a subsistence—both of which are most absurd. It further follows that Christ's humanity could by itself terminate the hypostatic union of some other nature, assuming that a created person can terminate it. The consequence holds because that humanity retains every positive to which such a union could be terminated. But the consequent is plainly unintelligible, supposing the principles of faith. For how could that which is not a created person and does not have a created personality constitute a created person? Such a union would not be immediately between a nature and a person, but between substantial and complete natures—which is repugnant to a substantial union, according to the doctrine of the Fathers and Councils.

12. They will perhaps respond that Christ's humanity has been made unfit to terminate another nature by its union to the Word. But this cannot be said consistently if by that union it has been deprived of no positive thing. What then does the union impede, if it does not impede or remove the thing that could be the ratio of terminating? If it removes only the negation of actual dependence, this is impertinent to terminating another nature; for termination is not by a negation but by something positive, as we said. They might indeed insist that this negation is a condition sine qua non; but that recourse is a plain petitio principii and gratuitous if no account is given of such necessity. We say the reason is that the union impedes the proper positive personality, which is the ratio for constituting a created

person—either one's own or even another's, if it is possible for some nature to be terminated by a created person alien to it.

13. Third, I argue on the part of the assumed humanity. The Councils and Fathers teach[7] that the Word assumed a humanity and not a man—that is, not a created human person; and in the same sense they say that, by assuming the humanity, the Word "consumed" the person, not the nature. Such locutions cannot be legitimately expounded except by saying that in man, besides human nature, there is a real something completing the ratio of person, which is impeded in Christ's humanity by the union to the Word—the Word, as theologians say, supplying in that nature the human personality. Otherwise the Councils would only say that by assuming the humanity the Word impeded or removed the negation of union; or when they say the Word did not assume a person, they would mean only that he did not assume a nature that remained without union. Such a sense would make the weighty locutions of the Councils empty and ridiculous. I confirm the force of this argument: on Scotus's opinion it would follow that the Word itself, as such, after the union, would not be a person but only a composite of human nature and the Word—which is openly heretical. The consequence I prove: in human nature every positive thing and real mode that is in a created person remains, and yet it ceases to be a person only because it is united; therefore conversely, the Word, because it is united, would not be a person even if deprived of no real thing or mode.

14. They will say that the humanity ceases to be a person not because it is united in any manner whatsoever, but because it is united such that it depends on the Word, while the Word does not depend on the humanity. But, according to this opinion, one cannot say that the humanity depends on the Word in its being; that humanity did not require anything beyond its own entity in order to exist; hence, if it

[7] "Lege D. Thom., III, q. 4, a. 2 et 4; et quae ibi notavimus in commentariis, et disp. VII, sect. 3, et disp. VIII, sect. 4, et disp. XXXV, in initio. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 334."

lacked the union, with no added causality or reality it would retain its being, because by the mere negation of union it has whatever is necessary to subsist in its being, as they themselves also admit. Therefore it is not the humanity but the composite of the humanity and the Word that depends on the Word; at most the humanity as united—or rather its union—depends on the Word; but in this respect something similar can be said even of the Word as united, namely, that as far as that formal denomination goes, it depends on the humanity. I concede that there is a difference here: the union is something in the humanity but not in the Word. But what does this matter to remove the denomination of "person," since the union, according to Scotus, is only some real relation? To forestall this evasion, let us imagine such a union among created things, whether that be impossible or possible (as they think). Suppose Peter terminates Paul's nature. Then, since each extreme is created, there is no reason why the union should be something positive or a real relation in one extreme rather than in the other. Further, all the positive entity that was previously in the extremes remains after the union in one just as in the other. Moreover, by force of the union neither depends on the other in its being, and each depends on the other with respect to the union. What reason, then, can be given why, after such a union, Peter should be considered to remain a person rather than Paul? Or why should not one person "consume" the other's person mutually, since in each the negation of dependence is removed with regard to the union? Hence one could no more say that Peter assumes Paul's nature than conversely. Finally, it cannot be explained what sort of substantial union that would be. To this issue the whole force of the argument tends, which I will express in another way.

15. Fourth, on this opinion Christ's humanity would be a complete substance in every respect, just as much as Paul's or John's person. This is clear, since in the category of substance the complement is not constituted by a negation; but that humanity lacks nothing that Peter's person has, except a certain negation; therefore it

is not a less complete substance than Peter's person. That something has been added does not remove its completeness; a thing is made incomplete by subtraction, not by addition; by addition, rather, it becomes more than complete, if one may so speak. From this it further follows that no substantial union can intervene between such a substance and another that is wholly complete. In this point the axiom is most true: "From two beings already in act—that is, altogether complete and perfect—there is not made one per se." For if each component is complete and integral in the category of substance and loses nothing by the union that is necessary for that completeness, it is not intelligible how a substantial union could be effected between them and be ordered to constitute a substance that is one per se. Otherwise no reason could be given why a substantial union could not immediately intervene between persons, and similarly between substantial and complete natures as such—whereas the whole reason is that, since they are complete in their own ratio, neither can natures be united to complete one nature, nor persons to form one person. Therefore in general two substances wholly complete cannot be substantially united to complete one substance.

16. If perhaps Scotus denies that the humanity is a complete substance only because it lacks the negation of dependence, then by his own account this negation would belong to the ratio of a complete substance, which is manifestly absurd; for a negation as such is nothing and therefore cannot belong to the complement of substance. From this one can finally draw a demonstrative argument against Scotus: that which a created suppositum adds to a created individual nature pertains to the perfection and complement of the created substance; therefore it is not a mere negation but something positive, since negation does not posit a perfection but presupposes one. The antecedent is proved first from what has been said, because it pertains to the notion of complete substance; next from Aristotle, who says that first substance is most and most perfectly substance; but "first substance" does not denote nature alone but the suppositum of

nature. Finally, because suppositum adds to nature "subsistence," as the principles of faith teach: for Christ's humanity is not a person because it does not have a created subsistence. But "subsistence" denotes a great perfection; if it consisted in negation alone, how could a nature be assumed to subsist, or how could its own subsistence be supplied by an alien one?

17. A final reason: an intrinsic and inseparable negation belonging to some thing is always founded upon some positive basis. By this reason Scotus himself teaches that the individual adds to the species some positive difference, because that indivision or incommunicability belonging to a singular thing is founded upon something positive; therefore the negation or incommunicability that belongs to the ratio of suppositum is founded upon something positive, by which the suppositum is formally constituted. It can be replied from Scotus that this negation which he says belongs to suppositum is indeed inseparable from the suppositum as such, because the suppositum under this word and its corresponding concept formally includes the negation; yet it is not inseparable from another thing that naturally has that negation conjoined, while that thing remains entire. For the substance of the humanity, although it naturally has conjoined the negation of dependence on another suppositum, nevertheless has nothing repugnant to losing it; hence supernaturally it can lack that negation, and therefore it is not necessary that such a negation be founded upon something positive. For a negation that is not utterly inseparable from a thing is not always founded upon something positive—like the lack of the beatific vision, which a created intellect has by its nature; that lack is not founded upon a positive, since it can be removed with no positive subtracted, although, if one word signifies the intellect as existing under such a negation, then indeed the negation is inseparable from the adequately signified object—because if it were separated, that signified thing would no longer remain. As from "dark air," taken absolutely, the negation of light is separable and therefore is not founded upon some

positive form repugnant to light; but from "dark air" as dark, that negation is not separable without losing its being "dark." Thus, Scotus argues, of "suppositum" as such, and of the thing to which the negation belongs that suppositum formally denotes. On this response he indeed speaks consistently; nevertheless all the foregoing arguments tell against it. Moreover, it follows that "suppositum" would be a kind of ens per accidens, like "dark." From this it rigorously follows that the name "suppositum" would be quasi-connotative, signifying negation formally and, materially, the thing to which such negation belongs—just as "dark" does. Hence, as we absolutely concede that "dark air" can be illuminated and that the separated soul can be united to the body—because "being separated" denotes merely a negation—so it would have to be conceded simply that a suppositum can be assumed or united to another. But this last consequence is contrary to all theologians and indeed to the doctrine of the Councils.

18. If it is said that in the prior locutions a divided sense is intended, whereas in this last a composite sense is intended, this is itself a clear sign that "suppositum" does not signify negation formally —as "separated" or "dark" do—but rather a positive form constituting the suppositum and founding that negation on account of which the suppositum is said to be unassumable or incommunicable. For this reason, when one says "a suppositum cannot be assumed," the meaning is not "it cannot be assumed while remaining with the negation of assumption," that is, while remaining separated—who could think that?—but "it cannot be assumed together with that positive by which it is constituted as a suppositum." Unless we interpret it thus, such sayings become ridiculous, as I said above: it would be as if one were to say "a separated soul cannot be united to a body," understanding "cannot be united while remaining separated." Therefore the negation of incommunicability, which repugns being separated from a suppositum as such, is inseparable not merely because of a "composite sense," so to speak, but because it is founded

upon something positive that formally constitutes the suppositum and renders it unassumable.

19. The foundation of the Scotist opinion is dissolved. We deny that a created suppositum is sufficiently constituted by a negation. What positive the suppositum adds to nature, we shall say in what follows. For now we admit that it is neither matter nor form nor the composite as such, but some mode or entity superadded—which Aristotle either did not include in his division because he did not know it, or which is reduced to those members as the mode of those or of the whole composite, as we shall later explain. As to the mystery of the Incarnation, we answer that it is not only not inconvenient but necessary for explaining the truth of that mystery that the Word did not assume in human nature any positive ratio constitutive of person —whether that be a thing entirely distinct or only a mode. From this it does not follow that that nature is imperfect as to the being of nature; it follows only that it is not a person. Thus must we understand Damascene's statement—that the Word assumed whatever pertains to the truth of human nature and to the formal constitution of a man, not what pertains to a created person as such. We also admit that if the human nature were separated from the Word, something would have to be newly added to it so that it could subsist in a connatural manner. Nor does it follow that it now exists "violently," since it is suppositated in a nobler way. All of which we treated more at length in its proper place[8].

### *Resolution of the Question*

20. From these points the resolution of the present section is gathered: a created suppositum adds to a created nature something real and positive, distinct from it in reality. Therefore, comparing suppositum to nature, they are distinguished as what includes to what is included; the suppositum includes the nature and adds something

[8] "Citata disp. VIII, sect. 4, I tom. III partis."

that can be called personality, suppositality, or created subsistence; nature of itself prescinds from this addition—that is, from subsistence. Thus nature can, by absolute power, be conserved without subsistence; the whole suppositum, however, cannot be conserved without nature, because it formally includes nature and is essentially constituted by it in the being of such a substance. But comparing subsistence itself to nature, they are distinct from each other as two extremes that compose the created suppositum. How great this distinction is, and what this subsistence is, remains to be explained.

## SECTION III

## WHETHER THE DISTINCTION OF THE SUPPOSIT FROM THE NATURE[9] IS MADE BY ACCIDENTS OR BY PRINCIPLES OF INDIVIDUATION, AND THEREFORE DOES NOT OBTAIN IN SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES

1. In this section a third opinion in this matter needs to be treated, which St. Thomas appears to have taught in that difficult passage, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, a. 3, where he inquires whether God is identical with His essence or nature. In brief he answers that in things composed of matter and form the nature and the supposit are distinguished, because "nature" as such includes only those elements which fall under the definition of the species, but not the individual matter together with the accidents that designate it; the material supposit, however, includes all these, and thus is distinguished from the nature. But in substances that are not composed of matter and form, since they lack individuating matter, the supposit does not differ from the nature, but the very forms are subsistent supposits. From this

[9] natura, 1960; creatura, ed. Vivès. "In the Vivès edition one reads creatura. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 340."

general consideration alone he concludes that God is His own deity—a conclusion that, in the same way, he could have drawn concerning any created angel. In this position, then, two points hinted at in the title must briefly be treated. The first is whether what the supposit adds to the nature is some accident, or rather the individual difference itself. The second is whether this common distinction between nature and supposit belongs to all created supposits, even the immaterial.

### *Whether the Supposit Adds to the Nature Individuating Conditions*

2. With respect to the first part, the holy Fathers sometimes seem to assert that the supposit adds to the nature singularity or individuation, whence they say that the supposit includes the singular properties which the nature does not include. Thus St. Basil speaks in his letter to Gregory On the Difference between Nature and Hypostasis; and St. John of Damascus, On the Orthodox Faith, book III, chapters 4 and 6, speaks similarly. Nevertheless, if one considers what we said at the beginning of the preceding section when explaining the title, no room remains for this question. For here we are not comparing a specific nature or a nature conceived abstractly with an individual or with a supposit, but a singular and individual nature with a supposit; it is therefore impossible that the supposit add individuation to the nature. For either this is understood of the individuation of the nature itself, or of the individuation of the supposit as supposit. The latter sense is true if we speak of individual supposits; for it is clear that each thing is constituted as this supposit by its own singular and proper subsistence, which it adds to its singular and individual nature. Yet this sense has no bearing on the present question, because we are not now disputing about the individuation or singularity of the supposit or of the nature, but about what each supposit adds over and above its own singular nature. Add that, although individual supposits add singular subsistences,

nevertheless, in the way in which we consider and define "supposit" in general, it does not properly add, over and above the nature, some singular subsistence, but that which pertains to the common notion of personal subsistence, as St. Thomas said in a like case, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1. Therefore, speaking in general, the supposit does not add, over and above the nature, the individuation of subsistence; it adds subsistence, which in individual persons is individual, and it is related in the same way to their formally taken individuals as other common notions are related to their individuals.

3. The former sense is manifestly false, as is sufficiently shown by the mystery of the Incarnation, in which the humanity was not assumed in general but "in an atom" (that is, individually), as the theologians say with St. John of Damascus. Therefore Christ's humanity has everything that is necessary for the individuation of human nature, and yet it still lacks the formal constitutive of a created person; therefore what the person adds is not the individuation of the specific nature, but something else. Likewise, it has been shown above that the individuation of the nature is not, in reality, something distinct from the nature; personality, however, is so distinct in reality that it is even separable. Likewise, the incommunicable subsistence belongs to the intrinsic notion of a supposit as such; but to the notion of a created individual nature subsistence does not belong. Therefore the individuation of such a nature is not its subsistence; therefore it is not individuation that the supposit adds to the nature. Finally, even in God, whose nature in itself and essentially is most of all singular and individual, there is at least a distinction of reason between what the supposit adds over and above the singular and individual nature; much more, then, in creatures these are distinct.

4. St. Basil and St. John of Damascus, then, in those places could not have been speaking in the sense that we are treating, but either they are speaking of "nature" as taken for the specific essence, or at least they speak indifferently of the nature insofar as it can be common to many persons, whether only according to reason, as in

creatures, or also according to reality, as in God. For they assert that teaching in order to show that the divine nature can be common to many persons, although the persons themselves are incommunicable, because "nature as nature" does not include incommunicable properties; and they make use of the example of creatures, in which the nature is common, while the persons are singular. This example is not to be taken as altogether similar; for the community of nature in creatures is only according to reason, whereas in God it is real. But it is to be taken only so far as it serves to explain the distinction of common and proper names in divine things. As to the meaning of St. Thomas, we shall speak below.

### *The Supposit does Not Add to the Nature any Accident*

5. We must add further on this point that the supposit does not add to the singular nature any accident, properly and strictly speaking of "accident." This also ought to be most certain, first, from the mystery of the Incarnation; for in Christ's humanity there are all the accidents connatural to human nature, or which can pertain to its perfection. In this sense the Councils define that the Word assumed the human nature with its connatural properties. And nonetheless there is not in that nature the proper personality of man; therefore this personality is not some accident connatural to human nature; therefore simply speaking it is not an accident. For if it were, it would not indeed be extrinsic and adventitious, but connatural and intrinsic. And this is confirmed: the divine Word, by assuming humanity, did not supply in it some accident; otherwise that union would not be substantial but accidental. Indeed, it could not have supplied of itself and formally the formal effect of an accident, because the Word itself is not an accident. But it could supply the ratio of subsisting, because it is formal and most perfect subsistence. Second, the point is proved from the thing itself: for the supposit, as supposit, is a complete

substance and one per se; therefore what the supposit adds to the nature belongs to the complement of substance; therefore it is of the genus of substance and not of accident. This could easily be shown by going through the several predicaments of accidents; but it is not necessary to dwell on what is clear. I said "properly speaking of accident," for if "accident" be taken broadly for whatever is not of the essence of a thing, then subsistence may be called an "accident," because, as we shall say, speaking simply, it is not of the substantial essence of the individual. Yet that way of speaking is improper and to be avoided, lest we occasion some error in theology.

6. Hence the opinion remains disapproved which Cajetan and others report, namely, that the supposit adds to the nature an affection by which it is subject to accidents, so that "supposit" signifies a nature as affected by accidents. Against this opinion the same arguments proceed; for this affection also is found in Christ's humanity: it is affected by its own accidents. And this affection, too, is of the genus of accidents; for either it is only the union to those accidents, or it is a denomination or formal effect of those accidents themselves. For what is it to be affected by an accident, if not to be informed by it? Some have said, indeed—Hervaeus, Quodlibeta III, q. 6—that although the supposit does not intrinsically include accidents, still it adds them extrinsically; but how false this is will be evident in the next section.

### *On the Distinction of the Supposit from the Nature in Angelic Substances*

7. Concerning the second point, some think that in created separated substances the supposit is not really distinct from the nature, but only by a distinction of reason, as God and deity are distinguished. St. Thomas seems so clearly to teach this opinion in the place cited that it can scarcely admit any other interpretation. For if we wanted to explain him as speaking only of the specific nature and the

individual, the contrary follows: he immediately concludes from that that God is His own deity; and in the same way he could have concluded that Gabriel is his own "Gabrielity" (so to speak)—which does not rightly follow from the mere identity of the specific nature with the individual. For since the individuation of nature and suppositality are distinct, suppositality can be distinguished from the nature even if the individuation is not. Add that otherwise St. Thomas would not have sufficiently excluded every composition that could be thought of in God, nor would he have raised the question whether there is in God a composition of nature and supposit. I add further that otherwise there would be no difference between material and immaterial substances; for even in material substances the individual is not distinguished from the specific nature if the discussion is only of individuation and not of personal subsistence—which was proved above when treating of the principle of individuation and of the rational distinction between specific and singular nature. Finally, in other places St. Thomas seems clearly to teach the same position: Contra Gentiles IV, c. 55, ad 4; In Sententias III, dist. 5, q. 1, a. 3, where he properly treats of nature and person, for he deals with the mystery of the Incarnation; likewise in the little work On Being and Essence, c. 5, where he cites Avicenna, who held this in Metaphysics V, c. 5. And the same position Albert the Great seems to have taught, In Sententias III, dist. 2, a. 2, where he denies that the angelic nature is assumable by the Word. Aristotle also is cited for this opinion, Metaphysics VII, c. 11, text 41, and De Anima III, c. 4, text 9, where he says that in material things "what a thing is" (the quidditas) is distinguished from that of which it is, but not in immaterial things.

8. The foundation explained at the beginning of the section is this: a material supposit includes designated matter, which a spiritual supposit does not have. This can be developed as follows. A material nature has form in matter, and therefore it also has a nature "in a supposit" and is not of itself actually subsisting from its intrinsic ratio; but an angel is wholly form without matter, and therefore it is of itself

and essentially subsisting by force of its nature, and accordingly there is in it nothing whereby the supposit should be distinguished from the nature. This is confirmed, because no reason can be given why God by His absolute power cannot make a substance in which the nature and the supposit are not distinguished. Where would there be any contradiction in this? Such a substance could be finite and in many other respects inferior to God. And if such a creature can be made, how could it be shown or believed that it was not made? For that has not been revealed, nor can it be shown by reason, since it depends solely on God's will. Indeed, supposing the possibility, it seems that it could be shown on the basis of fittingness that such a creature was made, because it was fitting that God create substances most like Himself in the grade and mode of being, as far as could be. Now if such a substance[10] has been made, it can be none other than an angelic one; for among creatures there is none higher or simpler. And although one could imagine that some angels possess this perfection but not all—for they are not all of equal essential perfection—still such a differentiation would be without foundation. For if this perfection is found in the angelic order, it does not come from some special difference but from the simplicity and immateriality of that rank.

### *Even in Angels the Supposit Adds Something Really Distinct from the Nature*

9. Nevertheless, one must say that even in angels personality is distinct ex natura rei from the singular and individual nature. This is the more common opinion of the theologians, both on II, dist. 3, where they ascribe to angels a composition of nature and supposit, and also on III, dist. 2, where they teach that the Word could have assumed an angelic nature; in this they presuppose in angels the

[10] substantia, 1960; alt. subsistentia. "Erroneously in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 345.

distinction between nature and supposit, in accordance with what was set forth above against Durandus—which we shall at once confirm. Hence St. Thomas must be of the same opinion; for in III, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3, he grants that the angelic nature is assumable by the Word, and that by the hypostatic union it could be so "prevened" as to lack its own personality. What Ferrariensis says on Contra Gentiles IV, c. 55—that this could be true even without a distinction between nature and person—is unintelligible and clearly falls into the opinion of Durandus refuted above. For if the angelic nature could be forestalled and deprived of its own personality without any distinction, then the human nature, too, could have been forestalled even if it were not distinguished from its personality; therefore the union would not prove a distinction ex natura rei, which is what Durandus contends. But the arguments made against him, which prove the contrary for human nature, do so also for angelic. For how can it be understood that the angelic nature should remain but not the personality, and yet that these two should not be distinct in reality—when this is the chief sign of a distinction ex natura rei, as we also proved above? St. Thomas taught that position more explicitly in Quodlibeta II, a. 4, where, although he also says that in angels there is no individuation that lies outside the essence of the species, nevertheless from the fact that in an angel there are some accidents which are beside the ratio of the species he concludes that there is in it a supposit outside the ratio of the essence and thus really distinct from the nature itself. He indicates the same line of reasoning in III, q. 2, a. 3, where he says: "In all things in which there is found something that does not pertain to the ratio of the species—namely accidents and individuating principles—nature and supposit differ in reality; as this is most apparent (he says) in those things which are composed of matter and form." He therefore takes this to be common to other beings, though it appears especially in composites. Hence a little below he expressly says: "And what has been said of 'supposit' must be understood of 'person' in a rational or intellectual creature." And in q. 17, a. 1, he expressly says that "nature"

is not predicated of "person" except in God, in whom "what is" does not differ from "that by which it is." Thus the followers of St. Thomas commonly defend this part, with Capreolus, In Sent. I, dist. 4, q. 2, a. 1, concl. 4; and Cajetan in the places cited on the Third Part and on De ente et essentia. And it agrees with the ancient Fathers, who hold it proper to God to be His own deity, as we saw above.

10. In my judgment this position cannot be demonstrated by reason absolutely speaking; indeed, I do not think it could have been proved by reason alone of other created substances, unless the mystery of the Incarnation had made this distinction known to us. From that mystery, therefore, the principal a posteriori argument should be taken, as was intimated above. For what God did in the human nature by assuming it He could have done in the angelic; therefore the same distinction holds. The antecedent, although not explicitly revealed, is nevertheless implied by St. Paul, Hebrews 2, when he says, "He nowhere takes hold of angels." Although this is sometimes interpreted, especially by the Greeks, of the care or will to redeem the angels—which God neither undertook nor had—many of the Fathers interpret it of "taking hold" by hypostatic union; nor does one exposition exclude the other, for perfect and fitting redemption includes the will to assume hypostatically a nature of the same order as the redeemed. Paul therefore presupposes that this mode of redemption and assumption was also possible in the angelic nature; yet by God's free will and grace it was done in human nature and not in the angelic. Further, from the mystery accomplished one takes a very probable argument that God could have done the same in a more perfect nature. Why should this be denied to divine power, since no contradiction can be shown? Whoever says that such a mystery would imply a contradiction in angels because in them no distinction is found between supposit and nature must show this assumption by some sufficient reason; this has not been done. Moreover, one can take no slight indication from the separated rational soul; for in it a partial subsistence is distinguished from its partial nature; for this

reason it could be assumed during the three days, as indeed it was in fact. Therefore by the same token we should believe that in higher spirits a complete subsistence is distinguished from the integral and complete nature.

11. Finally an a priori reason seems to be this: the distinction which we perceive in human nature does not arise from some peculiar condition or imperfection of that nature, nor from the composition of matter and form; it therefore arises from the general condition of created substance; hence it is common to angels. The first part of the antecedent is clear, for no specific and peculiar property can be assigned in man from which that distinction comes. The second part is made clear, first, because the composition of nature and supposit is in itself prior to and more abstract than the composition of matter and form. Second, because in matter as such and in some form as such—before a whole is composed from them—one finds that composition, proportionally speaking, that is, the composition of a partial subsistence with a partial nature, as was shown concerning the rational soul; and the same argument can be made concerning matter. This is a sign that the composition of nature and supposit is prior to and independent of the composition of matter and form, and common to simple things, and thus does not follow upon the other composition of matter and form. Third, because there is no reason why that metaphysical composition should depend upon the other physical composition, as we shall more fully explain in answering the difficulties proposed at the beginning.

### *Whether There Can be a Created Supposit Really not Distinct from its Nature*

12. To address the chief difficulty and at the same time to consider more fully the foregoing reasoning, one must consequently admit that it is not possible for there to be created a substance in which the supposit is not distinguished from the nature in reality; for

this, in my judgment, is rightly proved by the final argument made on the opposite side. Nor can it be established by any probable reason that this distinction is affirmed in some angels and denied in others; and if it be admitted in all created beings, by the same reasoning one could not set a reasonable discrimination between those already created and others that could be created. The reason why this distinction is necessary in every created substance is suggested by St. Thomas, especially in the said Quodlibet and in III, q. 2: there is no possible created substance in which there is not something beyond the essence of the species. For although in some substances there are more things beyond the essence than in others, nevertheless in all there are some such things—namely certain accidents and existence itself. Therefore (he says) it is necessary that in them the supposit be distinguished from the nature.

13. It is difficult to understand the force of this inference and to give its rationale. For if St. Thomas understands that such accidents or existence are that by which the supposit is formally distinguished from the nature, whether specific or individuated, the assumption is false—as we have shown a little above about accidents, and as can easily be gathered regarding existence from what we treated above about it and shall say more expressly in the next section. If, however, he means that these are not the very accidents by which the supposit is distinguished from the nature, but that from them one should take an indication that the subsisting reality to which they immediately belong adds something over and above the specific nature, outside whose ratio they are—if this be the meaning, then perhaps that indication is by itself probable; for it seems to be assumed as such by St. Thomas without further proof or explanation. Yet the inference still has difficulty. For wherein lies the repugnance that a substance, although essentially subsisting per se, should nevertheless be capable of accidents? Since subsistence and, for example, the power of understanding, are very different perfections, why, if the power is an accident, must subsistence also lie outside the nature or essence of the

thing? Or why could a thing not arrive at that grade of perfection in which by its essence alone it has the power of subsisting, but the power of operating only through accidents? St. Thomas himself holds that material substantial natures have both individuation and subsistence with existence and accidents through something or things added beyond the specific nature; but he says that immaterial natures have individuation without any addition to the species, while they have the rest through an addition. Therefore by a like imagining one could posit another nobler nature which by its essence itself has subsistence per se, and nevertheless needs accidents for many other things. Therefore the indication or argument taken from accidents is surely very obscure. Much more obscure is the argument taken from existence; for this is not something added beyond the actual essence, as was treated above; consequently one must say that it is something closer to the essence and much less distinct from it than subsistence is.

14. These arguments show that the foregoing discourse is not evident but at most a probable conjecture. I can explain it only in this way: if the essence of a created substance is so imperfect that it always needs an addition of another genus in order to attain its fitting state, by greater reason will it need some addition or complement of its own genus in order to be complete within that genus. Moreover the argument can derive strength from this: if in every substance there is found the lower composition (namely, with accidents), much more will there be found some real composition that is also substantial. So much for the accidents. As for existence, perhaps the argument proceeds according to the view that existence is a reality added to essence. On our opinion, however, it can be converted differently. It is probable that every created substance includes some substantial and real composition in reality itself, since it is infinitely distant from the substantial simplicity of God; but the composition of existence with essence is not real; nor is the composition of genus and difference; and there remains no other composition that could obtain in immaterial things, however perfect. Therefore it is likely that this

composition—of nature and supposit—is common to all. Again we can argue from the property of created existence: although existence is not a reality distinct from essence, nevertheless, simply speaking, it is not of the essence of a creature, because it does not have it from itself but from another, and with an essential dependence upon it. Therefore, if the existence of a created nature is such that it is essentially dependent upon God as efficient cause, it is also probable that it depends upon something as upon that which sustains—namely upon the supposit. Further, from this we can gather that every created substantial nature is such that it is not repugnant to it to be sustained by God as by a supposit; for since it is imperfect, by all the modes that do not imply imperfection in God it can be sustained by Him; for in the essential concept of nature, or of the existence of nature as such, nothing is included that repugns this sustaining—that is, this suppositation. I add this lest anyone apply a similar argument to created subsistence itself, in which the argument does not hold; for from its peculiar intrinsic ratio such suppositation repugns to it, inasmuch as it is the ultimate terminus.

15. Thus at length we arrive at the theological argument taken a posteriori from the mystery of the Incarnation. There is no creatable substantial nature that cannot be united to a divine person into the unity of a supposit; for the arguments made above concerning created angels prove this of all that can be created. Therefore there is no possible created substance that is not separable in reality from its subsistence, and consequently none that is not distinct from it in reality. The a priori reason seems to be this: the essence of a created substance as such does not consist in the actual mode of being per se, but in a potency, that is, in this—that it is such a nature to which such a mode of being is due. Therefore such a mode is always something added and really distinct from the substantial essence. Just as in an accident that has its own distinct accidental entity, because its essence does not consist in actual inherence but in aptitudinal inherence, hence the actual inherence is, ex natura rei, distinct from the essence

of that accident; nor can any such accident be made in which the mode of actually inhering is not something different from its essence. Thus it is to be philosophized about a proper substantial nature in relation to the mode of subsisting. And that the essential ratio of a created substance does not consist in act but in potency with respect to subsistence we gather from all the indications adduced and from the mystery of the Incarnation; for we can investigate the quiddities of things only in this way. Hence it also becomes likely that no created substance can be made that does not have a similar nature; for none can be made that is not univocally "substance" with those that have been made.

### *A Difficult Passage of St. Thomas is Treated*

16. From these points the answer is almost given to the difficulties proposed at the beginning. As to St. Thomas's meaning in that place, I, q. 3, a. 3, it is probable that he was speaking of the distinction of common nature from the individual, and did not raise the particular question of the identity of the singular divine nature with the person—either because that belonged to the treatise on the Trinity, or because he thought it sufficiently established by immediately showing that God is essentially His own act of being and that nothing can happen to Him. But since in that article he draws the conclusion that God is His own deity, it cannot be denied that he also treats there of the identity of the supposit—or subsistent in the deity—with the deity itself. How, however, he infers this identity from the general consideration of immaterial substance alone, and consequently puts on a par all substances not composed of matter and form, is difficult to explain. What Cajetan says there—that he does not put them on a par simply, but in this respect: that in spiritual substances supposit and nature do not differ intrinsically but extrinsically, whereas in material substances they differ in both ways—is not said by St. Thomas but added by Cajetan without foundation.

Next, this would not have sufficed for St. Thomas to conclude absolutely that God is His own deity; for first it should have been proved that there is no difference either intrinsically or extrinsically. Moreover, it is false that in angels supposit and nature do not differ intrinsically; for supposit, as such, includes subsisting—not extrinsically, as Cajetan says, but intrinsically, as the form that constitutes it, as I shall show below. Finally, in this point there can be no difference between created material and immaterial supposits: for if subsisting is intrinsic to a material supposit, it is also intrinsic to an immaterial one; and if to the latter it is extrinsic, then to the former as well. If Cajetan means that the material supposit intrinsically includes principles of individuation, and in this differs from the immaterial—as he explains more fully on De ente et essentia, c. 5, and Ferrariensis on Contra Gentiles I, c. 21—this difference too is false. For even in angels the supposit includes the individual nature and the proper principles that individuate it, about which we have spoken above. Lastly, Cajetan himself, on III, q. 4, a. 2, says that even in angels the supposit is intrinsically distinguished from the nature, and to the place in St. Thomas he gives no reply except that St. Thomas had not yet treated the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, and therefore did not fully treat the distinction of the supposit from the individual nature in material things.

17. It therefore seems to me that St. Thomas left the discourse begun in that place unfinished, which he completed in the Third Part and explained more clearly in that Quodlibet. He presupposes that the distinction of supposit from nature must be gathered by us from this: that a singular substance adds something beyond the specific nature, something extrinsic to it—whether this be an individuating principle or some accident. He then excludes from God any principles of individuation that would lie outside God's essence; to this extent he seems to put on a par all immaterial substances, and likewise, to that extent—that is, from this consideration—he denies a distinction of nature and person in angels. But since it is manifest, and ought also

immediately to have been proved by him, that there are no accidents in God, he therefore concludes at once that God is His own deity—which he does not say there of the other immaterial substances. In other places, however, he adds that since in angels there are at least accidents beyond the specific nature, therefore in them the supposit is distinguished from the nature. And this is surely his mind, in which only this is difficult, namely, what he says about the individuation of immaterial created substances. But on what seems truer on that point, we said in Disputation V.

### *The Passage of Aristotle in Metaphysics VII is Explained*

18. As for Aristotle, he never treated the question we are now disputing. If anywhere, it would be in the place cited, Metaphysics VII, c. 6 or 11; yet there he does not treat this question, as I shall explain at once. Nor, I think, did Aristotle have any principle for distinguishing the supposit from the singular nature; nor would we have had it, had we not, taught by the mysteries of faith, had occasion to investigate it. Therefore Aristotle everywhere speaks in the same way about the individual substance, the quiddity and nature, and the supposit. Those things that are usually cited from him—that actions belong to supposits and not to natures, and that "humanity" neither weaves nor walks, but "the man"—or that "substance" sometimes signifies "quiddity," sometimes the hypostasis—these statements in just this form are not found in Aristotle. In Metaphysics I, c. 1, he said that actions are concerned with singulars, which he explains: the physician does not heal "man" except per accidens, but per se he heals Callias or Socrates. And in De Anima I, text 64, he says not of humanity but of the soul that it neither weaves nor walks. Finally, in Metaphysics V, c. 8, he divides "substance" insofar as it signifies quiddity—whose ratio is the definition—and insofar as it signifies substantial supposits or individuals. But between the signification of the individual nature and of the supposit he never distinguished. Whatever he himself thought

here does not matter, because he was ignorant of the mysteries of faith, on which this discussion chiefly depends. This is to be understood with even greater reason of Avicenna and any other natural philosopher.

19. In Metaphysics VII, c. 6, Aristotle treats the question whether "what a thing is" (the "what-it-is," to ti ēn einai) is the same as that of which it is. By "what a thing is," however, he intends the definition of the thing, as is evident from c. 5 and from c. 10–12, where he at length discusses the definition and its parts, and he prefaces that he wants to treat of the "what-it-is" in a logical way, because the definition belongs to the logician in its own way. He therefore compares in that c. 6 the definition with the definiendum—that is, with the thing of which the definition is given. And in this sense he answers the question: in those things which are said per se, the "what-it-is" is the same as that of which it is; but with respect to that to which a predicate belongs per accidens, it is not the same. He said this latter on account of concrete names of accidents, which are wont materially to stand for the subjects or supposits themselves; with respect to these the "what-it-is" of the accident is not the same as that of which it is—for "white" is taken, for example, for "a white man," and the "what-it-is" of "white" is said of that, and yet the "what-it-is" of white is not the same as "man." Or conversely, the "what-it-is" of "a white man" is simply the "what-it-is" of "man," and yet it is not altogether the same as "a white man"; for "white man" includes something more. This indeed is per se manifest, although strictly speaking the "what-it-is" of "white" cannot be said to be the "what-it-is" of "man," although it is denominatively said of it. Nor does the "white man," insofar as he is an ens per accidens, properly have a "what-it-is," except also per accidens; for the quiddity of man is very per accidens in relation to "white man" as such. Hence, comparing properly and per se the "what-it-is" with that of which it is, universally it is true that they are the same—whether the definiendum be a substance or an accident—as the Philosopher there develops at

length; and this is sufficiently self-evident. Because the definition is given of the species and not of individuals, Aristotle therefore added that the "what-it-is" is not only the same as that of which it is but also is not separate from singular things, of whose essence it is; this he develops at length against Plato in the following chapters.

20. At the end of c. 11 he again touches on and sums up this comparison of the "what-it-is" with that of which it is; hence there is no doubt that he speaks of the "what-it-is" in the same sense. He adds there one point he had omitted earlier: in "first substances" the "what-it-is" is the same as that of which it is, whereas in those which have matter it is not the same. By "first substances" St. Thomas takes him there to mean spiritual substances. This interpretation is favored by the fact that he seems to distinguish them from substances that consist of matter. On this interpretation Aristotle does not restrict his earlier doctrine but amplifies it: he had said that the "what-it-is" is so the same as that of which it is that it is not separate from singular things, in whose very essence it is; now he adds that it is otherwise in immaterial beings and otherwise in those that have matter. In the former it is so "in" them that it is altogether the same as the individuals themselves, so that the individuals add nothing over and above the "what-it-is." In material individuals, however, it is so "in" them that nevertheless the individuals add something—namely, designated matter. From this interpretation it does not follow that Aristotle did anything about the distinction of nature and supposit in our sense, but at most about the distinction of specific and individual nature.

21. But in accordance with the doctrine set forth above, Disputation V, section 2, nn. 21 and 36, there is no such difference between material and immaterial things regarding the distinction of the individual. Nor is this interpretation of Aristotle necessary; for by "first substances" he does not mean immaterial substances, but the Platonic "ideas" or the bare essences of things as conceived specifically. And Aristotle himself explained this when he said: "By 'first' I mean that which is not said to be 'in' another, as in a subject or

in matter," that is, which is not said to be such because the common nature is in it as in a subject or in an individual, as Peter is said to be a man, but "by itself and precisely," as "man is man." With respect therefore to this first substance—or first definiendum—the "what-it-is" is altogether the same as that of which it is, so that it adds nothing even according to reason. But if the "what-it-is" be compared with that of which it is, insofar as this is in designated and particular matter (for in that chapter he very often uses the name "matter" in this sense, as St. Thomas explains), then, although the "what-it-is" is not separate from that of which it is, as he had said above, nevertheless it is not so the same that the individual adds nothing beyond the species. He speaks especially of material things, because only of these does he treat throughout that book—unless we choose to take "matter" to mean any individual entity that does not belong to the formal concept of the species and is compared, as it were "materially," to it, as Alexander, Alexander of Hales, and Scotus explained.

22. The other testimony of Aristotle, from De Anima III, was treated above; for there too Aristotle is not dealing with "nature" and "supposit" in our sense, but with quiddity in general, as it abstracts from individuals, and with the individuals themselves. All the other points adduced under the second head have been sufficiently dealt with.

## SECTION IV
## WHAT CREATED SUBSISTENCE IS, AND HOW IT IS RELATED TO THE NATURE AND THE SUPPOSIT

1. Thus far we have said only that the subsistence which a created supposit adds to the nature is something positive, distinct in reality from the nature. It remains to declare more precisely what that

is, how great the distinction is, and how it is related to the nature and to the supposit.

### *The Opinion is Treated Which says that Subsistence is Existence Itself*

2. First there comes for treatment the fourth opinion, well known in this matter, which said that subsistence is nothing other than the substantial existence of a created and complete nature. The foundation of this opinion in general is that substantial existence is essentially subsistence; therefore this alone can be what the supposit adds to the nature. The antecedent is proved: substantial existence is essentially existence per se; but the whole ratio of subsistence consists in this alone, as is clear from its common definition and conception; therefore so it is. The major is plain both from the common ratio of substance—for as substance is essentially a being per se, so substantial existence is essentially an existence per se—and also because in this alone does substantial existence essentially differ from accidental existence; and finally because such existence suffices to constitute a complete substance existing outside its causes and independent of any subject or sustainer. Therefore it also suffices to constitute a supposit, and it is superfluous to multiply other entities.

### *This Opinion is Subdivided in Two Ways*

3. There are two ways of holding this opinion. Some say that the supposit indeed adds only existence over and above the nature, yet does not include it intrinsically but only extrinsically, that is, as a relation to it. Thus Capreolus holds, In Sent. III, dist. 6, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1, against the second conclusion, where he does not say clearly enough that this which the supposit adds to the nature is not intrinsic to the supposit as supposit, but that it is not intrinsic to the nature; nor is it a part of the supposit, nor does it enter its essence. These points,

however, are very different. For even if subsistence be the intrinsic form, or quasi-form, constituting the supposit, it is not intrinsic to the nature, as is evident; and it can be said in a true sense that it is not a "part" of the supposit, nor of its essence absolutely, or inasmuch as it is an individual of a substance, as will be explained below. Nonetheless, Cajetan and other Thomists commonly ascribe to Capreolus this opinion in the sense stated, namely, that existence does not constitute the supposit intrinsically but extrinsically, in the way an object constitutes a power as the terminus of the power's relation to it. Capreolus indicates this meaning in the following words, when he says: "Existence stands to the supposit by way of what is connoted and implied," as if "supposit" were the same as "an individual of a substance having being per se"; and in this way Javellus follows that opinion, Metaphysics VII, q. 17. The foundation, as far as this part goes, can be: as existence lies outside the ratio of the substance or nature, so also outside the ratio of the supposit; for as the nature, so too the supposit is indifferent to existing and not existing.

### *The Opinion of Capreolus & Hervaeus about the Constitution of The Supposit by Something Extrinsic is Rejected*

4. With good reason Cajetan, Ferrariensis, and other Thomists reject this opinion, at least in this part. For it is a plain contradiction to say that supposit and nature are distinguished a parte rei, and yet that the supposit adds nothing to the nature which is intrinsic to the supposit itself, but only something extrinsically connoted. For if in the intrinsic constitution or composition of the supposit the being of existence is not included (for of this we are now speaking), I ask whether, in those things that the supposit intrinsically includes, or from which it is intrinsically constituted, there is included anything that does not enter into the intrinsic constitution of the nature. If this be affirmed, it is precisely this that we seek—what that thing is. For this is that by which the supposit is intrinsically and

formally distinguished from the nature; and it is not the being of existence, which on this opinion is extrinsic to each and can be considered, with respect to each, as the terminus of a relation, as I shall presently say. If, however, it be denied that the supposit intrinsically includes anything that is not included intrinsically in the nature, or vice versa, it follows plainly that the two are not distinguished in reality. For if they are distinguished, especially as containing and contained, yet the one includes nothing more than the other; therefore they are not distinguished in that way. You will say that this discourse proves rightly that nature and supposit are not intrinsically distinct, yet nevertheless they are distinguished extrinsically. But how can a distinction be understood to lie in an extrinsic thing alone, unless on account of that very thing there be also a distinction in something intrinsic? For a distinction consists immediately in this, that the one is not the other; and therefore it necessarily requires that the real extremes which are distinguished in reality be so disposed that each has intrinsically in itself something that the other does not have. Hence a distinction "through extrinsic things" is always immediately "through something intrinsic." Thus, for example, if sight and hearing are distinguished "by color and sound" extrinsically, it is necessary that they be distinguished intrinsically in the realities that are referred to colors and sounds.

5. You will say that so it is here: the supposit is distinguished from the nature by a relation to substantial existence; for "supposit" is that to which esse is due, whereas "nature" is not so. But either this is only a distinction of reason, or the same argument returns. And in the first place, what is said about the relation to being—that it belongs to the supposit and not to the nature—is not absolutely true, or it must be limited and explained. For as I showed above, every real essence has that by which it is of this sort "through existence," either in act or in aptitude, according to the state in which it is found—namely, in act or in potency. Therefore a real nature or essence also has a relation to real being. The supposit and the nature, then, differ only in this respect:

that the nature is, as it were, the "by which" (ut quo) of the existence, whereas the supposit is that which (ut quod) properly exists. Concerning this difference it remains to be inquired whether, besides existence, the supposit includes something really distinct from the nature, by reason of which it is said to be properly capable of existence as a what, while the nature is only the by which; or whether it includes nothing of the sort. For if the first be said, it remains to be stated what this is that the supposit adds; for this is prior to existence itself and is the proper and intrinsic constitutive of the supposit, distinguishing it from the nature. If the second be said, it plainly follows that nature and supposit are distinguished only by a mode of signifying and conceiving, as by which and that which in the order to being; for neither includes in reality anything more than the other such that they should be conceived or named in this way. Therefore that distinction is not in reality, but is fashioned by reason. In like manner, God and deity are conceived and signified as that which is and that by which it is, and yet they are distinguished only by reason; for in reality there is nothing of the ratio or concept of God that is not formally included in deity itself.

6. And the matter is finally clarified by the mystery of the Incarnation. According to faith, in Christ's humanity there is not a created supposit; and on the opinion of Capreolus, which we are treating, this is because it does not have created existence. I therefore ask whether besides existence there is lacking to the humanity some other entity or real mode by which it would be immediately capable of created existence, although now it is not. For if besides existence this other entity is lacking, it is that which intrinsically constitutes the supposit and distinguishes it from the nature. But if nothing is lacking besides existence, and by virtue precisely of the lack of existence the humanity ceases to be a created supposit, it follows plainly that existence is what formally constitutes the created supposit, and consequently that it does so intrinsically and not only extrinsically, and that it is this which distinguishes it from the nature. For if

existence constituted it only extrinsically, as the terminus of some relation, once existence were removed, the whole of that relation would remain in the humanity; and consequently the ratio of supposit —constituted through that relation intrinsically—would remain. It will perhaps be said that "supposit" does not signify a merely potential relation (so to speak) but an actual relation to being; it signifies a nature connoting that it actually stands under its being. But on the contrary: this very "standing under its being" adds nothing to the nature beyond being itself; nor is that order or actual relation that is imagined in the nature to its being, "under which" it is said to be, anything real in the nature besides being itself, which terminates or actuates it (omitting categorial relations, which are irrelevant to the present issue). Therefore existence, on this opinion, cannot be said to be extrinsic to the supposit, but intrinsically constitutes it. Thus, for example, "white" also signifies on the part of the body that it is actually "under" whiteness; and nonetheless, because the body does not have this relation except insofar as it is informed by whiteness, therefore "white, as white," is intrinsically constituted by whiteness. Similarly, a terminated line signifies the actual conjunction of the line with the terminating point; but because this adds nothing to the line besides the actually connected point, therefore although the terminating point is not absolutely of the essence of "line," it is nevertheless intrinsic to the "terminated line as such." Therefore, if "supposit" signifies a nature as actually terminated through existence, then although existence is not intrinsic to the nature, it will be intrinsic to the supposit as supposit.

7. This discourse concludes, in general, against all who think that the supposit adds something extrinsic to the supposit itself—whether this be being itself, or some accident, as Hervaeus opines, Quodlibeta III, q. 6, where he says that the supposit in reality says nothing beyond the nature, but connotes that it has all the things necessary to be "in the realm of things," whether this be existence or accidents. The reasons adduced prove in general that what constitutes

the supposit as supposit is intrinsic to it; for it formally, or quasi-formally, constitutes it. Hence if the supposit adds over and above the nature "that it have all things necessary for existing," this very "having," whatever it is, is the formal constitutive of the supposit and is intrinsic to it; but to "have being" is nothing other than to be actuated by it; and to "have accidents" is nothing other than to be affected or informed by them—in which formal effects the forms themselves are intrinsically included. Therefore this opinion, and all similar ones, are refuted by the same reasons; and, moreover, it is improbably added that "having accidents" pertains to the constitution of the complete substance, for these are altogether outside the ratio of substance; indeed, not even the relation to them, nor the denomination arising from them, can of itself pertain to the constitution of the complete substance—which is what "supposit" is. Hence if we imagine—whether that be possible or impossible—that God conserves a complete substance with its substantial existence and with any other substantial mode (if perhaps some is necessary to the complement of first substance), that would be a supposit even if it lacked the accidents naturally necessary to it for existing. Conversely, Christ's humanity has all the accidents necessary for existing and yet is not a person, for the sole reason that something else, substantial, is lacking. Therefore to "have accidents" in no way pertains to the notion of supposit, but at most is a natural consequent. But if to "have existence" is that which precisely completes the notion of supposit, and which alone the supposit adds over and above the nature, then existence itself, too, will be included intrinsically in the ratio and constitution of the supposit.

### *Another Opinion is Treated which Posits that the Supposit is Constituted Intrinsically by Existence*

8. There is, therefore, another way of speaking, and it can be a fifth principal opinion in this matter: that substantial existence

intrinsically and formally constitutes the supposit, and consequently that the supposit adds nothing else over and above the nature besides this kind of existence. This opinion is now frequent among modern theologians; and indeed, if the premise laid down earlier be granted, it speaks consistently. For if existence alone is what the supposit adds over and above the nature, it can only constitute it intrinsically. Likewise, because on this opinion existence is subsistence itself; but created subsistence intrinsically constitutes the created supposit, because the supposit is nothing other than an incommunicable subsistent, and through created subsistence that which is incommunicably subsistent is intrinsically constituted. Therefore so it is. Hence once this subsistence is posited in the nature, it is impossible that the supposit not be posited; and if it be removed, and everything else remain in the nature, it is impossible for the supposit[11] to remain. Therefore this is the intrinsic constitutive of the supposit. In this the opinion speaks excellently.

9. Yet in what it presupposes and in which it agrees with the preceding opinion—namely, that substantial existence is intrinsically, formally, and essentially subsistence itself—this opinion is impugned by Cajetan, III, q. 4, a. 2, and others who follow him; we shall presently see his reasons more at length when we treat his view. The sum of all is this: on the aforesaid opinion the nature is thought of as the immediate subject receptive of existence, and existence is posited as the immediate act of the nature, while the supposit is posited as something that immediately results from being and substantial essence. Likewise, on that opinion the composition of nature and supposit in complete substances is confused with the composition of being and essence. But these seem false. For the nature is not the proximate subject receptive of existence, but the supposit is, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, III, q. 17, a. 2, in the body and ad 1. Therefore (according to his doctrine) only the supposit is the principle of operation, the terminus of generation or birth, the subject of

[11] manere, 1960; alt. poni. "In some editions poni."

filiation, and the like. Therefore existence is not the immediate act of the nature, nor is the nature the proximate subject receptive of existence; but subsistence mediates between them and together with the nature constitutes the proximate subject receptive of existence.

10. Nevertheless, if the opinion were true in which all these authors agree—that existence is really distinct from essence—this fifth opinion would be altogether preferable to the opinion of Cajetan and others, who multiply entities without cause, distinguishing personality or subsistence from essence and from existence, and again existence from essence. No sufficient reason can be given for, nor any necessity of, so many entities. For what is touched on in the foregoing argument, namely, the "proximate subject receptive of existence," is of little moment; for even if the distinction be admitted, the essence in itself is capable of existence, as is sufficiently clear from the things treated above concerning essence and existence. Hence in common speech it is said that the created thing is composed of being and essence proximately and immediately—either according to reality or according to reason, according to different opinions; nor is there any reason why, if the created essence is not the same as its existence, it should not at least be capable of existence by itself. The way of speaking, moreover, that "the nature is not that which is, but the supposit is," does not militate against the aforesaid opinion; for the nature, signified in the abstract, prescinds from existence, from which it is really distinct, and therefore it is not signified as "having being," but as the principle and root of that being. But the supposit, according to this opinion, signifies the whole composite of being and essence; and therefore to it is properly ascribed "to have being and nature," as to the composite it is ascribed "to have parts or components."

11. In this one must consider again that existence is not an accidental act but a substantial one; therefore, if it be perfect and of such a kind as to need no sustainer, it itself constitutes the whole that exists per se. And because this is what is signified by the name "supposit," therefore "to exist as a what" is properly ascribed to this

composite of such being and essence. It is not properly ascribed to the nature, although in reality it is immediately actuated by being; for being is not an accidental form denominating the subject it proximately actuates—except improperly and, as it were, concomitantly—but it is a substantial act constituting the thing that stands per se, which, as so constituted, is denominated per se primo the supposit subsisting or existing as a what. Therefore, if substantial existence is really distinct from substantial nature, it seems far more probable that it is subsistence itself or the proximate ratio intrinsically constituting the supposit or person.

12. Nor does it stand against this that existence, according to this opinion, is not intrinsic to nature, or that it is not of the essence of the substantial individual, because, as I was saying, it is one thing to speak formally of the supposit insofar as it is a supposit, and another to speak of the nature itself, or of the supposit insofar as it is such a substantial individual constituted under such a species of substance. In the former way we say, according to this view, that substantial existence is intrinsic to the supposit and its formal constitutive principle, yet it is not intrinsic to nature because it is distinguished from it as its act. Similarly, it is not intrinsic or formally constitutive of the supposit in its character as a substantial individual, or contracting or determining the species to this individual, but this is the proper function of the individuating principles and singular nature, from which the supposit has that it is an individual of such an essence or species, and not from personality. Hence the three divine persons are one God, and this God, on account of the same singular nature of the divinity. And Christ the Lord, although he is this supposit as constituted by divine filiation, is nevertheless this man as constituted by this humanity. And if the Father or the Holy Spirit were to assume that humanity, it would always be the same man, although it would not be the same person. And for this reason Christ is univocally man with us, although he is not univocally person with us; for, since he is an uncreated person, and composed in a wonderful way from a twofold

nature, he cannot have univocal agreement with us in the character of person, whatever others may have said[12]; nevertheless, because personality does not pertain to the formal and intrinsic constitution of man as man or as this man, therefore with that diversity in the character of person there stands univocation in the character of man. Finally, for this reason St. Thomas rightly said, Quodl. II, a. 4, ad 1 et 2, that subsistence is not determinative of essence to the character of individual, nor is it placed in the definition or character of this man, even if he were to be defined as such. This does not prevent that, speaking formally of the supposit as supposit, subsistence should be said to be of its intrinsic character as the form constituting it; just as divine relation constitutes the divine person, although there without composition, [but in creatures with composition][13] such constitution takes place. All of which things are true not only in this opinion, but in any true one, speaking formally of personality, whatever it may be.

13. But what seems especially to stand against this view is what was touched upon above, because the supposit abstracts from actual existence no less than nature; therefore it cannot be constituted by existence any more than nature can. For either we are speaking of a supposit that is being in act, or one that is being in potency. In the former way it is true that it is constituted by actual existence proportioned to such a thing; but this very thing is true of nature as it is in act. But in the latter way the supposit is not constituted by actual or exercised existence, as is evident; for it is contradictory to have actual existence and to be only being in potency. Hence Antichrist is now a certain supposit in possible being without actual existence; it is therefore necessary that he be understood to be constituted by an order to that existence or by possible existence; but the same is true of nature considered under possible being, as was seen above. Nor can it be responded that, just as the existing insofar as actually existing with

[12] Zumel, 1 p., q. 3, a.3, concl. 3.

[13] [in creaturis autem cum compositione]. "Words omitted in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 367.

this reduplication cannot be conceived only under possible being, because this very possible being excludes the actual exercise of existence, which is involved in that reduplication of the existing as existing, so neither can the supposit be apprehended only under possible being, because the supposit includes that actuality of existence; this (I say) cannot be responded, because it is against the common sense and conception of men; for who would say that Antichrist is not a certain future person and not yet existing?, or that supposits, which are now created, were not possible before they came to be, and many others are possible which will not come to be? There is therefore no doubt that the supposit abstracts from the possible and the existing.

14. But it can be responded more plausibly that existence itself can be conceived as actual and as possible, and according to each state it can also be the principle of constituting the supposit, either as actually existing or as possible. But truly, according to this response, it cannot be said that the supposit adds, above actual nature, this existence, because actual nature, that is, which is already actual entity outside its causes, includes existence; but here we are not inquiring what the actually existing supposit adds above possible nature, but above actual nature and outside causes. But if they say that the actual supposit is constituted by actual existence, but actual nature also not except by essence, this is simply false; for above we showed that actual essence intrinsically imbibes the being of existence. And then it is not said consequently, since in both supposit and nature the possible and actual states are distinguished by us. Wherefore, although with that principle supposed about the distinction of existence from essence this view rightly does not multiply other entities, nevertheless, both that principle is simply false, and with it posited no reason can be given why a similar distinction does not intervene between existence and supposit.

15. We therefore conclude absolutely against that view thus. Existence is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from actual

essence; but subsistence is distinguished by the nature of the thing from actual essence; therefore it cannot be entirely the same as existence. Or conversely, actual essence and its existence are not distinguished in reality; therefore, as much as subsistence is distinguished from actual essence, so much it is necessary that it be distinguished from its existence; for, just as things that are the same to a third are the same among themselves in finite things, so things that are the same among themselves are equally distinguished from any third. Moreover, the existence of nature is not separable from nature, with that remaining in the nature of things or in the character of actual entity, as was demonstrated in what preceded; but subsistence is separable from nature remaining in its actual entity, as was done in Christ's humanity; therefore. Finally, from the proper principles of existence and subsistence it can be shown that they are not the same, nor have the same quasi-formal effect; for the principle of existence is to constitute that whose existence it is in the character of being in act; but subsistence has the function of constituting being per se independent from every sustainer; and therefore existence expresses a mode distinguished only by reason from actual entity, and cannot make real composition with it, because it would be necessary to suppose actual entity in the other extreme, which is contradictory to existence; but subsistence supposes the actual entity of the nature which it modifies, and thus can very well be distinguished from it by the nature of the thing and make composition with it; therefore the principle of subsistence is by the nature of the thing distinct from the principle of existence.

16. But I speak of the existence of nature; for in subsistence itself proper existence can be considered, just as proper entity or real mode, which is not distinguished in reality from subsistence itself. And concerning this existence it will be true that the supposit adds above nature some existence, not however that by which the nature itself exists, but by which the supposit exists as supposit, or rather by which the integral existence of the whole supposit is completed; in the

way that every form or real mode adds some existence of the thing whose form or mode it is. And from this another argument can be constructed; for the principle of existence taken generally extends very widely, and is common to both nature and person, and to personality itself; therefore the supposit cannot be distinguished from nature by existence taken absolutely and simply, since both nature and supposit include existence proportioned to itself, either in act or in potency; for in each state both nature and supposit can be considered; therefore, beyond the existence of nature, it is necessary that the supposit add some other thing or mode.

### *Cajetan's Opinion Distinguishing Really Essence, Existence and Subsistence*

17. Having therefore refuted the said opinions, Cajetan, in the said place III, devises another way of speaking, which also pleased Ferrariensis, IV cont. Gent., c. 43, and can be a sixth principal opinion in this matter, which consists in these points. First, that created subsistence is a certain entity entirely really distinct from the essence and from the existence of substantial nature. This is scarcely proved by the said authors by any argument that specially urges concerning real distinction most properly taken, but only broadly concerning distinction by the nature of the thing. Nor does the argument taken from the Incarnation prove more; for, that Christ's humanity may lack proper subsistence, it is sufficient that they are distinguished in reality by modal distinction, even if it is not real; for a thing can very well be conserved without its mode, especially by absolute power. But if you press because in Christ the Lord the subsistence by which humanity is in fact terminated is naturally distinguished from humanity, it is responded that from that wonderful composition an efficacious argument cannot be taken for declaring the natural composition or distinction of a created supposit; for that subsistence of Christ's humanity is supernatural and uncreated, indeed it is a perfect supposit,

to which humanity comes as if extrinsically, although it is united to it in an intimate and substantial way, and therefore it is necessary that that subsistence be distinguished in reality from that humanity. But truly proper subsistence is of the same order as nature, and only a certain mode of it; and therefore it is not necessary that it be distinguished from nature as much as that uncreated subsistence from assumed nature. But how, this notwithstanding, proper subsistence could be supplied by the subsistence of the Word, we said in tome I of part III, disp. VIII, sect. 3, final doubt.

18. Second, this view says that the proper function and quasi-formal effect of subsistence is to constitute the proper subject of substantial existence and other personal properties, such as filiation, operation and the like. Cajetan proves this only by certain testimonies of St. Thomas, and because by the common consensus of all it is not nature that properly is or operates, but the supposit. From which is added third, according to this view, that personality is something prior in the order of nature than existence is, and, a fortiori, than the other acts which flow from the supposit or are received in it. And finally (which is wonderful), Cajetan adds that this entity does not make composition with nature, because it is neither its form nor accident, but a pure terminus, and Fonseca also approves this last point, lib. V, c. 8, q. 6, sect. ult., ad ultimum, and considers it necessary that the created supposit be one being per se.

19. All these things, however, can easily be proved false from what was said. And first, to begin from this last point, there is manifest contradiction that this entity is a thing distinct from nature, and that from it and nature the supposit arises, which is a being per se one, and that it is not by true and proper composition. Because it is necessary that real union intervene between them, otherwise one per se would not arise from them; for in what way will there be one from many without their union? Therefore in the same way it is necessary that composition intervene, because composition is nothing other than the real union of distinct things. Second, the created supposit is not a

simple being by virtue of its constitution; for in this according to all it is distinguished from the uncreated supposit; it is therefore a composite being, because there is no middle between these; therefore it is composite by reason of the composition which is made from nature and suppositality. Third, existence, if it is a distinct thing (as they themselves want), is not properly form nor accident, but the terminus of essence or supposit, and nonetheless it makes true composition with essence or supposit, speaking consequently in the same doctrine. Indeed, they therefore posit such distinction, that they posit every creature to be truly and really composed of being and essence, as is evident from the same Cajetan, de Ente et essentia, q. 11, although there, in c. 5, he calls that composition with these, not truly from these, which we already rejected above, disp. XXXI, sect. 13; therefore, although personality is neither form nor accident, nor part properly taken, real composition can be made from it. This can be confirmed fourth from the mystery of the Incarnation, for from the Word and humanity proper, though ineffable, composition is made, as will be proved extensively in tome I of part III, disp. VI, sect. 4; and yet the Word is neither form nor accident, but the terminus of the assumed nature. The principle therefore of composition or composing extreme extends more widely than all these things, because the principle of real union, which immediately intervenes between diverse things, is also more common; and this alone is required for real composition. Hence, even in a line true composition is made from points and parts of the line, which Cajetan does not seem to have sufficiently attended to; for, although a line is not composed of points alone, namely, or immediately united among themselves (for thus that principle must be understood), it is nevertheless composed of parts and points, for parts through points, but parts and points are immediately united among themselves, and thus compose the line. Therefore, the distinction being supposed, whether real or by the nature of the thing, between personality and nature, it must necessarily be admitted that composition is made from them, as from

terminus and terminable, for these two are compared in some way as act and potency; if therefore they are distinguished and united, there is nothing that composition would lack; and thus there is also nothing more frequent in authors than that, in created substances, among other compositions this one which is from nature and supposit is found.

20. Substance is not supposed in nature before existence. From this principle, however, I gather that the third saying of this view is false, namely, that personality is compared to nature as something prior to the proper existence of nature itself. This is proved because, if it were so, it could not make real composition with it. For by this argument we proved above that existence cannot make real composition with essence, because before existence, neither by order of nature, nor even according to the mode of conceiving, can sufficient entity for composition be understood in essence itself. Because composition which is made in reality requires in the composing extremes actual entity which one does not have from the other formally; but before existence no such entity can be conceived; therefore much less can real composition be understood from nature and personality which would precede all existence of the thing even by order of nature. It is added that, if we were to admit true real composition from nature however preconceived in essential being, and from existence, then this other composition from nature in essential being, and from personality, which is by order of nature prior to composition with existence, would already be superfluous, because nature through itself or through intrinsic principles has the actuality of essence; and again personality is added which terminates it, so that it does not depend on another, but is through itself; what therefore is it necessary that another entity be again added, since the thing is already understood outside causes, and terminated per se and intrinsically?

21. Cajetan's opinion is rejected regarding the functions which he attributes to subsistence. And hence the second saying of this opinion is easily disproved. For it does not correctly declare the

function of suppositality or its quasi-formal effect, namely, to consist in this that it constitutes the proximate subject of existence. For first there is properly no respective or susceptive potency with respect to proper existence, but only objective; therefore such entity which would constitute the proximate subject of existence is fictitious. Then because, in that mode by which a thing can be said capable of existence, each created or creatable essence is through itself capable of proper and proportioned existence. Finally, that argument taken from that locution, that the supposit is that which is, is of no moment, as I said above, because it need not be understood to be that which is as the subject of existence, but as constituted by complete and everywhere terminated existence, or as having existence terminated by subsistence. But what pertains to other accidental personal properties, it can truly be said that personality constitutes the proximate subject or principle of them, although it does not constitute the subject of existence, as will be evident from what is to be said.

22. Finally, against this whole view various arguments can be drawn from the mystery of the Incarnation. From it follows first that two entities are lacking to Christ's humanity, from those which are wont to be in other human persons, namely, personality and existence, which Cajetan and those who follow him will readily concede. From which further follows that on the part of human nature a double union was made to God, one for constituting the person, another for existing. Third follows that the first of these unions was made to the personal property of the Word, but the second was made to the essential property, which is to exist; for, according to this opinion, to exist is said of God only essentially. Whence fourth it happens that, although the prior union is proper to the Word alone, the posterior is common, because it is made in the thing common to the whole Trinity, which they rightly teach to be entirely false against Durandus, who similarly posited two unions on the part of human nature, but in reverse order; for he said that humanity is first united to existence, or essential subsistence, then truly to the property of the Word; but

according to Cajetan's opinion on the contrary it follows that humanity is first united to the personality of the Word, so that in it and through it it becomes capable of existence, then truly it is united to existence, by which the divine essence and all relations exist. Finally, it can probably be inferred that one of these unions can be separated from the other by absolute power, and thus humanity personated by proper personality can be united to divine existence so that it exists through it, even if it is not united to the divine person so that it is supposited. All of which things are partly false, partly also novel, and superfluous, and asserted without foundation or necessity, which I do not pursue more broadly in this place, because the same things are touched upon above in the disputation on existence.

### *True View and Resolution of the Question*

23. Having rejected the opinions of others, it remains that we open our view; and, since personality is conceived by us by way of act and form, from its function and office it is very well understood what it is and how it is compared to nature. I say therefore, first, that personality is given to nature for this purpose that it give the ultimate complement in the character of existing, or (as I may say) that it complete its existence in the character of subsistence, so that personality is not properly the terminus or mode of nature according to essential being, but according to the existential being[14] of nature itself. This assertion is almost proved from what was said against Cajetan and others. Hence it only needs declaration, which can first be taken from the very terms of existing and subsisting; for to exist of itself only says to have entity outside causes or in the nature of things; hence of itself it is indifferent to the mode of existing by depending on

[14] secundum esse essentiae, sed secundum esse existentiae, 1960; secundum esse existentiae, et non secundum esse essentiae. "Alteration that does not modify the position of the Most Eminent in this point." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 375.

another as sustainer, and to the mode of existing per se without dependence on any sustainer; but truly to subsist says a determinate mode of existing per se and without dependence on a sustainer; hence to it is opposed to inexist or to inhere, and it says a determinate mode of existing in another. Therefore, as long as existence is not terminated by the mode of existing in itself and per se, it is still incomplete and in a quasi-potential state, and therefore as such it cannot have the character of subsistence. Again, if it is affected by the mode of existing in something by which it is sustained and depends, it also has an incomplete state, because it is in another on which it depends, and is ordered to the composition of some complete being. Then therefore the existence of substantial nature will be completely terminated, when it has been affected by the mode of existing per se; this mode therefore completes the character of created substance; that therefore has the proper character of personality or suppositality. And therefore it is rightly said to be the terminus or mode of nature according to existential being, because according to essential being nature is already entirely complete and needs no other determination, especially since it is already supposed to be contracted down to individuation and singularity; thus therefore conceived according to essential being it proximately and immediately needs (to speak in our mode of conceiving) existence, by which it becomes being in act; but after it is essence in act, it only needs the mode of existing in itself and per se; this therefore ultimate is the terminus of nature according to its existence, and this is the proper function of suppositality.

24. Second, it is declared from the opposite mode, which is to be in another. For, in accidental form, to actually inhere in another is as it were the ultimate terminus or mode of such form according to its existence. For an accident, although by virtue of its existence it is apt and inclined to inhering, is nevertheless not actually inhering by virtue of existence alone, but needs a special mode of inhering, which is as it were the ultimate terminus of its very existence. Therefore in an opposite way indeed, but proportionally, it must be understood in

substantial nature that, although it is actual entity through its existence, by virtue of such existence precisely taken it is not subsisting, but needs the mode of existing per se, by which the existence of nature is ultimately terminated, so that it is in itself without dependence on any sustainer; that mode therefore completes the supposit and has the character of suppositality.

25. Third, it is declared from the mystery of the Incarnation; for we understand nothing else to be lacking to Christ's humanity, so that it does not subsist by proper subsistence, except such a mode of existing by which it would be per se, not in another. For in it is the integral whole actual and created essence, and consequently there is also the substantial existence of human nature; nevertheless, because that existence is so affected that it depends on the Word, by which it is sustained and depends, therefore that humanity lacks the mode of existing per se; therefore only from the defect of this sort it is not subsisting, nor a created person; therefore such a mode is what has the character of created personality.

### *Satisfaction to an Objection Against The Proposed Assertion*

26. The principal arguments which can be made against this assertion are two, which in what preceded are almost touched upon and solved. One is, because this mode of existing per se does not seem to be such that in reality itself it is added to substantial existence, but only that according to reason it contracts existence in common to the character of substantial existence. Hence, although existence as such is indifferent to the mode per se or in another, nevertheless that indifference is not by way of real passive potency to acts distinct in reality itself and physically affecting, but it is indifferent according to reason, or it is logical potency, such as is understood to be in genus or in any confused concept, which can be contracted by inferior modes distinguished only by reason, and logically or metaphysically

determining the common concept. Wherefore, if we do not speak of existence in all that abstraction and commonality, but of substantial existence, that does not seem indifferent to the per se character of being; for through this it is distinguished from the existence of accident; therefore such a mode superadded to substantial existence is neither necessary nor can be understood.

27. Nevertheless it is responded from what was said that this mode or terminus, namely, being per se, is equivocal. For in one way it is taken, as it distinguishes against accident and is opposed to the mode of being in another, as it is of the essence of accident, and in this sense it is true that substantial existence is not indifferent to this mode per se, but is essentially constituted by it, and thus also it is true that existence in common is not indifferent to this mode as real potency, nor is it physically affected by it as by an act distinct in reality, but is only abstracted and contracted by reason; nevertheless per se, taken in this way, does not say such an actual mode of being which actually excludes union and dependence on every sustainer, but only says aptitude or existence to which by its nature such a mode and such independence is owed; just as, conversely, being in another, insofar as it is the essential mode constituting accident, does not say actual dependence or inherence to a subject, but a nature which postulates that. But in another way per se is taken as it says such an actual mode of being which entirely excludes dependence and actual union with any sustainer, and concerning this mode we deny that it is essential to the proper existence of substantial nature, since with this mode removed the existence of nature can be conserved, as was done in Christ's humanity. And therefore not only existence in common, as it abstracts from accidental and substantial, but also substantial existence, does not actually include this mode, but only by aptitude (we always speak of created existence, which because of its imperfection has this limitation; for in the uncreated it is otherwise); and that capacity is not only logical potency, but physical and real, such as is in a terminable thing with respect to a terminus distinct by

the nature of the thing. And in this sense substantial existence is said to be indifferent to this mode, not with quasi-neutral indifference (as I may say), because such existence by its nature postulates this mode definitely and determinately, and has natural connection with it, but indifference first precisive, because in its essence it does not include it, and then obediential, because it can by absolute power lack it and be affected by the opposite.

28. In what the formal character of subsistence consists. And hence incidentally it is gathered why the substantial existence of created nature, although complete, through itself and by virtue of its formal character is not subsistence, because namely it does not include the said per se, but rather is indifferent, in the said sense, so that it can depend on another sustainer and depend on it. But it can be controverted what created subsistence is, whether, namely, existence itself includes both, both existence and mode, or truly the mode alone is subsistence, so that subsistence is said to be added to existence and to terminate it. In which matter there seems to be more doubt about the signification of the word than about the thing itself; for in the thing it is already established that both those things are necessary for subsisting, namely, existence and mode, and what each contributes; therefore only can it be inquired what is signified by the name of subsistence. For it seems that to subsist signifies this whole thing, namely, to exist per se, and consequently subsistence seems to be the same as per se existence; and thus subsistence directly includes both, existence and per se character. But on the contrary is that Christ's humanity simply lacked created subsistence, not only because of the defect of the other part constituting subsistence, as I may say, but simply because it did not have the whole entity of subsistence. The argument for which is that the divine Word so supplied in humanity that whole character of subsisting, that it can in no way be said that the subsistence of Christ as man intrinsically includes created existence with the termination of the Word, but is simply uncreated. And a similar argument can be taken from the mystery of the Trinity; for

relations are truly personal subsistences, even if, properly speaking, they are not principles of existing for the divine nature itself. And thus this latter part seems entirely to be proved. Nor does the argument taken from the signification of the word stand in the way, for to exist is common to both nature and person, indeed also to personality itself; if therefore there is speech about the existence of nature, of which we have spoken, that is not formally included in the concept of subsistence, but is presupposed, and is included as something added, so that subsistence is not said to be per se existence, but is said rather to be the per se character of existence, or the per se mode of existing nature; but if we wish to speak of the existence of personality itself, that is intrinsically included in the concept of actual subsistence, just as it is included in the concept of any entity, and thus also in the Trinity relative subsistences include relative existences and in the mystery of the Incarnation the subsistence of humanity intrinsically includes the uncreated relative existence of the divine Word.

### *The Second Objection is Resolved*

29. Another argument was that, supposing existence in substantial nature, that mode of existing per se is sufficiently understood through the mere negation of existing in another, if that nature which has such a negation is complete, so that we exclude the separated rational soul, and also the integral parts, which are such by their nature, even if they should actually be separated, as would be a hand or foot, if they were preserved separate with the same matter and form, and the same many think concerning blood; but it is otherwise with homogeneous parts, for which it is accidental that they are parts, and therefore as soon as they are separated they are integral supposita. From this a new confirmation is drawn; for this part becomes a suppositum through the mere negation of union with the whole; what need is there, therefore, to devise new positive modes? Finally, it is confirmed thus: let us imagine that a complete substantial nature is

preserved by God without such a positive mode with only the negation of union to another suppositum; such a nature would be existing per se, because it would be existing and not in another, neither as a part of another, nor as depending on something sustaining it; it would therefore be existing in itself and per se; therefore this whole thing is sufficiently conceived through mere negation.

30. To this argument we respond almost from what was said above against Scotus; for we showed that, supposing the mystery of the Incarnation, it cannot be understood that created subsistence consists in mere negation, or that it adds only negation above the existence of the nature; for, although substantial nature is complete by reason of nature, it is nevertheless not complete in the genus of being and substance, and therefore it needs positive complement. To the confirmation concerning homogeneous parts, we must speak more broadly in the following section; now we respond briefly that when a part of water, for example, is separated from water, it either acquires new subsistence, or certainly a new positive term, by reason of which what was partial begins to be integral subsistence.

31. To the final confirmation, it is one thing to ask whether that case is possible, another what should be said about a nature so existing, given that hypothesis through the possible or impossible. Concerning the first point we shall speak below. Concerning the latter, which is touched upon in the said confirmation, it must be said that in that case humanity so existing would not be a person, nor properly subsistent, because, although it would not actually be in another, nevertheless, from its mode of existing it would not be repugnant to be in another suppositum and to be united to it according to its whole self, which is repugnant to a person as person. Hence it belongs to the nature of a person not only that it negatively not exist in another, but also that it contrarily (so to speak) or repugnantly exist positively in such a way that it is entirely repugnant to it to be in another. And in this manner some explain the quasi-formal effect of subsistence or personality, namely, that such an effect is to render the nature which it

terminates, or rather the person itself which it constitutes, utterly incommunicable to another person; which indeed is true, but it does not declare directly and in itself the effect of personality, but a posteriori. For a form or positive mode cannot be per se primarily for giving mere incommunicability, which is a negative effect; it is necessary therefore that it give some being of such condition and nature that it is utterly incommunicable to another person, on which it may rest or by which it may be sustained; but this positive being cannot be understood or explained by us otherwise than through that mode of actually existing per se, which we have declared. But concerning this incommunicability of person and created subsistence we shall say more in what follows.

### *The Distinction between Suppositum & Nature is Explained*

32. I say secondly: that which a created suppositum adds above nature is indeed distinguished in reality from the nature itself, but not entirely really, as thing from thing, but modally, as a mode of a thing from the thing. The first part is sufficiently proved by everything adduced above against Durandus, and concerning the first dictum of Cajetan's opinion. And according to that St. Thomas could be explained, wherever he says that suppositum in creatures is really distinguished from nature[15]; for every distinction which is actually found in things themselves is customarily called real in a broad sense. The latter part is followed by many of the more recent disciples of St. Thomas, especially those who think that substantial existence is a mode distinguished ex natura rei from essence, separable from it, in which sense Soto seems to hold this opinion, in Dialectica, q. 3 univers., and c. de Substant., q. 1, and II Phys., q. 2. But this opinion can be affirmed in three ways. First, by establishing this modal distinction, both between essence and existence and between

[15] St. Thomas, III, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3, and Quodl. II, a. 4.

existence and personality among themselves, and consequently also between essence and personality. And in this way Soto thinks; nevertheless, he both supposes what is false in that distinction of existence from essence, and with that distinction supposed, he superfluously introduces another between existence and personality, as can be shown by arguments made against Cajetan, here applied with proportion. In another way this modal distinction can be posited between essence and subsistence, but not between existence and subsistence. And this sense also supposes the opinion of Capreolus, which we have attacked, and modal distinction between existence and actual essence, which we have denied. Therefore in a third way we assert that personality is distinguished modally, both from essence and from the existence of substantial nature, although these are not distinguished among themselves. And in this sense it is proved first, because this distinction suffices to save everything that proves these to be distinguished ex natura rei, and especially for those things which faith teaches concerning the mystery of the Incarnation, on account of which this distinction has been chiefly introduced; therefore there is no reason why we should imagine a greater distinction. The assumption is clear, because this is sufficient so that humanity without such a mode of proper subsistence may be preserved, and may be affected by the mode opposite to that, namely, union to another person; for a thing can easily be separated from a mode distinguished ex natura rei; which matter has been treated extensively in the matter of the Incarnation in the places cited above. The consequence is clear, both from that general principle, that distinctions are neither to be multiplied nor augmented without great foundation and open necessity, and also because, explained in this way, the notion of subsistence is not difficult to understand; but that entity entirely distinct can scarcely be conceived what or of what kind it is, or how it is united to nature; for it will need to be united through another mode distinguished ex natura rei from the extremes, as happens in the union of really distinct things.

33. Secondly, this can be declared by the proportional example adduced above concerning accident, in which actual inherence is distinguished ex natura rei from the existence of the accident, not as a distinct thing, but as a mode of the thing; thus therefore, conversely, to actually exist per se and independently from another sustaining will be something distinct from substantial nature and its existence, not however as a thing, but as its mode; just as sitting and standing are distinguished from quantity.

34. Thirdly, because according to this opinion all things that are customarily asked about this subsistence and difficulties that occur concerning it are easily expedited. As, for example, whether it is substance or accident; for we say it is substance taken quasi-transcendently, as it is distinguished against accident, because substance cannot formally receive its complement from accident; but it is not an entity, but a substantial mode, and thus it is not placed directly, but reductively in the category of substance. Hence it is also easily answered to that question, how subsistence is not comprehended in that division of substance into matter, form and composite; for we say that there substance is divided insofar as it denotes proper substantial entity, and therefore it does not include modes of substance, except perhaps implicitly; for the union of matter with form is something substantial, and it is not matter, nor form, nor composite, but it is implicitly involved in the composite. Therefore in the same manner it can be said concerning subsistence, whether Aristotle knew it or not. Again, it is customarily asked in what genus of cause subsistence affects nature. And we easily respond that the affection of a mode does not always include proper causality, although it can be reduced to some. This is clear concerning union, inherence, dependence, and similar things; thus therefore we say that subsistence can indeed be reduced to the nature of form, for it is like the ultimate act of nature, but it is not properly a formal cause. An argument for this is that it can be supplied by the divine Word, which cannot exercise the proper nature of formal cause. Therefore this subsistence

is rightly called the ultimate and pure term of nature, because before this mode of existing nature is, as I said above, as if in potency and a certain indifference so that it can inhere in itself or be united to another; but through this mode it is so finished and terminated that it is no longer indifferent, and this without causality or information, but through intrinsic modification. Although some of these things can be declared in some way, even if subsistence is imagined as an entirely distinct thing, nevertheless not all, nor with the same facility or clarity.

35. Fourthly, according to this opinion also some things that are customarily disputed by theologians concerning the mystery of the Incarnation are conveniently explained. The first is whether humanity, terminated by proper personality, can also be terminated by another's. And it is commonly said that it cannot, the reason for which can scarcely be given, if proper personality is an entirely distinct thing. For if the same humanity can simultaneously be united to the Father and the Son, as more proven theologians teach, why will it not also be able to be united to the entity which is proper subsistence, and to divine filiation? For two unions do not formally repugn each other. But truly, if subsistence is only an intrinsic mode of actually existing per se, it has manifest proximate and immediate opposition with the mode of existing in another as in a suppositum; hence a fitting reason is rendered why humanity, affected by proper personality, cannot simultaneously be terminated by another's.

36. Again it is customarily asked whether a created person can terminate another's nature, and it is commonly believed that it cannot. But the reason for this can scarcely be given, if personality is a distinct entity. For why cannot God place it in two natures, just as He can place a body in two places, or the same whiteness in two subjects? But truly, if created personality is only a mode of nature, the reason is easily given, because a mode is so essentially defined to that thing of which it is a mode, that it can affect no other, neither simultaneously, nor successively, nor in any other way; for in its essential mode of affecting it includes not so much inherence or union as identity with

the thing which it affects; and therefore it cannot exercise its formal effect or quasi-effect concerning a distinct thing.

37. Besides, it is customarily inquired why created personality cannot be preserved without its proper nature, just as conversely nature can exist without proper personality. For, if personality is an entirely distinct thing, no sufficient reason could be given why God could not preserve it without proper nature, both because there is scarcely any sufficient indication of this real distinction other than mutual separation, and also because no contradiction intervenes, nor any essential dependence of personality on actual union with nature, on account of which it could not be separated from it, and preserved when separated. For what is this essential dependence, if personality is a distinct thing? But if it is only a mode, the reason is easy, because it belongs to the intrinsic nature and essence of a mode that through itself, without another mode of union intervening actually, it is conjoined and modifies the thing of which it is a mode, and therefore it cannot be preserved separated from such a thing; for, by the very fact that it is separated, its formal or essential nature is destroyed. But that personality cannot be preserved without proper nature, all suppose; for, just as it cannot be understood that sitting is preserved without one sitting, or standing without one standing, nor actual inherence without an inhering form, so neither existing per se without existing nature. Finally, all similar questions are best defined according to this manner of speaking, as I have pursued more broadly, in the first tome of the Third Part of St. Thomas, qq. 2, 3 and 4, and in the following I shall also touch on some things; therefore this manner of speaking is more probable and to be preferred to the others. Nor does there remain to be solved any argument that can be objected against this conclusion, for in treating the opinions of Durandus, Scotus and Cajetan, which are as if extremely opposed among themselves, and between them this our opinion is middle, satisfaction has been given to all.

## Section IV

### *Composition Arising from Nature & Subsistence: Its Character*

38. I state third: a created personality truly constitutes a composition with the created nature, as a mode with the thing it modifies, or as a terminus with the thing capable of being terminated. This assertion has been sufficiently established by what we said against Cajetan; and, given what we have already set forth, it is plain enough. For a real composition is nothing other than the conjunction of elements that are distinct in the thing for the purpose of composing a single third entity. In precisely this way nature and personality stand to one another in the present question. Thus it has been sufficiently explained how personality is related to nature—both in the way it affects nature and in its distinction from nature or composition with it.

39. One question remains concerning their comparative perfection: namely, which is simply more perfect, or more perfect in the order of being—nature or its subsistence. For if subsistence is of itself a distinct reality, the matter may seem doubtful. Subsistence is the act of a substantial nature, indeed its ultimate act; and if it is a proper entity, it would seem to be understood as sustaining and supporting the nature itself. On that account it could reasonably be judged more perfect. Likewise, some of those who hold that existence is a reality distinct from essence judge existence to be more perfect because it is the act of essence. Perhaps, then, they would judge the same of suppositality (suppositalitas), since it too is a substantial act and terminus—especially because, speaking consistently within that position, it is more probable that subsistence is altogether the same as substantial existence.

40. However, according to our view, it is absolutely truer that the substantial nature is more perfect than its subsistence, because subsistence is only a certain mode, whereas nature is truly and properly a substantial entity. Likewise, in a complete substance, the

essence of the substance is more perfect than its mode. Finally, this is confirmed by the fact that otherwise the Word would not have assumed the principal entity that is in a human being—an unfitting consequence. Indeed, as we saw in the preceding section, Scotus holds it unfitting that the Word did not assume some positive and substantial entity that is in us. We readily concede that this would be unfitting if one were speaking of a proper entity; but we deny that it is unfitting when one is speaking of the mode of existing of the nature itself. Rather, it is necessary and most apt for explaining the mystery. For from the very fact that the humanity was not left to itself to subsist in itself, but was implanted in the Word, it had necessarily to change its mode of being, though it did not thereby lose any entity. Thus, just as quantity, when separated from the bread by consecration, changes its internal mode of being without the removal of any proper and intrinsic entity, so too—since, in the case of an accident, if one compares the actual union of quantity with the quantity itself, that union is something less perfect than the quantity itself—conversely, in the case of substance, the mode of subsisting is something less perfect than the nature itself.

41. Finally, one may ask whether personality stands to nature as an intrinsic or an extrinsic act of it. The answer is easy from what has been said. If by "intrinsic act" one means an essential act, then personality is not intrinsic to nature, because it does not belong to the essence of the thing, as has been shown; otherwise it could not be distinguished from the essence, since nothing is more identical with a thing than its essence. Personality can, however, be called intrinsic to nature either because it is intimately conjoined to it or because it is owed to nature by the very constitution of the thing. Yet with respect to the person, personality can be called intrinsic as belonging to the intrinsic notion and constitution of the person, because it intrinsically composes the person—as was shown above, sufficiently, against the opinion attributed to Capreolus.

## SECTION V
## WHETHER EVERY CREATED SUBSISTENCE IS INDIVISIBLE AND ENTIRELY INCOMMUNICABLE

1. From what has been said in the preceding section, we can gather a definition or description of created subsistence, which alone we now treat: namely, that it is a substantial mode that ultimately terminates substantial nature and constitutes a thing as subsisting per se and incommunicable. All parts of this description have been explained by us except the last concerning incommunicability. For although this is not of the essence of subsistence as such (since communicable subsistence is found in God), it is nevertheless of the essence of created subsistence on account of its limitation, as we have touched upon above. And therefore every created subsistence is suppositality or personality, of whose essence incommunicability is, without any controversy. To explain this incommunicability exactly, however, we join another property concerning the indivisibility of subsistence, and we must begin from this, since knowledge of it contributes to understanding the said incommunicability. There is no difficulty regarding this part as concerns spiritual things, because it is most certain that their subsistence is indivisible, just as their nature is. For they must preserve proportion among themselves, whence, just as each is spiritual, so also is each indivisible.

### *Whether the Subsistence of Material Things is Divisible*

2. From this, however, arises a difficulty regarding material substances. For since their nature is divisible, their subsistence seems necessarily to be divisible as well, for the reason mentioned, because

they must preserve proportion among themselves. This is explained in the following way: material nature is divisible in two ways: in one way essentially, or into essential parts, as humanity into body and soul, and any other into its matter and form; or quantitatively, or into integral parts, as one water into many, etc. And by reason of both compositions or divisibilities[16], subsistence seems necessarily to be divisible. By reason of the first composition, indeed, because subsistence is not a simple entity really distinct from matter and form, since it is not an entity distinct from the whole composite nature, as is clear from the preceding section. It is therefore a mode of the whole integral nature, affecting proximately and immediately that whole as such, that is, as complete and integral. Therefore, just as the nature itself is not simple but composite, so also its subsistence is not a simple mode, but composite. Therefore it is divisible into those things from which it is composed. This is confirmed because, although subsistence is a mode distinct ex natura rei from nature, nevertheless, since it is not an entirely distinct thing, but only a mode, it also has some identity with the nature itself. It is not identified, however, with any essential part of the nature, but with the whole adequately. Since, therefore, the nature is not simple, but composite and divisible, it is necessary that subsistence have a similar or proportional composition and divisibility, because it cannot be understood how a simple thing or mode could be identified proximately and adequately with a composite thing. And this reason, applied with proportion, also proves that the subsistence of material things is divisible from the other aspect, that is, on account of composition from integral parts. And besides, there is here a special reason, because material subsistence cannot be whole in the whole and whole in any part, because this is repugnant to a material thing. Therefore it must be whole in the whole and part in part, and this is to be divisible.

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[16] divisibilitatis, 1960; indivisibilitatis, alit. "Although in some editions indivisibilitatis appears, the context of this whole number requires that divisibilitatis be read. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 389.

3. On the contrary, however, it is repugnant to the nature of subsistence that it be divisible, because this is contrary to its incommunicability. For if it is divisible, then part of subsistence is united to part of subsistence; therefore one subsistence is communicated to another through union, because nothing else seems to be communicated except to be united. This is explained in both members posited above. For if subsistence is divisible on account of the essential parts of nature, then in the supposit of a horse, for example, part of subsistence is in matter, and part in form. Therefore the soul of the horse subsists through partial subsistence, so that, just as God can conserve the soul of the horse separated from matter, so also he could conserve its partial subsistence, since in that case he would conserve it as subsisting. But the consequent is repugnant to the materiality of such a form; otherwise it could also naturally remain in that subsistence separated from matter. For why can a rational soul be thus conserved, except because it is subsistent? Again, if subsistence were divisible by reason of integral parts, it would follow that two parts of water continuous with each other would be two partial supposits, for they have partial subsistences and suppositalities. But the consequent is against the sense of all and the common manner of speaking. Likewise, it follows that water, when it is actually separated from all other water, is communicable according to its whole self and according to its subsistence to another water, or to the whole composed from both. But this is contrary to the nature of subsistence, as I have said.

### *The First Opinion is Proposed*

4. In this matter modern philosophers (for the ancients scarcely disputed about this) seem to hold that every subsistence is indivisible, and that this is of its essence on account of its incommunicability. And those who think thus consequently deny that either matter or form, especially material form, truly subsists.

Concerning the rational soul, however, there is disagreement, as we shall say. They also deny that integral parts subsist in the whole, even if when separated they can be conserved per se and subsist. Whence they consequently say that when water is divided into two parts, the whole subsistence of the divided water is destroyed and two others are produced anew, because one supposit is destroyed and two begin. This manner of speaking, however, is more easily understood according to the opinion of Cajetan, who asserts that subsistence is an entity entirely really distinct from the whole composite nature, and consequently from matter also and from form. For, given that opinion, many of the difficulties posited cease, because according to it it will easily be said that in man, for example, subsistence is a certain simple entity, and it will have to be admitted that it is spiritual, because, if it is simple, it cannot be composed from spiritual and material. And because it follows upon form and pertains to perfection, it will be spiritual rather than material. And thus it happens that it is indivisible and that it primarily affects the soul ex se and through it the body, so as finally to terminate the whole nature. In other things, however, such an entity will be material and will immediately terminate the whole nature, but the parts only insofar as they compose the integral nature, and therefore, if that nature is dissolved or divided, the entity of subsistence will not remain in the parts, but will be destroyed, and thus it is also indivisible. But truly, according to our opinion, this doctrine can be defended with more difficulty, and therefore we judge it absolutely false and insufficient in any opinion for explaining this matter.

### *Resolution of the Question*

5. To explain the matter, therefore, we suppose that something can be called indivisible in two ways: in one way, because it consists entirely of no parts, like an angel or a point; in another way, because, although it is composite, either it is indissoluble, like the

substance of heaven, or, if it is dissolved, the extremes from which it is composed cannot be conserved outside the whole, which sometimes happens in both extremes, as in the natural minimum, and in a heterogeneous whole as regards some principal parts; sometimes, however, in one extreme only, as in an arm, if it is divided from the whole, because it does not remain the same as it was before. In all these ways, therefore, subsistence can be understood to be indivisible; which of these, however, is true remains to be explained.

6. I say first: the subsistence of spiritual things is indivisible in the prior way. This assertion is self-evident and sufficiently proved at the beginning of the section.

7. I say second: no subsistence of material nature or supposit is indivisible in this way. The reasons of doubt made in the first place also convince this (as I think). Moreover, it is explained thus: if the subsistence of any material nature were indivisible in this way, it would be maximally the proper subsistence of humanity; but it is not; therefore none is. The major is evident, both because in others the reasons made earlier proceed more evidently, and also because in humanity at least the soul is spiritual. The minor is therefore proved, because the subsistence of man is not entirely spiritual; therefore it cannot be indivisible in the prior way. Nor is it indivisible as a point, as is self-evident, and will appear a fortiori from what is to be said; therefore. The antecedent is proved first, because it has been shown that subsistence is not a distinct thing, but only a mode of the nature of which it is the terminus; therefore the subsistence of the whole humanity cannot be spiritual. The consequence is proved, because it is necessary for a spiritual thing to be really distinct from humanity, either as entirely co-distinct from it, which has been disproved, or certainly as identified with the soul alone, which also contradicts the principle posited, both because it has been shown that subsistence is a mode of the whole nature, and thus is distinguished from that whole only modally, and not as part from whole; and also because through the subsistence of humanity matter itself also is terminated or co-

terminated. But it cannot be so terminated through an entirely distinct thing, such as a spiritual thing would be.

8. Second, because, as we have shown, the existence of humanity is not entirely spiritual, but composite from partial existences, material and spiritual; therefore neither is subsistence entirely spiritual. The consequence is proved, because, as we have also shown, subsistence is nothing other than a mode of existence, intrinsic to it; therefore, when subsistence is connatural, it is also proportioned to existence itself, and consequently composite from something spiritual and material just like existence itself. Third, this is proved from the common manner of speaking and thinking, because man is not a spiritual person, but rather a material one. But if his personality were spiritual, he would have to be called entirely a spiritual person, just as the person of Christ the man is simply called uncreated, because his whole subsistence is uncreated, although the human nature in which he subsists is created. Therefore person as person takes such denominations rather from personality than from nature. But this pertains to the manner of speaking; the prior reasons, however, are those that explain the matter, which will be more evident from what is to be said.

9. I say third: every subsistence of a material thing is doubly composite, namely, by integral and essential or quasi-essential composition. The first part is proved easily from the preceding conclusion. For every subsistence of a material thing is material; but whatever is material has some extension and consequently composition from integral parts, because to have extension is nothing other than to have parts coextensive to the extension of quantity, and these parts are called integral. This is also proved by some of the reasons made in the beginning, especially that the subsistence of whole water, for example, cannot be whole in the whole and whole in any part, since it is not a spiritual thing. Nor can it be imagined to be in some part or indivisible point of the whole water; for who could even think this fiction, or give a reason why it should be in one part or

point rather than in others, or finally explain how, existing in one point, it renders the whole substance subsistent?

10. Against this there is also an excellent theological argument, because the divine Word, in order to receive the whole human body into itself and wonderfully sustain it, or render it subsistent, is united to the whole and to all and each of its parts, and to the blood and its parts, and in a similar way remained united to the unanimated body in the triduum. Therefore the proper subsistence of the body, which the Word supplied, is also intimately in the whole body and each of its parts, and not in some determinate part or point of it. An excellent argument for this matter is also taken from existence; for this is intimate to the whole and to all and each of its parts; but subsistence is an intrinsic mode or terminus of existence; therefore it is as it were diffused through that whole existence and intimately conjoined to each of its parts. Just as also the actual inherence of an extended and quantified accidental form cannot be in one part of it, but in the whole and in each part, in which its existence is, because it is an intrinsic mode and as it were terminus of it. Whence, just as the inherence of a material accident is necessarily composed from integral parts, because such a form consists of similar parts, so also the subsistence of a material thing is necessarily composed from the same parts.

11. Therefore, this part of this assertion proceeds not only in our opinion, by which we have asserted that subsistence is a mode and not a distinct entity, but also in the opposite opinion, at least as regards entirely material things (excepting man); which that reason convinces, which is general in every opinion, namely, that such an entity cannot be whole in the whole and whole in any part, since it is not spiritual. For who would believe that a spiritual subsistence is owed to or results from a purely material nature? But if someone insists that a material entity can be whole in the whole and whole in any part, as many think concerning the souls of perfect brutes, we respond first that that opinion is not approved by us, for a form that

depends on matter in coming to be and in being cannot naturally depend simultaneously and wholly on diverse parts of matter. Then, granted that this is conceded in these peculiar forms, it is not to be extended to a material entity common to the lowest material substances, and which follows not only form, but also matter in its own way, because it is owed only (maximally according to that opinion) to complete nature, which in these things consists of form and matter.

12. But truly, in man this part does not proceed according to the aforesaid opinion, for it must consequently say that the subsistence of man is spiritual; but this has already been disproved by us. We can establish only this distinction, that in man subsistence has this kind of extension or composition only from that part by which it includes matter and the mode of existing per se or the partial subsistence of matter, but not from the part of form, as in other material things. This difference is sufficiently known per se, yet it does not prevent the proper subsistence of humanity from being called extended or composite from integral parts; just as also its existence or humanity itself is thus composite, although it essentially includes a spiritual form. Not to mention that there are in man some parts that are in some way integral which are not informed by the rational soul, like blood and similar things, whose subsistence (which cannot but be material) pertains in some way to the complete subsistence of the whole humanity, as I have treated more widely in q. 5 of the Third Part.

13. The other part of the conclusion, which concerns composition from quasi-essential parts, properly has place supposing that subsistence is only a mode of nature. For if it is an entirely distinct entity, although it could also be imagined as composite, so that matter would have its partial entity of subsistence, and form its own, and from both the integral subsistence would be composed, as from act and potency—although this (I say) could be imagined, nevertheless it would be too superfluous to imagine so many entities, and it would

not be sufficiently consequent to those principles on which the other opinion is founded. And thus neither Cajetan, nor the authors who think subsistence has its proper entity, posit it as thus composite, but as simple as regards this quasi-essential composition, or from act and potency. In this indeed they speak consequently, yet they suffer difficulty in explaining the subsistence of humanity, which they must necessarily confess to be spiritual, which does not seem consonant with truth, as I proved in the second conclusion; whence the reasons made there can be valid for persuading this part. Moreover, from our opinion that subsistence is only a mode, this part seems necessarily to be inferred, as has been sufficiently touched upon in the prior arguments at the beginning of the section. Because universally a mode of a composite thing, which is distinguished from it only modally and adequately and per se primarily affects that whole as such, that is, according to its whole self, and not by reason of another part, such a mode (I say) necessarily participates in composition proportioned to the thing of which it is a mode. Because it cannot otherwise be understood how a mode intimately affects the whole thing and all its parts with some real identity, and with modal distinction alone. But, in the present case, subsistence so modifies the existence of the whole nature that it terminates and modifies both the existence of matter and the existence of form; therefore it is identified with them taken together, and therefore it is necessary that it include composition proportioned to the composition from matter and form, which we call essential.

### *Whether Material Things Subsist by Reason of Matter Alone*

14. Someone could, however, devise a way by which it could be understood that in entirely material things (we exclude man), subsistence lacks such composition, namely, because, although this subsistence is said to be of the whole nature, because by virtue of it the

whole nature subsists, nevertheless it does not per se primarily affect the whole nature as such, but its part, namely, prime matter, and by virtue of that the whole subsists, or denomination in the whole is derived from it. This can be explained in the following way, for the reason of positive subsistence is conceived or explained by us through those negations by which Aristotle defined first substance, which are: not to be in a subject, not to be said of a subject. These negations, however, in material things draw their first origin from prime matter; for this, since it is the first subject from which form is educed, per se primarily postulates not to be in a subject, and consequently not to be said of a subject, if it is taken individually. But form, which is educed from the potency of matter, just as it comes to be from a subject, so also it is in a subject; and therefore the whole reason of subsisting in such things seems to exist in matter. Whence that Boethius, whom we cited in the second section, asserted that prime matter is maximally first substance, who indeed erred in that he either thought prime matter is complete substance, or did not notice that without complete nature there is no perfectly and properly first substance; he does not seem, however, to have erred in that he attributed to prime matter a proper and perfect reason of subsisting sufficient ex se, so that by reason of it the whole nature subsists. This is finally confirmed, for matter most properly is per se, because it rests on no subject or sustaining thing nor can it naturally rest on one; but material form rests on matter itself as sustaining; therefore in the whole material nature the reason and mode of subsisting is in matter itself, and does not affect form in itself, but denomination in the whole is derived from matter.

15. But if you object that, since matter is more imperfect than even material form, it seems unfitting to attribute the whole reason of subsisting of these material things to matter and not to form, it is responded that subsistence pertains rather to the mode of existing than to the grade of entity, and therefore it is not unfitting that form, although it is more perfect simply in grade of entity than matter, in a

certain mode of existing is less perfect, because it depends on a subject, which matter does not have. And therefore it can happen that matter, although less perfect, has subsistence which form does not have.

16. Second, it can be objected that in human nature proper subsistence is not subsistence of matter alone; therefore neither in other things. The consequence holds from parity of reason; the antecedent, however, seems certain. First, from the mystery of the Incarnation, for the divine Word was united immediately only to that thing to which natural subsistence is united; but it was united immediately not only to matter, but also to soul, as is known by certain faith, and was explained in the triduum; for the soul remained united to the Word by virtue of the prior union. And not the soul and flesh alone according to themselves, but also the whole humanity was united to the Word immediately; therefore the proper subsistence of humanity is not only the subsistence of matter, but also includes the subsistence of soul, and simply denotes a certain complete subsistence of the whole humanity. And this is confirmed, for by this reasoning theologians say the divine Word did not corrupt preexisting subsistence, but prevented it from coming to be in humanity, as is clear from St. Thomas, III, q. 4, a. 2, ad 3. But if that subsistence were of matter alone, it would not so much have been prevented as corrupted; for it preexisted in that matter; and it would only have been brought about that matter not have it under human form. Second, the same can be proved by reason, because in man form is not only more perfect than matter in grade of entity, but also in mode of being, for it is as independent from a subject as matter, and therefore it cannot come to be except through creation just as matter can; therefore it is per se and consequently as subsistent as matter; therefore it has its partial subsistence, the more perfect the more immaterial; since therefore man consists of soul and body, and more principally of soul than of body, it is more the subsistence of soul than of body, or neither

properly, but integral subsistence composed from both; the same therefore will be in its own way in other things.

17. Nevertheless it can be responded to this objection by denying the consequence; for concerning the antecedent there does not seem to be ability to doubt; indeed, as I was saying above, if the subsistence of man were simple, it should rather be posited in soul than in matter. There does not seem, however, to be the same reason concerning other material things, as can be gathered from the same reason adduced, for in man form is independent from subject; in others, however, form is dependent, and therefore, although the soul of man is terminated through partial subsistence, other forms cannot be terminated except through inherence or quasi-inherence. Nor is it unfitting, but it seems rather very consonant with the natures of things, that the nature of man be in some way more subsistent than all lower natures; for it is according to its whole self per se primarily and intrinsically subsistent, because it consists of a double part per se apt for subsisting and independent from subject; lower natures, however, are only subsistent by reason of one part, and as it were through denomination from it, because they have another part entirely dependent on subject.

18. This opinion thus explained (as I have said elsewhere) seems in some way probable, yet not to be approved as true. For first it is foreign to the manner of speaking and thinking of philosophers and theologians; for all think that any complete substance also has its complete subsistence, and that form concurs to it no less, indeed more in some way, than matter, as can be seen in the authors cited above, and in St. Thomas, II cont. Gent., c. 68, where he says that substance composed from matter and form is one according to one being consisting of matter and form, in which the whole substance subsists. Then I argue by pressing the second objection made above, for from it is concluded that the subsistence of humanity is composed in some way from partial modes of soul and matter, which now, for the sake of brevity, we call partial subsistences (for concerning this appellation

and its true sense something must be said below); from this therefore we gather that the subsistence of matter alone is not complete in the nature of subsistence, but at most partial, because otherwise it could not compose with the partial subsistence of soul integral subsistence that is per se one; therefore that subsistence of matter cannot be sufficient so that through it any integral substantial nature subsists. The consequence is clear, both because subsistence ought to be proportioned to the nature which it terminates; if therefore substantial nature is complete, it requires complete subsistence, and not partial; and also because otherwise only the existence of matter would be terminated through subsistence, and not the existence of form, nor of the whole composite nature.

19. From which we can moreover argue; for it follows from that opinion that properly and rigorously matter alone is substance in such material things, and not form, and consequently neither the composite from matter and form. The sequel is clear, first indeed, because substance is what has substantial being; but substantial being is that which by its nature is apt to be terminated through subsistence; but only the existence of matter is apt to be terminated through subsistence, not however the existence of form, but through inherence only; therefore only the existence of matter is substantial, not however the existence of form. Nor is it sufficient if it be said that the existence of form is terminated as it were mediately through the subsistence of matter; for this can be understood in two ways. First, that the subsistence of matter truly terminates and as it were affects the existence of form proximately and in itself, and is only said to do this mediately because it affects matter prior in nature; and this sense has no place in our opinion, both because we suppose subsistence is not a distinct thing, but only a mode of that existence which it proximately terminates; and also because, if the existence of form is thus terminable, it is undeservedly said to beg terminus from matter and not to have it ex se.

20. The other sense, therefore, and truly intended in that response, is that the existence of form is said to be mediately terminated through the subsistence of matter, because such form inheres in subsistent matter, and now does not need another sustaining thing. But this does not solve the argument made, because in this way also the existence of quantity is terminated through the subsistence of matter, because it inheres in subsistent matter, and now does not need another sustaining thing. Nor does it matter if it be said that it needs the partnership of form in order to be able to be and be sustained in matter, for material form also needs the partnership of quantity, without which it could not naturally either be or be received in matter; therefore in this they are equal. Indeed, from this arises a new reason, for a difference can scarcely be assigned between substantial form that is merely material and accidental form, because neither contributes formally per se, or through a mode intrinsic to itself, to the subsistence of the composite, and each contributes some actual or formal being to matter, in which each depends on matter in coming to be and in being conserved. What reason or difference, therefore, can be assigned why one should rather be called substantial than the other? For it is not sufficient to say that one has substantial entity and the other accidental, and that the difference is to be sought from this; for the genus of entity cannot be taken or explained from anywhere else than from being itself and the mode of being; if therefore they agree in mode of being, because each depends equally on matter as subject, and is not more terminated by subsistence, or contributes to it, one entity than another, one entity is not more substantial than another.

21. Whence it is further inferred from that opinion that material things are not integral and complete supposits, which is plainly absurd. The sequel, however, is clear, both because it has been probably shown that it follows from the said opinion that in these things there is no more substance than is in matter alone, and also ad hominem, because supposit is formally constituted through

subsistence; therefore if subsistence is incomplete, supposit cannot be except incomplete. Whence also it is confirmed, for, if the subsistence of matter is incomplete, it by its nature postulates to be completed; therefore it would be absurd and beyond the order of nature that in all natural things except man it should remain without complement; just as therefore the essence of matter seeks complement of essence, and the existence of matter complement of existence, so also the subsistence of matter complement of subsistence, for it is also ordered to this by its nature; therefore under every form under which it naturally remains it has complement of subsistence, just as of essence and existence. Finally, an argument is taken from the mystery of the Incarnation; for from the aforesaid opinion it follows that the form of blood was not immediately united to the subsistence of the Word, but only mediately, by reason of matter or subject, like accidents, which is entirely false, as is clear from St. Thomas, III, q. 5, and from what is treated there. The sequel, however, is manifest, for in that way nature or part of nature is united to the Word in which way it would be united to created subsistence, mediately or immediately, if it were in its proper supposit.

### *Corollaries from the Preceding Doctrine*

22. From all these considerations, therefore, it is concluded that every subsistence of a complete and material nature is in some way composed of parts or extremes that are compared to one another after the manner of act and potency and pertain to essential composition. This follows manifestly from what has been said, because it has been shown that this subsistence is not the mode of only one part, but is the adequate mode of the entire nature, terminating it primarily in itself, yet mediately affecting in some way the individual essential parts of it, namely, matter and form. Hence it necessarily follows that such a mode is not simple, but essentially composite in proportion to the nature and its parts which it affects. But every

essential composition requires extremes that are related as act and potency.

23. Second, it is gathered from what has been said that subsistence of this kind includes both the partial modes of the parts themselves and the union of these among themselves. The first part is proved, both because a composite includes the extremes from which it is composed, and also because subsistence is not a thing entirely distinct, but the adequate mode of composite nature. The latter part is likewise easy from what has been said, because the adequate subsistence of one nature is one per se, just as the nature itself is. For they must often maintain proportion among themselves. Therefore the integral subsistence of the entire nature is not merely some aggregate of partial subsistences, or modes of matter and form, otherwise in the notion of subsistence it would not be one per se. It therefore includes in its genus some union of those partial modes among themselves, by which they are conjoined to constitute one adequate subsistence of the entire composite. And this is confirmed by analogy, for essence, in order to be one, requires beyond the essences of the parts—namely, of matter and form—a union of these among themselves, and the same is true of existence. Therefore the same is true of subsistence. Finally, it is confirmed, for when the form of man is separated from matter, for example, although partial subsistences remain in the individual parts, nevertheless the subsistence of humanity does not remain, just as humanity itself does not remain. Therefore, just as humanity is not an aggregate of matter and form (for such an aggregate remains when the union is dissolved, yet humanity does not remain, from which it is necessarily concluded that humanity per se and essentially includes union), so we must philosophize entirely about subsistence in the same way, proportion being maintained.

24. Third, it follows from what has been said that the subsistence of complete material nature is not indivisible in the prior mode set forth above, as was also said in the second conclusion—that is, simple and incomposite. Now it remains to be seen whether it is

also divisible in the posterior mode—that is, resolvable into those things from which it is composed, with the components being conserved, whether both or one of them.

### *Composite Subsistence Can Be Divided into Integral Parts*

25. I say fourth: material subsistence, by reason of composition from integral parts, is as such divisible into parts which after division are conserved in their being and begin to be integral supposita or integral subsistences. I say "as such" because on the part of the nature or subject it can sometimes happen that this division cannot be reduced to act, at least naturally, either because the substance is incorruptible, as in the heavens, or because it is physically indivisible, as in a natural minimum, or because the substance cannot be conserved without such integrity of parts, as when an animal's head is cut off. For then, when the substance is corrupted, it is also necessary that the subsistence be destroyed. But whenever a substance is divided into integral parts that retain the same substantial nature, then also the subsistence of the whole is divided into the integral parts from which it consisted, which cease to be parts not by losing the being they had before, but by losing only the union. And in this sense we say that material subsistence, as such, is divisible. This is proved, for when water that was continuous is divided into two parts, which after division are two supposita of water, the subsistence that was formerly one and composite is divided into two. Therefore such division does not repugn material subsistence as such, if it does not otherwise repugn on the part of the form or nature. Some respond that then subsistence is not divided, but entirely corrupted and destroyed as it was before, and two others are generated. But this is said without foundation, and therefore is per se incredible, for that subsistence imitates the substance whose subsistence it is. But substance is divisible, so that after division the same entity of substance remains in

each divided part with the same singularity, individuation and existence, with only the mode of union or termination changed. Therefore the same will be true of subsistence. They respond that there is no equal reason, because subsistence is the complement of a supposit, and it repugns this complement to be part of one whole complement[17]. But this response cannot consist with what has been said above, for we have shown that this subsistence of material things is not so indivisible as to be whole in the whole and whole in any part, and consequently it has been proved to be extended and to have parts. Therefore it does not repugn this total complement to have parts united among themselves and continuous in their own way.

26. Nor do the said authors bring forward any reason that would show such repugnance, nor can one really be brought forward, because subsistence is the complement of a thing in the notion of standing per se and being independent of any sustaining subject. But it does not repugn this complement to have parts proportioned to the thing whose complement it is. For the thing itself that subsists per se —for example, all the water—consists of parts that also partially subsist, or co-subsist with the whole and in the whole, because, although the parts are in the whole composing it, nevertheless they are not properly in it as in a sustaining subject, and therefore they can have in it a part of subsistence, or a partial mode of subsistence. Therefore it does not repugn this complement that it consist of parts of the complement itself united among themselves. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, it will not repugn that, when the union is dissolved, the modal entity of each subsistence is conserved in each part of the divided substance, which was formerly partial because of the union and begins to be total through division. For no union or continuation of parts of subsistence is more necessary for the conservation of subsistence than of the substance itself. Therefore, just as in material subsistence of this kind extension of parts is understood, so their continuation should be understood in some common term

[17] Fonseca, Book V Metaphysics, c. 8, q. 6, sect. 5, ad 3.

proportioned to itself. Hence, when division of such parts occurs, only that common term is destroyed, and new extreme and terminating terms result, and for this reason alone the partial subsistences lose the denomination of partial, and begin to be total, just as happens in the parts of quantity and matter or substance. Nor is any reason brought forward why we should philosophize differently about the extension, continuation and division of this subsistence than of other material things. Nor should generations and corruptions of things or real modes be multiplied without cause. But from the force of division alone, precisely taken, nothing is destroyed except continuation alone, nor does anything else arise besides terms terminating in place of the common or continuing term. Therefore the entire entity of subsistence that was before is not destroyed, but is divided into two through their discontinuation alone.

### *How the Integral Subsistence of Man Is Divided into Quasi-Essential Parts*

27. I say fifth: in man the integral subsistence of total humanity consists of the partial subsistences of soul and body, so that when the union of these is dissolved, a part of subsistence remains in each part of the composite, and thus it happens that the integral subsistence of man is divisible quasi-essentially just as nature is. This conclusion was indicated by Genebrard (Book II On the Trinity, pages 63 and 64), saying that subsistence sometimes flows from one principle, as in angels, sometimes from two, as in men, consisting of soul and body. And as regards that part which pertains to matter or the body, it is common to man with other material things, and therefore will be treated and proved in the following conclusion. But the other part, which pertains to the soul, is proper to man, and in it we suppose first that the soul of man separated from the body truly subsists, which is most certain. For that it remains truly existing is a matter of faith; from this it follows almost evidently that it also remains subsisting,

because it exists per se independently of every sustaining subject. This the mystery of the Incarnation also manifestly declared, for the separated soul of Christ remained united to the Word, and consequently subsisting through the subsistence of the Word. Therefore it is a sign that it is capable from itself of proper subsistence, which the Word through union prevented and supplied in a higher way.

28. But concerning the rational soul joined to the body, there is usually a question whether it subsists in that state. For some simply affirm this, because even while united to the body it is not sustained by nor depends on it. Cajetan (I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 5, and q. 90, a. 2); Ferrara (Book I Against the Gentiles, c. 68); St. Thomas favors this (In I, dist. 8, q. 5, a. 2). But others absolutely deny it, because to subsist includes the negation of existing in another, even by way of form. Cajetan (III, q. 6, a. 3). But others (like Fonseca, Book V, c. 8, q. 5, sect. 4) respond with a distinction, because they think that to subsist can be taken in both ways, namely, as including only the negation of dependence on a subject or sustaining thing, or as including the absolute negation of existing in another even by way of part or form. And in the first way they concede that the rational soul united to the body subsists, but in the latter way they deny it. And they say almost the same about the separated soul, for under one signification they confess that it subsists, but under another they deny it, namely, insofar as to subsist means the negation not only of actual union, but also of aptitude for existing in another by way of form or part. But this response, by multiplying significations of the word, stops at these and does not sufficiently declare the matter. We, however, looking especially to the matter itself, suppose (what has been proved above) that a thing is not constituted subsistent formally by some negation, but by a positive mode of existing, which is accompanied by the negation of every other repugnant mode—for example, the negation of hypostatic union to another supposit. For just as from hypostatic union occasion was taken for inquiring and knowing the mode of subsistence of created

nature, so the notion of this subsistence is best declared by us through the negation of hypostatic union, or through the immediate repugnance between the mode of subsisting per se and the mode of hypostatic union. Thus, therefore, concerning the separated soul there is no reason for doubt that it has this positive mode and consequently subsists, as has been shown. The difficulty, therefore, can only be whether that positive and real mode, from which the separated soul has that it subsists, is newly acquired by it through separation, or whether it has the same from the beginning of its creation in the body. For if it has it, it will be denominated subsisting from it, for this is not a negative but a positive denomination. But if it does not have it, it will not be subsisting while it is in the body, and thus, if we look at the matter, the given distinction entirely ceases.

29. But I think that neither of the first two opinions can be sufficiently demonstrated. Because the true resolution depends on this, namely, whether the mode of subsisting of the soul has formal repugnance with the mode of union or information of the body, for each mode is positive, as is partly evident from what has been said and partly from the disputation on causes. If therefore they have formal repugnance among themselves, the soul informing the body will not be able to have simultaneously the mode of subsisting, and thus it will happen that the soul in the body does not subsist. But if the modes do not formally repugn among themselves, the soul will without doubt be subsisting even while it informs the body, because such a soul by its nature is capable of that mode of subsisting, and man by his nature demands it, or rather it flows from it immediately when it is not impeded, as is evident in the separated soul. But if the mode of union or information does not formally repugn that mode of subsisting, the human soul has nothing, even while united to the body, that would impede its proper subsistence. Therefore it will have it. But whether those two modes of subsisting and informing have formal repugnance among themselves, I find no sufficient demonstration or showing for either part.

*The Rational Soul Subsists Even in the Body*

30. But I think it more probable to hold the opinion of those who say there is no formal repugnance between those two modes, and therefore the soul of man, even when united to the body, truly subsists. The reason is that, although the soul informs the body, it is not sustained by the body nor does it depend on it. Therefore, although it informs, it exists in itself and per se by reason of its independence. It is confirmed first, because that informative union is far distinct from hypostatic union, as is evident per se. Therefore it is not necessary that it include formal repugnance with subsistence, which hypostatic union includes. You will say that, although the soul is not united hypostatically to the body, it is nevertheless united hypostatically to the whole man or person of man, and therefore cannot have proper subsistence. But this rather confirms the opposite, for the rational soul is not united to the person of man merely as begging subsistence from it, but rather as constituting or conferring it, either totally, as St. Thomas sometimes seems to suggest[18], or at least partially or in part, as we hold. But this union in the person does not exclude but rather requires partial subsistence, just as also the parts of water are united in one supposit, composing its integral subsistence with their partial subsistences.

31. Second, this very thing is confirmed and declared from the mystery of the Incarnation. For the soul of Christ, from the beginning of its creation and the whole time it was united to the body, was also united hypostatically to the divine Word by its own union independent from the union to the body, which remained in it even after separation from the body. Therefore the hypostatic union of the soul to the subsistence of the Word and the informative union of the same soul to the body do not have formal repugnance among themselves. Therefore neither does the proper subsistence of the soul

[18] I, q. 76, a. 1, ad 3; Book I Against the Gentiles, c. 68.

have formal repugnance with actual information, for hypostatic union supplies the place of proper subsistence and prevents it. We took a similar argument elsewhere[19], ad hominem, against Cajetan, for he concedes that the rational soul after resurrection informing the glorified body will be subsisting in that very body. From which it is plainly concluded that information and subsistence do not have formal repugnance among themselves. Therefore the same must be said of information in a corruptible body, for this is of the same nature physically and essentially as the information of a glorified body, just as the body itself is essentially the same, although affected with different qualities.

32. Finally, it can be confirmed because the rational soul is made through creation prior by nature to being united to the body. Therefore it is made subsisting in that instant in which it is created. Therefore it remains subsisting while it informs the body. The antecedent is certain, and the latter consequence evident, because the rational soul in the same instant of time in which it is created informs the body. If therefore in that instant it is created subsisting, it has subsistence simultaneously with information, because it cannot in the same instant of time first by nature receive a positive mode of subsistence and be deprived of it because of union to the body, because this involves open contradiction. But if in that first instant the soul has both the mode of subsistence and of information, it will also have both throughout the whole time it is in the body, because such modes do not fight among themselves more in any time than in one instant. But the prior consequence is proved from St. Thomas (I, q. 45, a. 4), where he proves that to be created is proper to subsisting things. If therefore the soul of man is created in the body, it also subsists in it. It can be responded that creation can be terminated at existence without subsistence. But although this is true supernaturally and miraculously, as happens in the creation of the soul of Christ, naturally however this does not seem able to happen, since it is not consonant

[19] Volume III, Part I, disputation XVII, section 1.

with the natures of things, for creation by its nature tends to a subsisting thing. Hence its efficacy cannot be impeded by the natural condition of the thing that is created. From which a new argument can be formed in this way: for just as the rational soul by its nature seeks to be made through creation, so also it seeks to subsist, to which creation ultimately tends. Since therefore it also seeks to inform the body, it is a sign that these two conditions are not repugnant among themselves, for the soul cannot by its nature demand simultaneously repugnant conditions. But if those conditions were repugnant, subsistence would rather impede information than conversely, because the former is more intimate to creation, for subsistence is concreated or intrinsically follows the term of creation, but information or union to the body happens through the distinct notion of an extrinsic agent.

33. Thus, therefore, it is concluded with sufficient probability that the rational soul, even while joined to the body, has a positive mode of subsisting, and when it is separated, it does not acquire some new positive mode of existing, but is deprived only of the positive mode of union to the body. Nor is it necessary that in place of that positive union there succeed in the separated soul some positive mode formally repugnant to union with the body, but the mere absence of union suffices. And this is more consonant with the natural condition of the soul itself, which from itself is apt for union and naturally seeks it, and therefore never demands some mode of existing repugnant to union. Therefore there is no reason or cause why it should be attributed to it, even if it is deprived of union. And therefore, even if it is separated, it remains as if violent, desiring the body, which certainly would not be so if another positive and connatural mode of existing repugnant to union succeeded the union, just as matter does not remain in a violent state when deprived of one form, because another succeeds it. But it would be violent if it were deprived of every form.

34. From these things, therefore, the assertion set forth remains proved. For if the rational soul in the body has its partial subsistence, which it retains even if separated from the body, it is

necessary that the integral subsistence of man be composed from the partial subsistences of soul and body united among themselves, and be resolvable or divisible into the same through separation of the soul from the body, with partial subsistence remaining in the separated part. And this can be confirmed from the mystery of the Incarnation, for in this way the union of total humanity is composed from the partial unions of soul and body, and was resolvable into them. For through separation of the soul from the body, just as humanity was destroyed, so also its integral union to the Word, but the partial unions remained in the separated soul and body. Thus therefore we must speak of partial subsistences, for that union supplies proper subsistence with proportion. Nor does a new difficulty occur against this assertion from the part of the soul (for we will speak of matter immediately), because, since that subsistence of the soul is incomplete and partial, composition of integral subsistence does not repugn it, nor does it repugn that the same thing simultaneously subsist in this way and be a part, just as we said above about the parts of water, which example St. Thomas uses for the present matter (I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1 and 2), from which place it is plainly evident that he held this opinion, which he also has in Disputed Questions on the Soul, a. 1, ad 6.

### *On the Composition & Dissolution of Subsistence in Other Purely Material Things*

35. I say sixth: in other material and corruptible substances besides man, although the integral subsistence of the whole is composed from the partial modes of matter and form, and is dissolved through their separation, nevertheless after separation both partial modes cannot be consequent, but only the partial mode of matter, and therefore in these things matter alone has partial subsistence, but not form. In this assertion we explain the mode of composition of complete subsistence that is entirely material, which is indeed not an easy matter to explain. That such subsistence is composite from partial

modes that are compared among themselves by way of act and potency has been proved in the preceding, and we attribute these partial modes to matter and form, because, since the integral mode of subsistence is really identified and adequate with the total nature, it is necessary that it be partially the same with form and matter, and consequently that partial modes corresponding to matter and form respond, from which integral subsistence is composed. And hence it also necessarily happens that when the union of these parts is dissolved, integral subsistence is dissolved and perishes, for this is common to every composite whose parts can be separated. But it is evident that in these things of which we treat, the union of parts can be dissolved. Again, in these things it is also manifest that when the union is dissolved, both partial modes cannot remain, because at least that one does not remain which pertains to the form, since when the form itself does not remain, its mode cannot be conserved either.

36. But that the same partial mode of subsistence remains on the part of matter does not seem to be proved to all, for since matter is more imperfect than form, it seems to receive from it the mode and notion of subsisting, and consequently, when the form is changed, the partial mode of subsistence in matter must necessarily be changed. Next, because matter existing in the whole does not properly subsist, therefore it does not have a proper mode of subsistence that it could retain under diverse forms. Nevertheless, the part of the conclusion set forth seems truer, because when the form is changed, no real entity or substantial mode is changed in matter except the mode of union, which is far different from the mode of subsistence, even if we admit there is in matter such a mode of union distinct from the union of the form, concerning which we have spoken above. That these modes—namely, of union and subsistence—are distinct is proved first by analogy from what has been said about the union and subsistence of the rational soul. Second, because if God conserves matter without form, as He can do, such matter would lack every mode of union to form, and nevertheless would be subsisting. Therefore the mode of

subsistence can be conserved without the mode of union; therefore they are distinguished ex natura rei. Third, the same can be gathered from the proper notions of such modes, for the mode of union is quasi-respective, essentially depending on the other extreme of union and composition. But the mode of subsistence is in itself entirely absolute, and therefore can scarcely be declared by us except through negation. Fourth, from the mystery of the Incarnation, for the mode of union of matter with form does not conflict with hypostatic union, for matter actually united to the rational soul and the form of blood or corpse was simultaneously united hypostatically to the divine Word. But the mode of proper subsistence directly repugns hypostatic union, as is evident from what has been said. Therefore those modes are different.

37. But that these two modes do not repugn being simultaneously in matter can be proved by the same arguments by which we proved this very thing or something similar concerning the rational soul, namely, because matter is not united to form as to a subject or as to something sustaining it in its being, for rather matter is the first subject of form or generation, and therefore by its nature maximally demands this mode of existing in itself and per se simultaneously with union to form. Therefore it demands both modes, and one does not repugn the other, nor can any probable reason for such repugnance be brought forward. Likewise, because in the mystery of the Incarnation the body of Christ the Lord simultaneously had union to the soul and hypostatic union to the Word in place of proper subsistence. Therefore such a body by its nature would have with union to the soul a proper mode of subsistence, unless it were prevented by hypostatic union.

38. Finally (to arrive at what we intend), that the partial mode of subsistence of matter does not so depend on form or on union to it that it is necessary, when the form is changed, that that mode of subsistence be changed, is proved because there is no reason for such dependence. For the very essence or existence of matter depends on

form, insofar as it naturally requires it in order to be, and nevertheless, when the form is changed, the actual entity or existence of matter is not changed, but the same numerically perseveres. Therefore the same will be true of the partial subsistence of matter itself. The consequence is proved, both because subsistence is proportioned to existence, and also because it is as absolute as existence itself. Therefore there is no reason why it should depend more on this individual and determinate form, or on union to it, than existence itself does. From this the prior part of the contrary reason is easily solved, for there is great diversity between material form and matter. For although form is absolutely more perfect than matter, in this respect it is in some way less perfect, that this determinate form depends more on this determinate matter than conversely. For the same form cannot migrate from matter to matter, but by the very fact that it is separated from this matter, it perishes. But matter migrates (so to speak) from form to form, or rather the same remains under diverse forms succeeding in it. This arises either from a different mode of dependence, for form depends on matter as on its proper cause, but matter depends only on form as on a required condition, by reason of which existence and its conservation are owed to it, and not without form; or certainly it arises from the proper function of the first subject, for the action of the agent is concerned with it, and therefore it is necessary that it be apt to remain under either term. But form, which is the term of action, does not have that indifference, and therefore, if it is material, it depends in its being on actual union to the subject, which cannot be changed while the form itself remains and is conserved. But from this same root arises the other difference, namely, that matter, when the form is changed, can be conserved with existence and with the mode of existing, but form, just as it cannot conserve existence by changing subject, so also cannot retain the mode of existing.

39. And hence the penultimate part of the conclusion is also left proved, namely, that matter[20] has its partial subsistence, by which in its genus it concurs to compose the integral subsistence of any complete material substance. For it has its own partial mode of existing, by which it composes total subsistence, as has been shown; and that mode is such that through it matter has being in itself and per se, and independent of every subject or sustaining thing; and by reason of the same mode of existing the same matter can quasi remain in itself under diverse forms, with the same mode of existing conserved, as has been shown. Therefore that mode of existing of matter is truly and properly subsistence, at least partial. Some respond that by the very fact that matter depends in its being and mode of being on form absolutely or taken in common, it cannot have such a proper mode of existing that would be subsistence. And for the same reason they say that matter actually united to form can much less be said to subsist than the rational soul united to the body, for the rational soul is so in the body that in its being it simply does not depend, neither on this body, nor absolutely on body; but matter depends on form, even if it can be without this or that form. But others use the distinction given above, namely, if to subsist only means the negation of inherence in a subject, thus prime matter subsists; but if it means to be per se, that is, not in something on which it depends in its being, thus prime matter does not subsist, because it is in the composite and depends on it, or on its form.

40. But, omitting the ambiguity of the word, as regards the matter itself, it must be said that the dependence of matter on form is no obstacle to there being in matter a proper partial mode of subsisting. For not every dependence repugns the notion of subsisting; for every created subsistence depends primarily on an agent, and especially on God. Every material supposit also depends in

[20] The editors note: "It seems necessary to correct the adjective materialem, which is read in some editions, including that of Vivès, to the noun materiam, more in conformity with the context." Cf. BHF, volume V, page 415.

its own way on its dispositions, without which it cannot exist, and consequently the subsistence of such a supposit depends on the same; and in this way matter depends on form as on a substantial disposition so intrinsic and connatural that it cannot be without it. Therefore such dependence does not repugn subsistence, but only that which is from a subject or supporting supposit. And hence it follows (which pertains to the use of the word subsisting) that matter can truly be said to subsist, because this is a positive denomination from the mode of subsisting, and not merely negative, nor including (as I said) the negation of every dependence or every union with another, or of being in something as in a whole whose subsistence it partially composes, just as we said of the rational soul. For there is the same proportion in this respect. Nevertheless, so that all equivocation may be removed, let something be added by which it is declared that matter does not subsist as an integral supposit, for I do not deny that to subsist, simply said, is sometimes taken in this rigor, as is gathered from St. Thomas (I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1 and 2). Let it therefore be said that matter subsists incompletely or partially.

41. It remains to speak of the last part of the conclusion, which pertains to material substantial forms, and if what we have said thus far is attentively considered, it can seem obscure and not sufficiently coherent with them. For we said that the subsistence of a purely material supposit is a certain mode composed from partial modes of matter and form; we also said that mode which holds itself on the part of matter is partial subsistence. How therefore can another partial mode on the part of form be understood, unless that too is partial subsistence, since from both the complete subsistence results and is composed? Or if that mode of form is not subsistence, what, I ask, will it be? Or how can its notion be understood? Because of this, therefore, some deny that part of the conclusion set forth, and concede that material forms also have partial modes of subsistence, and consequently also confess that they subsist, although incompletely and in the whole. But others, as regards this

denomination, use the distinction brought forward above, namely, insofar as to subsist means only the negation of inherence, thus these forms can be said to subsist, but not insofar as it means the negation of dependence and existence in another on which it depends. Nevertheless, among the ancient doctors these forms are never called subsisting, nor are they said to subsist even incompletely. Indeed, St. Thomas expressly, in the place just cited, distinguishing subsisting or "this something" into incomplete and complete, says that in the prior way it excludes the inherence of accident and material form, but in the latter way it excludes the imperfection of a part. In which he sufficiently signifies that material forms cannot be said to subsist, even incompletely, or in that way in which matter or the rational soul is said to subsist.

42. From this it becomes entirely clear that a material form does not have its own proper mode of existing which would constitute partial subsistence; otherwise it would be denominated subsistent from that mode, at least incompletely. Hence St. Thomas, in the cited passage, and other theologians attribute as proper and peculiar to the rational soul, among all forms that inform a body, that it is something subsistent, precisely because it operates independently of the body as an organ or instrument; and in article 3, St. Thomas expressly denies that the souls of brute animals are subsistent. And in this sense it is said in the name of Augustine, in the book On Ecclesiastical Doctrines, chapters 16 and 17, that only the human soul is substantive, while the souls of brutes are not substantive. The reason is that substance intrinsically and formally includes independence from what sustains it, and especially from a material subject, or the cause upon which a thing depends in its being; but in these material forms there is nothing (that is, neither essence, nor existence, nor mode of existing) that does not rely upon matter as sustaining it, and which does not depend upon it in being and being conserved in the genus of material causality; therefore the mode of existing connatural to such a form cannot have the true nature of partial subsistence. The

consequence is self-evident. The minor premise is also clear, and has been sufficiently declared and proven above, because whatever is in these forms is affixed to matter; for it is commensurate with the entity and nature of such a form, to which this dependence is connatural. Finally, nothing is in these forms that is not produced or co-produced through eduction from the potency of matter; therefore nothing in them exists that does not depend upon matter as sustaining it. But the major proposition also seems sufficiently established from the common consensus of all; for all declare the nature of subsistence especially through this negation, and require it as the minimum for subsisting, although many demand something beyond this, as we have seen. Likewise, inherence is directly opposed to subsistence; but every dependence upon a sustaining subject can be called inherence, and thus St. Thomas, above, calls the mode of existence of a material form in matter inherence; therefore it is repugnant to proper subsistence.

43. Nor does it matter that in these material composites something or some partial mode on the part of the form concurs to compose the integral subsistence of the whole. For it is not necessary that everything from which something is composed participates in the nature or denomination of the whole; just as not everything that composes a line is a line, nor is everything that composes a man a man, if we speak properly; thus therefore, not everything that completes the subsistence of the whole is subsistence, even incomplete, but is a certain terminus or mode completing subsistence. Therefore, we acknowledge that the integral subsistence of an entirely material nature is composed from partial modes of matter and form; we say nevertheless that the mode of matter is partial subsistence, but not the mode of form, because the mode of matter is like the first foundation or basis of the entire subsistence of such things, and does not rest upon a prior foundation or subject. Hence it happens that it can remain, naturally indeed without this or that form, or without any determinate one, supernaturally however without any form and without any complement that can come from it. But the mode of

form, although it is a certain complement of total subsistence, is not however properly partial and incomplete subsistence, because it is such a mode that rests upon a prior subject and foundation, upon which it depends as upon something sustaining it so that without it it cannot be sustained or exist, not only naturally, which is most certain, but not even supernaturally. For although a material form can be conserved by God without matter, nevertheless the mode of existing which it has while it is in matter cannot be conserved in that form separated from matter, both because through separation the mode of existing is intrinsically changed, and also because that mode is quasi-relative and expresses an actual relation, and belongs to the form not in any way whatever, but as informing and composing a whole. This also excellently declares how much that mode falls short of the nature of partial subsistence. Hence also the difference between the mode of existing of the rational soul and of other forms is evident; for the former, besides union, has its own mode of existing independent of matter. And thus it happens that man subsists in a more noble way than all other material things; for he subsists both per se as a whole, and according to matter, and according to form, and has integral subsistence composed from partial subsistences, which perfection other material things do not attain, as has been declared.

44. But you will ask whether this mode which concurs on the part of a material form to complete the subsistence of the whole is the very union of such a form with matter, or some other mode distinct from the union in the nature of the thing. For it seems from what has been said that the former follows; for we said this mode is such that it cannot be conserved without matter; but such dependence or so great a connection seems to be proper to the union of form with matter. Likewise, because besides the union which includes substantial inherence and dependence of the existence of such a form upon matter, it does not seem necessary why there should be another mode of the same form and its existence, or what formal effect it could have regarding the existence of such a form; therefore there is no other

mode of existence in such a form except union or adhesion in matter. Just as in an accidental form, actual inherence in a subject is the mode of existence of such a form and quasi the ultimate terminus of it, beyond which it would be entirely superfluous to imagine another; therefore the same is true in substantial form, insofar as it agrees with the accidental in informative inherence or dependence upon the subject which it informs, although it differs in the degree or perfection of such inherence. This difference is also excellently declared according to the same doctrine; for the inherence of a material form differs from the inherence of an accident, because that prior one is such that, when joined to the incomplete subsistence of matter, it completes with it perfect and integral subsistence in the genus of substance, from which it is evident that it is a substantial mode; but the inherence of an accident in no way completes or pertains to the subsistence of an integral substance, but is entirely outside the genus and scope of substance.

45. Although this position seems probable in appearance, especially since this plurality of things or modes should be avoided as far as possible, nevertheless I think it must be said that this mode is distinct in the nature of the thing from information, or union, or inherence of a material form in matter. This I declare especially from the mystery of the Incarnation; for the Word hypostatically united blood to itself (which I suppose has a form distinct from the rational soul), and during the triduum assumed the corpse, and according to the true and received opinion could have assumed the nature of a lion and another similar one; but by virtue of such union the assumed nature would be deprived of integral and total created subsistence, and in fact this happens in the blood and corpse of Christ, according to sound doctrine; therefore it is deprived both of the incomplete subsistence of matter, and of every complement of subsistence which is joined on the part of form, that is, that partial mode which the material form brings with itself to complete with the subsistence of matter the integral subsistence of the composite; but the form is not

deprived of its[21] information and union to matter on account of the assumption, as is self-evident; therefore that mode completing subsistence is distinct in the nature of the thing from actual information, because, as was delivered above, there is no more certain sign of such distinction than real separation of one from another, even if it is not mutual. Nor do I see how this argument can be satisfied, unless through the assumption of irrational or inanimate nature the divine subsistence is not united to the entire created nature per se primarily or according to itself as a whole, but only according to matter. However, this evasion is improbable in theology, and more than false, as we have shown in the books on the Incarnation in their proper places. And besides it does not solve the difficulty; for if the union is made to matter, therefore matter is deprived of its partial subsistence; therefore there cannot remain in the material form any mode that pertains to the nature or complement of subsistence, because such a mode directly and precisely regards the mode of subsistence of matter and quasi actuates it and depends entirely upon it, as has been shown; therefore we return with the same efficacy to the argument made, namely, that such a mode is separable from actual information, and consequently distinct in the nature of the thing from it.

46. And from this can be taken the metaphysical and proper account of this matter; for just as in an integral composite nature we distinguish the entity of the nature from the complete mode of subsistence, so in matter itself we distinguish essential entity, by reason of which it is part of the essence or composite nature, and the partial mode of subsistence, by reason of which it composes the integral subsistence of the whole. Thus therefore in substantial form is understood the essential entity of the form, which is part of the essence and composite nature; and this is what informs matter as it is also part of nature, and this actual information in no way pertains to

[21] sua, 1960; alit. sub. "In other editions sub is read, with which the text becomes more obscure." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 420.

the nature of subsistence, but precisely to the composition of nature, as is evident also in the humanity of Christ, which includes the information of the rational soul without any trace of created subsistence; therefore this information as such in no way pertains to the complement of subsistence; therefore it is necessary to add something else on the part of form. Otherwise it would follow that in complete material nature there is nothing that pertains to the nature of subsistence, besides the incomplete subsistence of matter, which has been disproven above.

47. It will perhaps be said that by these arguments it is correctly proven that something else must be added on the part of form, besides union with matter, insofar as each is part of the essence or nature, but that this is nothing other than the union of the existence of the form to the subsistence of matter. For just as in matter essence and partial subsistence are distinguished in the nature of the thing, so in the form itself the union to the essence of matter is distinguished from the union to subsistence, and through hypostatic assumption one is separated from the other; for the form of Christ's blood remained united to the essence of matter, but not to its proper subsistence, since it did not have it; therefore this is sufficient for the efficacy of the argument made and for understanding that the subsistence of material nature is completed through this union alone of the existence of form to the subsistence of matter. But this response can in no way stand; for if it is rightly considered, it introduces in the natural composition of a supposit from form and matter a certain mode of hypostatic union, which how incredible and improbable this is, is sufficiently evident per se. But the assumption is declared, because hypostatic union is nothing other than the union of one substance or substantial existence to the subsistence of another, so that it may be terminated by it; but this is attributed to material form, when it is said to be united through its existence to the subsistence of matter, so that it may be terminated by it. Nor does it matter that that form is not an integral substance, but partial; for the rational soul is

also a partial substance, and nevertheless its union to the subsistence of another is true hypostatic union. Nor does it hinder that the subsistence of matter is incomplete, indeed the union will be all the more wonderful.

48. Hence an excellent argument is constructed. For complete subsistence can naturally terminate only the complete nature of which it is the subsistence, which it intimately affects; therefore incomplete subsistence can naturally terminate only that incomplete nature which it intimately affects, as its intrinsic mode, not really but only modally distinct from it; therefore the subsistence of matter so adequately terminates intensively and extensively (as Cajetan speaks elsewhere) the partial nature of matter, that it cannot at least naturally terminate the existence of form, nor conversely can the existence of form be quasi-hypostatically united to the subsistence of matter. Rather, if we wish to turn the argument around, from that position it follows that the subsistence of matter is not incomplete, for if it is such that through it the existence of matter and form is terminated, and consequently the existence of the entire integral nature, what is lacking to it that it should not be complete subsistence? Hence from that opinion it also follows that in the entire material composite there is no other subsistence or complement of subsistence besides the subsistence of matter; for the union of existence to subsistence is not a complement of subsistence, but only a way or quasi-necessary condition so that the existence of one may be terminated through alien subsistence, as is evident in the humanity of Christ and its union to the Word.

49. Therefore, nothing prevents if someone responds that the subsistence of matter is not alien to the form substantially united to that matter, and therefore that union is not similar to hypostatic union, which is to alien subsistence; just as on the contrary many judge that subsistence belongs to form alone, especially in man, and to it the essence and existence of matter are united. This (I say) does not prevent; for since matter is really distinct from form, and has imperfect

subsistence and only commensurate to itself, it is sufficiently alien and extrinsic to the form itself that it cannot terminate its subsistence, unless some preternatural union intervenes. Especially, since it has been shown above that subsistence connatural to any thing is not a thing distinct from it, but an intrinsic mode of it. But that opinion which attributes all subsistence to form supposes that subsistence is a simple thing and really distinct, both from matter and from form, and is not the terminus of existence, but either existence itself or a condition prerequisite to it, which principles we do not admit. And according to those it is more consistently attributed to form either as to a root with respect to material forms, or even as to a first quasi-subject with respect to the rational soul; but in no opinion can it be said probably that the subsistence of matter terminates hypostatically the existence of form, or that the integral subsistence of the entire material composite is completed through the union alone of the existence of form to the subsistence of matter.

50. We conclude therefore, just as in matter, besides the entity of its essence, which is a certain partial nature, there is given a certain mode also partial and incomplete, which is the ultimate terminus of its existence, so in material form, besides its essential entity, which is the other partial nature, there is given another partial mode distinct in the nature of the thing from it, which is the terminus of its existence; and just as from the partial essences of matter and form united among themselves there arises integral and complete nature, so from those two modes of matter and form also united among themselves there arises the integral subsistence of the entire material nature. Again, those two partial modes agree in this, that each seeks from its nature union with the other, to such a degree that naturally neither can be conserved without the other. They differ however, in that the mode of matter does not rest upon the other as sustaining, but only requires it as its quasi-ultimate act or complement. Hence it further happens that such a mode of matter does not require determinately this or that mode of form, but is content with any form or mode of form, and can

successively remain the same under diverse forms and their modes. From this it is also gathered that such a mode does not terminate or affect matter precisely as united to this or that form, but according to itself, since, with any union to form varied, that mode of existing perseveres in matter according to itself. But all these things happen far otherwise in material form. For first, just as this form has entity resting upon matter, so its mode of existing rests upon the mode of existing of matter, and is quasi supported or sustained by it. From this it happens that it is inseparable from it, so that this mode of form depends determinately upon this subsistence of matter, nor can it either vary this sustenance, and quasi migrate into another subject, or remain entirely without it. Again, from this we conjecture that this mode of form does not affect it according to itself, but only as united to matter. Not that it does not adhere (so to speak) intimately to the form itself and its existence, which it terminates, for this cannot be said, otherwise such a mode would be superfluous, nor would it have proportionate entity, which it would immediately affect; but that it does not follow upon form nor affect it except as united to matter; for just as that form according to itself is not naturally capable of existence, but only as united, so also it has no terminus or mode of existence except as united. Therefore, just as prime matter is presupposed to form in the order of nature, so also in the same order of nature the mode of its subsistence is presupposed in it; but material form is first understood to be united to matter, and in it to bring with itself a mode by which it composes with matter a thing completely subsistent, which mode it cannot have except insofar as it is united to such matter; and therefore it is said not to affect it according to itself, but as united.

51. And on account of these differences we call that mode of matter partial subsistence, and we say that matter according to itself constitutes something subsistent; but the mode of form we do not call subsistence, even incomplete and partial, but a certain complement of integral subsistence, which does not constitute such a form as

subsistent according to itself, but with the subsistence of matter completes the integral terminus of the entire supposit as completely subsistent. But if someone contends that that mode of form should also be called partial subsistence, because it is quasi a part of total subsistence, first he will rely upon a weak argument, as has already been shown. Then he will differ from us, and from the common usage of philosophers, only in manner of speaking; for (what pertains to the matter) it cannot be denied that that mode rests upon matter and depends upon it. And finally, absolutely and simply no one can say that material form subsists by reason of that mode, but only that it is in a whole which subsists in it. This is finally declared from the mode of existing which a material form would have, if it were conserved separated by divine power, and from the difference between the mode which it would then have and which it has united to matter. For if God conserves the soul of a horse separated from matter, and confers a positive mode of existing per se, just as he confers upon consecrated quantity in the Eucharist, that mode will differ from the mode of existing which that soul has united to matter in two ways. First, because that mode does not have from itself an order to matter, by reason of which it would depend upon it; second, because it directly repugns the union of such a soul to matter, because such a soul cannot be united to matter except with dependence upon it, which dependence repugns that mode of existing, just as the mode which separated quantity has repugns actual inherence. But truly the mode of existing which a material soul has naturally does not repugn union and dependence or inherence in matter; indeed, by its nature it postulates it, and therefore such a mode is not subsistence; but that which that soul would have in the aforesaid case of separation would truly be subsistence. Because it would be a substantial mode, just as also the existence which it terminates; and it would be a mode of existing per se incompatible with inherence; what therefore would be lacking to it for the nature of subsistence?

52. You will say: Would that subsistence be total or partial? For the first does not seem to be the case, since it is only in partial nature; nor the second, because it is not apt to compose one total subsistence. Concerning this many things could be said, which I will briefly suggest. The first is that it is not repugnant for a partial nature to subsist through integral and complete subsistence, since the soul of Christ subsists through the subsistence of the Word, which is at least most certain during the triduum; thus therefore that subsistence of such a soul can be said to be quasi-total, because it is not apt for composing another subsistence, but is indivisible in itself. The second is that such subsistence is simply imperfect in its entity, and in this sense can be said to be incomplete, not because it is ordered to completing another subsistence, but because it is only apt for terminating incomplete nature. Just as the mode per se of separated quantity is not properly partial, because it is not ordered to composing another; nevertheless, it is something imperfect and incomplete in itself, just as also motion is something incomplete in itself, although it is not ordered to composing another motion; and these two things are true. But a third could be added by someone, namely, that it can be done by God that such a soul, with that subsistence conserved, be united to matter, and then that subsistence with the partial subsistence of matter would compose one; and if this is true, that subsistence is most properly said to be partial. But this is not proven to me, because I think that a material form cannot be united to matter except through a union including dependence upon matter and inherence, which repugns subsistence, as I said above; for a form cannot inform otherwise than it is apt by its nature, because formal causality cannot be supplied or varied in the same form; but a material form is not apt to inform except by inhering in its own way; therefore it is impossible that it should inform by subsisting. Unless perhaps with the addition of a new miracle, that such a form be simultaneously affected by opposite modes and repugnant in the nature of the thing, which in these modes so proximately opposed, as are existing per se and

inhering, I do not think is possible, unless by constituting the same thing twice in the nature of things or in diverse places. See what we have touched upon concerning this matter in tome I, part III, disputation XIV, sections 1 and 3.

### *Arguments Placed at the Beginning are Satisfied, & the Incommunicability of Subsistence is Declared*

53. The arguments or reasons for doubting placed at the beginning of the section in the first place are not to be solved by us; for they prove and confirm the opinion proposed by us. But in those which were placed in the second place, another difficulty is touched upon, principally intended in this section, namely, in what way created subsistence is said to be incommunicable; for this is most certain to be of the nature of a supposit from the opinion of all theologians, in the beginning of the third book of the Sentences, and of St. Thomas in the third part. In which sense Boethius also said that a person is an individual substance of rational nature, that is, incommunicable, as all explain. Therefore created subsistence, which always constitutes a supposit, must also be incommunicable; for if it itself were communicable, how could it render a thing incommunicable? But this incommunicability seems to repugn what we have said about the composition of subsistence, and about the union of one subsistence with another[22], because all composition is made through a certain communication; therefore it is necessary to open the true sense of this incommunicability.

54. Therefore it must first be considered that there are various modes of communication, and not all are excluded by virtue of subsistence or supposit. For there is first a certain extrinsic intentional communication, or in the genus of final causality, in which way an end or good is said to communicate itself, by alluring to love of itself; and in this way it is evident that subsistence and supposit are

[22] alia, 1960; alit. illa. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 428.

communicable; for they express some perfection lovable per se. Another is communication also extrinsic, but real and effective, in which way an efficient cause is said to communicate itself to its effects, and in this way also it is clear that it is not of the nature of a supposit to be incommunicable in this way. Indeed, it pertains maximally to a supposit to communicate itself in this way; for (as they say) actions belong to supposits, and subsistence, although it is not the proper and formal reason of this communication, nevertheless does not exclude it, indeed it is a necessary condition for this communication. Again there is another communication intrinsic and formal; but I call formal not only that which is in the genus of formal causality, but all that in which a thing communicates or provides to something its own entity or formality, in which way also matter will be said to communicate itself intrinsically and formally to the composite. But this communication can also be multiple; some is according to reason only or community of reason, in which way species, genera and other superior predicates are said to be communicated to inferiors. And this communication is excluded especially by the incommunicability of supposit and subsistence, but it is not proper to it, but common to any singular thing; for any singular thing, whether it be nature or supposit, cannot be communicated to several inferiors. Indeed, the very supposit or subsistence insofar as it is incommunicable in this way is insofar as in the thing itself it is singular; for the very notion of subsistence, or of supposit, insofar as it can be conceived abstractly, is communicable according to reason, as St. Thomas indicated, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1.

55. Another is real communication of the same singular thing to several supposits or several entities really distinct. Which can be understood in two ways, namely, either through identity or through union only. In the prior way such communication is not found outside the divine nature. Hence incommunicability opposed to this communication belongs indeed to every finite subsistence, not however precisely from the fact that subsistence is singular, but only

from the fact that it is finite. For the divine nature, although it is singular and essentially subsistent, is really common to three persons really distinct, according to its entire perfection and the very absolute subsistence; and conversely, every finite thing, even if it is not subsistent, is incapable of this communicability with respect to several and distinct things through identity; therefore this incommunicability arises from limitation. Although however this is a sufficient and adequate reason with respect to creatures, it is not however with respect to all things, because the divine persons according to their proper relations or personal properties are incommunicable in this way through identity, not on account of limitation, but on account of relative opposition, or of origin; for from this comes the distinction of divine persons, and consequently the incommunicability of one with respect to others; for with respect to inferior things it rather comes from eminence and infinity, by reason of which they cannot be identified with finite and inferior things, as is self-evident.

56. But another real communication of one and the same singular thing with respect to several and distinct ones, not through identity, but through union only, naturally at least speaking, repugns supposit and created subsistence; hence in this sense also incommunicability opposed to such communication is of its nature. Indeed, according to the probable opinion of theologians, even supernaturally or through divine power, every created subsistence is incommunicable not only to several supposits, which is undoubted, but also to several natures; for created subsistence is so bound (so to speak) to its proper nature, which it terminates, that it can be communicated to no other, which is usually said in other words that a created supposit is so imperfect that it cannot assume or terminate an alien nature. Which incommunicability the divine person or subsistence does not have; for it can be communicated to several natures through hypostatic union, at least supernaturally; for naturally this cannot be done; for although being communicable in this way is connatural to the divine person or subsistence, the communication

itself cannot be connatural to any created nature, and since it must be done through change of creature and not of God, it necessarily follows that it can be done through supernatural action alone. Hence it happens that this incommunicability taken absolutely is not of the nature of supposit as such, but of the nature of created supposit. Indeed, in the very created supposit it does not arise from some condition pertaining to the nature of supposit; for it belongs to other things also, which are not supposits. For one form cannot naturally be in diverse matters adequately, nor one matter under diverse forms mutually repugnant, nor one accident in distinct subjects nor one nature in distinct supposits, and so of others. That therefore created subsistence cannot naturally be communicated to several things or natures arises from the fact that it is limited and finite; for from the same root similar incommunicability is found in all the examples adduced, and in other things or similar modes. But that even supernaturally the same created subsistence is incommunicable to many natures is also thought to arise from its limitation; but because this common reason does not suffice, as I think, it must be added that it arises from the proper imperfection of created subsistence, namely, because it is only a mode of the nature which it terminates, and not a thing entirely distinct from it. For it is intrinsic to this mode that it can affect only that thing which it modifies, because in its way of affecting it expresses a certain identity with the thing which it affects. Hence this is not proper to subsistence, but common to all modes, both substantial and accidental; which matter I have treated more broadly in tome I, part III, disputation XIII, section 4.

57. What formal communication is, and to which things it can belong. Moreover, besides the communication of one thing with respect to several, there can be understood communication of one thing with respect to another through formal union or some conjunction, as form is communicated to matter, and matter to form, and so of others. And in this way no created thing seems (let us omit divine things) to be entirely incommunicable; for although not every

thing can be communicated in every way, nevertheless no thing seems to exist which is not communicable in some way. For, as I was saying, matter is communicated to form, and form to matter, and accident is communicated to subject, and subject to accident, and (what regards the present matter) subsistence is communicated to nature, to which it is intimately conjoined, by terminating it, and nature is communicated to the supposit, of which it is the form and essence, and it is also communicated to the subsistence itself, since it is united to it. Hence it seems to be concluded that incommunicability taken absolutely cannot be of the nature of subsistence, even created, but under some determinate reason or limitation.

58. In order to declare this, it must be noted that it is one thing to speak of supposit, another of any created thing subsisting, another finally of subsistence itself complete or incomplete. For supposit absolutely said signifies complete and total substance, and entirely determinate in the genus of substance. Hence a created supposit, as such, is entirely incommunicable, because it cannot be further determined, or quasi contracted or modified in the genus of substance, and although it receives accidents, by which it seems to be communicated, it does not however receive them according to its subsistence, but according to its nature; a sign of which is that, with subsistence removed, the same accidents remain, except that this communication of accidents is in another genus and very extrinsic. But a created supposit cannot be communicated according to its subsistence to another substantial nature, not only naturally, but not even supernaturally, as we said, and thus it is entirely incommunicable. But formally and most properly, and insofar as it is supposit, it is incommunicable to another supposit, not only created, but also divine, so that it may be sustained or terminated by it; for in its nature it includes that it be ultimately terminated; therefore this incommunicability is proper to supposit as supposit. Hence it also belongs to divine and uncreated supposits; for although a divine supposit is communicable to created natures, it is not however so that

it may be terminated by them, but so that it may terminate them, and quasi sustain them in itself.

59. Nor does this incommunicability prevent that when one water, for example, is united to another, from two integral supposits one is made, and thus one supposit seems to be substantially united and communicated to another to compose one third. This (I say) does not prevent, because, when a supposit is said to be incommunicable, it is understood formally or with composition, that is, remaining supposit; for if it loses the nature or complement of supposit, what remains can be communicated, at least as part to whole or to co-part. And thus it happens in the aforesaid example; for when water is united to water, each loses some ultimate terminus terminating completing the nature of the whole, or total substance which supposit signifies, and both acquire a common terminus in which they are united by way of parts; and therefore, what are united are not supposits, but rather in order to be united they cease to be supposits, and thus it is always true that supposit as supposit is incommunicable, or (so to speak) inunitable substantially to another supposit. But we said above that substances which are thus united do not lose the entire subsistence which they had before, but only the indivisible terminus of it; from which it happens that parts of water after union among themselves can be said to be subsistent, but not supposits; for the denomination of subsistent is indifferent to whole and to parts which participate in the mode of subsisting, or to complete and incomplete thing; but the denomination of supposit, just as of person, belongs to complete substance alone and fully constituted in its genus. This is evident from the common usage of these names. For thus, as St. Thomas noted, I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 5, the rational soul even when separated, although it subsists, is not a person, because it is incomplete substance, just as neither is a hand (he says) nor any other parts of man. But if someone says that at least it can be called an incomplete supposit, just as some call the soul a semi-person, it must be answered that this depends only upon usage of the word, and therefore that locution is most improper

and false in rigor; for when incomplete supposit is said, repugnance is involved in the very terms according to their proper signification; for supposit signifies nothing but complete substance. It is true that St. Thomas sometimes indicates that distinction, not however under the name of supposit, but of subsistent, and "this something," as is evident I, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1, where he says: "This something" can be taken in two ways, in one way for anything subsistent, in another way for something subsistent complete in the nature of some species; in the first way it excludes the inherence of accident and material form; in the second way it excludes the imperfection of a part; hence a hand could be said to be "this something" in the first way, but not in the second way, and the same is true of the soul.

60. Subsistence absolutely does not render nature entirely incommunicable. Therefore, speaking of something subsistent as such, it does not include that complete incommunicability which supposit includes. For in divine things subsistent nature, even if it is perfect and complete being, is communicable to three supposits, not as depending upon them, nor because it needs them in order to subsist, but on account of its infinity, by reason of which it is communicated to many supposits in some ineffable way, through supreme identity and simplicity. But in creatures that mode of communication has no place, and therefore, if a subsistent thing is also complete, it is entirely incommunicable, and is a supposit. But an incomplete subsistent thing can be communicable by way of a part, provided such communication is not through inherence, for this repugns the mode of subsisting, as has been said; but union by way of a part does not repugn an incomplete or partial subsistent thing, since extended subsistence consisting of parts can be given, as has been shown.

61. What incommunicability belongs to the nature of subsistence. And thus it is easily evident what must be said about subsistence itself taken abstractly; for, generally speaking, only that incommunicability belongs to its nature which is opposed to inherence, or inexistence in another sustaining thing; but speaking

particularly about complete subsistence, which in created things is always suppositality, or personality, it can be said to be communicable in some way as "that which," incommunicable however as "that by which," if we speak in the manner of the metaphysicians; for it, insofar as it is a certain act of nature to which it is joined, is communicated to it, and in this sense it is said to be communicable as "that which"; it constitutes however a thing entirely incommunicable, both by way of inherent form, insofar as it is subsistence, and also by way of part, insofar as it is complete, and in this way it is said to be incommunicable as "that by which." Hence it consequently has that even as "that which" it is incommunicable to other things except its own proper nature, and that it is also not communicable through inherence, but through a certain intimate modification and identity. In two ways moreover can created and complete subsistence be understood to be incommunicable as "that by which," or (which is the same) to be the reason constituting a thing incommunicable. First, with respect to the very thing constituted by it, as such; and this is most certain, because that constituted thing is a supposit, which, as such, is entirely incommunicable, as we have declared. Second, with respect to the nature which it terminates, that is, that it renders not only the supposit itself, but also the nature once terminated incommunicable to another supposit, or incapable of another subsistence. And this indeed, if it is understood only according to the laws of nature and natural capacity, is most certain, and self-evident. But if also in relation to divine power, the matter is uncertain, although it is probable that in this way also a created nature terminated by proper subsistence is rendered entirely incommunicable; although neither of divine nature, nor of created nature terminated by divine personality, is this true, concerning which matter I spoke in tome I, part III, disputation XV, section 2. Finally concerning incomplete subsistence it must be said that it constitutes a thing incommunicable by way of inhering, but not by way of part; for by this very fact that it is

incomplete, it can be a part; and therefore communication by way of part does not repugn it, as is sufficiently evident from the above.

62. Double mode of incomplete subsistence. Only it occurs finally to be noted, that subsistence can be incomplete in two ways, namely, either from itself and intrinsically, or by accident and (so to speak) by reason of state. In the prior way the subsistence of the rational soul, or of prime matter is incomplete; and therefore, whether the soul is conjoined, or is separated, its subsistence is always incomplete, and it is always communicable, nor after separation does it have any positive mode repugnant to communication; and on account of this cause also it is not a supposit. But in the posterior way the subsistence of a part of water is incomplete, when it is united to another part, because only on account of state it is not terminated by its proper and incommunicable terminus. And therefore, if it is separated, it acquires such a terminus and is a true supposit having complete subsistence. And thus it is sufficiently evident in what way subsistence is incommunicable, and for what reason this property does not repugn its divisibility or composition from parts; and thus also the arguments placed at the beginning of the section have been sufficiently satisfied.

## SECTION VI

## WHAT EFFICIENT AND MATERIAL CAUSE SUBSISTENCE HAS

1. From what we have thus far said concerning the formal nature of subsistence, nearly all its properties and various divisions have been explained, namely into incomplete and complete, spiritual and material, simple and composite, or divisible and indivisible. Therefore, it remains only to speak in the present section about its causes, and in the following section about its effects. Among the causes of subsistence, the final cause has been declared by explaining

its function and necessity; there is no formal cause, however, because subsistence itself is like a form or ultimate act in its genus. It remains therefore only to speak about the efficient cause, and we shall touch briefly on the material cause.

2. All created subsistence requires God as efficient cause. There are therefore two certain points concerning the efficient cause of subsistence. The first is that some cause is necessary from which all subsistence of created things comes to be. This is evident because this subsistence is something real and is not something uncreated or eternal; therefore it is necessary that it have its being, whatever that being may be, from some agent. The second is that the subsistence of any given thing is made by that efficient cause from which the thing itself that subsists is made, or that nature which subsistence terminates. Thus, in angels and all things that come to be through creation, God himself is the efficient cause of subsistence; but in those things that come to be through generation, the generator itself from which the generated thing is made also confers subsistence. This will become clearer from what follows; for now it is briefly proved because both creation and generation per se primarily and immediately tend toward a subsisting thing as such; therefore it is necessary that what effects creation or generation effect in some way the subsistence of its effect. The difficulty, however, is also twofold: first, whether the cause creating or generating a subsisting thing confers subsistence by itself alone and by the very same action by which it confers existence; second, granted that the action is in some way different, whether it proceeds immediately from the efficient cause alone that gives existence to the thing, or whether it effects subsistence through the very nature whose subsistence it is.

### *By What Action Subsistence Comes to Be*

3. The opinion of some authors. Concerning the first part, many hold that the entire subsisting thing is made by the same agent

through exactly the same action, along with subsistence itself and existence. This opinion seems to be taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 45, a. 4, where he says that to be created and to come to be is proper to the subsisting thing, because coming to be belongs to that whose being it is; but being properly belongs to what is subsisting, for that is what has being; therefore St. Thomas holds that there is a single action by which a subsisting thing as such comes to be, through which subsistence itself is co-produced or co-created. This testimony seems to contain not only the authority of St. Thomas but also an efficacious argument. And it is confirmed because when an accident comes to be in a subject, the entity of the accident and actual inherence are made by the same action, as we now suppose from what was said above; therefore by the same reasoning, substantial nature and its subsistence are made by a single action. The consequence is proved both because we have often said that the mode of subsistence maintains the same proportion to substantial nature as the mode of inherence has to accidental nature, and also because just as an inhering accidental form comes to be, so a subsisting substantial nature comes to be. Finally it is confirmed because a created supposit is one being simply and per se; therefore it comes to be by one action; therefore subsistence is made or co-created by that same action and by the same agent.

4. On the contrary, however, an argument can be taken from the mystery of the Incarnation, in which we see that the rational soul is created by the same action by which it would be created if it were not to be united to the Word, and of the same species as the actions by which other rational souls are created, as I suppose from what I have treated extensively in tome I of part III, disp. VIII, sect. 1. Therefore the creation of the soul as such does not terminate in the subsistence of the soul but in existence alone; therefore subsistence must come to be by another action or in another way. A similar argument can be made concerning the effection of the whole humanity, and it can be applied to all things. For an angel, for example, could now be united hypostatically to God as regards its nature, as we suppose, and then

the subsistence of the angel would cease to be or be conserved; but its nature would be conserved in the same way and in the same existence in which it is now conserved. Therefore the action by which existence is conserved is different from that by which subsistence is conserved, since when one ceases the other remains. Therefore the action by which a thing receives existence is also different from that through which it receives subsistence, for the productive action and conservative action are the same, properly speaking, if the agent does not vary. And this is confirmed by a physical argument: actions vary according to the distinction and necessity of their terms, because action is nothing other than the dependence of the term on the agent, which formally is a certain mode of the term itself, but really is the term itself as proceeding from the agent. But subsistence is something distinct ex natura rei from the subsisting thing and from its existence; therefore it has a different dependence and emanation from the agent; therefore it comes to be through a distinct action.

5. This action can be understood to be one or several in two ways: first, that it be so one as to be indivisibly the same, such that the effection of subsistence adds nothing in reality to the effection of the nature and its existence that is terminated through subsistence. In another way, the effection of subsistence can be understood to add something to the creative or productive action of the existence of the thing. But this must be subdivided, for it can happen in two ways: first, that what the effection of subsistence adds be an action entirely distinct from the effection of existence, although it be joined with it ex natura rei. Second, that it not be a distinct action but like a certain part of the same action, such that there is only one action terminated to an existing and subsisting thing, yet that action is not simple but composite, consisting of a partial mode or dependence terminated to existence and another partial mode terminated to subsistence—just as the action by which heat of two degrees or heat of two feet is continuously made is indeed one, yet not simple but composite, consisting of partial actions terminated to different degrees and

different parts of the heat. Moreover, this composition of action can occur in two further ways: one is that the composition be such and with such great dependence of the parts on each other that one part cannot remain or come to be without the other—and in this way we judge there to be one action by which an accident both comes to be and is united to its subject, and every form that is educed from the potency of matter or subject. The other way is that this composition be without mutual dependence of the parts, such that one part of the action can remain without the other, which sometimes happens reciprocally and indifferently in either part, as when there is no per se order between them and their partial terms—as in the example given of bipedal heating, for it could occur in half the part only, and indifferently in one part or the other. Sometimes, however, this independence is not mutual, but one part of the action per se presupposes another and cannot exist without it, or at least without it having preceded, although conversely, that which is presupposed or is prior can exist without the subsequent part—as in the example of the action producing heat of two degrees, the action by which the first degree is produced could remain without the subsequent action, but not vice versa.

*The Author's Judgment*

6. The arguments therefore placed in the latter position sufficiently prove that the action by which subsistence comes to be along with the existence of the thing is not so one as to be entirely simple and indivisible, otherwise that action could in no way be terminated to the existence of the thing and prevented from being terminated to subsistence. Because if an action is actually exercised, it is necessary that it have its term; therefore if it attains one term and not another, or one part of a term and not another, this is because one action or one part of an action is impeded and not another. Therefore an action that is thus diminished or impeded, so to speak, cannot be

entirely simple and indivisible. But such is the action by which the entire subsisting thing comes to be, since that action can remain as terminated to the thing or existence of the nature without the action of subsistence; therefore [the conclusion follows]. Moreover, those arguments prove that the effection of existence and subsistence of a thing do not have mutual and necessary dependence between themselves, since one can remain without the other. But I judge that this is not true indifferently or reciprocally and mutually, for the action by which an existing nature comes to be can exist without the effection of proper subsistence, as is evident from the mystery of the Incarnation. But conversely, it cannot happen that the effection of subsistence[23] remain without the productive or conservative action of existing nature. The reason is that since subsistence is only a mode of nature, it cannot exist or come to be except in the nature itself and actually terminating it. Therefore in the order of nature it essentially presupposes existence and consequently also the effection or conservation of the nature itself. According to the principles we have established, therefore, we must philosophize in this way, even if others following other principles are compelled to think otherwise.

7. Nor do the prior arguments accomplish anything against these points, for at most they tend to prove that this action is one, but not that it is simple and indivisible. Just as conversely, although the later arguments prove, as I said, that the action is not simply one, they do not prove definitively that there are two actions, but either that there are two or that there is one composite action that can be diminished and remain as it were maimed or halved. What is truer among these alternatives remains to be investigated, and this depends on the latter point proposed above. For if only the agent that effects existence also immediately makes subsistence, it certainly seems to do both by one total action. But if it alone confers existence while conferring subsistence not by itself alone but through some principle of the subsisting thing itself, there will be two actions, because strictly

[23] subsistentiae, 1960; alit. existentiae. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 440.

speaking they are from different principles. For this reason, therefore, these matters must be treated together.

### *What is the Proximate Principle from Which Subsistence Flows*

8. The principal difficulty of this section is therefore whether subsistence effectively follows from the intrinsic principles of existing nature, or whether it is given by the extrinsic agent alone, with nature behaving only passively or quasi-passively with respect to it. And indeed the latter seems to be true. First, because of the reason suggested above, that the action of the agent per se primarily tends toward the subsisting thing as such; therefore it alone is what gives the effect its entire entity, up to subsistence. Second, from that analogy with accident: when an accident comes to be united with a subject, the mode of inherence is not actively from the accident itself that is united, but the extrinsic agent alone that effects the accident confers actual inherence. Therefore, if proportion is to be maintained, the same must be said about subsistence with respect to substantial nature. Third, because otherwise it follows that prime matter is an intrinsic active principle of its own subsistence, which is contrary to the nature of matter, for since it is pure potency, it is not active. The consequence is evident because that partial subsistence is as intrinsically related to matter and has as much connection with it as the subsistence of the soul has with the soul, or the complete subsistence of the whole nature has with the nature itself. Fourth, because otherwise it follows that nature is violently deprived of its subsistence, which is not consonant with the mystery of the Incarnation, because otherwise it would have to be said that the humanity of Christ is in a violent state. The consequence is evident because that is violent which is against the internal active impulse of nature, according to Ethics III, ch. 1. Therefore, if nature were the intrinsic active principle of its own subsistence, to be deprived of it

would be against the internal active impulse and consequently would be violent. Fifth, because subsistence is not educed from the potency of nature or of any subject, but is only co-created; therefore it can be made immediately by God alone. The antecedent is proved because subsistence is not something inhering in a subject, for as we said above, subsistence is a mode directly opposed to inherence. The consequence is evident because a secondary cause can do nothing except through eduction from the potency of a subject. And this is confirmed because what is co-created with something else does not have an active connection with it, but a formal and material connection, or some similar connection reducible to these. Therefore it comes to be by the same action as the thing that is per se primarily created, just as the matter and form of heaven are co-created with heaven—not, as is known, because of active connection, but because of formal and material connection. Therefore the same must be said about the subsisting thing and about the connection of nature and its proper subsistence. Sixth, because otherwise it follows that existing nature can be conserved without proper subsistence and without any other subsistence, which seems unintelligible, because if nature exists a parte rei and is not in another supposit, it cannot be understood except as being in itself and per se, and consequently as subsisting. The consequence is proved because if God alone effects existence and then subsistence results from existing nature, therefore there are different actions; therefore God can separate one from the other and conserve the former without the latter. Nor will a new action be necessary for this by which some positive mode is given to such a nature in place of proper subsistence, but suspension of divine influence will suffice, for that emanation of proper subsistence from existing nature depends on God's concurrence. For every real mode and every dependence, whatever it may be, depends more and more immediately on the first cause than on the second. Therefore God can suspend that concurrence, giving no other, and conserving the action by which he alone produces existing nature.

*The Author's Opinion*

9. This opinion is probable, nor can the opposite be sufficiently demonstrated. Nevertheless, in tome I of part III, disp. VIII, sect. 3, the contrary seemed more probable to us because of the authority of St. Thomas, at q. 2, a. 5, ad 1, and q. 16, a. 12, in corp. and ad 1, whom his disciples commonly understand in this way and therefore incline to this opinion, which Genebrardus also indicates in book II On the Trinity, pages 93 and 94. The reason is that on the part of nature there are all the principles sufficient for subsistence to result actively from it; therefore it should not be denied that such an active connection intervenes between them. The antecedent is explained because, as we showed above, substantial essence with its existence precedes subsistence in the order of nature; therefore it has everything necessary so that the mode of subsistence can result from it. The consequence is evident because the essence itself is nobler than subsistence, and through existence it is constituted in a state in which it can be the intrinsic principle of subsistence through resultance, at least natural resultance. Again, it seems to be most proportioned to be such a principle, both because such a mode of existing comes from its nobility and perfection, whence it can contain it virtually, and also because it pertains to the perfection of a thing that it can be the intrinsic principle of its own mode of being, especially when that mode is entirely intrinsic and connatural and naturally inseparable from the thing itself. And from this the first consequence of the entire argument remains proved, for when an effect or some mode of a thing can be conveniently reduced to a secondary cause, it should not be attributed to the primary cause alone. Similarly, when it can be referred to an internal principle, it should not be referred to an extrinsic cause alone, especially when such a mode has an intrinsic and inseparable natural connection with the thing whose mode it is. The force of this argument is increased by the similar example of the active

flowing of proper passion from essence, which is admitted both by several authors and by those who think better on the matter. It seems sufficiently proved by the physical experiment of the reduction of water to its pristine coldness, and is more widely taught by philosophers in On the Soul II. But there are no arguments that more probably recommend that effective flowing of passions from essence than the argument we have made; indeed, all arguments are reduced to it, as will easily be apparent to anyone consulting the authors or carefully thinking out such arguments and their force. I add that the said argument has greater force in the present case because there is greater proportion between existing nature and its subsistence, and greater and more intimate connection, than there is between substantial essence and accidental property. Nor does it stand against this argument that subsistence is only a mode of nature while accidental property is a distinct entity—indeed, this rather helps and confirms the argument made, because it is easier for an intrinsic mode to be made or flow from an internal principle than for a distinct entity. This will be further confirmed by the response to the arguments for doubt posed to the contrary.

### *Solutions to the Arguments*

10. To the first argument, I respond that the action of the agent ultimately indeed tends to constitute a per se subsisting thing (for we are dealing with substantial action), but proximately and immediately it effects the existing thing or nature, which when not impeded is naturally followed by subsistence. The agent is said to confer subsistence in the way that one who gives a form is said to give all things consequent to the form. Hence creation, for example, is said to be of subsisting things, not because it is formally terminated to subsistence—for it is really terminated to being as such, as is taken from St. Thomas, I, q. 45, throughout, and specifically a. 4, ad 1—but because it per se primarily tends toward such being to which

subsistence follows ex natura rei, if the creation is made in a manner quasi-connatural to the term itself. I note this because God can create an accidental form that ex se does not have being to which subsistence would follow; nevertheless, that mode of production is extraordinary and preternatural, and then it is necessary that God supernaturally sustain that accident without a subject, and it is probable that he confers on it through a new action a positive mode of per se existing, as was said in similar matter concerning the Eucharist.

11. To the second argument, I deny the consequence and the analogy taken from the inherence of accident, for the reasoning is dissimilar. When an accidental form comes to be in a subject and from a subject, it does not exist prior to inhering by nature, otherwise it would be necessary for it to be created prior to being united by nature. For the same reason it cannot actively unite itself to the subject, because it cannot educate itself from the potency of the subject, nor does it have the being of existence before union even according to the order of nature so that it could be the efficient principle of its own inherence. From the same root comes the fact that such a form receives inherence from the same action and from the same agent from which it receives being. Similarly, those who think that the subsistence of substantial nature is nothing other than the very existence of the substance will correctly and consequently say that subsistence does not result from proper essence but is conferred only by an extrinsic agent, because existence cannot come from an intrinsic principle, nor does a thing have anything before existence from which it could be an efficient principle. Nevertheless, these authors do not speak consequently in this respect: they admit that substantial essence has the actual entity of essence by nature prior to subsistence, because then it is necessary that they admit some prior action through which essence has that actuality which it did not have before and which is separable de potentia absoluta from the action by which subsistence comes to be. Then without reason they deny that essence constituted through the action of the agent in that actuality can be the intrinsic

active principle from which subsistence flows. But this error follows from another noted above, namely because they falsely deny that the actual being of essence is existence, and therefore they also speak falsely and abuse words when they call subsistence, which does not formally constitute the actuality of the thing but affects or modifies it, the existence of the essence itself. But these matters have been sufficiently treated above.

12. Whether an accidental form can in some way efficiently unite itself to a subject. Here, however, it can be inquired concerning the response given whether in any case, or supposing some miracle, an accidental form could effectively unite itself to a subject, at least through natural resultance—for example, supposing quantity is conserved by God separated from a subject, as happens in the Eucharist, and afterwards matter or substance is created intimately present to that quantity, and every impediment is removed on God's part, that is, every action by which God was preventing inherence and per se constituting the quantity is suspended. In that case, therefore, the response given ceases to apply, for that quantity already existed before it was united; therefore it has being from which union can effectively flow. And on the other hand, there is as intimate a connection between quantity and actual inherence as there is between substantial nature and subsistence. This can be confirmed from a certain probable opinion of Henry, asserting that because the rational soul exists by nature prior to being substantially united to matter that is intimately present to disposed matter, it actively unites itself to the body through a certain natural resultance or activity. If you object that form does not effect information actively but formally, it can be responded that both concurrences occur.

13. I left this way of speaking about quantity in that case as probable in tome I of part III, in the place cited. But afterwards, having considered the matter more thoroughly, in tome III, disp. LVII, sect. 3, I judged more probably, and rightly, that even the inherence of a preexisting accident does not flow actively from the accident itself, but

must be made by some extrinsic agent. The reason is that although the accident exists for an entire prior time without inherence and consequently is conserved in being through an action not educting from the potency of matter but of another and superior kind, nevertheless, in that instant in which it is again united to the subject, it does not have being prior to being united, because then it no longer receives being through that superior and quasi-creative action, but through an eductive action, or (which is the same thing) a conservative action of the form in the subject and from the subject, and not otherwise. Through this action the form simultaneously receives being and in-being, and therefore such a form cannot be the active principle of such action or inherence that it receives through it in that instant. In this way the difference assigned in the superior response has place even in an accident that is supposed to exist previously separated in time. For that preexistence (so to speak) preceding in time is per accidens with respect to the action that is in that instant in which such an accident is united to the subject. Therefore the example taken from the rational soul is also not similar, for it, even as it exists in that instant in which it is united to the body, exists prior by nature and through an action not eductive but creative. Besides which, that opinion of Henry is quite doubtful and uncertain, as I noted in tome II of part III, disp. XLIV, sect. 5.

14. Whether a corporeal substantial form can actively unite itself. From this, however, it is incidentally inferred that the same thing that was said about accidental form must also be said about material substantial form regarding its actual union and quasi-inherence in matter. Because it too comes to be through eduction, and therefore simultaneously and by the same action it exists and is united, and therefore just as it cannot effect itself, so it cannot unite itself. But truly, if the discussion is not about the inherence of substantial form but about that partial mode by which such a form completes the subsistence of the whole, it is correctly understood to result actively from the form itself. For this already presupposes the form as existing

and united to matter according to its essential entity, and in other respects it is related to it in the same way as subsistence is related to essence.

15. Second, the reason is also incidentally understood why the action through which an accident or material form comes to be and is united to a subject cannot be quasi-divided and remain giving being to such a form without giving it inherence or union with the subject. But whenever an accident is separated from a subject and thus conserved, the prior action entirely ceases and a new one begins, giving or conserving that being without union. But it is otherwise with the action or actions through which substantial nature receives being and subsistence, for that prior action can be divided and separated from the posterior, as I said. The reason for the difference is that the action by which accidental or material form receives being in a connatural way is essentially dependent on the subject, otherwise it would not be an eductive action. But when the union is removed, the concurrence of the subject ceases, and therefore it is necessary that such an action cease and another begin that is quasi-creative and productive. But the action through which substantial nature comes to be does not essentially depend on subsistence, since this is posterior to the very being to which such action is terminated. I have said more about this matter in tome I of part III, disp. VIII, sect. 1.

16. Whether subsistence results from prime matter. To the third argument, which concerned prime matter, some think it inappropriate to attribute this activity, even through natural resultance, to it, and therefore they say that activity of subsistence of this kind is always from form alone, not only in simple natures or subsisting forms (which is per se clear), but also in complete natures consisting of matter and form. This way of speaking would be quite probable if subsistence were a simple entity entirely really distinct from matter and form. But supposing what we taught above, that subsistence is a mode of nature having composition or simplicity proportioned to the nature itself, and that it is either partial or integral

according to the condition of the nature it terminates, it must necessarily be said that subsistence follows from that nature which it proximately terminates. I therefore concede that the incomplete subsistence of matter results from matter itself. For it cannot result from form, both because subsistence follows nature as a mode follows the thing whose mode it is, but the subsistence of matter is not a mode of form but of matter itself, and also because that subsistence of matter is presupposed by nature to the form itself, because for matter to be the first subject of generation, it is presupposed as subsisting, and under different forms it retains numerically the same subsistence. Nor is it inappropriate to attribute this kind of activity concerning proper subsistence to matter, for although it is not active by proper action that is ordered to communicating its being, because it cannot produce something similar to itself nor dispose toward it, nevertheless, through a certain resultance concerning some property or mode of its own, nothing prevents it from being active. For thus quantity, which is a property of matter and always accompanies it, naturally flows from it according to a probable opinion, and many think the same about relations that exist in matter and result in it when a term is posited. Nor does it stand against this that matter is pure potency in the order to formal act, for this does not exclude its having some actual essence, which is sufficient for some properties or modes of being proportioned to it to result from it.

17. Whether a substance deprived of its subsistence is in a violent state. To the fourth argument, I respond that the difficulty touched on there proceeds equally concerning essence, whether it be compared actively to subsistence or only passively, because the violent is not only what is against an internal active principle, but also what is against a passive principle. For Aristotle, in the place cited there, only says that the violent is what is from an extrinsic principle, with the patient contributing nothing at all to whom force is applied. But one who suffers something from outside contrary to natural passive appetite contributes nothing but rather resists. Therefore the same

difficulty remains, whether nature is the active principle of proper subsistence or only postulates it by natural aptitude and passive appetite—in what way is it not in a violent state if deprived of it? Theologians dispute about this matter, partly in I-II, q. 6, partly in III, q. 2, and some generally say that whatever a creature suffers from God positively or privatively is not violent, because according to obediential potency it is subject to its creator and is more inclined toward this than toward its particular perfection—just as water, when it ascends to fill a vacuum, does not ascend violently, because although that motion is against the particular appetite of its proper nature, it is according to the general appetite for the good of the universe. Others, however, respond in particular that the humanity of Christ is not in a violent state because, although it is deprived of proper subsistence, it is elevated to a higher state and to union with a nobler subsistence that virtually and eminently contains whatever perfection is in its own subsistence. This is the true opinion, which I have treated extensively in tome I of part III, disp. VIII, sect. 3.

18. The fifth argument could be turned to the contrary, at least to prove that the mode by which subsistence comes to be is different from that by which existing nature comes to be, and therefore it can rather be concluded from this part that the action or effection is different, and it does not contradict that subsistence results actively from nature itself, even if nature according to its existence is created by an extrinsic agent. Because nature is created simply from nothing, or generated from preexisting matter that was created from nothing; but subsistence comes to be in some way from the very nature whose subsistence it is. For just as it is in it as its mode and essentially depends on it in the genus of material cause, at least by reduction, so it comes to be from it, nor can it come to be otherwise than joined to the nature itself and resting in it and depending on it. This is sufficient for it to be able to result actively from the nature itself. Nor does it stand against this that subsistence is said to be co-created when a thing is created, because co-creation, although it does not always require the

flowing of one thing from another, as the confirmation added to that fifth argument well explains, nevertheless does not always exclude it. For sometimes something is said to be co-created as a part of what is per se primarily created, and then it is not necessary that flowing of one from another intervene, but only the composition of one integral term that per se primarily comes to be through one action composite and proportioned to the term—and in this way heaven is created by one action and its parts are co-created. In another way something is said to be co-created because it is joined by natural necessity with the proximate term of creation, as intellect is co-created with the soul, and co-creation of this kind does not exclude but rather almost always has joined to it the flowing of that thing which is co-created from the existence or essence of the thing that is created—and in this way subsistence is said to be co-created. Finally, in another way co-creation only indicates concomitance with creation in the same moment, without intrinsic or necessary connection. In this way grace is commonly said to be co-created with angels, or with Adam, and co-creation of this kind is neither the same action as creation nor flowing necessarily joined with it, but is an entirely distinct action joined with creation either from the will of the creator or from the concomitance of another agent—as, for example, the light of air could have been co-created with air from the presence of the sun, which illuminated it in the same instant in which it was created. Therefore from the co-creation of subsistence, flowing of it from essence[24] cannot be excluded.

19. But you will urge that the co-creation of subsistence should not be placed in the second order but in the first, and therefore excludes the aforesaid flowing. The assumption is proved because what is co-created in that second way presupposes the integral term of creation constituted and is only joined per accidens and at most per se secundo with the term that is per se primo created—and in this way intellect is co-created with soul or angel, and light with sun, and

[24] essentia, 1960; alit. existentiae. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 450.

quantity with body or matter, and so forth. But subsistence is not thus related; for it does not presuppose the term of creation and is joined to it per se secundo, but is formally included in the adequate and per se primo term of creation. For what is created is not nature but the supposit, or subsisting thing as such; therefore subsistence is created as a formal part of the thing that is created, which pertains to the first mode of co-creation. Therefore it cannot be co-created as flowing from the term of creation. I respond that this objection is founded only on that common way of speaking that the supposit is what is generated or created, and not the nature. This locution must be understood in the same way as another similar one, namely that the supposit is what operates. The sense of this is not that subsistence is the reason for acting, but that it is a certain complement that ex natura rei is presupposed in the agent, by reason of which the supposit itself is said to be what operates, although the reason for acting is the nature or form itself, as we shall say more fully in the following section. Thus, therefore, the supposit is said to be what comes to be or is created, not because subsistence itself is the formal reason (so to speak) for terminating creation, but because it is the substantial complement of the thing that is created, naturally and necessarily resulting from the formal term of creation, which is substantial being itself. Therefore creation by its force makes a thing independent of a subject, and by its nature tends toward producing a thing entirely complete in its substantial being. But it is completed through subsistence, as I said, and therefore a subsisting thing is said to be created although creation as such does not immediately attain subsistence itself, but that being to which subsistence follows. And thus it remains sufficiently explained in what way subsistence is said to be co-created, not as part of the term that creation immediately attains, but as a mode naturally consequent to such a term.

*On the Material Cause of Subsistence*

20. There is suggested in that argument a certain difficulty pertaining to the other part of this section, which concerns the material cause of subsistence—namely, whether subsistence properly has a material cause, and what that cause might be. In this matter, subsistence can first be compared to that nature which it adequately terminates, that is, simple and complete subsistence to its proportionate nature (namely, the angelic), simple but incomplete subsistence to matter or the rational soul, and complete and composite subsistence to the integral and composite nature. According to this comparison, it is certain that subsistence is affixed to and intimately adheres to the nature which it terminates, and thus depends upon that nature both in its coming to be and in its being, such that it could not come to be or exist in any other way. All of these points have been proven in what precedes.

21. The Opinion of Some. From this, some also speak in such a way as to say that subsistence inheres in the nature which it terminates, and is made or educed from it as from matter, because every mode which by the order of nature presupposes the thing which it modifies thus inheres and is made from that thing. I say "which presupposes the modifiable thing" in order to exclude creative dependence or passive creation, which is also a mode of the thing that is created, yet is not in that thing or made from it as from a subject, because it does not presuppose that thing by the order of nature, but rather tends toward it. This, however, is singular in this mode because of its special character, which is to be a way to the terminus. But subsistence is not of this kind; rather, it presupposes by the order of nature the thing which it affects and terminates, and therefore is compared to that thing as to a subject and matter, just like all other similar modes. This is confirmed, for in this way it is excellently understood how subsistence can come to be with the concurrence of the essence itself, because, namely, it is educed from the potency of the subject, just as for the contrary reason passive creation, although it is affixed to the terminus, cannot be brought about by a created agent,

nor with the concurrence of the terminus itself, because it is not in that terminus as in a subject. If you object that inherence is repugnant to subsistence, it can be answered that inherence is not repugnant to it as that which inheres, but as that by which something inheres—that is, it is not repugnant to subsistence to be inherent, but rather to constitute something inherent. Or otherwise (and it comes to the same thing), inherence is repugnant to it not on its own part, but on the part of the thing in which it inheres or which it constitutes. For subsistence itself constitutes the subsistent, to which as such it is repugnant that it should inhere. It also terminates nature, which it renders inept for inhering in or existing in another. But subsistence accomplishes this very thing by inhering in such a nature.

22. The Opinion of Others. Others, however, are not pleased with this manner of speaking and consequently deny that subsistence inheres in nature. Some give as the reason for this that otherwise it would be an accident—a reason which does not conclude, because there is no question here of inherence in that strict sense, but as it can pertain to substantial union with dependence in existing, which is often attributed to material forms. Others give the reason that subsistence is not a form properly and strictly speaking; therefore neither is the nature which it terminates compared to it as matter or subject; therefore neither does inherence occur between them, but another kind of union far different. Both consequences are clear, because these are as it were correlatives, or mutually follow from each other. The antecedent is proven by theologians, because otherwise the divine Word could not supply the place of subsistence, since it cannot be a form. It can also be proven because subsistence is neither an accidental form, as has been proven above, nor substantial, because otherwise it could not inform either another form or a complete substantial nature.

23. The Author's Judgment. This disagreement seems to be largely a matter of manner of speaking, for in reality it is established that there is an inseparable union between subsistence and essence or

nature with its terminus, and that created subsistence itself, insofar as it is a certain mode really distinct from nature, has a certain imperfect and diminished being, which can neither come to be nor be conserved except as affixed to such a nature. Whether, however, that conjunction and dependence should be called inherence or not seems to pertain to manner of speaking. Nevertheless, the latter manner of speaking pleases me more, both because every mode which is not really distinguished, but only modally, from the thing of which it is a mode seems to have with that thing a union of a different character than inherence properly taken, as can be gathered from what has been said above concerning modal distinction and formal cause, and as we shall say again below when treating of accidents. If this holds place in all modes, much more so in substantial ones, which concur to the completion of substance. And this proceeds especially in this mode which is subsistence, since it has of itself to complete the created supposit in the positive character of being per se. This is also because of the reason given, that subsistence is not compared to nature as form, but as pure terminus; therefore neither is nature compared to subsistence as matter or proper subject; it is compared therefore as terminable to its terminus, with which it has a necessary natural connection, and broadly speaking or reductively they are related as act and potency. This relationship and connection is sufficient for subsistence to be able to emanate from nature through natural resultance.

24. From these considerations it is established that if subsistence is compared not to the nature which it terminates, but to another subject, it cannot be inherent in anything, because this is much more repugnant to its character, and this is per se manifest in every complete subsistence. Likewise in the partial subsistence of prime matter. Concerning the partial subsistence of the rational soul, it is true that it is in some way in the body, or in the subsistence of the body, with which it completes the integral subsistence of the whole, as the ultimate act of that subsistence, yet not with inherence, because it

does not depend upon that subsistence in its being, but with simple union, which is not repugnant to partial subsistence. Hence the subsistence of the body cannot be said to be the material cause of the subsistence of the soul. In material forms, however, we deny that there is partial subsistence precisely because their mode is truly in matter with material causality and with dependence and some inherence.

### *Whether Substantial Nature Can Be Conserved Without Any Subsistence*

25. The Opinion of Scotus and the Position of Cajetan. In the sixth argument there is touched upon another difficulty—namely, whether it can happen that God impede the emanation of subsistence from nature through the mere suspension of influx, and thus whether it can happen that nature be conserved without any subsistence, whether proper or alien. This difficulty, if it is attentively considered, has much more place in the contrary position, which asserts that God alone effects subsistence together with existence. For if he can suspend his influx concerning a thing or posterior mode while conserving the prior one, when that influx is with a second cause, by the same or greater reason he will be able to do this if it is from himself alone. Therefore, that difficulty does not depend upon the present question which we are now treating, but is common to every position asserting that subsistence is a positive thing really distinct from nature. Scotus touched upon this in III, dist. 1, q. 1, where, although he considers it unfitting that an existing nature could be conserved without proper subsistence and without union to an alien one, he nevertheless thinks that this follows from that position asserting subsistence to be a positive thing really distinct. And Cajetan, III, q. 4, a. 2, responding to Scotus, concedes that this follows, and does not consider it unfitting that through the absolute power of God nature be conserved without any personality, whether proper or alien.

26. The Difficulty in Cajetan's Opinion. This position is very difficult in Cajetan's own opinion, for he says that subsistence is prior to existence and constitutes the proper recipient of existence. But nature cannot be conserved without existence; therefore neither without subsistence, which is prior. If it should be said that God can invert this order and place existence in nature before subsistence, we can argue ad hominem against this. For Cajetan says that God does not conserve matter without form, because it is not capable of existence except through form, since form constitutes the recipient of existence, nor can existence be constituted outside its proper recipient[25]. Thus therefore nature will not be able to be conserved without subsistence, because it is not capable of existence except through subsistence, nor can this order be inverted, because existence cannot be constituted outside its proper recipient. That is more remarkable which some teach—that subsistence is nothing other than substantial existence itself, and nonetheless they admit that nature can be conserved without proper or alien subsistence. For here they are forced to concede that essence can be conserved in the nature of things without existence. How absurd this is, is evident from the very terms, and has been treated more broadly above. In our position, however, this difficulty ceases, for we think that existing essence is prior by the order of nature to its subsistence, and therefore, even if subsistence were impeded, nature would not be deprived of its existence, and thus it seems it can probably be said that this implies no contradiction. For in that case such a nature would be said to be per se merely negatively, because it would not be in another, yet not positively, because it would not be so terminated as to be positively incapable of union to another supposit.

27. Resolution of the Doubt. Nevertheless, the contrary position seems more probable, which Fonseca also held, lib. V, c. 8, q. 6, sect. 5, ad 4 Scoti, and he cites St. Thomas for this position, In III,

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[25] extra … susceptivum, 1960; alit. circa positivum susceptivum. "… resultando difícilmente inteligible la idea." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 456.

dist. 5, q. 3, a. 3, ad 3, where he only says that if humanity were separated from the Word, it would immediately subsist. The words of St. Thomas are to be noted, from which a not weak argument for this side is gathered: "Separation (he says) gives totality to each of the parts, and in continuous things it also gives actual being to each, whence by the very fact that he would lay down humanity, that man would subsist per se in rational nature, and from this very fact would receive the character of person." When therefore that which is added or results is only an intrinsic terminus, it cannot be so impeded that the thing remains utterly unterminated, as the example of a line proves. For it cannot be understood that it remains utterly without terminus, or that when a line is divided and the point connecting the parts is removed, proper termini do not result in the divided parts, although there is the same or greater distinction between the point and the parts of the line as between subsistence and nature. There is also an excellent example concerning quantity and figure. For who would understand a magnitude existing in the nature of things that is terminable by figure, yet terminated by no figure? This truly cannot be understood. Or that a line should not be straight or oblique, and a surface not round or angular[26]? Yet figure is a mode of quantity really distinct from it.

28. It happens therefore that between thing and mode there is so intrinsic a connection that the thing cannot lack every terminating mode. Therefore, if this connection is found anywhere, it is maximally between subsistence and nature, which are compared not only as terminus and terminable, but subsistence is such a terminus as to be immutable by nature, and makes more of a unity with nature than figure with quantity. The same argument can be taken from local presence, for it cannot happen that there be quantity, for example, in the nature of things and have no local presence, even though it could vary this or that presence, although presence is also a mode really

[26] angularis, 1960; singularis, 1597. "La palabra singularis debería ser sustituida por angularis. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 457.

distinct and of inferior or accidental character. From this we also understand that there are some modes so immediately opposed that a thing cannot be deprived of one except by reason of the opposed mode, not indeed through pure lack of both. Of this kind are, in a line for example, being straight or oblique; in nature, existing per se or inexisting in another. Therefore, for this reason also, nature cannot be deprived of proper subsistence unless it is constituted in some other person, which happens through a certain mode of union opposed to subsistence.

29. To the argument therefore made in the sixth reason, it must be said that although God can absolutely suspend his influx, nevertheless sometimes he necessarily confers one mode, given the will to remove another, because of the intrinsic connection of things, as can be seen in the said examples. I add, however, that although it would not imply contradiction for nature to be deprived of all subsistence, both proper and alien, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it is more consonant with the natures of things that whenever a thing is deprived of some mode of existing connatural to it, it is affected by the opposed mode, when there is immediate opposition between them, so that nature is not deprived of subsistence except through hypostatic union. And conversely, that an accident, when deprived of inherence, receives some positive mode of being per se, opposed to inherence, as we have more probably indicated in the matter of the Eucharist, because it is very alien to nature to remain without some intrinsic terminus. Hence, besides the miracle of separation, there would be a new miracle for a thing to be conserved without any other mode or terminus.

## *Whether Existence & Subsistence Come to Be by One Action*

30. From the resolution of this point follows the decision of another touched upon above, concerning the unity or plurality of this

action. For it must be said that the action by which subsistence comes to be together with the existence of the thing is not only not simple or indivisible, but is not even one composite action, but consists of distinct though connected efficiencies. This is evident from what has been said, because one is creation, for example, in an angel, but another is (so to speak) only the modification of the thing already created, which is as it were a certain eduction from the potency of the subject. Likewise, they are from diverse principles, for one is from God alone, or an extrinsic agent, but the other proximately is from intrinsic nature. There is no greater difference between actions or efficiencies than between principles. Finally, one is proper action, the other is intrinsic resultance. It is customarily said that there is only one action by which essence comes to be with subsistence, not indeed in the sense which we have treated thus far—that is, that it immediately attains subsistence itself together with existence—but that that resultance of subsistence from existing nature is not a new action, since subsistence results from the force of the proper action. In this way many speak of the emanation of properties from essence. Nevertheless, if this position is to be correctly explained, it can differ only in words. For as regards the matter itself, it cannot be denied that some efficiency is necessary so that subsistence, which previously was not, begins to be in the nature of things, as we were saying at the beginning of the section, and this is sufficiently known from philosophical principles, because what previously was not cannot begin to be except from some agent and through some efficiency—otherwise every way of proving the necessity of an efficient cause is removed. Again, that this efficiency is in some way really distinct is easily proven, both from the distinction of the very things that come to be, and from separation, because the existence or entity of a thing can come to be without proper subsistence, as happened in Christ's humanity. Hence, if the divine Word were to dismiss humanity, and that humanity were to receive proper subsistence, this could not happen without a new efficiency, distinct from that by which it was

long ago created, because it is a new effect distinct from the prior one. Whether, however, this efficiency should be called proper and per se action can be a question, which has been treated generally above, disp. XVIII, sect. 3, and what was said there can be applied here.

31. What Action Subsistence Determines for Itself in Order to Come to Be. Finally, concerning this emanation or dependence of subsistence upon nature, it can be asked whether it is entirely essential to subsistence itself, or is something distinct from it, in the way that above we said action or dependence upon efficient cause is distinguished from its terminus. This is the same as asking whether subsistence so requires to come to be through emanation from its proper essence that it cannot come to be otherwise, even through the absolute power of God, or whether God can change the mode of effecting such subsistence, so that it does not come to be from the essence itself, but from God alone. For if we admit this latter to be possible, it plainly follows that the dependence or emanation[27] of proper subsistence upon essence is something really distinct from subsistence itself, because it is separable from it, since it is supposed that the same subsistence can come to be or remain without dependence upon proper essence, through the efficiency of God alone. If, however, this is believed impossible, it follows more probably that subsistence itself through itself essentially depends upon proper essence. For this inseparability, both from the nature of the thing and in relation to divine power, indicates sufficiently real indistinction or identity, especially where no other indication of real or modal distinction can be found, as is evident from what has been said above when treating of distinctions of things. Just as, because subsistence is so related to nature that subsistence cannot be conserved separated from nature, we correctly conclude that the formal union which proper subsistence has with its nature is not a mode really distinct from subsistence itself, but that it is through itself essentially

[27] dimanationem, 1597, 1960; denominationem, ed. Vivès. "En otras ediciones, p. ej. en la de Vivès, consta incomprensiblemente denominationem."

conjoined to its nature, and therefore cannot be conserved otherwise. If therefore subsistence similarly cannot be conserved without effective dependence upon proper essence, it is a sign that that dependence is not a distinct mode, but is included in the essential character of subsistence itself.

32. Someone could again take an argument from formal union to effective dependence. For if subsistence can in no way be except in its nature, therefore by parity of reason it must be said that it can in no way be except from its nature. Just as therefore the dependence of subsistence upon proper nature, as upon a cause materially speaking, is essential to it, so also dependence upon the same essence as upon an active principle will be essential. Nevertheless, this conclusion is not effective, both because material dependence is more intrinsic by its genus, and also because subsistence, precisely from the fact that it is only a mode, has essentially that it be united through itself, without any intervening mode of union, to the thing of which it is a mode. For this is common to all modes, as has been said above, and is evident in motion, figure, sitting, and similar things. But the essential dependence of a mode upon the thing of which it is a mode, as upon an effective principle, is not of the character of mode as such. Indeed, often the dependence upon the terminus is really distinguished, even in these modes. Thus local presence, which is only a certain mode, can come to be through diverse actions and from diverse agents, which is a manifest sign that dependence is outside its essence and really distinct and separable, since it is thus variable concerning the same presence. Therefore, from the common character of mode it cannot be concluded that subsistence depends equally essentially upon its nature in the genus of efficient cause as in the genus of material cause. Nor is it easy to find any principle by which this could be proven to belong to subsistence from its proper and special character.

33. Likewise, it is difficult to assign a contradiction in this—that God impede the natural emanation of subsistence from proper

essence, and produce it by his efficacy and power alone. For why can he not withhold the concurrence suitable and necessary for that emanation, but by more powerful action prevent it, and effect subsistence by himself alone? If someone should respond that this cannot happen because it is repugnant to the essence of subsistence itself, he begs the question or commits a circle in the present doubt, for this is what we are investigating—whence it is evident that this is included in the character of subsistence. Therefore I think the matter is uncertain and there is no special principle from which it can be defined. Using, however, general principles—such as that effective dependence is regularly distinguished from the terminus, and that God can effect by himself alone whatever a second cause can, where no special repugnance appears—using these and similar principles, I say, it is more probable that this dependence is not of the essence of subsistence, but outside its character.

## SECTION VII

## WHETHER SUBSISTENCE HAS ANY CAUSALITY, AND HOW ACTIONS ARE SAID TO BE OF SUPPOSITA

1. Although every kind of causality can in some way be attributed to subsistence, the principal difficulty in this matter concerns efficient causality, and something must also be touched upon incidentally concerning material causality. For regarding formal causality, it is already clear from what has been said that subsistence is not a form, properly and physically speaking, but is nevertheless compared to the suppositum or subsisting thing as a formal act constituting the suppositum and terminating the nature. Beyond this metaphysical causality of whatever sort, it has no other formal causality, because it is received in nothing else that it could inform. This is especially true of any complete subsistence and of the partial

subsistence of matter, for the partial subsistence of the rational soul can be compared to the subsistence of the body by way of form, as was said above. Beyond these things, the term specifying an action, or that toward which the action tends, is customarily reduced to causality or the nature of form, and this kind of causality is usually attributed to subsistence with respect to all or most actions. But this is very improper causality and can scarcely be attributed to subsistence except with respect to that action by which it itself comes to be. For with respect to other actions, it is compared rather in a quasi-material way, as will become clearer from the end of this entire section.

2. Again, concerning final causality, nothing else occurs to be said except that subsistence is desirable for its own sake. Nevertheless, because subsistence is always and necessarily conjoined with the existence of a nature, and does not come to be per se primarily through any action, but necessarily remains once the creation or generation of the thing is posited, according to the sense declared in the preceding section, therefore in relation to use or attainment it does not exercise proper causality as an end, beyond that which is found in being itself or living. For we do not care to obtain subsistence, or rather to preserve it, by any other means than those by which we protect existence or life.

3. Again, efficient causality can be understood in two ways. One can be called internal or quasi-immanent, concerning the very suppositum constituted through subsistence, whether that efficiency be proper, such as the efficiency of the soul concerning its vital acts, or improper or through natural resultance, such as that of the soul concerning its powers, or of any form concerning its proper accidents. The other is efficiency that is quasi-extrinsic or entirely passing over to others. And something must be said about all of these. We shall begin, however, with the last mode of efficiency as being more common and clearer.

## *Various Opinions Concerning the Mode by Which Subsistence is a Principle of Actions*

4. First Opinion. We inquire therefore whether subsistence is a principle of actions proceeding from a suppositum. In this matter there can be two extreme ways of speaking. The first is that subsistence is the per se and formal principle of all actions of the suppositum, if not complete, at least partial, such that it influences together with the nature itself, and the action depends no less immediately and per se on subsistence than on the nature. Certain recent theologians seem to hold this opinion when explaining the mystery of the Incarnation. For in order to defend that the actions of Christ proceeding from his humanity are in some way divine or operations of God, they think it necessary that they flow per se and proximately from the very subsistence of the Word, and therefore they say that this causality belongs to proper subsistence, and for this reason the same is supplied by the divine Word. And in this way they understand that axiom: "Actions are of supposita," since otherwise (they say), if suppositalitas itself does not per se influence actions and is related to them only accidentally, then they will not be actions of supposita except concomitantly and by a very accidental denomination, which is contrary to the sense of the doctors who use that axiom and contrary to Aristotle, from whom it seems to be taken in the places cited below. But if this opinion is true, it has place not only in transient actions but also in immanent ones, in supposita that have them, and not only in one or another action, but in all that are proper actions, omitting natural resultances. For subsistence never has some peculiar action of which it is the proper principle; in this all agree, nor indeed would it be easy to feign or assign such an action. If therefore subsistence is posited as a principle of acting in the aforesaid mode, it ought to be for some universal and common reason applying to all actions, or to all

natures that are not of themselves sufficient principles of actions unless they are helped by subsistence.

5. Second Opinion. The other mode of speaking, extremely opposed, can be that subsistence is in no way a principle of acting, nor is it per se required and concurrent to actions, but merely concomitantly. Many theologians seem to embrace this doctrine, especially the nominalists, who indifferently admit that nature itself or humanity operates equally as well as the suppositum. And it can be founded on Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 1, from which place many take that axiom: "Actions are of supposita"; and yet Aristotle did not say that actions are of supposita, but that they are concerned with singulars. From this an argument can be constructed, for, setting aside subsistence, nature itself is a singular and existing thing; therefore it is a sufficient principle of action, while subsistence is a concomitant condition entirely accidental in relation to action. And it is confirmed, for subsistence cannot per se immediately influence action, as will immediately be proved; therefore it concurs only accidentally. And it can be excellently declared by the example of the Trinity, for although actions ad extra, such as creation, etc., are denominatively attributed to the Father and Son and Holy Spirit, nevertheless, because those relations and personal subsistences were not per se necessary for such an action of creating and similar ones, but the divine nature itself was per se sufficient, therefore creation is attributed as properly to the divinity as to the persons themselves, and those relations as such are not principles per se and immediately influencing such actions. Thus therefore every created subsistence is compared to the actions of its nature.

### *For the Resolution of the Question: First Assertion*

6. Nevertheless, a middle way must be held, and it must be said first that created subsistence does not have a proper and immediate influx into the actions of the suppositum. This is the

common opinion (as I believe). First of all, it is necessary that Scotus and all who place the nature of subsisting in negations hold this view. For they could not think that a negation per se actively influences positive actions. Then, the Thomists who say that even existence itself is not a principle per se and formally of acting, but only a necessary condition, are compelled by much greater reason to say this of subsistence. Indeed, some of them affirm this, even if they otherwise hold that subsistence is nothing other than substantial existence—which we cannot prove, because we showed above that existence is formally and per se included in the actual principle of acting. But concerning subsistence we now think otherwise, because we believe it is only a mode of existence itself, distinct from it according to the nature of the thing. And the conclusion can be proved primarily by theological arguments or examples, for in God the entire nature of acting is the divine nature or will; but the personalities, as such, do not have proper influx into actions ad extra, and for this reason actions ad extra are said to be undivided in the Trinity, just as the nature, will, and power are also undivided. Someone will say that this is peculiar to God, because the divine nature per se is and essentially subsisting. It is replied first that it is much more certain that the entire nature of acting ad extra is the divine nature or will, than that there is in God an essential subsistence rationally distinct from the personal ones. Then, if created personal subsistence is per se active, there is no reason why divine personal subsistences should not also be active, although essential subsistence, as it belongs to the nature of the nature itself, is also active, especially since it is also true of these divine actions that actions are of supposita. Therefore, if in divine persons, in order that they themselves be the ones who operate, it is not necessary that the personalities themselves have proper influx or are formal principles of acting, neither will this be necessary in created persons. And (what presses most strongly) even in productions ad intra, such as generation and spiration, the more serious theologians say that the formal principle of these is the nature, or intellect, or will, while the

relation of the producing person is only a necessary condition, and this is sufficient for only such a person to be said to be able to generate or spirate, and not the divine nature.

7. Another example or argument is taken from the mystery of the Incarnation. For Christ subsisting in human nature had a complete and total principle of human operations, and yet he did not have created subsistence; therefore this subsistence is not part of that principle, nor does it per se have proper influx into operations. Nor indeed can it be said that in Christ humanity alone is not the complete formal principle of human acts, but is completed by the subsistence of the Word, supplying the place of created subsistence. For the subsistence of the Word does not supply the place of created subsistence with regard to any activity, but only with regard to the termination of the assumed nature. Otherwise some activity ad extra would belong to the divine Word through its proper relation, which would not be common to the other persons—which is entirely false and contrary to that axiom: "The actions of the Trinity ad extra are undivided." Nor can it be said that this activity of proper subsistence is supplied in Christ by the divine Word, not through relation, but through the divine will. For hence it would follow that the humanity of Christ is not the proper and complete principle of human actions, but that the divinity together with humanity is that principle. It also follows that human actions are not proper to Christ as proximate cause, but were partly common to the Father and Holy Spirit. Both of these, however, are false and very absurd in theology. Concerning this matter it was said in its proper place, tome 1 of the Third Part, disputation IV, section 4. Therefore the humanity of Christ was the complete formal principle of his human actions; therefore in the same way it is in other men. And this also confirms the common doctrine of the Holy Fathers, asserting that multiple natures are followed by multiple operations, even if there is one person, because, namely, the formal principle of acting is nature, not personality.

8. Physical Argument. Third, the same can be proved by physical induction. For if we run through merely accidental and natural actions, all of these flow proximately from proportioned forms, such as heating from heat, cooling from cold, local motion from impetus or gravity, etc. And similarly vital actions flow proximately from proper faculties, with the soul concurring as principal principle. Hence it is so far from the case that these actions are attributed to supposita on account of the proper influx of subsistence itself, that often not even the nature or substantial form itself has such proximate influx, but the action is attributed to the suppositum only because it sustains in itself the accidental form that is the principle of acting, as hot water sustains heat. But if the form or soul itself somehow immediately concurs in vital actions (as is most probable), this indeed belongs to the soul according to its essential entity, according to which it is the principle of life, but not according to subsistence, whose proper and special influx is in no way necessary for such acts. Hence it happens that the same judgment must be made concerning vital actions of spiritual supposita and concerning accidental actions of any supposita whatever. But concerning the generation of substances, judgment must be taken from the accidental, either because we do not know substance except through accidents, or because natural agents do not attain substantial generation except through accidental disposition, or certainly because such generative action is entirely concerned with the composition of the nature of the thing to be generated. But subsistence is partly presupposed, partly naturally follows, as I will declare in the following reasoning.

9. Fourth, therefore, I argue by reason, which can be taken partly from the proper nature of subsistence itself, partly from the term of each action. For created subsistence is only, as we said, a certain mode of created nature and presupposes in the nature the entire actual essence of the thing with its existence. But the principle of operations is the essence of the thing, either through itself or through faculties that follow upon it. A mode of existing, however, is

not a principle of acting, but at most can be a condition required for acting. Indeed, universally all those modes of things that do not bring with them proper entity and reality, although they are often conditions either useful or necessary for operations, are never proper and per se principles of acting, as can easily be shown by induction. From the part of the term, however, it is proved in this way: in every purely accidental action the formal term is some accident that is not subsisting; therefore on its part it is not necessary that the subsistence of the agent be the proximate principle of such action. And although through such action the form is not said to be made (for example, heat), but the composite, namely the hot thing, which on the part of the subject includes the subsisting suppositum, nevertheless all this that is included on the part of the subject is not made through that action, but is presupposed to it, and only because of the union of the form with the nature existing in such a suppositum is that composite said to be made per se primo. Therefore even on the part of the principle it is not necessary that subsistence be the proper, per se, and formal principle of such action, but it suffices that it be presupposed in the operating suppositum as a necessary condition. In substantial generation, however, subsisting matter is presupposed primarily as the first subject, and from this part it is clear that the subsistence of the generated thing is not entirely made by the generator, but is partly presupposed. Again, the entire generative action is concerned with the eduction or union of form with matter, from which subsistence results, according to what was said in the preceding section. Therefore the sufficient formal principle of that action is the form of the generator, nor is there reason why the proper influx of subsistence should be required, since the action of the agent does not per se and immediately attain the subsistence of the thing produced. Rather, as I was saying in the preceding section, the entire generative action can remain even if the effection or emanation of proper subsistence is impeded, and the action is proximately terminated to the composition of nature alone, as happened in the human conception of Christ. Therefore the formal

principle of such action is the generating nature by reason of form, and not subsistence itself.

*Second Assertion*

10. I say second: subsistence is not related merely concomitantly to the action of the agent, but antecedently; nor merely accidentally, but per se on the part of the agent. And in this way action is properly and per se attributed to the suppositum as to that which operates. In this proposition we explain that axiom: "Actions are of supposita," which is commonly received by theologians, as can be seen in St. Thomas, I, q. 39, a. 5, ad 1, and q. 49, a. 1, ad 3, and III, q. 19, a. 1, ad 3 and 4, and In I, dist. 5, a. 1, where other theologians are found, and In III, dist. 2, and often elsewhere, treating of the mysteries of the Incarnation and Trinity. For it seemed to them that this principle was necessary for explaining those two mysteries and for speaking appropriately about them. Hence in the Council of Florence, session XVIII, not far from the end, Bishop John, to explain that the Father generates and not the essence, adds the reason, because the essence does not signify a suppositum, and he adds: "Moreover, actions, according to every school of philosophers, seem to be of supposita, as we see happen in the human race; for although this man, that is, the person or suppositum generates, nevertheless his substance is the principle of such generation, since actions are of supposita, as we said; which substance or essence in man, since it is humanity, exists as the principle of human generation, by which he generates a man." By these words both this and the preceding conclusion are confirmed.

11. And this conclusion can be strengthened from Aristotle, De Anima I, text 64, where he says it is better to say not that the soul pities, or learns, or reasons, but that the man does so by the soul. From this place an argument is taken only from similarity of reason. For the operation is not correctly attributed to the soul because it is signified as a part; but the same reason applies to humanity. He speaks,

however, of the soul as it is a part or form of the body, for if the rational soul is taken as subsisting, proper action can be attributed to it, because, although it is not a suppositum on account of its incomplete nature, it is nevertheless subsisting singularly and per se. It is also customarily proved from the same philosopher, Metaphysics I, c. 1, whose words are: "All actions and generations are concerned with singulars, or are conversant with singulars." Here first it must be considered that, although Aristotle does not use the name of suppositum but of singular, he nevertheless took them for the same thing in reality, as is clear from the reason he immediately adds: "For one who practices medicine does not heal man, except accidentally, but Callias, or Socrates, or some other of those who are so called." He understood such a suppositum by the name of singular thing, either because the singular absolutely said signifies a complete and singular being, as it exists in the nature of things, or certainly because (as is probable) Aristotle did not recognize the distinction between complete singular substantial nature and suppositum. Then it must be observed that action can express a threefold relation to such a singular thing. The first is as to a principle, as we now say that actions are of supposita. The second is as to a term, as we say that Peter, for example, is generated, not humanity. The third is as to a subject. I omit, however, the fourth, which can be thought of, to the object properly taken, for this belongs only to immanent acts, insofar as the acts are also such qualities, but not as they are productive actions, concerning which Aristotle speaks. And therefore according to this fourth relation it can happen that action is concerned with a universal, because it is not concerned by inhering in it or really effecting it, but by extrinsically denominating or attaining it, which is outside our purpose. Aristotle therefore speaks of the other modes, and seems to speak more expressly, in the place cited, of the third relation, as much as can be gathered from the example he uses. For those earlier words, "Actions are concerned with singulars," seem indifferent to the second and third relations; but they cannot properly be accommodated to the

first. Hence there is no doubt that Aristotle did not posit that formal proposition in that place. Nevertheless, it is taken from similarity of reason, which is that to be belongs to that whose being it is, or action is concerned with that to which being is conferred, because action tends toward some being. But being per se primo belongs to a singular thing, for universals are only in singulars; and similarly being properly belongs to a complete singular, or suppositum or subsisting thing, for being properly belongs to that which is. Only the suppositum, however, is properly that which is, and therefore it is properly said to be made, or action is concerned with it. But this reason proceeds equally in the first relation, for it also belongs to that to operate whose being it is, because, just as action is toward being, so it is from being. But the suppositum is that which properly is, or which has being; therefore action according to the first relation is also per se primo attributed to the singular thing in the aforesaid sense, that is, to the suppositum.

12. The Second Assertion is Shown Through Its Individual Parts. And thus not only by authority but also by reason the aforesaid metaphysical dogma has been confirmed, which can be further explained and confirmed by running through the individual parts of the second assertion. The first was that subsistence is related not only concomitantly but antecedently to the action of the agent. This is proved because by nature of the thing it is prior that a thing be complete and fully constituted in its being than that it operate. But subsistence pertains to the completion of the thing and its substance; therefore by order of nature the nature terminated by proper subsistence ought to be prior to being able to proceed into operation. Therefore subsistence and its quasi-formal effect is related not only concomitantly but antecedently to the operation of the nature. And it can be confirmed by a similar case with accident, for an accidental form (we speak according to the nature of the thing) first has that it inhere before any action remains from it, because that mode of being is like an intrinsic term and completion of such a form. Likewise there

is an excellent and sufficient reason, because such a mode has a more intimate natural connection with such a form than every action that can emanate from it. But subsistence is compared to substantial nature in the same way; therefore [the conclusion follows].

13. The second part of the assertion is gathered from the preceding, namely, that subsistence is not compared merely accidentally to the action of the agent, because, just as the being of the agent is not compared accidentally to its action, so the complement of being that is entirely intrinsic, connatural, and substantial is not compared entirely accidentally to action, but there is a per se required order that the thing first be subsisting in itself before it operates. And for this reason I say that subsistence is required per se on the part of the agent. For precisely on the part of the action, or of its proximate or formal term, the subsistence of the form or nature that is the principle of action was not so necessary, because in the nature itself is the entire perfection per se necessary for eliciting such action. Nevertheless, on the part of the agent such nature requires a proper and complete mode of being, so that it be constituted in a state accommodated to operating, and in this way we say that subsistence is per se required on the part of the agent, as a necessary condition for operating. And thus theologians are accustomed to say that the Trinity of persons in God is not per se required for creation on the part of the action itself; nevertheless, on the part of God it is per se and necessarily presupposed, because it pertains to the personal constitution of God, and it is prior and per se prerequisite that God be fully and perfectly substantially constituted in himself before he operates ad extra. Hence, even if we imagined God creating something from eternity, we would nevertheless understand that the internal origins and constitutions of the divine persons precede creation by order of nature. But if this is true in God, in whom the divine nature is essentially subsisting, much more so in a creature, in which subsistence is entirely outside the essence of the thing. And hence finally it is clear in what sense operation is per se primo attributed to the suppositum, which we were

saying in the third part of the assertion, because nature, as nature before subsistence, is not constituted in a complete state and proximately accommodated to operating, and therefore action is deservedly attributed to the suppositum, and not to the nature.

14. The Foundations of Other Opinions are Satisfied. From this the reasons and foundations of other opinions have been satisfied. For we respond to both simultaneously that for the truth and propriety of that axiom, "Actions are of supposita," it is not necessary that subsistence itself per se influence actions, nor that it be entirely accidental and concomitant in its relation. For there is a middle ground, namely, that it be a prerequisite condition on the part of the agent. But the example that the second opinion brought forward from divine persons rather suggests the contrary, as we have explained. That in God creation and other actions ad extra can be attributed not only to the divine persons, or to this God in the concrete, but also to the deity, comes both from the fact that the deity is essentially subsisting, and from the perfect identity between the divine nature and the persons. On account of this identity that locution is admitted when it otherwise involves no error, as happens in actions ad extra, although from the mode of signifying of the terms it is not formal and proper, and therefore in creatures, where there is not that identity between nature and suppositum, that locution is not admitted, nor can it be extended in God to notional acts. For this proposition, "The essence generates," is erroneous; it indicates the distinction of the essence itself from the thing generated, as is more broadly handed down in I, q. 39.

### *Whether a Nature Can Supernaturally Operate Without a Suppositum*

15. What we have said thus far must be understood according to the natures of things, with no intervening miracle. But it can be asked whether by absolute power, or with some miracle intervening, it

can be otherwise. And indeed, if we speak of a complete substantial nature, according to what was handed down above, it must consequently be said that a nature cannot per se primo operate, but some suppositum through it. For if the nature is not deprived of its subsistence, but is left in its proper suppositum, it cannot happen but that proper subsistence precedes the action by order of nature, because proper subsistence necessarily retains the same relation to its nature. But if we suppose that God deprives the nature of proper subsistence, constituting it in another suppositum, that suppositum will operate through that nature, and the action must be attributed to it, as I explained more broadly in tome I of the Third Part, disputation X, sections 2 and 3. But if we supposed that God conserves a nature existing without proper subsistence and without any alien one, then certainly it could happen that the nature would operate without a suppositum, because there would be sufficient active power in it, and the condition of subsistence is not so intrinsically necessary that, if it were impeded and God conserved the nature by some other superior reason, action could not proceed from it, because no contradiction appears in this matter. Indeed, supposing that miracle, no other miracle would be necessary for such a nature to operate, but it could operate with common concurrence, because there would be nothing supernatural in such action, since it has no proper and special relation to subsistence or peculiar dependence on it. But natural concurrence for operating is not owed by the nature of the thing before subsistence; nevertheless, given that hypothesis that the nature would be conserved without any subsistence, it would not be deprived of all concurrence and all action, and therefore even then such concurrence would be owed by the nature of the thing, because there always remains a per se necessary and sufficient principle on the part of the action, although otherwise on the part of the natural agent the order and perfection is changed.

16. And in this manner one must speak of a substantial form separated from matter. For it necessarily retains some subsistence,

either proper, as happens by nature of the thing in rational souls alone, or alien and divinely given, as happened supernaturally in the soul of Christ, and could happen in other forms. And therefore such a form thus separated and constituted can operate in the manner of a suppositum. But if such a form were conserved without any subsistence, the same must be said of it as of a complete nature, for the reason is the same. And the same proportionally applies to an accident separated from a subject, for we think it is never thus conserved without a positive mode of existing per se, opposed to actual inherence, and therefore an accident thus conserved, although it is not a suppositum, can operate in the manner of a suppositum. If nevertheless we imagine an accident conserved separated in its being of existence without another positive mode of being, similarly it must be judged that it can then have every action of its own, for the reason touched upon, which is also taken from St. Thomas, III, q. 77, a. 3.

### *Whether Natural Emanation Can Be From Nature Before the Suppositum*

17. Again, from what has been said it is clear what must be said concerning effection taken more broadly for natural emanation (for what we have said is common to all proper actions, both immanent and transient, nor is it necessary to distinguish anything among them with regard to the doctrine given). But concerning effection through natural resultance one must distinguish, for some is toward subsistence itself, while others can be toward other properties or accidents. Among these I think the former is also by order of nature first and quasi-originally precedes the resultance of all other properties. The reason is that subsistence is more intimate and more per se conjoined with nature than every other property. Likewise, because all other properties are accidents, but the complete constitution of proper substance is prior to accidents, even proper ones, coming to it. Hence therefore it happens that the emanation of

all properties or proper accidents is also from the suppositum as the principle which, through the mediation of nature as the principle by which, so that in this the same reasoning applies to these emanations as to other proper actions, because the same per se order on the part of the suppositum exists between subsistence and subsequent properties. Therefore only the natural emanation of subsistence itself is from nature, as nature is. And the reason is that it tends toward the constitution of the suppositum, and therefore cannot presuppose the suppositum as constituted, from which it remains. Nor is it inconvenient that some natural resultance be from nature, as nature is, when it is such that it does not express an order to a thing already having a completely complete state in the genus of substance. For then neither on the part of the principle nor on the part of the term is subsistence presupposed, but existence alone, as is sufficiently clear from what was said above.

### *Whether Subsistence is Necessary for Material Causality*

18. Finally, from what has been said it is clear what must be said concerning material causality, namely, how it can belong to or be attributed to subsistence. For one must philosophize about it in almost the same way as about efficiency. For subsistence is not the proper nature or power of receiving something, as is per se clear from what we have said about it. For it is the ultimate mode completing perfect substance; hence it is not ordered toward receiving something substantial. I except only the partial subsistence of matter, which, because it is incomplete and material, is ordered toward receiving the formal complement of the subsistence of the entire material suppositum, as was explained above. But properties or accidents, although they are received in the suppositum, are nevertheless received not by reason of subsistence, but by reason of nature. For they are received in the entity of substance, not in the mode of

substance. An excellent argument for this matter is taken from the mystery of the Incarnation, for in Christ all the properties and accidental perfections of man could be received, not by reason of subsistence, nor by attaining that which is uncreated, but by affecting the nature alone. Hence with regard to this there is the same reason concerning nature and suppositum, insofar as they are principles of acting or receiving accidents. For both is attributed to the suppositum as that which, but the nature itself is the principle by which, both of acting and of receiving—of acting indeed through form, but of receiving either according to itself as a whole, or according to matter in certain material accidents, or according to form in spiritual ones, which it is not necessary to expound or treat more broadly here. From this, however, it happens that, although subsistence is not the nature of receiving, it is nevertheless a condition per se required on the part of the recipient. For by this reason accidents are said to be properly of supposita, just as actions are. And thus we also speak in the mystery of the Incarnation, for Christ suffered and died, and not properly humanity, and therefore, just as the actions, so also the sufferings of Christ were of infinite value. Therefore, just as subsistence is a condition of the agent, so also of the recipient, and in this way material causality can be attributed to it, just as efficiency. And this also confirms the testimony of Aristotle, Metaphysics I, c. 1, according to the exposition given above, namely, that actions are concerned with singulars, that is, supposita, namely Callias and Socrates, as with subjected matter.

19. But a double limitation must be applied to this doctrine. The first is that it be understood concerning the subject of accidental action or passion, not substantial, or if it be extended to substantial, this be done with proportion. I call substantial passion substantial generation, for I omit creation, which has no material cause, nor is it received in a subject. Therefore every action or passion, besides substantial generation, is correctly attributed to the suppositum and is concerned with it as with subjected matter. And concerning this

Aristotle gave an example when he said: "The physician does not cure man, but Callias or Socrates." But substantial generation is not concerned with the suppositum as with subjected matter, but with prime matter in which alone it is received, the suppositum from which the generation happens having been already destroyed, and before another is constituted. And for this reason this passion cannot properly be attributed to the suppositum as to a subject, or material cause. But it can be done with a certain proportion, namely, that the action or passion also be concerned with a singular and subsisting thing, though partial, in which it falls short of the nature of a suppositum, just as we were saying above that, although actions are of supposita, nevertheless a form subsisting per se operates. Hence it happens that even for substantial generation itself some subsistence, at least partial, is per se presupposed and is a necessarily required condition on the part of the material cause. For there too the general reason has place, that a thing ought first to be understood as subsisting in itself before it is apt to sustain or receive something else.

20. But what about that action or quasi-action by which subsistence results from nature itself? For that is received in nature, which it in no way presupposes as subsisting. It is answered that action is proportioned to its term; hence, just as subsistence itself is not properly inhering, but affecting nature in a higher mode and adhering to it, so that emanation, if it be distinct according to the nature of the thing from subsistence itself, does not inhere, nor is it in nature as in a subject or matter, but as in a thing terminable through subsistence, to which it is intimately conjoined through a certain identity, and therefore it is not necessary that such emanation presuppose a subsisting thing.

21. Hence it is understood incidentally that when substantial generation (and with regard to this the same applies to creation) is said to be concerned with a person or suppositum, this must be understood concerning the term, not concerning the subject or matter of generation. In this sense we said that the saying of Aristotle can also

be understood, namely, that actions are concerned with singulars, and in this sense it applies most properly to those actions we call substantial. For accidental actions are properly terminated to composites from accidental forms, from Metaphysics VII, c. 8, in which composites the supposita themselves are included; indeed, they stand for them, and therefore also in this way all these actions can be said to be concerned with supposita.

22. The second limitation was that these things be understood according to the nature of the thing and setting aside miracles. For with some supernatural operation intervening, it can happen that some thing suffers something or receives, although it is not a suppositum, as theologians teach concerning the quantity of the Eucharist. But it can be said further that even in this exception a certain proportion is preserved, for that quantity, in order to become the subject of accidents or changes, first receives a mode of subsisting per se, and is thus constituted in a state similar or proportional to a suppositum. I add, however, that if, per possible or impossible, God were to conserve some nature or separated quantity without subsistence or a positive mode of per se being, it could through its entity be the subject of change proportioned to it, for the same reason by which we said the same above concerning actions. And thus in causalities of this kind, material and efficient, almost the same proportion is preserved in all things, as we have said.

## SECTION VIII

## WHETHER IN SECOND SUBSTANCES THE CONCRETE IS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE ABSTRACT, AND HOW THE SUPREME NOTION OF SUBSTANCE AND PREDICAMENTAL COORDINATION SHOULD BE CONSTITUTED IN THEM

## Section VIII

1. We have thus far explained the nature of first substance; it remains for us to speak briefly about second substance, and just as we compared first substance or the supposit with singular nature, so too now let us compare species or genera of substance with those common natures proportioned to them, so that, for example, we may compare man with humanity, animal with animal nature, and the rest in a proportional manner. For we said above in section 4 that this kind of comparison also pertains to this disputation. Having explained this, we shall finally declare the general nature constituting the supreme genus of the category of substance, and we shall suggest and very briefly touch upon its coordination, since this matter pertains more to dialectic than to metaphysics.

2. Some therefore say that these abstract and concrete terms, when taken in universals or in second substances, are not distinguished and compared among themselves in the same way as in first substances, that is, man and humanity are not distinguished in the same way as Peter and this humanity. For Peter is distinguished from his individual humanity by the nature of the thing, as has been seen; but man differs from humanity only by reason and mode of signifying. So holds Fonseca, Metaphysics book V, chapter 8, question 5, section 10, and question 6, section 1. His foundation seems to be that the concrete names of second substances formally signify the same thing as the abstract ones; they only suggest and as it were connote the singular supposits in which they subsist, for which they also supposit or are taken, just as concrete terms of accidents formally signify only the accidental form, but connote the subject in which they inhere, and they supposit for that subject. This happens differently with the concrete names of first substances; for these do not formally signify some nature and suggest a subject, but they primarily signify the supposit itself, which as the first subject is compared to all higher things and accidents, as is clear from the definition of first substance. And therefore no other subject can be suggested through these names, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. From this diversity of

names, therefore, it seems to be gathered that man, for example, and humanity do not formally differ according to themselves by the nature of the thing, but only in the mode of conceiving and signifying, from which it results that man is taken and supposits for supposits, for which humanity does not supposit. And this is confirmed, for man, as such, does not include the subsistence that Peter includes, because subsistence is an incommunicable thing; but man expresses only a common notion. Therefore man has nothing in which it is distinguished by the nature of the thing from humanity, since in first substances the concrete is distinguished from the abstract only by the addition of substance.

3. How the abstract of second substances differs from the concrete. Nevertheless, I think it should be said that concrete terms are equally distinguished from abstract ones in second substances as in first substances. So think more frequently the disciples of St. Thomas, in the places cited above, and this is taken from St. Thomas in his opusculum On Being and Essence, chapter 3, at the end, where he says that humanity and man differ because humanity prescinds from all things that are outside the formal essence of man, but man implicitly and confusedly includes the notions constituting human individuals or supposits. And in III, question 4, article 3, he says that although this locution is true: "The Word assumed humanity," this one is nevertheless improper and strictly false: "The Word assumed man." For this name "man" (he says) signifies human nature as born to be in a supposit, because, as Damascene says in book III On the Faith, chapters 4 and 11, just as this name "God" signifies him who has divine nature, so this name "man" signifies him who has human nature. From these words this reasoning can be formed: Peter and this humanity are not distinguished by the nature of the thing for any other reason than because this humanity only signifies individual nature, but Peter expresses one having such a nature; but man and humanity are compared in the same proportional way; therefore they are equally distinguished. And this is confirmed and declared: just as

this supposit or this one having this nature adds something determinate to this individual nature, by reason of which it is distinguished by the nature of the thing from that nature, so one having humanity absolutely adds something in common or in universal to humanity itself, by reason of which man is one having nature, and not humanity; therefore the distinction is the same.

4. Furthermore, this is declared in this way: humanity is distinguished by the nature of the thing from Peter and Paul; for if this humanity is distinguished by the nature of the thing from Peter, much more so is humanity, because humanity includes less than this humanity, at least actually and explicitly. But indeed man is not distinguished by the nature of the thing from Peter and Paul, nor humanity from this and that humanity, but only by reason, as is clear from what was said above about universals. Therefore man and humanity are not altogether the same by the nature of the thing, but are equally distinguished as supposit and individual nature. The consequence is proved because otherwise Peter could not be more distinguished from humanity than from man; for things that are the same among themselves are identified with or distinguished from the same third thing in the same way. And from this can be taken the a priori reason for this position, namely, that these universal predicates are distinguished from singular ones taken proportionally only by our mode of conceiving, that is, concrete from concrete and abstract from abstract. Therefore they are distinguished in the same way, whether conceived singularly or universally, because the mode of conceiving alone does not remove the distinction that is found by the nature of the thing in the things themselves. And therefore these locutions are equally false: "Man is humanity," and similar ones, just like this one: "Peter is his humanity." And finally this is declared in this way: if man and humanity were the same in reality, by the very fact that we would understand an individuating difference to be added to humanity, we would understand this man to be constituted just as this humanity,

and consequently this man would not be distinguished from this humanity. Therefore, just as this is false, so also is that.

5. The foundation of the contrary opinion is overturned. Nor does the foundation of the contrary position have a difficult response. For first, that difference between the names of first and second substances is not necessary, because even "this man" can be said to formally signify this humanity, but to suggest or co-signify the supposit in which such humanity subsists. For why is this affirmed of man rather than of this man? For this does not conflict with the notion of first substance, since in it not only do accidents inhere and second substances subsist, but also individual and singular nature in its own way is or subsists in the supposit. Therefore it does not conflict with the name of first substance that it formally signify singular nature, but suggest the supposit. Nor does an infinite regress follow from this, because we do not say that the name of first substance suggests a subject or supposit in which the whole first substance itself is, but in which the individual nature of that first substance is. This is excellently declared from the mystery of the Incarnation and Trinity; for this man Christ formally signifies this humanity, suggesting the supposit in which it subsists. Whence theologians say more frequently that, although that humanity might change supposit, it would always be the same man, or, although it might be assumed by three persons, it would nevertheless be this man. Just as also "this God" formally expresses this deity, but suggests the person in whom this deity subsists; and therefore, although there are three persons, God or this God is nevertheless the same. It is true, however, that there are certain names of first substances that more formally signify the notion of supposit than individual nature, such as "this supposit" or "this person." But there can be other singular names about which it is not sufficiently clear what they more formally signify, such as the proper names of individuals: Peter, Paul, etc. Nevertheless, this matters little for the distinction of things that we are investigating.

6. Whence it is said secondly that, although in concrete names we distinguish, for the sake of explanation, that twofold quasi-partial signification—formal, namely, and material, or quasi-material or connoted—nevertheless in the thing itself there is one adequate signification, which is especially seen in all concrete terms of second substances; for they are absolute names whose adequate signification is one per se. Therefore, to distinguish man from humanity, it matters little that in the signification of this word "man" we can not distinguish formal and connoted signification, but the adequate signification must be attended to, for comparison is made between that and humanity. Whence, if something is really included in that which is not included in humanity, this is sufficient for those two to be said to be distinguished by the nature of the thing. And I think the same should be said about concrete terms of accidents, even though in them there is less unity and the connotation is more express, or the distinction of formal and material signification is clearer. For I do not think it true what some say, that in accidents the concrete and abstract are distinguished only by mode of conceiving, since they signify altogether the same thing in reality; which Durandus holds, In I, distinction 34, question 1, citing Aristotle in the Categories, chapter 2 on Substance, text 7, saying that "white" signifies only quality, just like "whiteness." Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that "white" (and the same is true of similar terms), although it formally signifies whiteness alone, nevertheless adequately signifies more than whiteness, namely, the composite of subject and accident. Otherwise how could it be taken for or supposit for the subject, unless it signified or co-signified that? This is so manifest from the common mode of conceiving that one can scarcely doubt it. Nor did Aristotle say that "white" signifies quality alone, but only "what kind," and by that exclusive particle he does not exclude that it adequately signifies the composite, but excludes essential "what kind." For he had said that second substances do not signify "this something," but "what kind of thing," and therefore he adds that they do not signify "what kind" in the same way

as "white," which signifies only "what kind," that is, accidental "what kind," which is not the quiddity of the thing; but second substance expresses essential and quidditative "what kind." Since therefore these concrete terms of accidents adequately signify the composites themselves, it must be said that they are distinguished from abstracts not by conception alone, but in reality, just as a composite from its component form.

7. Add finally (to respond to the confirmation of that position) that the quasi-material signification, which this word "man" is said to suggest or co-signify, is not Peter or Paul according as they are such individuals or supposits, but only according to the common or confused notion of what subsists in humanity. For just as "man" formally does not immediately express this or that humanity as such, but humanity confusedly, so it does not immediately suggest this or that human supposit, but simply what subsists in humanity, under which it mediately and confusedly embraces singular things subsisting in humanity. For the whole immediate and adequate signification of this word "man" abstracts by reason from individuals, both by reason of the formal and by reason of the material aspect. Whence it is understood that, just as Peter, beyond this humanity, includes its subsistence, so man beyond humanity includes the subsistence of humanity, not this or that one, but the common notion of subsistence of such a nature. For the common notion of subsistence is abstractable from singulars in the same way as the common notion of humanity or of man. But it is certain that the subsistence of man is distinguished by the nature of the thing from humanity in the same way, if taken in common, as in the individual this subsistence from this humanity. Since therefore man beyond humanity includes human subsistence in common, it is necessary that it be distinguished from that as the including from the included.

8. You will say: therefore "man" and "some man" signify the same thing, for "some man," beyond humanity, expresses nothing except what subsists in humanity, which it does not designate

singularly, but only in common; but the consequent does not seem true, because "man" expresses only the human species, while "some man" is called a vague individual. It is answered that it is under controversy whether "some man" is properly a univocal term; but supposing for now that it is so, I concede that "some man" and "man" signify the same thing in reality, but in a different way as to the formal mode of signifying. For "man" formally signifies humanity and includes in its immediate signification human subsistence in common, but embraces individuals confusedly, yet it does not express them, either particularly or according to some common notion of human individual. However "some man," although it also expresses in common what subsists in humanity, nevertheless formally signifies that under the notion of human individual, not materially assigning that, but under the common notion of individual, just as "human supposit" also signifies what subsists in humanity, yet formally signifying subsistence itself.

### *Corollaries from the Preceding Doctrine*

9. First. From what has been said it is gathered, first, that in all second substances the aforesaid distinction of concrete from abstract has place, proportional to that which exists in first substances between supposit and nature; for the reasoning is the same for all. For just as in the ultimate species man is distinguished from humanity, and so forth, so in the proximate genus animal, for example, is distinguished from animality (so to speak), or from the nature that is the principle of sensing, and in intermediate genera, for example, the living thing is distinguished from the nature of vegetating or from life. And finally, in the supreme genus of substance itself, finite substance (for we always speak of this) is distinguished from substantiality or substantial nature. For in all these that reasoning has place, that concrete terms include the notion of subsisting in community or universality proportioned to themselves, which abstract terms do not include; and

the other reasons given can be accommodated in the same way. And finally this can be so declared in the humanity of Christ; for that humanity, just as it is essentially humanity and includes the specific notion of such a nature, so also it essentially includes the generic notion of animal nature, living and corporeal, and substantial nature; and similarly, just as it is not man, so neither is it animal, nor living thing, nor substance—namely, complete substance, which the most general genus of substance expresses. And the reason is that, just as something necessary for the completion of man is lacking to that humanity as such, so also something is lacking for the completion of animal and other higher things; therefore there is the same proportional distinction in all these.

10. Second corollary. Secondly, it follows that, just as a supposit or first substance, beyond the essence of the thing, includes a proper mode of subsisting, which, although it pertains to the completion of substance, nevertheless is not of its essence, so in a proportional way any second substance, beyond its essential notion, includes a mode of having such an essence or specific or generic nature, which mode does not pertain to essence, but to the completion of such second substance. The reason is clear from the aforesaid proportion, for just as suppositality is not of the essence of Peter, so neither is human subsistence of the essence of man, nor animal subsistence of the essence of animal, and so forth for the other higher ones; for the reasoning is the same for all. Likewise, because whatever is of the essence of man is of the essence of Peter; therefore, conversely, whatever is not of the essence of Peter is not of the essence of man. But not only is proper and individual subsistence not of the essence of Peter, but indeed neither is human subsistence according to its specific notion; for in Christ there is the whole essence of this man, and there is not human subsistence properly so called or according to its specific and created notion. Therefore such a notion of subsistence is not of the essence of man as such; and the same reasoning proceeds in all higher things. Finally, these abstract and concrete terms,

although they are distinguished by the nature of the thing, as we have said, nevertheless are not properly distinguished essentially or in essence, but in a certain mode terminating and completing essence, which concrete terms include and abstract ones do not. Therefore all these concrete terms beyond essence include something that properly does not regard essence, but the completion of such substance in its grade.

11. What is the most general in the category of substance. Third, it is inferred from what has been said what is the essential nature of substance simply so called, that is, which is most general in the category of substance. For it is commonly accustomed to be described as "being per se"; which description, just like the name of substance itself, can be ambiguous. For if the name "being" is taken most generally and transcendentally, and that "per se" only denotes the negation of inhering in another by way of accident, thus not only the supreme genus of substance and whatever is directly contained under it is being per se, but universally whatever is not an accident, that is, every substance, whether complete or incomplete either physically or metaphysically, according to what was said above in section 1 of this disputation. In another way "being per se" can be taken for complete being that can be per se subsistent. And in this way the essential nature of substance is described through those words, insofar as it is the supreme genus; yet they need a twofold annotation. The first is that substance which is the supreme genus (and the same is true of any second substance) is not said to be or subsist per se because it can primarily or precisely, and insofar as it is second substance, subsist in the nature of things; for this pertains to the opinion attributed to Plato about universals existing separately in reality itself. And to exclude this sense Aristotle said, in the Categories, chapter on Substance, that second substance seems to be "this something," because it is signified by way of something subsisting, but in truth it is not "this something," because it does not subsist except in singulars. Therefore substance in common is said to be per se, because by virtue of its formal notion it

postulates that mode of being, and because it includes that in its concept, according to its most common and most abstract notion, although in reality itself it is not exercised except in singulars. The other observation is that, since actual subsistence is not of the essence of substance, as we have said, the essential nature of substance as such does not consist in being per se, insofar as these words describe actual subsisting; but in this, that it has such an essence and nature to which subsistence is owed, or which of itself is a sufficient principle of that.

12. Which things and in what order are placed in the category of substance. Finally, it is permitted to gather from what has been said which things are constituted in the category of substance, and how. For the first foundation and basis of that category is the supposit, or created first substance (for the uncreated is not placed in a category, as can be established from what we have said about being by essence); and therefore first substance was called by Aristotle principally and maximally substance. Above it, however, in a direct line are placed its species and genera, up to the supreme, because they too are complete substances, as we have seen above, since they express the integral nature of substance with the mode of subsisting and by way of a whole, and they differ only in greater or lesser abstraction or in a more confused or distinct mode of conceiving the same integral substance. But all other things that compose first or second substance physically or metaphysically are referred to the category of substance, yet they are not constituted in the direct line. The reason for this latter part is that they are not complete substances. But the reason for the former part is that a complete substance cannot be composed except from complete things, as Aristotle testifies, Physics I, chapters 3 and 6. For substance cannot be composed per se from accidents; nor in general can a thing of one category be composed from a thing of another category, as Aristotle testifies, Topics I, chapter 3.

13. Such are first of all the substantial natures themselves, insofar as they are signified and conceived in the abstract, for although these can be conceived among themselves with subordination, and as

it were constituting their own line, proportioned to that which is constituted from first and second substances (for thus is conceived this humanity, and above it humanity, and above this animal nature up to substantial nature), nevertheless this whole line and series is substance secundum quid, and therefore only secundum quid or by reduction pertains to that category; and each of those abstract terms is referred to its proportional concrete term, that is, this humanity to this man, humanity to man, and so forth. Whence it consequently happens that the other extreme of this composition also, namely, subsistence, whether conceived singularly or universally, cannot be directly placed in this category, because it is much less a complete substance than nature itself; yet it is reduced to the same composites with the aforesaid proportion; for the components themselves must be referred to their composite. And the same judgment applies to the essential parts of composite substance, such as matter and form, in which also the intellect can constitute its own lines, and especially in forms, which we can conceive either in the individual or in the species, and from forms specifically diverse we can also abstract a generic concept, such as the concept of elemental form, or sensitive soul; and in matter something similar can easily be devised, especially if it is true that there are specifically diverse matters, which must agree in the generic notion of matter. Nevertheless, this whole coordination is secundum quid and by reduction, with respect to the category of substance, because neither matter nor form is complete substance, nor are their individuals first substances, or "this something," as is also taken from Aristotle, On the Soul II, chapter 1, and Metaphysics VII, chapter 3.

14. Again, nearly the same must be said about integral parts, which, as Aristotle testifies, Metaphysics VII, chapter 5, as long as they actually compose, are not beings in act, but in potency—not that they do not have the actuality of being, but that they do not have it separate and by reason of themselves, but in the whole and by reason of the whole; and in the same sense they are not substances in act, but in potency, and therefore they are not placed directly and per se under

the supreme genus of substance, but are comprehended in the whole itself and must be referred to it, even if they are conceived separately by the mind. And in nearly the same way one must philosophize about substantial differences, which are not substances—namely, directly and completely, as Aristotle testifies in the chapter on Substance; for no difference is directly placed under its genus; for this conflicts with the proper composition from genus and difference, as is clear from Aristotle, Metaphysics III, chapter 2. Otherwise, both in such composition there would be an infinite regress, and the difference itself would be a species, and would be predicated in quid; all of which conflict, as Aristotle also indicated, Topics I, chapter 13. Therefore these differences are placed in the category of substance reductively, because they are neither accidents, as has been shown, nor can they be outside the whole latitude of substance, between which and accident no middle is given. Finally, for the same reasons, all substantial modes, or inchoations and ways toward substance as such, such as passive creation and similar things, are placed in this category by reduction. This whole doctrine is common among the interpreters of Aristotle, partly in Metaphysics V, chapter 8, partly in the Categories, chapter on Substance, where this predicamental coordination is discussed more fully; for that is the proper task of dialectic; but for metaphysical consideration what has been said in general seems to suffice, and it only remains for us to discuss the diverse grades or orders of substances, insofar as metaphysical abstraction permits.

## DISPUTATION XXXV

## ON CREATED IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE

This title presupposes a division of substance (divisio substantiae) into the immaterial and the material. I intentionally pass over a formal treatment of that division here, because it is self-evident to sense (per se notum ad sensum) that there exists some material substance, and no one has ever doubted that such substance is directly and properly located within the category of substance (in praedicamento substantiae collocetur). Consequently, in order to establish and elucidate the said division, it suffices that we constitute the other member (alterum membrum) of it; once that member is posited and its rationale explained in its own right, the division as a whole will thereby stand clarified, and it will be easy to understand both the ground (ratio) and the sufficiency (sufficientia) of the division. As for incorporeal substances (substantiae incorporeae), theologians treat of them most broadly under the name of angels. In this place, however, I shall not pursue everything that they have said, nor institute a lengthy disputation; rather, I will offer a brief and concise inquiry, touching only those matters that the human mind, employing the natural light alone (solo lumine naturae), can investigate concerning these substances on the basis of natural principles and effects (ex principiis et effectibus naturalibus): namely, whether they exist (an sint), what they are (quid sint), and what

properties and causes or effects (quas proprietates et causas vel effectus) they have.

## SECTION I
## WHETHER IT CAN BE PROVED BY NATURAL REASON THAT THERE ARE SOME SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCES IN THE UNIVERSE BESIDES GOD

1. First it is necessary to presuppose what is meant by the term spiritual or immaterial substance; for these words can have multiple meanings, as we shall touch upon later when we explain more fully the essence of such substance. Now by immaterial substance we understand that which does not have this corporeal bulk which we experience in material substances and which we believe to proceed proximately from quantity insofar as through it one part of substance is outside another, so that they cannot penetrate each other in place, although this proceeds radically from the substance itself which demands quantity. Therefore we inquire whether there are in the universe some created substances which neither have such corporeal bulk or quantitative extension, nor demand it by their nature.

### *Reasons for Doubt Arguing the Negative*

2. And it seems this cannot be shown by natural reason, first, because we cannot know substances except through effects which we experience; but there is no natural effect from which we can infer such substance; therefore. The minor is proved, because if there were any effect, it would especially be the motion of the heavens; for this alone Aristotle used, in Physics VIII and Metaphysics XII, to demonstrate these substances; but this cannot sufficiently prove them, both because it is uncertain whether heaven is moved by an extrinsic mover,

or rather by an intrinsic and natural impulse, and also because, even if it is moved extrinsically, it can be sufficiently moved by the first mover alone; and finally because, even if we admit that individual heavens have their own and immediate movers, it cannot be inferred from this that these are incorporeal; for why could they not move the heavens even if they were corporeal? Second, I argue that, if such substances are granted, either they are entirely unproduced; and this is not the case, because it has been shown that only one being can be granted which has existence from itself and essentially without being effected by another; but if they are made, either through generation, and consequently it is necessary that they have matter from which they are generated, therefore they will not be immaterial; or if they are said to be made through creation, this exceeds natural knowledge; for it is a philosophical principle that nothing comes from nothing, and consequently creation, according to mere natural reason, is impossible. Third, because, if there were some immaterial substance, either it would be entirely indivisible like a point, so that it could exist only in an indivisible place or space, and this is very imperfect; whence it seems to conflict with a complete and perfect substantial thing. Or such substance would be apt to exist in an extended and divisible place or space; and from this it seems necessarily to follow that such substance is divisible in itself, and consequently material and consisting of parts, so that according to one part it can be in one part of space and according to another in another. For if it is indivisible in itself and present to an indivisible place, it is necessary that it be wholly in the whole and wholly in any part of it; which mode of existing the human mind scarcely grasps; and therefore, although it admits this in the creator because of his infinite perfection, nevertheless it can scarcely be persuaded that this can befit a finite creature; nor does any natural reason appear by which this can be demonstrated; therefore in no way can it be shown by natural reason that there are some created substances immaterial and indivisible in this manner. It is one thing to seek or prove that these substances are

possible, another that they exist in fact; for the former depends only on divine power together with non-repugnance on the part of the thing; but the latter, besides power, requires divine will, which can be shown with more difficulty, because its decree is free, although faculty or power is necessary.

### *First A Priori Reason, Showing that Immaterial Substances can be Created*

3. I say therefore first that it can be sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason that created immaterial or spiritual substances are possible. This is proved first a priori, because there is no repugnance on the part of the thing; nor can power be lacking on the part of the efficient cause; therefore it is evident that such an effect is possible. The minor has been proved above in treating of God's infinite intensive power, which is true omnipotence, because it has the force of effecting whatever does not involve repugnance in itself, or (which is the same) whatever does not exceed or surpass the limits of creature. The major is proved, because that a substance be simultaneously created and immaterial involves no repugnance, nor does that predicate, namely immaterial, exceed the limits of creature; for why should it? For it does not require infinite essential perfection, because, although the immaterial thing exists, it can be dependent, and thus simply finite in being, in operating, and in any other perfection. Indeed rather (if it may be so expressed) it seems more possible that there be immaterial substance than material. Which I explain in this way, for the efficient cause intends to make its effect like itself; whence the more the effect is like the cause, the more apt it is to be made by it; since therefore God is the first cause of all things, and he himself is spiritual substance, it is in some way more possible and more consonant with such a cause that immaterial substances proceed from such a cause than material ones. Whence certain philosophers have thought that prime matter, because of its imperfection and

dissimilarity which it has with God, being pure potency compared with pure act, is not from God; in which they were indeed deceived, yet they shadowed forth a certain truth in this, that created substance, the more actual and immaterial it is, the more similar it is to God and therefore more conformable to divine power, and from this aspect in some way more possible, if nevertheless there can be more and less in this, for divine power, since it is infinite, can equally effect all things from itself. You will say that by this reasoning it would be proved that an infinitely perfect substance is most possible, because it would be most similar to God. It is answered by denying the consequence; for such substance cannot be an effect similar to God, because it cannot be an effect, for, by the very fact that it is an effect it is essentially dissimilar to God, of whose essential nature it is that he is not an effect. Likewise if it is an effect, it is dependent; if it is dependent, it is not infinite through essence, because this infinity requires being through essence without dependence. Therefore such great similarity to God or rather equality conflicts with the nature of effect; but similarity in the sole nature of immaterial substance does not conflict with the nature of effect; and therefore, supposing divine omnipotence, it is rightly concluded that such an effect is most possible. And this reasoning is properly metaphysical or theological.

### *Another Reason from Effects*

4. Second we can argue from other things made, in which it is necessary that metaphysics suppose something from philosophy and use its service. The principal medium seems to be taken from the substance of the rational soul; for there is granted a certain immaterial substance, incomplete, and part of another; therefore a complete wholly immaterial substance is also possible. The antecedent is supposed from philosophy; for the rational soul is a partial substance and form of man and yet it is immaterial, since it is immortal and independent of matter. The consequence is proved, first indeed,

because an incomplete substance is more imperfect than an integral and complete one; if therefore that which is less perfect can be immaterial, much more can that which is more perfect. You will say this is not rightly inferred, because an incomplete substance is sometimes simpler than a complete one and from this aspect can be more immaterial; for even the soul of a horse, although it is called material insofar as it depends on matter, nevertheless is really less material than the horse, because it does not intrinsically consist of matter as the horse does. It is answered that this proceeds correctly when an incomplete substance is compared to the complete one of which it is a part; but we do not argue thus, but from one incomplete substance of such order and perfection we infer that there can be granted another complete in its order and which is not part of another, in which similar perfection is found in a nobler mode. And in this way the consequence seems self-evident, because if that perfection does not conflict with a less perfect thing, why will it conflict with the order of more perfect things? Likewise, because in the rational soul there is an inchoate order of immaterial substances; therefore it is possible that such order be completed by producing some integral and immaterial substances. Likewise this appears more clearly from the operation of understanding or reasoning; for this follows upon the immateriality of substance; just as in the rational soul there is only an incomplete immaterial substance, so the operation of understanding is in it as if inchoate and imperfect, and mixed with other inferior operations and in some way depending on them or drawing its origin from them; therefore it will not conflict to grant a created substance in which that operation of understanding is more perfect and more abstract from association with body and as if complete in its order and adequate to such substance; but that substance, which will have had such operation, must necessarily be complete and immaterial. Which reason will be more clarified from what follows.

## *That There are Such Substances is Shown by Almost the Same Reasons*

5. I say second that it can be sufficiently shown by natural reason that there are in the universe some created substances wholly immaterial. This conclusion conforms to the doctrine of St. Thomas, I, q. 50, and II cont. Gent., from c. 46. I omit other authors, because they say almost nothing expressly about this; but what philosophers have thought about angels, I shall report below. Now the assertion is proved by applying almost the same reasons made in the preceding conclusion. The first reason therefore and the principal one in St. Thomas, is that it pertained to the perfection of the universe that there be in it this grade of immaterial substances; but God established the universe perfect; therefore there are in it such substances. The major is proved first, because it pertains to the perfection of an effect that it be perfectly similar to the cause; therefore it belongs to the perfection of the universe that it be similar to God, as far as possible; since therefore God is immaterial and intellectual substance, it belongs to the perfection of the universe that there be in it immaterial and intellectual substances, by reason of which it is similar to God according to this grade. The minor seems either true or very probable from itself and from the terms, both because from a perfect and supremely good cause, which envies no one, and most powerful, which can be impeded by no one, no effect ought to proceed unless perfect; and also because God in establishing the universe intended both the communication of his goodness and the manifestation of his perfection; and therefore he established the universe consisting of various grades and orders of things, because none by itself sufficed for the end which God intended in the establishment of things and perfection of the universe; therefore the universe ought to have consisted of that order of things which could most contribute to its perfection and to the aforesaid end. This reasoning for the capacity of

the matter is without doubt most efficacious and most a priori, for, since God does not operate from necessity of nature but by free will, that such substances exist depends on divine will; and therefore, supposing the possibility of the effect, only from the reason moving divine will and consonant with his end and intention can we infer that these substances are not only possible, but actually found.

### *How it is True that God Produced a Universe Perfectly Similar to Himself*

6. Several reasons raising difficulty. In order that the sense and force of this reason may be more fully explained, certain objections must be raised. First, because it was impossible for God to produce a universe most similar to himself in the highest degree, because there is no such highest degree; therefore from the perfect similarity of the universe to God there cannot be inferred similarity in spiritual substances. Second, this very thing is explained, because just as God could establish immaterial substances beyond material ones, so beyond any immaterial ones he could create others more excellent, and whatever ones are made, others more perfect are still possible; therefore from the perfection, or excess of perfection, or greater similarity to God of spiritual substances beyond material ones, it cannot be concluded that God established such immaterial substances; otherwise the same would always be concluded about any more perfect substance. But if it should perhaps be said that the reason made is not founded on any greater perfection of the universe, nor only on greater similarity according to any creatable species, but according to the supreme grade or order of things, against this I argue third, because this supreme grade seems to consist in intellect and free will; but this intellectual grade is already in the universe by reason of the human species, which therefore God is said to have established by special counsel in his image and likeness; therefore for this reason it was not necessary that any superior substances be established. You

will say that in man that grade is only as if inchoate, and therefore immaterial substances are necessary in which it is complete and perfect. But against this is objected fourth, for hence it also follows that it can be proved by natural reason that there is in the universe the order of grace and glory, both because that is a new order of things, constituting not only a more perfect species, but also a new grade, and also because without that order the inferior intellectual grade remains as if inchoate and imperfect and unable to obtain its perfect beatitude and clear vision of its creator. Indeed the theologian will further object that from that reasoning it follows that the grade or order of hypostatic union pertained to the perfection of the universe. Therefore by a similar natural reasoning it could be concluded that there is in the universe such a grade of things, because it most pertains to the perfection of the universe. Similarly, if the opinion of certain theologians is true, namely, that there can be granted a supernatural substance to which it is connatural to see God by its natural powers alone, it follows from the same reasoning that there is granted some such substance in the universe, because without doubt it will constitute a new grade of things very superior to every natural substance and in a new and singular mode similar to God. Finally the same argument can be made about any substance which is both understood to be possible, and to have some singular mode of perfection of another nature and order from other substances, as would be, for example, to understand through its own substance, or to be substantially altogether simple, or some such thing, for, by the very fact that such substance would be possible, it would also be concluded to exist, because it would most pertain to the perfection of the universe.

7. The difficulties having been posed are satisfied. To the first and second objection it is rightly answered there that the perfection of the universe which arises from individual species of things is not to be considered here, for this, as the argument concludes, has no certain limit and can progress to infinity, and therefore it cannot be concluded

from it that any species of things was made because it is more perfect. Therefore, as Cajetan rightly noted, there is considered the perfection of the universe, which arises from grades of things, in which there is no progress to infinity, but one arrives at the highest, which in natural things is the intellectual grade, whatever may now be the case concerning supernatural perfections which God can add to it, which does not pertain to metaphysical consideration. That the intellectual grade is in the supreme order of natural things is both the common consensus of all and seems manifest of itself, because God himself is intellectual, nor can a more perfect act or operation be understood in him and therefore the intellectual creature is said singularly to be in the image of God, because it represents God according to the supreme grade of life, which is in him. To the first objection therefore, if in the antecedent there is talk of maximum similarity according to the most perfect specific nature, it is true that this is not required for the perfection of the universe, since it is impossible, as the second objection rightly assumes speaking of the most perfect possible by absolute power; for it is necessary to speak thus that the reason and reasoning made may have some force; for, if there were talk according to ordinary power, it is clear that, however the universe is constituted, there is necessarily in it some species according to which it in fact and possibly according to the law of ordinary power most imitates divine perfection. Therefore we do not speak of the highest perfection which can be found in species of things, but of perfection in grades of things, and in this sense that antecedent is denied, namely, that there cannot be granted in created things a supreme grade in which they are assimilated to God. And thus the second objection is also solved, as is well answered there, because it clearly proceeds concerning maximum similarity in specific perfections.

8. But you will press: therefore the intellectual grade would suffice for the perfection of the universe, because in it alone is saved the most perfect similarity to God. It is answered first that in the consequent itself a repugnance is involved, because, if there were only

the intellectual grade, there would not be a universe, for, as the name itself indicates, the universe requires that it result from the variety, distinction and wonderful connection of things. Whence, that it may be consummated and perfect, it ought to consist at least of all grades of things, among which is most demanded that which is most perfect and more representing its author. Then, not forcing the point about the name of universe, and speaking of the effect of God, it is answered that, if only the intellectual grade had been produced by God, it would have in itself the maximum intensive similarity which is now in the universe; nevertheless in the whole universe there is greater similarity as if extensive, because of which such variety of things is necessary for the perfection of the universe. For, because no creature by itself suffices to represent God, it was necessary that the perfect universe be established as an effect adequately intended by God, so that at least from the multitude and variety of things this representation might be perfected, as much as could or ought be done according to the order of divine wisdom. For although a more perfect thing from itself more perfectly represents God, nevertheless it often happens that a less perfect thing, either in another mode, or according to a distinct perfection, represents God.

9. From the supreme and lowest intellectuality, the middle, which is that of angels, is inferred. To the third it is rightly answered there that the intellectual grade is inchoate and imperfect in man, and therefore not only is it not proved from this that immaterial substances, complete and perfectly intellectual, are not necessary, but even the opposite can be concluded from this. First indeed, because so perfect an order of things ought not to have been left in so low a state and perfection; indeed, by the very fact that it is in man according to its lowest nature and as if mixed with inferior and as if foreign natures, it was necessary that in some substances it be pure and unmixed and according to its complete and perfect nature. Then because, since there are granted in the universe creatures altogether material and a creature composed of material and immaterial, it was fitting that there

also be creatures altogether immaterial, that the perfection of the universe might be completed. Moreover, because, since God is complete, immaterial and intellectual substance, the perfect similarity to God, which the universe requires, is not had sufficiently from the mode in which the rational grade is participated by man; therefore besides the human species there are necessary substances complete, immaterial and purely intellectual. Finally, because God and man are as if two extremes, supreme and lowest, of the whole order or grade of understanding, therefore there ought to be in the universe other intelligent substances intermediate between God and men, that that grade might have complete status in the universe and convenient variety. Which can be confirmed from inferior grades of things, for in individual ones there is wonderful variety of sentient, vegetative and other bodies, as much as was expedient that individual orders of things have complete perfection in the universe; therefore by greater reason the same is to be judged about the intellectual grade. Indeed, if such conjectures are rightly weighed, they not only prove that there are immaterial intelligences in the universe, but also that they are in greater number, and in greater diversity of species, than is any of the inferior grades, or even than all taken together, which St. Thomas thought, I, q. 50, a. 4, and will again occur to us below.

10. In the fourth objection many things are touched upon, which, since they are theological, will be briefly expedited by us; nevertheless they can bring some light to making a judgment in certain questions about the possible, from those things which have already been done. To the earlier part therefore about the order of grace and glory, I concede that the force of the inference is the same; and thus, if we once suppose that the order of grace and glory is possible, it is rightly inferred that there is granted in the universe this order of things, and that it pertains to the complement of the works of God. Nevertheless there intervenes a notable twofold difference. The former is, that the order of grace and glory is above the whole order of nature; but natural immaterial substances are natural; whence it

happens that these substances are more required in some way for the perfection of the universe than the order of grace and glory; for they are required for the natural perfection of the universe, which ought to be supposed for the supernatural; but grace and glory is only necessary for supernatural perfection; nevertheless, because this is perfection simply and consummated, and most consonant with the end of divine works, and completing in some way the similarity to God in his image, as many of the Fathers speak, expounding: "Let us make man in our image and likeness," understanding by image, the natural perfection of intellectual nature, by likeness, the ornament of grace, therefore, considering the absolute and consummated perfection of the universe, the inference made is efficacious even concerning the order of grace and glory. Nevertheless there is another distinction, because it cannot be proved so efficaciously by natural reason that the order of grace and glory is possible, as that the grade of intellectual substances is possible, because whatever is supernatural falls with more difficulty under natural reason, and because if the natural intellect cannot by its power attain the clear vision of God, in which the whole order of grace is founded, it cannot easily be understood how it can be elevated to such exalted beatitude; whence much less can it be proved by natural reason that this is possible, and therefore, speaking simply, it cannot be proved by natural reason alone that there is in the universe this order of grace and glory, as it can be proved that there are some immaterial substances.

11. Whether also concerning hypostatic union. And I think the same is to be said about the grade of hypostatic union; for supposing it to be possible, I think it is efficaciously proved by that reasoning that it pertains to the maximum perfection of the universe and its complement, and therefore it was of divine wisdom and goodness not to deprive the universe of such great perfection, concerning which matter is disputed very extensively in III, q. 1, a. 3. Concerning the supernatural substance also I think the same reason proceeds efficaciously; and therefore, as much as it is certain that God

did not make such a substance, so much is it more probable, and to me almost certain, that it is not possible. For indeed if such substance were possible, no other creature would be similar to God in its naturals in those things which are most proper to God, except that one, because by its naturals it would be capable of seeing God, as he is in himself; and consequently it would necessarily see him, at least by natural necessity, just as now the intellect illustrated by the light of glory necessarily sees God, and consequently such substance would from its nature always be blessed and impeccable; and thus it would be most similar to God in his most proper attributes; therefore such substance would most pertain to that perfect similarity with God which the perfection of the universe demands; if therefore it is possible, it is rightly concluded to have been made; but if it has not been made, as indeed it has not, this is a great argument that it is not possible. Which can also be confirmed by other reasons; but it does not pertain to this place.

12. Finally I think the same about any substance, which is imagined to have some genus of perfection of another order from all those which have been communicated to substances actually created, namely, that concerning such perfection and substance it is to be said, either that it is not possible, or that it has been made in its grade, or at least that it cannot be shown by any sufficient reason that among created substances there is none which has such connatural perfection. For, if this is possible and that perfection is posited to be such that by reason of it a new order of things arises, why will it not pertain to the perfect variety of the universe to have in itself such substantial order, or by what reason can it be shown not to have been made? But if it is supposed by revelation and authority, not by reason, that this has not been made, I think it is inferred from this with great probability that it is not possible. Wherefore, just as in fact no created substance is altogether simple, so neither can it be created; and, just as none is that is not capable of accident, so neither can there be, and so concerning others. For we believe such similar properties to be in created

substances, not from revelation, but from reasoning, inferring them from the nature of created and limited substance as such; whence we rightly conclude that opposite properties or perfections exceed the nature of created or limited substance; and therefore, just as we infer in fact that there are no such substances, it is also concluded that there cannot be; or conversely, if anyone admits that they are possible, he cannot, revelation being set aside, with foundation deny that they exist, especially when such is the perfection that the substance which has it seems to induce some new mode or order of things.

### *The Reasoning of Aristotle is Examined & Satisfaction is Given to the Reasons for Doubt Posed in the Beginning*

13. To the first reason posed in the beginning, it must be said first that we show these to be possible and to exist in fact not so much a posteriori from effect, as a priori from efficient, exemplar and final cause, together with non-repugnance on the part of such spiritual things, and concerning the former part, the demonstration is simply necessary, concerning the latter however it is not so absolutely necessary, but is, according to the capacity of the matter, efficacious. But when we say this demonstration does not proceed a posteriori from effect, we speak of effects of the very created and immaterial substances themselves, not of effects of God himself. Whence that demonstration is mediately a posteriori, because it supposes knowledge of the existence, power and causality of God himself, all of which are known naturally only from effects and a posteriori; but those principles being known, from them we proceed by immediate reasoning a priori to proving that among the effects of God there are some separated from matter. But it is asked in that argument whether a posteriori from some effects of angels we can naturally come to knowledge of them, and in particular this is commonly treated concerning the motion of heaven, since concerning other effects which men can experience, it seems manifest that the existence of

intelligences cannot be inferred from them. But from the motion of heaven, philosophers, especially Aristotle, came to knowledge of intelligences.

### *Whether Truly Demonstratively or Only Probably, is Not Established*

14. But I think that is not a demonstration, although a probable conjecture can be made, if certain other principles are taken from elsewhere. For two things are inferred in that reasoning from the motion of heaven: the first is, that heaven is moved by some mover distinct from heaven itself, and from God, the first and universal mover. This inference is uncertain in many respects. First, from the opinion of those who thought heaven to be intrinsically, properly and formally animated, which many grave philosophers held, as Augustine reports concerning Plato, I Retract., c. 11; and Aristotle does not seem entirely alien from that opinion, as is clear from the second book On the Heavens, c. 2, and Metaphysics XII, c. 7, in which places Aphrodisias and Simplicius so interpret and follow him; Avicenna also held it, book IX of his Metaphysics, c. 2, 3 and 4, and book On the Soul, I p., c. 1. Which opinion, although it is false, nevertheless the opposite truth cannot be convicted by evident demonstration; which suffices that the other reasoning not be demonstrative; for it necessarily supposes that heaven is not animated, for, if it were animated, it could be moved by an intrinsic soul; whence an extrinsic mover could not be inferred from that motion. For what Avicenna says, that each heaven besides its intrinsic soul understanding and effectively moving it, has an extrinsic mover, which is a separate intelligence, which moves heaven not effectively but finally, this (I say) as easily as it is said, is to be rejected, because this cannot be inferred from the motion of heaven, nor is there any reason for positing that mover or intermediate end between animated heaven and God.

Therefore, the true and proper animation of heaven being posited, without doubt that reasoning is entirely weakened.

15. Nevertheless that supposition, namely, that heaven is not truly and properly animated, is inferred at least by very probable reason. Because in heaven there is no vegetative or sensitive soul, both because the actions of these souls demand corruptible bodies mixed from first qualities, and also because the very figure, disposition and magnitude of heaven is disproportionate to these souls. But a purely intellectual substance is not apt for informing body, because it cannot use it in any way for its own proper operation. But since matter is for the sake of form and body for the sake of soul, if body can serve no use to the soul concerning its proper operations, it really cannot be the natural body of such soul; therefore, and conversely, if a purely intellectual substance cannot use body for its own proper operation, it cannot really be the form of such body. Whence the human soul can therefore be the form of body, because through the senses it can use it for its own proper operation. Therefore the form of heaven cannot be a purely intellectual soul. But besides these three souls we acknowledge no other, as is clear from the science On the Soul. For if anyone should imagine a soul purely locally motive without vital cognition and appetition, he will err manifestly, because local motion by itself alone, if it does not proceed from cognition and appetite, is not an action of life, since it can be done both by an extrinsic mover and by natural emanation and as if by intrinsic impulse. By almost this reasoning St. Thomas proves this truth, I, q. 70, a. 3; and he brings Plato and Aristotle to the same opinion, which the Fathers of the Church also prefer to the former, as Augustine, book I Retract., c. 5 and 11, and book On Two Souls, c. 4, where he suggests this, but does not speak quite expressly. Basil, homily III Hexam.; Damascene, book II On Faith, c. 6; Jerome, on Isaiah, 1, speak more clearly. And the definition of the Church in c. Firmiter favors this, which acknowledges no other rational creature besides human and angelic. Therefore, as far as this point is concerned, that reasoning is sufficiently probable,

because in the heavens there is no indication of life besides local motion; but local motion by itself is not an indication of life, cognition and love being set aside, as has been said.

16. Second reason for difficulty in the Aristotelian reasoning. But from another aspect difficulty arises, because even inanimate things are accustomed to be moved locally by an intrinsic impulse through innate impulse, as earth through gravity, and then they do not need extrinsic movers; if therefore we think the heavens are moved thus, separate intelligences cannot be inferred from their motions. But no sufficient reason appears, why it cannot be said that the heavens are moved in that way through intrinsic and natural impulse without extrinsic movers. Someone will say, when inanimate things are thus moved from intrinsic weight or other quality, they do not move themselves, but are moved by another, namely, by the generator. But this offers no obstacle, even if we admit that mode of speaking; for by the same reason we shall say that the heavens are indeed effectively and proximately moved by intrinsic and connatural quality, but that motion, as it is from that quality, is only instrumentally, but principally attributed to the author and creator of the heavens, who implanted that power. Nor will he satisfy who says that to other inanimate things natural impulse to some motion is not impressed, except only for that state in which they are outside their natural places, so that they can return to them, which is known in elements and inanimate mixtures; but the heavens are never in that state, but always are in their natural places, and are moved in them; this (I say) does not satisfy, because complete similarity is not to be sought, but proportion and its reason is to be attended to, namely, that natural perfection consonant with intrinsic nature and the way to it flow from intrinsic nature also; whence, because elements naturally exist and rest in their places, from intrinsic nature they have the power either of remaining in them, if they are constituted in them, or of tending to them, when they exist outside them, unless they are impeded. But it is natural to heaven both to remain perpetually in its natural place, and to be moved perpetually

within it so that it may attain its operation as its ultimate perfection, and therefore it will also be said to have received an internal principle or as if natural impulse for both.

17. The second difficulty is dissolved. Nevertheless this evasion also does not prevent that reasoning from being very probable; because really the motion of heaven is not so natural to heaven that, the private and proper nature of that body being considered, either it flows from it intrinsically, or is owed or necessary to it for its own and private perfection. For motion, since it is only a certain way, is usually either necessary, or useful, or connatural only on account of the terminus, as St. Thomas excellently shows, III cont. Gent., c. 23 and lib. IV, final c., and q. 5 de Potent., a. 4. But the proper or intrinsic terminus of local motion is where, or local presence, which in circular motion is not changed or innovated, except according to parts; therefore through circular motion heaven only acquires that it sometimes has this part or this star present to this hemisphere, sometimes to the other, etc.; but what does this matter for the private perfection of heaven itself, since the whole heaven remains in the same place? That it is moved thus, therefore, is not for itself, but for its action, namely, so that it may be applied to acting in diverse places or bodies; from which action, since it is merely transient, no advantage or perfection accrues to it, but to the things into which it flows, and to the whole universe, which is conserved by that influence. Wherefore that motion is indeed natural to the universe itself, and to heaven, insofar as it is the principal part of it; but not as owed to heaven according to private and proper perfection and nature; whence, even if it sometimes rests, it will not rest violently, nor will it lack any perfection owed. But inanimate bodies do not receive innate internal impulse to some motion, except when that motion or its terminus is so natural according to their own and private nature that it is also owed and necessary for their own perfection and state befitting their nature, as is established by induction in all other natural bodies. And thus it is rightly concluded that the heavens, since they are not moved

from within, need an extrinsic mover. Which the very conception of celestial motions and their uniform irregularity also sufficiently persuades; for the whole is so constituted as is expedient for the good government of the entire universe and for its conservation through continual vicissitudes of times. It is therefore a sign that those motions are not for the heavens themselves, nor are they the work of private nature, but of a mind which provides for universal nature.

### *Third Difficulty Concerning the Same Reasoning*

18. But a third evasion immediately arises; for, although we concede that an extrinsic mover of heaven is necessary, it is not therefore concluded that it is a created intelligence, for heaven can be moved by the first mover immediately, and this in two ways. First, by creating and impressing from the beginning on heaven itself some quality by way of an impulse having that power of moving. Second, by moving all heavens through himself and his will; for with the same facility with which he created and conserves them by his power alone, he can also perpetually move them. It is added that, according to the opinion of Aristotle (if the Commentator's exposition is true), the first mover immediately moves the first mobile, as is clear from Metaphysics XII, text 38 and 43, where he says the first immobile substance effects the first motion, where St. Thomas also seems so to expound; therefore by equal reason it can be said that he moves all heavens immediately; for there is no greater reason concerning one than concerning others, nor is it more difficult for him to move all than one. And then, although we grant that God willed to move the heavens not through himself, but by the ministry of some intelligence, what need is there to multiply intelligences according to the number of heavens? For one intelligence alone can have power for effecting all those motions. And it is more consonant with the order and proportion of those motions that all be subordinated to the same will of the same mover. Finally, because the number of intelligences, that

is, that there are so many and not more, cannot be inferred from the motion of these heavens; therefore neither that there are so many and not fewer; therefore absolutely, that there are created intelligences cannot be inferred from those motions.

### *By what Reason the Posed Difficulty Can be Resolved*

19. This objection or evasion sufficiently shows that the aforesaid reasoning is not a demonstration; nevertheless it can be satisfied in such a way that the reason, as much as is from this point, remains very probable. For first, although God by himself alone could effect that effect immediately, nevertheless it is not consonant with his gentle providence, to which it belongs to administer through creatures subject to himself those things which he established through himself; and in this way also from revealed doctrine we have that God governs inferior things through superior ones and corporeal things through spiritual ones. Therefore it does not befit God to be the immediate mover of the heavens or of any corporeal heaven, whether it is believed that he moves it immediately through his will, or through some impressed quality; for in either way he would be the principal mover immediately and impressing that quality. Especially since that quality would be superfluous in the presence of a proximate principal mover having sufficient power to move through himself, whence, if God were the immediate mover, he would not concur through an impressed quality, but immediately by effecting and impressing the motion itself; but in this way it is more consonant with reason that he make that effect through a creature subject to himself; therefore that motion is not to be referred immediately to God, but to some intermediate creature superior to the heavens and inferior to God, which cannot be except an intelligence. Concerning this reasoning St. Thomas can be read, I, q. 110, a. 1, and we shall say more below, treating of the power of acting of intelligences.

*On the Immediate Mover of the First Mobile*

20. Therefore, to confirm the doctrine concerning the mover of the first mobile, it must consequently be denied (as far as the matter itself is concerned) that the first mobile is moved immediately by God, but rather by some intelligence superior to the other movers of the other spheres. However, as regards the mind of Aristotle and the Commentator, it is doubtful what they actually thought. For sometimes Aristotle signifies that the first mover, that is, God, moves the first mobile immediately, as in Metaphysics XII, text 38, where he attributes the first motion to the first mover, and text 43 says the first principle moves with a primary, eternal, and single motion. And he immediately declares that this primary motion, which the first mover effects, is the motion of the first mobile, and to effect the other motions of the heavens he establishes other intelligences. Hence he seems to speak proportionally about proximate movers; for if he were speaking of mediated or universal motion through general concurrence, he should equally attribute to the first mover the motions of all the heavens. Here St. Thomas both interprets Aristotle in this way and seems to incline to the same opinion, reproving Avicenna; and the Commentator in the same place, who more clearly in comment 94 teaches the same thing, although Jandun interprets him differently in Metaphysics XII, chapter 17, against whom Javellus disputes in question 15. But it matters little to us what the Commentator thought. In other places, however, Aristotle signifies that God is only the universal mover, existing above the whole order of the universe and presiding over it, as is clear from Metaphysics XII, text 38, and more clearly in the entire final chapter. And thus St. Thomas attributes this view in Summa contra Gentiles I, chapter 13, and in On Spiritual Creatures, article 6, reply to 10. And indeed this opinion is more consistent with the reasoning and argument that Aristotle intends, although if his words are examined, they seem to

favor more the opposite opinion. If someone wished to defend this, he could respond to the confirmation made by denying the consequence, because the motion of the first mobile is a more universal cause of sublunary things, and the first mover could claim it for himself by a special reason, even if he attributed particular movers to the other heavens. St. Thomas indicates this response in the cited passage of Metaphysics XII.

### *On the Number of Intelligences*

21. To the other confirmation, in which it is asked what number of intelligences can be gathered from the motions of the heavens, I confess indeed that the matter is quite uncertain. Nevertheless, the probable conjecture is that a proper moving intelligence should be assigned to each heaven, and therefore from this sensible effect at least this number of intelligences can be investigated. That individual heavens have individual movers, many conclude from the fact that the intelligence moving a heaven, although it is not a proper soul informing it, nevertheless has with it a certain special union, by reason of which the heaven participates from the intelligence not only motion, but also influence, indeed even proper and internal properties and perpetuity. Because of this union the heaven is said to be animated, and to move itself, and to be distinguished in it between the part that moves per se and the part that is moved per se. Thus philosophizes Averroes in Metaphysics XII, comments 36 and 37, and On the Heaven II, chapter 61. Since therefore one intelligence cannot have this union except with one heaven, it is necessary that the number of intelligences be multiplied according to the number of heavens. But this reasoning does not please me, because that union is either feigned to be greater than what exists between a local mover and the movable, or not. The first cannot be understood; for what can that greater union be? For it cannot be substantial, since it is between two complete and perfect supposita;

but no accidental union can intervene, except through mediate action or virtual contact. But an intelligence cannot exercise any other action around a heaven except local motion, nor does the heaven otherwise receive influence or power of influencing from the intelligence, except insofar as the actual influence of the heaven depends on local motion. Of what sort this dependence is, is not to be disputed here; but it can be taken from what has been said about efficient cause. That the heaven has proper and internal properties from the intelligence, such as quantity, figure, light, and other innate powers, is fictitious, because all these things either arise from the internal principles of the thing, or are co-created with the thing and made by the same cause from which the thing itself is created. Hence in the first instant of creation the heaven has all these properties, although it is not yet moved in that instant, nor united to an intelligence as effecting something in it. From this it is also established that the heaven does not have perpetuity from the intelligence, since by its nature it is incorruptible and from the first instant of its creation it has perpetual duration from itself. Rather, it is even more probable that the intelligence effects no quality in the heaven through which it acts on these inferior things, both because the innate qualities suffice for the heaven for this purpose, participation in which the heavens can perhaps communicate among themselves so that influence is varied, and also because, as we shall say below, separated substances cannot impress qualities on bodies.

22. Therefore, only a union, or rather proximity, necessary for local motion intervenes between heaven and intelligence. From this motion, however, the said number can probably be gathered in various ways. First, because, given the great magnitude of each heaven and such diversity in those motions, both in velocity and slowness and in the terms between which they occur, it does not seem likely that all are made by one and the same mover of finite power. Especially since the mover ought to be proximate to the movable and the same finite intelligence cannot be present to all those bodies. Also, because an intelligence moves heaven through intellect and will; hence it is

necessary that it perpetually attend, consider, and will that motion, and therefore it is not likely that it simultaneously attends to such variety and multitude of motions. These reasons, in my opinion, do not prove that God cannot create some intelligence which, by a single species and simple intuition, can attend to the whole variety of heavens and their motions, and also by a single act will to effect all those motions and all their differences, and which also has the power to execute such a will, and finally which can have presence or proximity sufficient for that entire effect. For all these things do not exceed the capacity of a finite substance in its whole extent, nor does any contradiction appear in all of them. Nevertheless, it is more likely in fact what I have said and what Aristotle teaches, and with him other philosophers and theologians, especially since the angels that move the heavens are not believed to be from the highest orders, but from the lower orders of angels.

23. Therefore, from the motions of the heavens a similar number of intelligences is gathered; but whether the number of intelligences is greater than that of the movable heavens does not seem to be able to be gathered from effects. Hence St. Thomas, Summa I, q. 110, a. 1, reply 2, says that Aristotle posited the number of spiritual substances according to the number of motions that appear in celestial bodies, because from those motions alone he investigated those substances, which he did not think had any other action or presidency in the universe besides the motions of the heavens. But Avicenna, in book IX of his Metaphysics, chapter 4, adds to that number a certain intelligence which presides over the sublunary world and induces substantial forms into disposed matter. But this presidency or operation, in the sense that Avicenna intends, does not belong to angels, as has been demonstrated above in the disputations on formal and efficient cause. Hence from this source the number of intelligences is not truly increased. But there is (says St. Thomas above) another immediate presidency of angels over these inferior bodies, which the philosophers were ignorant of, because it is ordered

not to merely natural actions, but to supernatural or free ones, or those which in some way happen beyond the common course of nature; and from this it is rightly concluded that the number of angels is much greater than that of celestial bodies. But it should be added that although from effects only such a number of intelligences can be determinately gathered, it is not rightly concluded from this that there are not more intelligences than are necessary for such effects. So the Commentator wrongly says in Metaphysics XII, comment 44, that if there were some immaterial substances that do not move, they would be idle. For this is false, because the primary end of intelligences is not to move bodies, nor to have some other action or presidency over corporeal things, whether celestial or sublunary. This can be evident even by natural reason, because spiritual substances are nobler than corporeal ones and have their absolute perfection not only without them, but also without intrinsic relation to them, because they are not incomplete and partial substances, like the rational soul, which for that reason expresses intrinsic relation to bodies, but they are integral and absolute substances entirely separate from bodies, and superior to them. Therefore their primary end is not bodies, or actions on bodies, but they are for God as ultimate end, and apart from him they have no other end, but are for themselves, and for their own perfection. From the negation therefore of multiple effects or motions on bodies it is not positively inferred (so to speak) that there is not a greater number of angels, but at most it can be negatively inferred that from that source a greater number is not gathered.

24. That there is a far greater number, besides what is established from divine Scripture and the Fathers[28], can also be shown by natural reason, at least probably, because a perfect agent makes more perfect things and those more similar to itself, if it conveniently can, in greater multitude. And St. Thomas adduces many other fitting

[28] Daniel 7; Apocalypse 5; Job 25; Luke 3; Matthew 23; Jerome on these places; Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 15; Gregory, Morals 17, chapter 7.

arguments in Summa contra Gentiles II, chapter 92, and Summa I, q. 50, a. 3; and other Doctors, on Sentences II, distinctions 2 and 3. Nor do philosophers seem to have been entirely ignorant of this number of angels, for Aristotle in On the Heaven I, chapter 9, says that above heaven there are certain eternal beings, subject to no alterations or passions, which have the best and most sufficient life in all eternity; and in book I, chapter 3, he says that both Greeks and barbarians, and all universally, think that gods exist and attribute the supreme place to them, because the immortal is fitted to the immortal. He repeats the same in book II, chapter 1. But truly, in On the Soul I, chapter 5, and at the end, he reports from Thales that all things are full of gods, and in On the Parts of Animals I, chapter 5, he reports the same from Heraclitus, and seems to approve that opinion, and in Metaphysics XII, chapter 8, he declares that by the name of gods the first substances are to be understood, that is, separated intelligences, and says that many things about gods have been handed down by his ancestors fabulously and for the persuasion of the people and for the convenience of laws and human affairs. From these things (he says) if anyone separates and takes this alone, namely, that gods are the first substances, he will think it divinely spoken. About these same gods, in Ethics X, chapter 8, he says they are to be thought most blessed and happy, and their extraordinary beatitude is placed not in some action, but in contemplation. He adds, however, in Politics I, chapter 1, that all peoples have thought that gods have a king, indicating that, although intelligences are called gods, there is nevertheless among them one supreme divinity, which has true divinity through essence. In Politics VII, chapter 14, he declares that gods most clearly differ from men and far excel them; and there also he names heroes, whom he separates from men. And finally, in Rhetoric III, chapter 18, he reports from Socrates and Melitus that there are certain substances which are called demons, which Socrates called gods, but Melitus called sons of gods. From all these things, therefore, it is concluded that Aristotle recognized a multitude of intelligences which are not

destined to move the heavens. And that this was Plato's opinion is established from the dialogue in Laws X, and from the dialogue Critias, and from Marsilio Ficino in its argument. About this matter more can be seen in Plotinus, Ennead III, book V, chapter 6; and Alcinous, in the book on the doctrine of Plato, chapter 15; and Proclus, in the book on Soul and Demon; and Eugubinus, book III of Perennial Philosophy, from chapter 12 almost to book V, and book VIII, chapter 1 and following; where he notes that the name of gods was often attributed by the gentiles to dead men, sometimes to celestial bodies or stars or their movers, but sometimes to separated substances, which are bound to no body.

25. From this it can finally be conjectured that philosophers did not arrive at knowledge of separated substances from celestial motions alone, but also by another way; otherwise they would not have believed that there are other substances of this kind besides the movers of the heavens. By what way they arrived at this knowledge, however, is not sufficiently established. And Aristotle sometimes insinuates that this was received by tradition alone and by a certain human faith, of which tradition he thinks there was no beginning. Hence in Metaphysics XII, chapter 8, he thinks it likely that when every art and philosophy was invented as far as possible, and again corrupted, these opinions of theirs were preserved as certain relics up to this time. Others think it likely that this knowledge or rather suspicion could have been acquired from certain effects that men experienced, either concerning themselves or concerning their affairs, such as oracles of idols, prophecies, or some extraordinary motions made by invisible movers, for from these they could gather that there are some invisible and intellectual substances, which lived among men. And they called these by various names, namely, gods, demons, lares, genii, heroes, about which and their various significations can be read in Eugubinus above, and Marsilio Ficino, oration VI on Plato's Symposium; and Ludovicus Vives, in Scholia to Augustine, book VII of City of God, chapter 13. It is true that the gentiles could have

attributed the aforesaid effects to the souls of dead men; but many of them were ignorant of the immortality of souls, others did not think that all those effects could have been made by separated human spirits; and (which is more credible), joined with the tradition which they had about these gods, angels or demons, they easily persuaded themselves that those effects came from gods.

### *On the Origin of Intelligences*

26. In the second argument the question is posed as to whence such substances have being—not according to faith, both because that does not presently concern us, and because according to faith it is certain that all things are created by God—but according to philosophy and the philosophers. Much could be said on this matter, were it not that the essential points have already been sufficiently touched upon above. For, when disputing about the efficient cause, we showed that the creation of all things by the one God can be known by natural reason, and that it was not entirely unknown to Aristotle. Further, when disputing about the First Being (primum ens), we demonstrated that there is only one being that is necessary of itself, whereas the others are not, except insofar as they proceed from Him and are brought into being by Him. Thus it must be affirmed that all spiritual substances, apart from the First, are not simply necessary beings, but receive existence (esse) through God's production and creation (per effectionem et creationem Dei). Nor is this foreign to philosophy; for the principal line of reasoning by which we proved above that these substances exist was drawn from their efficient cause. Moreover, the mode of this production by creation (modus effectionis per creationem) not only is not repugnant to reason, but can even be shown, from other considerations, to be necessary, as has been set forth above. Concerning the third argument we shall speak in the two following sections; for it requires that we explain the mode of being (modus essendi) proper to these substances.

## SECTION II
## WHAT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON ABOUT THE QUIDDITY AND ESSENCE OF CREATED INTELLIGENCES

1. It is customary for writers and philosophers to dispute extensively whether we can know separated substances quidditatively in this life; which doubt Aristotle seems to have raised in On the Soul III, chapter 7, when he said: "Whether it is possible that it itself, namely the human intellect, not separated from magnitude, understands anything of separated things or not, must be considered later"; where the Commentator notes that the question proposed there was defined by Aristotle in no other place. He himself, however, with Themistius, Alexander, and Avempace, whom he cites, defines it affirmatively that we can arrive in this life at that state of perfect contemplation in which we can know those substances quidditatively and through themselves; which opinion he declares most extensively.

### *Resolution of the Question*

2. But I consider it superfluous to waste effort either in expounding or refuting it; for if the terms are understood, it is self-evident that we cannot know those substances quidditatively in this life, especially because the Commentator speaks not only of created intelligences, but also of God, indeed of Him especially; because in His contemplation our beatitude and perfection chiefly consists, as Aristotle also testifies in Metaphysics XII, chapter 7, and Ethics X, chapter 7. But it is evident that we cannot know God quidditatively in this life; indeed it is also certain that no creature by its natural powers can attain such knowledge, as has been extensively treated above. We speak here of quidditative knowledge in the mode we explained there,

namely, for such knowledge of the essence and quiddity of a thing, which manifests not only common predicates, but also proper ones up to the ultimate difference according to its proper and positive knowledge; for the Commentator speaks of this, and this is the proper signification of the phrase "quidditative knowledge"; for the quiddity of a thing consists not only in common predicates, but especially in proper ones.

3. Speaking therefore of this knowledge, we suppose, as experience itself makes sufficiently known, that we cannot quidditatively know intelligences by natural way or mode, although we can in some way declare their quiddity through negative, or connotative, or confused concepts. The first part is most received, as is clear from St. Thomas, Metaphysics II, lecture 1, part 6, and Summa I, q. 12, a. 12, q. 88, a. 2, where Cajetan should be seen, On Being and Essence, chapter 6, question 14; Ferrara, Summa contra Gentiles III, chapter 45; Javellus, Metaphysics II, question 3; Scotus, on Sentences I, distinction 3, question 1; Antonius Andreas, Metaphysics II, question 3. These seem to differ in their mode of speaking, saying that we can acquire quidditative knowledge of separated substances; but when they explain that knowledge, they sufficiently declare that they do not differ in the matter, because they call any knowledge of quiddity "quidditative knowledge," even if it is through imperfect concepts, partly common, partly negative, as the Thomists also noted, and extensively Fonseca, Metaphysics II, chapter 1, question 2. The reason for the assertion is that we have no principle by which we can naturally arrive at such perfect knowledge of separated substances. For our knowledge either occurs immediately through the species of the thing, or is acquired mediately and through discourse from effects or properties; rarely do we proceed a priori to know effects from known causes. But we do not have proper species through which we know intelligences quidditatively, nor can we acquire this from effects or causes; therefore in no way. The minor is proved as to the first part, because we do not have those species as congenital from nature, since

the human intellect from the beginning is like a blank tablet, on which nothing is depicted. Nor can we receive them from sensible things, because they are in no way contained in them, nor can sensible phantasms serve to effect species of spiritual things as they are in themselves. Nor finally can such species be acquired naturally for the state of this life through the influx of God or intelligences; because for this state our soul can conceive nothing except through conversion to phantasms, hence the influx of such species is entirely beyond or supernatural. What Averroes fabricates about a certain state in which the passive intellect (as he speaks) is united to the agent intellect, and from that special union is elevated to know separated substances, and becomes (as he says) the acquired intellect, this (I say) is entirely like a fiction, and supposes the error that both the possible and agent intellects are separated substances, and through their union we understand without proper information of the intellectual soul, which is obviously impossible from the science of the Soul. And then he falsely and against all experience feigns that we sometimes arrive at such perfect union with that agent intellect, or rather separated intelligence, that we perfectly know other separated substances; for neither has he experienced this state, as his errors sufficiently manifest, nor do we experience it, nor can it naturally be thought or understood, to omit other reasons which St. Thomas produced against that fiction and similar ones, Summa contra Gentiles III, chapters 41 to 45.

4. Again, there is no effect in nature through which we can acquire quidditative knowledge of intelligences, which is clear a fortiori from what was said in the preceding section. For from effects we can scarcely know probably that these substances exist, even confusedly and in general; how therefore shall we know their quiddities through effects, up to their proper differences? Rather, although the essence of God is more incomprehensible to us than that of intelligences, nevertheless it is better known to us through effects than other intelligences, for from effects we know more evidently that God exists than that angels do, because the effects we experience

depend essentially on God and not on angels. And similarly we know more essential attributes of God than of angels, because His perfections and powers are more represented in sensible effects than the nature of angels. Hence it also happens that, in that imperfect mode by which we can conceive spiritual things from creatures, we arrive at a more proper concept of God than of any created intelligence. For about God we know many things from effects which can belong to Him alone, such as being from Himself, pure act, and similar things which were touched upon above. About intelligences, however, we can attain nothing, especially from effects, except either what is common to all beings or created substances, or at most, what is common to all incorporeal substances. For there is no effect in nature depending on some immaterial substance which could not be made by another more perfect, or even by a less perfect one; therefore it does not depend on the specific difference, so to speak, or on the entirely proper faculty of any intelligence, as such; therefore from effects we cannot arrive at specific and proper concepts of intelligences, even negative and imperfect ones, much less at their quidditative knowledge.

5. And hence it can finally easily be proved that we cannot acquire such knowledge from knowledge of causes, because intelligences have no intrinsic cause besides their simple nature, which cannot be immediately known by us in itself, as has been proved. They have no extrinsic cause except God, whom we do not naturally know except as far as can be manifested from sensible effects, or at most as far as can be manifested from our soul, as Augustine touched upon in On the Trinity IX, chapter 3; therefore it is impossible from this knowledge of God to arrive at quidditative knowledge of intelligences. The consequence is clear, because by that knowledge we can neither know God as He is in Himself, nor as He eminently contains these effects, nor even the emanations of individual effects from Him. Hence at most from that cause and His power we reason that He can effect some grade of incorporeal or intellectual substances, and

perhaps in it there can be made many genera and species of substances; but what those species are like, and what is the proper quiddity of each one, we cannot know from the force of that knowledge which we naturally have of God. Therefore by no reason or natural way can we acquire quidditative knowledge of these substances.

*Solving the Objection about the Rational Soul*

6. One difficulty remains, because our soul separated from the body can know separated intelligences quidditatively, even if it cannot comprehensively (for these two are distinct, as has been declared more broadly above and elsewhere); therefore also when joined to the body it will be able to arrive at such knowledge. The consequence is clear, for otherwise our soul would be deprived by union to the body of the most perfect operation to which it has the highest inclination, and thus would be in the body violently, and would naturally desire to be separated from it so that it could attain ultimate perfection; but this conflicts with the fact that it is the natural form of the body. This difficulty, however, depends on many principles, pertaining to the science of the Soul. For the antecedent that is assumed is uncertain, especially in the doctrine of St. Thomas, as is clear from Summa I, q. 89, a. 2. But if that antecedent is conceded, it is also controversial whether the soul according to its higher and intellective grade informs the body, or not. Hence those who hold the negative part will perhaps respond that the soul is not impeded by union to the body as to those operations which it can have as the form of the body, but can be impeded as to others which it can have according to that grade by which it does not inform the body. Nevertheless, neither can this response be sustained nor does it satisfy, both because it supposes a false opinion, since the rational soul, according to its whole substance up to the ultimate and most perfect grade that is in it, is the form of the body, otherwise it would not

formally constitute man in the human and rational species; and also because the touched difficulty is not solved, in what way the soul is the natural form of the body and yet is impeded by it from the most perfect operation.

7. Therefore it must be said that this is the condition of our soul that it can have a double state, one in the body and another outside the body, and, consequently, that it can acquire intellective knowledge by a double way, namely, either through the body, or through the influx of another superior cause. Therefore as long as the soul is in the body, it can acquire knowledge only through the body, naturally speaking; and so it cannot know itself through itself, but through certain effects which it experiences in itself, nor even superior substances, except through sensible effects, or at most through proportion and analogy to itself and to the effects which it experiences in itself. That it cannot ascend further is from its natural imperfection, from which it has that it is the form of the body, and that for that state it uses it as an organ for acquiring knowledge; nor does the body properly impede it, but rather helps toward knowledge as far as it can; but it is not helped higher, because higher knowledge is entirely disproportionate to the body. But truly after the soul is separated, it has another mode of acquiring species more immaterial, through the influx of a superior cause; it also has freer use of them without dependence on phantasms, and therefore can have more perfect knowledge of certain things in that state. This must necessarily be asserted in every opinion; for at least it is beyond controversy that the separated soul can intuitively see itself through itself, which it cannot do while it is joined to the body, as is evidently known from experience. Therefore that difficulty is not special, but common in every opinion, and therefore must be solved by all by saying that the soul is of finite perfection and has limited powers, and so cannot conjoin to itself the perfections of both states; and therefore it is not wonderful that, while it is conjoined, in some respect it cannot exercise so freely and perfectly those actions in which it agrees with

separated substances; just as, on the contrary, even while it is separated, it is deprived of many perfections or operations and causalities, which it has when conjoined to the body, for which reason this state is more natural to it, although the other is not positively (so to speak) violent, but preternatural.

8. And from these things which were said in the first part of the assertion, the second part of the conclusion has been proved almost incidentally, namely, that we can in some way understand the quiddity of intelligences in this life, because at least in general we understand them to be possible, indeed also to exist in fact. Again we understand them to be similar to God in the complete intellectual and spiritual grade; but this is to know their quiddity in some way. And this is what the testimonies and reasons which are customarily adduced to confirm Averroes's opinion prove at most. Such is that argument, that such substances are contained under the adequate object of the intellect. From this principle at most it can be gathered that intelligences can be confusedly known by us under the aspect of being or substance; for our intellect cannot equally perfectly know all things that are contained under the latitude of being, according to their proper aspects. For, beyond that general objective aspect, proportion is required both between the natural powers of the intellect and the perfection of the object, and between the species through which the power is united to the object and the connatural mode of obtaining such a species, all of which things are disproportionate in us with respect to intelligences, so that they can be known quidditatively by us; nevertheless they contribute to some knowledge, because of some similarity or connection which those substances have with those things which are better known to us.

9. That argument also proves the same thing, that the natural beatitude of man consists in the contemplation of separated substances. For first, our essential beatitude does not consist in knowledge of created intelligences, but of the first uncreated substance alone; for that alone is our ultimate end; but the contemplation of

created intelligences at most pertains to the accidental perfection of our beatitude. But truly, quidditative knowledge of the highest and uncreated intelligence is not required for the essential beatitude connatural to man, because that is not possible to man through nature, as has been shown above. Nor is any perfection of knowledge of the nature of human beatitude, but that which is proportioned to natural capacity; for, as Aristotle excellently said in those same places, man can only be happy as man. Therefore for accidental beatitude, which is situated in contemplation of other intelligences, quidditative knowledge of them will not be necessary, but some conception of their quiddity will be necessary. And perhaps in this sense Aristotle said, in Metaphysics IX, chapter 12, text 22, that ignorance of immaterial substances is not in us like blindness, which consists in privation of the visual power itself, but only signifies privation of act, because namely in us there is potency for knowing them, although many are ignorant of them. This can be understood either of imperfect knowledge, to which there is potency in us for the state of this life, or of quidditative knowledge, to which there is power in our soul, and it will be able to use it when separated from the body, even if Aristotle never expressly declared this. But now it remains that we explain in particular how great this knowledge of separated substances can be in us for the state of this life, which we shall accomplish in the following section.

## SECTION III

## WHAT ATTRIBUTES CAN BE KNOWN CONCERNING THE ESSENCES OF CREATED INTELLIGENCES

1. That intelligences are real beings and substances can be known naturally. First, it is certain that we can know concerning these substances that they are real beings existing per se, and consequently

that they are substances. This is evident from what has been said; for when we demonstrate that these substances exist, we demonstrate that they are beings. But they are not beings that inhere in some other being, because they cannot inhere in material substance, since they are of a higher and more perfect order. Nor can they inhere in any immaterial substance, because that which is uncreated is not capable of any entity inhering in it; but if it is a created and immaterial substance, we call this a separate intelligence, whether it be one or many, as has already been said. Hence, if there are no accidents in these beings, it is rightly concluded that they are substances; but if they do have accidents, from this it is also proved that there must be in them a substance that underlies such accidents. The intelligence itself, therefore, is essentially a substance; regarding these common predicates, then, we know sufficiently the quiddity of these substances.

2. Someone will ask, however, whether these very predicates —namely, being and substance, as they are predicated of intelligences —are known by us quidditatively; for Scotus, In I, dist. 3, q. 1, affirms this of being but denies it of substance. First, because the concept of being is entirely simple and one; hence it cannot be known partly and ignored partly, and therefore if it is known in any way, it is known quidditatively. Second, because we do not know substance through its proper species, therefore we do not know it quidditatively either. Others, however, say the contrary: that the concept of being is not known quidditatively by us, but the concept of substance is so known. The reason for the first part is that the concept of being is not one nor abstracted from its inferiors; hence it is not known quidditatively, at least adequately, unless all its inferiors are known, which is not possible for us. The reason for the second part is that, if we do not know substance as such quidditatively, we know nothing quidditatively at all, because when substance is unknown, accident cannot be known quidditatively, and when the supreme genus is unknown, those things contained under it cannot be known quidditatively. Someone, however, might perhaps think that both

predicates are known quidditatively, because of the foundation of each opinion.

3. I myself am of the opinion that neither is known quidditatively, if we speak properly of quidditative knowledge. For quidditative knowledge requires not only that it be proper knowledge of some thing or predicate, that is, not common to others; in this manner we know the essence of God through some concept that is in a way proper, and yet we do not know it quidditatively, because we do not know that very thing which is proper to God in the way that it is, but through negations or relation to created things. Similarly in this life we know our soul up to its specific difference in some way, and yet we do not know it quidditatively, according to the more probable opinion, because we do not conceive it through its proper substance and species, nor do we sufficiently understand its mode of understanding or operating, nor finally do we apprehend the mode of its substance positively (so to speak), but through negation. So therefore we do not know the nature of substance or being quidditatively, because we can explain the proper natures of these concepts only confusedly through negations or certain relations.

4. This is declared more fully in particular; for concerning being, we know at most that it is that which is, but we do not know quidditatively what esse itself is; hence some think that esse is an act really distinct from essence, while others think it is not distinct. It is also uncertain whether that very concept which we explain by this expression, namely, "that which is," is objectively one and having one quiddity; therefore it is a sign that it is not known quidditatively by us. Nor is it sufficient for this that that nature be absolutely simple and in some way one, according to our opinion, because a nature, although simple, can be known confusedly and through improper concepts, whether negative or connotative. This is more evidently clear in the concept of substance, whose nature we conceive only either through the negation of not existing in another, or through the relation of standing under others, which do not pertain to the quidditative nature

of substance. Again, we do not know quidditatively the nature of subsistence; indeed, if we had not known the mystery of the Incarnation by the light of faith, through natural knowledge alone we would not have distinguished subsistence from the essence of substance; but with subsistence not known quidditatively, it is impossible to know substance quidditatively. Furthermore, we cannot know quidditatively even material substance, which seems more proportionate to us, because we do not know matter quidditatively, but through analogy, as Aristotle said, and consequently neither form, which is also sufficiently manifested by the diversity of opinions in explaining the proper natures and effects of such principles. What wonder, then, that we cannot know quidditatively the nature of substance as such, and as it is found in intelligences? Especially since it is not so certain that their common nature is one and univocal; indeed, there are various opinions of philosophers concerning this matter. Finally, Scotus's argument is excellent, because we do not know substance as such through its proper species, as is clear from the science concerning the soul and we shall touch upon a little below when comparing accident to substance.

5. Nor do I consider it inconvenient to concede that no substance is known quidditatively by us in this life; rather, I think this is known by sufficient experience. For what has not been discovered by so many philosophers with so much diligence applied, it is quite probable that it exceeds the natural faculty of human genius; but I do not see that this quidditative knowledge of any substance has yet been found. The one we seem to know most is the human species or soul, and even that knowledge is so imperfect that it cannot be called quidditative. Concerning accidents that are not sensed per se, the same can easily be said; concerning those that are sensed per se, greater knowledge can be had, because they are conceived through their proper species. But even those do not seem to be known quidditatively (so great is the weakness of human genius); for who has yet sufficiently explained what sound, odor, and similar things are? But

concerning these matters more extensively elsewhere; from this discourse, however, the resolution of the preceding section is more evidently confirmed.

### *It is Shown that Angels are in Fact Intellectual & Lack Matter*

6. I say second: by natural reason it is known that intelligences are incorporeal, immaterial, and intellectual substances. This conclusion is taken from Aristotle, XII Metaphysics, where he speaks only of the movers of the celestial orbs, but the same reasoning applies to the rest, and the Commentator and other later philosophers and interpreters of Aristotle hold the same view; theologians also and the ancient Fathers have expressly taught this, whom I shall commemorate below. I omit the places in Scripture where angels are called spirits, not by the common appellation by which air is also usually called spirit, but by the proper one, by which it is said of an incorporeal thing, as is taken from the chapter Firmiter, de Sum. Trinit. et fide Cathol. Therefore, the matter must be treated by reason alone, and to explain this I suppose that substance can be corporeal in two ways: in one way entirely and with regard to both parts, matter namely and form; for I suppose from what has been said above concerning material cause that every corporeal substance is composed of matter and form, although if there could be a simple and corporeal substance, it would be entirely necessary for it to be extended and divisible into parts according to its whole self, which is the condition and imperfection of material substance. In another way, some substance can be corporeal only on the part of matter, that is, composed of body and spirit, as man is. And the same distinction can be applied concerning the other two attributes, namely, being immaterial and intellectual; for these three attributes, as I shall say in the course of discussion, are convertible in the present matter.

7. Intelligences are not corporeal according to their whole selves. Concerning the first attribute, then, namely incorporeal, if it is taken as opposed to corporeal in the first way mentioned, it is most evident that intelligences are not corporeal in that way, because a thing that is totally and with regard to both parts corporeal is very imperfect; for in its being and operating it is in no way separated from matter, nor does it dominate it. But intelligences are placed in the universe in the supreme grade and order of things, and thus Aristotle, I de Caelo, c. 8, says there are above the heavens eternal beings leading the best life. Hence without any doubt intelligences are more perfect than the human species. That even the gentiles recognized this is proved at length by Franc. Georg., in Harm. mund., tom. VI, cant. 1, c. 32, whom Ioan. Arbor. reports, lib. I Theosoph., c. 2, saying that he held the opposite. This, however, is not only alien to the Holy Fathers and the mode of speaking of Scripture, as Arboreus treats at length there, but also to the tradition of all peoples who have spoken of these substances, and to all reason. For if there are effects through which we arrive at knowledge of intelligences, those show or indicate that there is in intelligences greater power and strength, or at least not less, than is in human nature, as is evident from the motions of the heavens and from other effects which they work in men, such as predictions or revelations of most hidden things, etc. The principal reason also by which we proved above that intelligences exist, from their more perfect likeness to God, proves that they are more perfect than all visible things, even man, and more perfectly participate in the intellectual grade; otherwise they would not have been necessary in the universe for that cause. Since therefore man is not a corporeal substance in that way, neither will intelligences be corporeal in that way. Also because from this we gather that man is not corporeal in that way, but has at least a spiritual form, because he participates in intellectual operation; but intelligences are intellectual in a more noble way; therefore.

8. From the reasoning already made, however, we can proceed further to show that intelligences are incorporeal also in the other way, that is, having in themselves no mass or extension of quantity. For God is incorporeal in this way; therefore it pertains to the perfection of the universe that there be some grade of creatures similar to God in this mode of being; for participation in divine being with regard to a similar mode of substance does not seem to involve repugnance, nor does it exceed the limits of creature, and therefore such created substance pertains to the perfection of the universe; but we call substances of this grade and order intelligences. This reasoning is the same and of the same efficacy as that which was treated at length in section 1, and it proves indeed that there are some created substances incorporeal in this way, but it does not prove that all those whom we call intelligences and confess to be superior to man are incorporeal in that way, because likeness to God and perfection of the universe is sufficiently preserved if there are some supreme intelligences entirely incorporeal, although there are others of lower order having bodies. Indeed, if such variety of intelligences is possible, it will pertain to the beauty of the universe that both modes and orders of intelligences be present.

9. Hence not only many of the ancient philosophers, but also some modern philosophers and theologians seem to have asserted in this way that some angels, especially demons, are corporeal. Cajetan affirms this of the movers of the heavens, in c. 4 Genes., and of demons, in c. 2 ad Ephes., where he adduces the reason touched upon concerning the perfection and completion of the universe, namely that it is necessary for there to be in it all grades of things, one of which is corporeal intellectual substance that does not sense, but only moves itself locally. Niph. also held this, lib. III de Daemon., c. 3 and following; the same extensively Eugub., lib. VIII Peren. philos., c. 27 and 41, where he brings not only Plato, but also Aristotle into that opinion, who seems to favor it V Metaph., c. 8. Indeed St. Thomas, q. 16 de Malo, a. 1, ad 2, says it is probable that Dionysius believed

demons to be corporeal. And St. Augustine, whom he reports there, lib. XI Genes. ad litter., c. 13, and in other places, seems to have been of the same opinion.

### *No Corporeal Intelligences are Given*

10. In order that the reasoning already made may conclude universally, therefore, that distinction of intelligences into incorporeal and corporeal must be excluded by another way. And first we can show that this distinction is supported by no reasoning, nor can any indication be assigned by us on account of which we should judge some angels to be corporeal rather than others. For that some are good and others evil is no argument that the evil ones are corporeal while the good ones are incorporeal, both because since all are creatures, all of whatever grade and order could have declined to evil, and according to the more probable opinion of theologians the most excellent angel in nature fell and became a demon, with whom some from individual orders and hierarchies fell; therefore from the distinction in goodness or malice no distinction of incorporeal or corporeal in intelligences can be taken. Hence Dionysius, c. 4 de Divinis nomin., says that it is thereby established that body is not the proper cause of vices, because demons fell without body, and Damascenus, lib. II, c. 3, says that good angels are separated from evil ones by morals, not by nature. Therefore that threefold distinction of the ancient philosophers, who divided rational animals into gods, demons, and men, attributing celestial bodies to gods, aerial to demons, terrestrial to men, as St. Augustine recalls, lib. VIII de Civit., c. 4, this (I say) division was both given without foundation and introduced from some false error, because they thought that rational souls were united to diverse bodies according to the diversity of merits, as the same St. Augustine reports from Plotinus, lib. IX de Civit., c. 10, 11 and 12. Again, angels cannot be distinguished into incorporeal and corporeal from their operation, for all are perfect intelligences, which for the use of understanding do

not need the ministry of body, nor can the opposite be proved of any by any indication. Every action also which they have outside themselves is of the same nature in all, because it does not transcend local motion, which can be done by an incorporeal agent. Indeed rather concerning the movers of the heavens, from perpetual local motion Aristotle tries to elicit that they are incorporeal, which although he does not gather with sufficient evidence, as has been seen in what precedes, it is nevertheless certain that that motion per se does not require body, and is done more expeditiously, uniformly, and invariably, if it is done without body.

11. What pertains to those intelligences which many even among the gentiles have understood to converse among us, there are no actions of theirs which, even if they are frequently done by lower ones, cannot also be done by higher ones; therefore neither do those actions require bodies substantially united, but assumed ones suffice for them, or locally moved ones, as theologians treat more extensively, I, q. 51. Finally, neither from sensible and corporeal passions can it be established that some angels are corporeal rather than others, because it cannot be established by any natural reason that such passions have place in any of the intelligences; for that principal passion by which we believe demons suffer from corporeal fire cannot be known by natural reason and it is certain that it does not occur by natural power. Hence, although it proceeds from a corporeal agent or instrument, it is nevertheless not corporeal in itself and on the part of the recipient; and therefore it also has place in separated souls. Other animal passions are sometimes usually attributed to demons, such as that they delight in sensible odors, as St. Augustine reports from the gentiles, lib. VIII de Civit., c. 15, from Apuleius, lib. de Deo Socratis, and lib. IX, c. 16, and lib. XI, c. 1, from Porphyry, epist. ad Anebundem; and similar things Cyril reports, lib. IV cont. Iulian., from Porph., lib. II de Abstinentia animator., and from Homer and others; Origen also reports these, lib. VII cont. Celsum; and Theodoret, lib. III and VII de Affect. Graecar. Indeed many of the Fathers believed that demons

delight in venereal things, whom it is not now necessary to report; but Pamelius can be seen, in annotat. ad Tertullian., Parad. 1. Nevertheless, those who attributed such passions to demons, if they understood this properly and formally, erred in thinking them to be corporeal animals having senses, which they could not know by any sufficient sign or effect, but otherwise they were deceived who felt thus by false rumor and human tradition. But if this is understood only objectively, body will not be necessary for that effect; for demons can intellectually perceive sensible odors or vapors of gentile sacrifices, and take pleasure in them with spiritual affection. Therefore from effects there is no reason for distinguishing corporeal intelligences from incorporeal ones.

12. Someone will say: even if this is not perceived by us from operation and therefore we cannot particularly discern which angels are corporeal and which incorporeal, that is, whether good or evil, whether movers of heavens or guardians of men, etc., nevertheless from a priori reasoning we can understand that those two orders of intelligences are given, because both are possible and that variety pertains to the perfection of the universe, and we can only say in general that incorporeal intelligences are more perfect by their nature. But nevertheless it must be said that by philosophical reasoning (even if it is not mathematical demonstration) it can be sufficiently shown that corporeal intelligences are not possible nor do they pertain to the perfection of the universe. This I show thus: for either those intelligences have such bodies that they cannot use them for sensing or for any other act of life, or they have organs and operations of senses in their bodies. Neither can be said; therefore. The first is proved by St. Thomas's argument, I, q. 51, a. 1, and q. 70, a. 3, because a form which is a pure principle of understanding and cannot exercise any act of life through body, cannot be a true form and incomplete substance, by its nature ordered to actuating a body substantially and with it constituting a complete substance per se one. For, since form is more perfect than matter, it is not united to it principally on account

of matter, but on account of the composite and on account of itself and its operation; if therefore no proper operation of such form can be exercised through body, the being of such form is not by its nature ordered to body; for operation indicates being itself and its mode, because being is for the sake of operation and operation flows from being. Add that such body would serve nothing at all for the operation of understanding, because body does not serve for this action except through the mediation of senses. Nor indeed should such an intellective principle be united to body for local motion alone, for this motion per se is not an action of life, except insofar as it proceeds from cognition and appetite, and, proportion being preserved, it is not an action of a living body, except insofar as it proceeds from cognition and appetite having corporeal organs, such as phantasy and sensitive appetite. But if it proceeds from cognition and affection purely intellectual and spiritual, it is sufficiently done in body by an external mover; therefore for this motion alone an intellective principle cannot be substantially and vitally united to body; therefore intelligences cannot be composed of bodies lacking actions of life.

13. Nor can intelligences have bodies that sense per se, for such bodies must have organs accommodated to senses, among which the sense of touch holds the first place; but these organs require a mixed body tempered from the first qualities, as is evident from the books de Anima. Therefore intelligences cannot have such bodies, for intelligences are substances entirely incorruptible and incapable of natural alterations that dispose to corruption; but such bodies are by nature corruptible and alterable, since they consist of matter subject to these elementary qualities. You will say that angels are incorruptible not by nature, but by grace. But that this is false we shall show below and it is evident per se that it is alien to all natural reason. Hence, even those who say that the heavens are corruptible on the part of matter, but never are corrupted, nor is there active power in natural agents against them, place in the heavens themselves some dispositions not having a contrary, by reason of which they cannot be corrupted;

otherwise if there were in them a temperament of hot and humid, no reason could be given why they could not be corrupted. If therefore there were in angels bodies so disposed and tempered, they could naturally be corrupted and altered. Especially since those are not substances always existing in some natural place removed from these natural agents, but which go around various places and pass through any places affected by any qualities, from which they suffer nothing; therefore it is a sign that they do not have naturally corruptible bodies.

14. The argument can be answered otherwise, that it only concludes that the bodies of intelligences do not have such organs and such senses as ours have; but they can have another genus of senses that does not require corruptible bodies nor organs tempered from the first qualities. For why could not God make such senses and bodies? But although we cannot demonstrate openly that this implies contradiction, it is sufficient for us that there is no principle in nature for feigning such bodies, nor can it be understood from natural principles how they might be possible, or what those senses would be like, or what acts they would have. Hence those who attribute bodies to demons or angels do not attribute to them organic bodies or ones apt for sensing, but subtle or homogeneous ones, and therefore they call them aerial, which surely could not help but be most imperfect. And therefore it is far more true that there are no bodies in intelligences, nor is there another nature consisting of body and spirit besides the human. This the Lateran Council indicated, in c. Firmiter, de Summ. Trinit., saying that God from the beginning of time created spiritual and corporeal creature, that is, angelic and mundane, and then human as if common, constituted from spirit and body. But the angelic nature as a whole, and as it embraces all intelligences, does not consist of body and spirit, but is only spiritual. And in this way the Fathers of the Church feel about angels and call them spiritual in this sense, such as Dionysius, c. 1 and 2 de Caelest. hierar., and IV de Divin. nom.; Ignatius, epist. 2 ad Trallian.; Damascenus, lib. I de Fid., c. 17, and lib. II, c. 3; and Basil, homilia Quod Deus non est auctor

malorum; Chrysostom, hom. XXII in Genes., and XLIV in Math.; Cyril, lib. IV in Ioan., c. 10; Athanasius, orat. de Commun. essent. Patris et Filii et Spiritus Sancti, and in Ps. 79, around that passage: "Who sits upon the Cherubim," as is reported in VII Syn., epist. Germani ad Thomam; Irenaeus, lib. II cont. Haeres., c. 54 and 55; Gregory, II Moral., c. 5; Hilary, VIII de Trinit.; Jerome, Isaiae, 63; Pope Leo, epist. 96. And St. Augustine, although in many ways he seems doubtful, nevertheless, I lib. Retract., c. 11 and 12, and lib. II, c. 14, retracts what he had said elsewhere, that angels have souls or are souls, but he says they should be called spiritual creatures and spirits.

15. How Fathers saying angels are corporeal are to be understood. I know that many things can also be objected to the contrary from the Fathers of the Church and from ancient philosophers. But that philosophers erred in a hidden matter and one very distant from the senses is not to be wondered at. The Fathers of the Church, however, sometimes followed in these matters, which do not pertain to the doctrine of faith, the ancient philosophers, especially Plato; sometimes they call something material or corporeal not by absolute propriety, but by comparative speech; thus Damascenus above simultaneously says that angels are incorporeal and immaterial in themselves, but material in respect to God. And in the same way can be explained what is said in de Ecclesiast. dogmat., c. 12 and 13, that nothing is incorporeal except God; and the reason is given, because every creature is locally circumscribed, which can also be understood broadly, as I shall say below. Indeed even St. Augustine, haeres. 86, reporting Tertullian as asserting that God is body, piously says that he can be explained as having called God corporeal, that is, who is not something vain or fictitious, but a true and perfect being. In this sense we explain that passage of Paul: "In whom dwells the fullness of divinity bodily," that is, truly and naturally and not only figuratively. Much more therefore can angels be called corporeal, not on account of corporeal mass and extension, but on account of some composition and imperfection which they have in comparison to God.

16. Angels are immaterial. From this part of the conclusion is gathered another or another attribute of intelligences, namely, that angels are immaterial, that is, not composed of matter, or of essential parts really distinct, of which one is potency, the other substantial act. This inference is evident from another principle, which was proved in disp. XIII, namely, that this composition is not found except in quantified and corporeal things; since therefore it has been shown that angels do not have quantity of mass nor extension of parts, it is rightly concluded that they are immaterial. And because in that place we adduced everything that could be desired here, it will not be necessary to add or repeat anything in this place.

*Angels are Intellectual*

17. Finally, from the aforementioned attributes, another conclusion follows that was stated in the third part of our proposition: namely, that angels are of intellectual nature. This is also naturally evident and most certain in our faith, as Bernard noted in book V of his Considerations to Eugenius. For evil angels were able to sin, and good angels always see the face of the Father, and both speak to men and teach, instruct, and tempt them, etc. All of these things cannot occur without intellect. Finally, the very name "intelligences," which philosophers have imposed upon angels, sufficiently indicates that they understood angels to be intellectual. Moreover, the argument made above by which we showed that intelligences exist proves that they must be of intellectual nature, because God is constituted in this supreme degree, and from likeness to Him and from perfect participation in that degree, insofar as it can exist in created nature, we concluded that such creatures are necessary in the universe. Therefore, such creatures are living and intellectual substances.

18. Finally, we can prove this same point from the previous attributes. For St. Thomas proves in this manner in I, q. 14, a. 1 that God is of intellectual nature, because He is incorporeal and

immaterial. For the immateriality of some thing (he says) is the reason why it is cognitive, and according to the degree of immateriality is the degree of cognition. Therefore, just as God is supremely immaterial, so He is supremely cognitive. Conversely, however, corporeal things down to the level of plants, because of excessive materiality, participate in no cognition, while animals do participate in some cognition, insofar as they begin in some way to dominate matter and to be capable of forms or species without matter. But the rational soul already attains the intellectual degree, because although it informs matter, it can nevertheless subsist without it. Therefore, intelligences, which approach more closely to God's immateriality because they not only subsist without matter but also cannot inform it, nor do they have an essential relation to it, nor do they need it in any way for their own proper and vital operations, live a purely intellectual life, as Aristotle also taught in XII Metaphysics, c. 8, and I On the Heavens, c. 8. That immateriality is the reason for some thing being cognitive, St. Thomas explains from the fact that matter is what limits and constrains form. But the nature of a knowing thing requires a certain relation and capacity by reason of which it can in a superior manner become those things which it recognizes, from III On the Soul, text 34. This can be explained in this manner: because intellectual life is most perfect, and all actual life consists in a perfect and internal manner of operating, which necessarily proceeds from form and not from matter, because matter is not active but purely receptive. Therefore, the more form surpasses the imperfection of matter, the more perfectly it is operative. And therefore the forms of inanimate things, because they are very material, although they can act upon something outside themselves, nevertheless cannot operate in a perfect and vital manner. But other forms either attain the degree of life, or participate in greater perfection in it, the more they are distant in their being and perfection from the imperfection of matter. Therefore, forms that are entirely abstracted and removed from the potentiality of matter will participate in the best mode of life, which consists in understanding.

19. But someone might object that this entire argument supposes that every immaterial substance is intellectual; however, this principle is neither self-evident nor evidently demonstrated. For what contradiction does it imply for God to create some immaterial substance that is not intelligent? If this implies no contradiction, how do we know that none of created things are of this kind? Furthermore, how can immateriality be the reason for intellectuality, when the former is a negation and the latter a positive perfection? If through that negation some positive difference is circumscribed, it is either more common than intellectuality and thus cannot be an adequate reason for intellectuality (whence there are immaterial accidents that are in no way intellectual), or if it is taken as it is a perfection of intellectual substances, it says nothing distinct from intellectuality.

20. Gabriel raises these and other objections in I, dist. 35, q. 1, and Aureolus, as cited by Capreolus, ibid., q. 1. Nevertheless, it seems more truly to be the case that it is impossible for a created spiritual and incorporeal substance not to be intellectual. This St. Thomas and all theologians seem to suppose, as does Dionysius throughout his book On the Celestial Hierarchy. For from this he concludes that angels are intelligent, because they are similar to God in spiritual and immaterial being, and the purer they are in this, the more perfect they are in understanding. And St. Augustine in book XII of his Genesis Literally Interpreted, c. 10, says that every substance that is actually intelligible is intellectual. Although he speaks of fact, nevertheless he understands this connection to be per se and necessary. Indeed, if this were not so, no one could certainly affirm with foundation that every substance that is actually intelligible or spiritual is intellectual. For why would God not have made in that order both a knowing and a non-knowing substance, if both differences were possible, just as is the case in the corporeal order? The reason why this is not possible was touched upon above and is explained more fully: because a substance, especially an actual one having being simply, cannot be understood not to have an operation

connaturally proportioned to itself. Therefore, every spiritual substance will necessarily have such an operation. But that operation cannot consist in transient action alone, both because such action as it can exist among created things presupposes some communication in matter or in mode of composition, as I shall say below, and also because such action, if it does not proceed from the operation of life, is very imperfect. But a spiritual substance, since it is in the most perfect order of things, ought by its nature to participate in a perfect mode of operating. Therefore, the operation of a spiritual substance, intrinsic and connatural, is immanent. Consequently, it will also be a vital operation, because action that is per se immanent, as such, is always vital, and because the degree of the living is more perfect than that of the non-living. Therefore, a spiritual substance, since it is of the most perfect order, ought to be constituted in that degree. Finally, such operation will necessarily be spiritual, since it is in a spiritual substance. But spiritual, vital, and immanent operation is only that which pertains to the intellectual degree.

21. To the other part of the objection, Capreolus responds that when immaterial being is said to be the reason for being intellectual, intellectual is not taken for the essential difference, or (as they say) radically; for in this way the argument made proves that being spiritual and being intellectual are the same, and therefore one cannot be the reason for the other. Rather, intellectual is taken for the proximate faculty of understanding, and in this way it is clear that intellect follows upon such a substance insofar as it is spiritual. But I add that even if intellectual is taken in the former way, it can be verified that immateriality is its reason, not indeed in the manner of a proper principle and cause, but either only insofar as one condition infers another, or at most insofar as one concept is the reason for another, just as in God we say one attribute is the reason for another. And indeed, if immateriality is taken for the negation of composition from matter and form in a complete or actual substance, it can be called the reason for intellectuality only in the manner of a condition

sine qua non, which when posited, it necessarily follows that such a substance is intellectual. But if it is taken for the positive perfection that we circumscribe through that negation, then, although in a spiritual substance spirituality (so to speak) and intellectuality are not distinguished, nevertheless we can distinguish them according to precise and inadequate concepts. For just as the same form according to the same entity and essential principle both informs and is a principle of operating, although we distinguish these two through concepts, so the same separated form by virtue of the same essential difference is both in itself of such perfection and order, and is the radical principle of such operation as understanding is. But we distinguish these two by reason through inadequate concepts. Of the former of these (comparing them objectively), we most truly say it is the reason for the latter, for because the form in itself is such that it attains the degree and order of spiritual substances, therefore it is necessarily intellectual, that is, the radical principle of understanding. And immateriality taken in this way is not something more common than intellectuality, nor conversely, but they are convertible with each other, and nevertheless one is said to be the reason for the other because of the aforesaid precision of the intellect.

22. Hence it does not matter that spiritual accidents are not intellectual, because they are not immaterial in the way we now speak of immaterial being, namely, as it belongs to being per se. The reason is that substance alone is the first principle of operating; but accidents are faculties or operations or dispositions of substance, and therefore, although an immaterial substance is necessarily the principal principle of understanding, accidents, although they also are spiritual, do not participate in this perfection. Indeed, although some are proximate principles, not all are, because either they are the operations themselves and ultimate acts, or they are proximate principles of other actions that can also belong to an angel, such as desiring, moving, etc., or they are only certain modes of the substance itself, such as local presence.

*Angels are of Finite Perfection, & in What Manner*

23. I say third, that by natural reason it is known that all created intelligences are limited and finite in essential perfection and consequently in every power that follows upon the same essence. This assertion is indeed entirely certain in itself, for it is easily demonstrated from the principles posited and demonstrated in what precedes. For it has been proven that all these substances distinct from the First will necessarily be created, because necessary being from itself can be only one in the nature of things. Then it was shown that it belongs to the intrinsic and essential concept of created being that it be essentially finite, because it is of its essence that it be dependent; but it involves a contradiction that an infinite being depend, as we said above, and from this we also concluded that it cannot happen that God create another God or another being that is simply infinite. Therefore, the common attribute of all intelligences distinct from God is that they are of finite and limited essential perfection, and in this all Catholic philosophers agree.

*What Aristotle Thought About This*

24. Nevertheless, they ask whether Aristotle thought thus about these intelligences, or rather believed them to be simply infinite. The reason for doubt is that in XII Metaphysics, from the perpetual motion of the heavens he concludes the infinite power of the mover; but he believed that either all or many intelligences move perpetually; therefore he believed all of them to be infinite. Furthermore, he proves the immateriality of these substances in no other way than from their infinity, as is clear from XII Metaphysics, text 41, where he thus reasons about the first mover; and in text 42 he concludes that there are more such substances that move perpetually, and in text 43 he concludes that all of them are eternal, immobile, and without

magnitude. Here St. Thomas notes that the Philosopher's conclusion is founded on the fact that they move for infinite time, and consequently with infinite power. Nevertheless, it seems incredible that Aristotle thought that all the motive intelligences of the spheres are infinite simply and in essence, as we now speak. For he himself, as was proven in what precedes, was not ignorant that all are created by the first mover, whom alone he confesses, at the end of the Metaphysics, to be the unique prince of the universe. Therefore, he could not think that those intelligences are of infinite perfection simply, since this plainly conflicts with dependence upon another, and indeed with inequality. For how can the inferior intelligences be unequal to the first, if they are simply and in the genus of being infinite like the first? Indeed, Aristotle also makes them unequal among themselves; for he says in book XII of the Metaphysics, c. 8, that they are ordered in perfection just as are the heavens which they move. But how the other argument of Aristotle can consist with this truth is difficult to explain; what we might say, I shall add shortly below.

### *Whether Intelligences are Infinite in Essence, At Least in Some Respect*

25. For it can be further asked: granted that created intelligences are not infinite simply in essence or in the genus of being, can they be thought to be infinite in some respect, that is, in some genus or species, or with regard to some property or power? For some think it not inconvenient to attribute this kind of infinity to intelligences, because from the fact that some creature is infinite in this manner, no inconvenience follows, since it neither follows that such a creature does not depend, nor that there cannot be many beings infinite in such a manner, and beyond them another being infinite simply, which is their cause. Moreover, that angels are thus infinite seems likely, because each of them is so perfect that it can contain under itself infinite species of things, or many to infinity. Likewise,

because they have a power of understanding that is in some way infinite, since they can be extended to an infinite multitude of things and even to an infinite object.

26. Nevertheless, this infinity in some respect can be understood well and badly, and when the matter is explained, it is almost nothing except in name only. For a created thing can be understood to be infinite in some respect in two ways: formally, namely, or only virtually. In the former way, heat would be infinite if it formally had in reality infinite degrees of intensification; and similarly a line would be infinite if according to length it had infinite equal parts. For either infinity would be in some respect, because it would be only in the breadth of heat or of the line. But this formal infinity is repugnant (as I think) to created entity, because although in the genus of being it is called infinity in some respect, nevertheless in some aspect it is infinite simply, and constitutes something absolutely infinite in act, either in intension or in extension, and both are repugnant to being in the nature of things, as I now suppose. Therefore, this infinity in some respect cannot be attributed to angels, neither according to quality, because they have none infinitely intense, nor according to multitude, because they do not have any infinite multitude of perfections or operating principles, nor finally in essence, because this formal infinity cannot be understood in an indivisible thing that has no breadth and which otherwise is simply finite in its perfection, as is the angelic substance. For, setting aside infinity of essential perfection, actual and formal infinity cannot be understood except in a thing either having quantity or breadth proportioned to quantity, such as intensive breadth.

27. You might say: just as in an indivisible and most perfect essence formal infinity is understood simply in perfection, as is clear in the divine essence, so in a simple angelic substance formal infinity of perfection could be understood, although in some respect and in a certain genus. It is answered by denying the similarity, because by the very fact that such an essence is finite simply and is constituted

through a finite and limited difference, it is through the same difference so limited in every genus that in none does it have the total essential perfection that can exist in it. Hence, running through all formal and essential perfections, it will be found finite in all, namely, in the nature of substance, spirit, in goodness, intellectuality, etc. But it is otherwise with an essence that is infinite simply, which is limited by no difference, and therefore in any perfection simply and in all simultaneously it formally has supreme perfection simply.

28. But virtual infinity can be conceived and explained in two ways: first, through a certain eminence and equivalence to infinite things of a lower order; in which way infinity in some respect can easily be admitted in angelic nature, and not only in it, but also in human nature and in any perfect thing of a higher order compared to things of a lower order. For thus human nature is more perfect than any species of brute, even if they were multiplied to infinity; indeed, that alone is to be esteemed as worth more, as regards the perfection of nature, than all others taken together. Nevertheless, this infinity is not really infinity except in name only, because it is nothing other than a certain finite perfection, under which infinite things can be contained or multiplied to infinity, because they never attain that degree and order in which the more perfect thing is constituted. And in this way any angelic species can be called infinite, especially if compared to material things, nor can any other mode of infinity be understood in angelic substance taken according to itself. Nevertheless, there are not lacking those who attribute another mode of infinity to intelligence, namely, because each contains the total perfection of its species, which in some way is infinite, insofar as in other species it can be communicated to individuals to infinity. Thus hold those who think that in each angelic species only one individual can exist; concerning which matter Cajetan treats extensively in On Being and Essence, c. 6. But this infinity (in my opinion) is nothing, and supposes a false foundation, as is clear from what we said above in disputation V concerning the principle of individuation.

29. Finally, that virtual infinity can be explained in another way in relation to operation or effect, and thus a power seems infinite that can in some way operate infinitely, and an essence will be called infinite in some respect to which such power follows. But such power cannot be attributed to angels except either in relation to immanent acts of intellect and will, or in relation to transient action, which (as I suppose) in created intelligences can exist only as local motion. Concerning the first acts, therefore, the intellective or appetitive power of an angel will be called infinite most improperly, because it has a simply finite mode of operating and can apply finite power or attention in operating, whence it is capable of exercising only one adequate act, or at most several in the manner of one, which does not exceed finite power. Moreover, that it is capable of many intelligible species, even to infinity, pertains only to passive potency, which is not thereby increased in perfection. Again, that it can successively make many acts to infinity pertains only to the permanence of the same power, not to increase in power of acting. Finally, that it can attain various objects to infinity and among them some object that is simply infinite indicates indeed a capacity that is in some way infinite, that is, eminent and universal, but absolutely that power cannot properly be called infinite, because it always has a term in the highest act that it can effect.

30. Whether the motive power of angels is infinite. But as regards motive power, it can have twofold infinity in effect. The first is of continuation and perpetual succession, and in this way some think Aristotle believed all intelligences to be infinite, because they can move for infinite time. But this infinity in effect does not indicate infinite power in the cause, but only power that is indefatigable and perpetually enduring, as we showed above when we dealt with God's infinity. From this infinity of effect, therefore, infinite intensive power cannot be concluded, nor infinite essence, even in some respect. Nor can it be concluded from this that such power is entirely separate from quantity, as we showed in the aforementioned place. Another mode of

infinity in this effect[29] can exist with regard to the velocity of motion, as if we say that any intelligence has power to move any body with any velocity greater and greater to infinity; for such power would without doubt be infinite in some respect, namely, in the genus of motive power. And some attribute this sense to Aristotle. But neither can it be sufficiently concluded from his argument, nor does it suffice for his intention. The first is clear, because he only concludes the infinity of intelligences from the perpetuity of motion; but from this effect it cannot be concluded that the mover has power to effect swifter motion to infinity, because it can be a power limited to effecting such velocity without any fatigue, and it could continue motion of such velocity for infinite time and not augment or intensify its velocity. The second is clear because, even if we granted that the motive intelligences of the spheres are infinite in that way, it would not follow by intrinsic argument that they are powers outside all magnitude, as is easily clear from what was said above about God's attributes.

31. But although this was not Aristotle's mind, someone could probably defend that intelligences have this infinity in some respect, because it does not require an infinite essence, nor any quality that is formally infinite, but only a power of higher order, which therefore does not have a supreme or maximum term in an effect of lower order. And this can be confirmed, for according to a probable opinion, an angel by discrete motion can in a moment transfer itself from one place to another, indeed even to a distant place (as some wish); therefore by continuous motion it will also be able to move itself with any velocity to infinity; therefore similarly it will be able to move any body in the same way. If therefore this opinion is true, intelligences will be able to be called infinite in some respect, or in moving, which infinity can be said to be radically in essence, insofar as that power is rooted in the essence itself. Although however this mode of infinity from itself does not conflict with created nature, it is nevertheless uncertain whether it belongs to angels, because there is

[29] [effectu], alit. om. "Missing in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, 553.

no effect from which it can be sufficiently concluded, and otherwise since all their power is absolutely finite, it is likely that it is terminated to a maximum in any breadth of effect which it can produce. Therefore this matter is doubtful, concerning which the discussion will return below, section 6, when we deal with the active power of intelligences. Now, as pertains to their essence and substance, it is established that they are entirely finite, and we shall speak better and more properly if we do not call them infinite even in some respect.

32. But what about Aristotle? I respond that it can scarcely be sufficiently understood what he thought about these intelligences, for regarding this part, he speaks and reasons about them in the same way as about the first mover, as St. Thomas openly confesses and other expositors. But it can be said that Aristotle by his argument indeed proved that there is infinite power in the movers of the heavens, but that this is not formally in all, but in some first and principal mover, in which all others in some way rely, so that they can move perpetually, and therefore it is not necessary that Aristotle affirm that all motive intelligences that immediately move heaven are infinite in themselves, but that they move in some way by infinite power, that is, that they rely in moving on some infinite power. But although this is true, it can with difficulty or in no way be applied to Aristotle. First indeed, because that infinity cannot be concluded from the infinite duration of motion, from which Aristotle argues, but from the subordination of the proximate mover to the first, or of secondary cause to the first, which intervenes even in momentary action or motion. Second, because from this he could not have concluded that all motive intelligences of the spheres are incorporeal, because even if they were corporeal, they could rely in moving on the infinite power of the first mover, or depend upon it. Therefore I find nothing that satisfies me for explaining Aristotle in this part.

*On the Simplicity & Actuality of Angelic Substance*

33. I say fourth: created intelligences, although they are substances that are simple substantially and physically, are nevertheless not entirely simple metaphysically or accidentally, and therefore are not pure acts, but are potential in some way. This conclusion is also certain, and can be demonstrated by natural reason. For the first part concerning substantial physical simplicity is sufficiently established from what has been said, because this consists only in the fact that they are neither composed of matter and form, nor of integral parts, which are none without quantity, and both have been shown above concerning such substances. But metaphysical substantial composition is manifold: one from nature and supposit, another from being and essence, and these two, whatever they may be, that is, whether modal, or real, or of reason, are found in all created intelligences, as is established from what was said above concerning existence and subsistence in created things.

### *Whether Intelligences are Under Genus & Composed of Differences*

34. Another composition is from genus and difference. And some deny that this belongs to intelligences, which the Commentator signifies in XII Metaphysics, text 26, and II On the Heavens, text 49, whom Durandus follows in II, dist. 3, q. 1, and Marsilius in II, q. 2. The foundation can be, first, because genus is taken from matter, and difference from form; therefore where there is no matter and form, there will be no genus and difference. Second, because what is composed from genus and difference is placed in a category; but intelligences are not placed in a category. Especially in the category of substance; but they cannot be in that, because they do not agree generically with corruptible substances. Both because Aristotle says in X Metaphysics, final chapter, that the corruptible and incorruptible differ generically. And also because one genus signifies one common nature; but one common nature cannot be conceived that is neither

corporeal nor incorporeal; therefore neither one genus common to intelligences and other substances.

35. Nevertheless, the truer opinion is that composition from genus and difference is found in angels, which theologians more frequently hold: St. Thomas in I, q. 50, a. 2, and in his opusculum On Being and Essence, c. 6, and in III, dist. 3, q. 1, where Capreolus, Scotus, Herveus and others; Ferrariensis in II Contra Gentiles, c. 95; Henry in Quodlibet VII, q. 8; Alexander of Hales in V Metaphysics, text 33; Soncinas in XII Metaphysics, q. 47; and Avicenna holds the same in book IX of his Metaphysics, c. 4. The reason is that intelligences can be constituted in a category, for God is excluded because He is infinite, and eminently contains the natures of all categories in Himself, nor does He have univocal agreement with created beings; but all these reasons are lacking to created intelligences. For they are finite in essence and power and in no way contain in their substance alone all the perfections of all categories, neither formally nor properly eminently; and therefore they can be affected by true and proper accidents, as we shall say below. They have furthermore univocal agreement with other created substances, both because the concept of substance is common to them and there is no reason for devising analogy, and also because in the mode of subsisting or of standing under accidents they have proper agreement or similarity, without dependence and relation of one to another. Therefore created intelligences are placed in the same category of substance in which other created substances are; just as also the accidents of those substances are placed in the proper categories of accidents, as we shall see below. But whatever is in a category is composed from genus and difference, because it is necessary that it be contained under the supreme genus; therefore there will be such a genus in that thing contracted through some difference. Likewise an accident, although it is a simple form, can be composed from genus and difference because of some inadequate agreement, so to speak, and dissimilarity that it can have with other accidental forms; but all

this is found in intelligences, although they are physically simple forms; therefore they can excellently be composed from genus and difference.

36. Finally, this composition does not necessarily presuppose composition from matter and form, because, as we said above, genus is not taken from physical matter, but is said to be taken by a certain proportion to it, or according to that which in the thing is conceived as something potential and actualizable. And indeed, since that composition from matter and form is real and the greatest that can exist in essential composition, there is no reason why it should necessarily be presupposed to composition from genus and difference, which is minimal and only of reason. But St. Thomas is accustomed to found composition from genus and difference in some way in composition from being and essence, because essence is compared to being as potency to act. Nevertheless, if this is understood concerning essence and being really distinct, it is certainly not necessary, because for this composition of reason that real composition is not necessarily presupposed. For in whatever way a finite essence is understood, it is understood as capable of some proper constitutive difference, and of some univocal and limited and determinate agreement with other things, and this suffices for composition from genus and difference. And in this way this composition is founded in the limitation of finite essence, whence because such an essence is always potential and does not necessarily or from itself have actual existence, therefore in a good sense it can also be said that this composition from genus and difference presupposes composition from being and essence, whatever that may be.

### *Exposition of Aristotle's Saying: The Corruptible & Incorruptible Differ Generically*

37. The first foundation of the other opinion has therefore already been solved. To the second also response has been made by

denying the assumption; for we have shown that intelligences are truly placed in the category of substance. To the first proof to the contrary, the common interpretation of that Aristotelian saying, "the corruptible and incorruptible differ generically," is that it should be understood not concerning logical genus, but physical. Thus St. Thomas in X Metaphysics, and opusculum 42, c. 6 and 7; and Alexander of Hales in X Metaphysics, text 26, who distinguishes logical genus and genus of nature; and Scotus in the same place. Others respond that Aristotle did not speak concerning predicable genus, but concerning subject genus[30]; for it is established that the name of genus is sometimes taken in this way by Aristotle, from IV Metaphysics, text 2, and book V, text 33, and from I Posterior Analytics, text 19. This response is not different from the preceding except in words, for what the former response calls physical genus, the latter calls subject genus, as Alexander of Hales clearly declared in V Metaphysics, text 33. For subject genus is nothing other than physical potency for receiving various changes; but this very thing is physical genus. Whence in sum, the sense of both responses is that the corruptible and incorruptible according to Aristotle differ not only in form, but also in matter or material property.

38. This response is indeed consistent with Aristotle's mind, which I demonstrate as follows. Someone might think that Aristotle takes "differing in genus" and "differing in species" to mean the same thing in that passage, for he infers there: contraries are diverse in species; the corruptible and incorruptible are contraries; therefore they must necessarily be diverse in genus. This inference appears most inept and commits the fallacy of four terms, unless "differing in genus" and "differing in species" are taken as equivalent. Therefore Aristotle seems to intend nothing other than that the corruptible and incorruptible differ essentially, which is perfectly true, especially in substances. And this seems sufficient for Aristotle's intention, who from this deduces that Plato incorrectly posited separate and

[30] Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 8, q. 5.

incorruptible ideas of corruptible things, because an individual cannot be corruptible while the species is incorruptible, since species and individual do not differ in species. However, Aristotle's final words in that chapter oppose this interpretation, where he concludes: "But things that are diverse in genus are more distant than those that differ in species." Here he clearly declares those two to be diverse. Therefore all interpreters notice that in that argument we have cited, Aristotle does not infer that the corruptible and incorruptible differ in genus solely from the fact that contraries differ in species, but from the fact that the corruptible and incorruptible differ according to potency and impotency, or according to potency subject to privation or not subject to it.

39. Hence the sense of that argument is this: although contraries usually differ in species, nevertheless the corruptible and incorruptible, even if they are contraries, differ not only in species but also in genus, because they differ not only on the side of act, but also on the side of potency, which is to differ in the underlying genus. Aristotle then explains this, for contraries that differ only in species or form can exist in the same thing, either simultaneously with respect to species, as a human being is both white and black, or successively with respect to the individual; but truly the corruptible and incorruptible are contraries in such a way that they can belong neither simultaneously to the same species nor successively to the same individual or subject; for these predicates are not among those that belong accidentally or contingently, but among those that belong substantially and necessarily. And thus it happens that the corruptible and incorruptible differ not only in form, but absolutely in their whole substance, and therefore in matter, which means they are diverse in physical genus. Therefore Aristotle speaks of physical genus, not of predicable or logical genus.

40. To the second proof of that opinion, some respond that it is not inappropriate for there to be one common logical genus for material and immaterial substances, although there is no common

nature given. And in this way they interpret the position asserting that there is one logical genus, not physical. This is held under the name of St. Thomas in Opusculum 42, chapters 6 and 7, which I do not think is his. Nor do I sufficiently understand in what sense it could be true that there is a common logical genus without real agreement in one nature, as is said in those chapters. For every generic intention and univocal abstraction of our concept is founded on the real agreement of species contained under the genus, and therefore the universal unity that is conceived in the genus presupposes the formal unity of the generic nature itself. Likewise, if substance is a genus, then the concept of substance is univocal; therefore through it neither corporeal substance as such nor spiritual substance as such is immediately represented; otherwise it would be neither univocal nor common to them; therefore the ratio of substance as such is represented as equally participable by inferiors. But that common ratio of substance is nothing other than a certain real nature having formal unity from itself and precision and universality from the intellect; therefore equally in this genus there is one common nature just as in others; only a difference of greater [or lesser][31] universality intervenes. But that position could be explained in a good sense concerning a real nature that is not integral, but partial and potential and physically one; for thus all generable things are said to agree in genus not only logically, but also in the same physical nature, at least by reason of matter, which is called physical genus or subject genus. And in this way it is true that those things that agree in one logical or metaphysical genus need not agree in one nature, since they can be physically diverse in genus. However, I fear this was not the sense of the author of that opusculum; it is nevertheless undoubtedly the sense of other authors, as is evident from St. Thomas and Alexander of Hales in other places cited; and Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, question 47; Hervaeus, In II, distinction 3,

[31] [or lesser], 1960; missing in other editions. "Lacking in some editions". Cf. BHE, 1960, t. V, p. 561.

question 3, and other scholastics there; and Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VII, question 8.

41. Nor is it inappropriate that through mental abstraction there should be given a nature of substance that is neither corporeal nor incorporeal, neither corruptible nor incorruptible, because, although in reality a nature existing per se can never be separated from both differences, it can nevertheless be separated from each individually and joined with each individually, and therefore it can be mentally abstracted from both or confusedly conceived as a potency including both and actually neither. And the same is true of these two differences, namely, being a simple substance, or being composed of matter and form; for neither of these differences belongs to the ratio of substance as such, and both can be mentally abstracted from, because, although they seem to involve immediate contradiction, nevertheless as they express or suggest positive perfection, they can agree in some perfection that abstracts from those opposite modes, which is being per se. Hence corporeal substance, insofar as it is precisely substance, although in reality it is composed only of matter and form, nevertheless does not have this from the ratio of substance as such, nor under that ratio is it properly composed of matter and form as such, but as they are substantial act and potency, as we shall explain more properly in the following disputation when treating of material substance itself.

### *Whether Intelligences Differ Essentially, & In What Genus They Agree*

42. The opinion denying this. From these things, therefore, the second part of the conclusion concerning the metaphysical composition of intelligences is sufficiently proven. But in this matter it can be further asked how great this composition is, namely, whether it is from only one genus and difference, or from several. This doubt depends primarily on another, namely whether created intelligences

differ among themselves by essential difference, or only by numerical difference. St. Augustine touches on this latter doubt in Enchiridion chapter 58, and in the book Against Priscillian to Orosius, chapter 11, and clearly confesses that he does not know its resolution; and St. Bernard speaks in the same way in book II On Consideration to Eugene; and John Damascene also in book II On Faith, chapter 3. Yet in the book On the Beliefs of the First Institute, chapters 1 and 7, he inclines toward the position affirming that there is personal, not essential difference among angels. St. Athanasius also taught this in questions 3 and 4 to Antiochus, from whose patristic testimonies it is established that it is not certain from revealed principles that there is specific difference among angels. But if this is not shown from revealed sources, certainly it cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, unless perhaps someone thinks it impossible that there be multiplication of individuals under the same species in intelligences; which is not true, nor perhaps probable, as was touched upon above when disputing about the principle of individuation. Hence there were not lacking scholastics who were pleased with this position about the specific unity of all intelligences, such as Albert the Great in the Summa, II part, treatise II, question 8; St. Bonaventure, In II, distinction 3, part 1, article 2, question 1. From which it clearly follows that in individual angels there is only composition from one genus and one essential difference, with an individual difference added in each.

43. The affirming opinion is more probable. But truly the opposite position is simply more probable, namely, that there is specific and essential difference among angels, which theologians commonly teach, In II, distinction 8; and St. Thomas, I, question 50, article 4; and this is taken from Dionysius, throughout the book On the Celestial Hierarchy, especially chapter 6; and Isidore, book I On the Supreme Good, chapter 21, and book VII Etymologies, chapter 5. Philosophers also incline more toward this position; for Aristotle in Metaphysics XII posits at minimum that coordination for intelligences

which exists among the heavens, which is more probably specific and essential. But a natural reason can be offered, because it is not repugnant that there be such essential diversity in intelligences. For although they all agree in the intellectual grade, since they do not have it in supreme perfection, they can participate in it according to various and diverse essential modes, just as all brute animals participate in the grade of sensing, and within that have essential diversity. Nor can any reason be devised why this multiplication of species within the intellectual grade should be repugnant; especially since in intelligences various modes of operating or understanding can easily be understood, which would require essential diversity, as theologians treat more extensively. Finally, we said above that it pertains to God's omnipotence to be able to produce another more perfect substance beyond any given species; but it is certain that intellectual substance is more perfect than any material one; therefore if in that grade only one ultimate species could be given, it would be supreme among all that God could produce, which is repugnant to God's omnipotence. Therefore God could create several essentially diverse species in that intellectual grade. Therefore it is far more probable and more consonant with the perfection of the universe that there be several essentially diverse species of intelligences in that grade; for this variety especially pertains to the perfection and beauty of the universe. For multiplication of individuals is usually quasi-accidental; but variety of species is much more per se, because of their perfection. And for this reason in corporeal things, the more perfect a grade is, the more species of things are multiplied in it; for there are more species of living things than of inanimate bodies, and more differences and species of animals than of plants; for there are terrestrial, aquatic and flying animals, and in each of these orders there are innumerable species. But the rational grade, because it is so superior to the others that it reaches the lowest of the supreme, was not multiplied, nor perhaps could be multiplied within the range of material species, and therefore the intellectual grade existing in its purity ought to be

multiplied or divided through innumerable species. St. Thomas touched on and excellently explained this reasoning in the question On Spiritual Creatures, articles 8 and 10.

44. But with this supposed as more true, it is necessarily concluded that there is at minimum one subaltern genus in angels between the supreme genus and the lowest species, and therefore individual species of intelligences consist of at least a double genus and double difference, or (which is the same) consist of the supreme genus and one subaltern difference and another lowest difference. This is evident, because substance is the supreme genus common to all intelligences. Then they all agree in the ratio of spirit, which is the proximate genus distinct from body. Or (which is nearly the same) they all agree in the ratio of intellectual substance; for no reason can be devised why this difference should not be abstractable from all intelligences, which would be univocal and essential to all of them. But that is a subaltern difference and further determinable through various modes and differences of participating in the intellectual grade. Whether, however, that proximate genus belongs to all intelligences, or whether other intermediate genera can be given, is uncertain. And St. Thomas indeed, in Opusculum 42 (if it is indeed his), chapter 5, holds that it is the proximate genus, and that all intelligences differ in species in such a way that they agree only in one proximate genus; Albert the Great holds the same in the Summa On the Four Coequals, I part, question 5, article 22; and Durandus inclines toward this, In II, distinction 3, question 1. But Gualric holds the contrary in book IV of his Summa; and Henry of Ghent suggests this in Quodlibet VII, question 8. And this can be taken from Alexander of Hales, II part, question 20, member 6, article 2. But both positions are uncertain, nor do I think that either can be sufficiently proven by natural reason. But what is consonant with theological principles, supposing the distinction of hierarchies and orders that the holy Fathers hand down, must be disputed by theologians. Again, whether in individual species of intelligences there are or can be given several individuals, and

consequently whether there is also in intelligences metaphysical composition from the specific grade and individual difference, has been sufficiently disputed above[32] when we treated the principle of individuation; and from the principles posited there it is established that this metaphysical composition is also found in intelligences.

45. Created intelligences are not pure acts. What philosophers thought of intelligences. From these things, therefore, the assertion is sufficiently proven as to substantial composition. But what pertains to accidental composition will be established more extensively from what we shall say about the intellect, will and limitation of intelligences as to the defect of immensity; for these three kinds of accidents can especially be found in those substances. And thus it happens (as we concluded in the last part of the assertion) that there is very much potentiality in these intelligences, and therefore they are not pure acts. For there is primarily in them objective or extrinsic potentiality, insofar as they do not have actual being from themselves, but only non-repugnance to being, and therefore they are only possible to be through extrinsic potency and through the same potency can not be. And this is the greatest potentiality, from which it follows that they are composed according to reason from essence and being, as has been explained in what precedes. And hence it also follows that they are composed of genus and difference, in which is included a certain (so to speak) metaphysical potentiality, insofar as genus is compared to difference as potency to act. Again, there is in intelligences real passive or receptive potentiality of accidents, for wherever there is true accident, there must be potency toward it; therefore intelligences [created][33] are not pure acts. But what philosophers thought in this matter cannot be treated in one question, because it includes several. For primarily this depends on whether they thought these intelligences to be created or rather to lack an

[32] Disp. V.

[33] [created], 1960; missing in other editions. "Lacking in some editions". Cf. BHF, Madrid 1960, t. V, p. 565.

efficient principle; for if they thought the latter, they necessarily had to believe them to be pure acts, at least as to the necessity of being, which excludes all objective potentiality, or all potency of being and not being, even through extrinsic potency. And because they thought thus, truly they did not speak of created intelligences, but of uncreated ones, in which they erred by thinking there were several, against whom we disputed above and thus there that position was refuted as to this part and it was shown that Aristotle and the more serious philosophers were not in that opinion; that question also depends on the mutability or immutability of intelligences, and on their mode of understanding or loving, about which we shall speak in what follows.

### *That Created Intelligences are Not Immense*

46. Durandus is criticized. John Damascene is explained. I say fifth: all created intelligences lack immensity, and therefore are definite in place and consequently also mutable according to place. The first part is not only certain according to faith, but also evident by natural reason. In this Durandus is justly criticized, In I, distinction 37, 2nd part of the distinction, question 2, because he suggested that any created intelligence is everywhere, although he attributes this to God and angels in different ways. Hervaeus was also in this position, ibidem, question 2, article 2. Nevertheless the conclusion, as I said, is certain, for, properly and simply speaking, to be immense is proper to God, just like being infinite; for these two follow each other, if they are taken proportionally. But it has been shown that every created intelligence is simply finite; therefore it cannot be simply immense. Hence it necessarily follows that any created intelligence has a limited boundary in that space to which it can be present, and this is to be definable by place or space. All these things are established from what was said above about God's immensity. And according to this must be understood what John Damascene says, book II On Faith, chapter 3, when he calls angels circumscribed, for it was equivalent to saying

they are defined by place, which he declares by adding: "For they are not on earth when they are in heaven; nor when they are sent by God to earth do they remain in heaven."

47. What determination of place intelligences claim for themselves. But it should be noted that an angel can be understood to be limited to a certain place or space in two ways. First, formally or in general; second, also materially or in particular. For some intelligence can be so limited by its nature that it can be present to the space of this hall, for example, and not to a greater space; yet it is not determined by its nature to be present to so much space in air or in heaven, or in another body, but where or when it wills, and this limitation I call formal and in general. But it would be material in particular if it were determined by its nature always to have that presence in such a body or space, as if someone believed that an intelligence moving the lunar sphere is determined by its nature to be quasi-fixed and intimately present to that sphere, or to some part of it. Therefore, when intelligences are said to be defined by their nature to a limited place, this should be understood in the first and not the second way. Because intelligences, since they are abstract forms, are in no way bound to bodies by their nature; therefore by their nature they do not determine for themselves any certain body to which they are necessarily present; therefore they also do not determine in particular any space to which they must necessarily exhibit their presence. And this is confirmed, for a body, although it cannot be simultaneously present except to a finite place equal to itself, nevertheless absolutely is not determined always to be in the same numbered place; therefore with greater reason an angel, who is free and more perfect, should not be constrained to one numerically definite place. Indeed, although bodies require certain natural places for themselves, spiritual things from natural propensity alone determine no certain place for themselves, although from a certain congruity and decency it is expedient for them to be in a higher and nobler place, if the dignity of nature is considered and nothing else interferes. But the reason is that

spiritual things neither need a natural place in which to be conserved, nor do they have position or coordination in place such that for that reason they would seek a certain order; for that is proper to bodies. Therefore intelligences are definable by place, yet in such a way that they are compelled by no natural necessity always to be present to the same body or space.

48. Angels are mobile in place. St. Augustine is explained. And hence it happens that they are also mutable in place; for a thing can be immutable in place for two reasons. First, because of immensity, because, since an immense thing occupies all things and is present everywhere, it has nowhere to move, and this root of immutability belongs to God alone, as has been shown. Second, if it is so fixed to some place that it can neither desert it nor be present to another, and this also does not belong to created intelligences, as has been shown. Therefore they are in no way immutable in place. And this is confirmed, for, supposing limitation and lack of immensity, it pertains to the perfection of a substance to be able to move itself, as is established in more perfect living things; but all created intelligences have the former imperfection; therefore (that being supposed) it pertains to their perfection that they can move themselves and apply themselves to diverse places. Finally, Sacred Scripture agrees with this truth, which attributes motion to angels, as theologians treat more extensively, I part, questions 52 and 53, and In I, distinction 37. But what St. Augustine says in Genesis ad Litteram VIII, chapter 20, that God moves corporeal creature through time and place, but spiritual creature only through time and not through place, should be understood of physical motion, which has extension and division on the part of the mobile thing. But concerning the place of an angel and consequently concerning its motion we shall perhaps say more below, when treating the predicament of where, in disputation LI.

49. That Aristotle and other philosophers taught the contrary of this assertion, at least as to the immutability of intelligences, is held by Soncinas, Metaphysics XII, question 6; Javelli, question 4, and

others. And certainly Aristotle seems to signify this, Metaphysics XII, text 43, where he concludes that there are as many substances eternal and immobile by nature as there are mobile celestial spheres. And this can be confirmed at least concerning intelligences moving celestial spheres; for if those were mobile in place, they could also depart from their spheres; but this is repugnant; otherwise they could also cease from moving the heavens, since they cannot move them if they are distant from them in place; therefore it is probable that the Philosopher thought at least of those intelligences that they are quasi-fixed to the heavens by their nature and inseparable from them, not because of substantial union or information, but because of the accidental relation of natural mover to mobile. And therefore Aristotle seems to have posited them as locally immobile, both per se, lest they be separated from their mobile objects and cease from moving, or produce non-uniform and varied motion, and also per accidens properly and secundum se, because they are not the forms of those bodies, as is taken from Physics VIII, text 52. But concerning other separate substances that do not move the heavens, wherever Aristotle makes any mention, he sufficiently signifies that they are mutable, and dwell among us, as can be established from the places adduced in the sections above.

50. But we say that even the motive intelligences of the spheres, although they can be called immobile by physical and corporeal motion, because they are not capable of that motion which has extension on the part of the mobile through comparison of the part of the mobile to the part of space, nevertheless according to their own proper and spiritual mode of presence they are not entirely immobile, nor are they fixed to their spheres by their nature, but by special ordinance of the first cause they always assist them, as much as is necessary for continuing uniform motion. And therefore in the composite sense (as they say) they can never desert the place necessary to them for that action, because they cannot resist God's will, especially since those intelligences are from the number of

blessed angels, who cannot transgress God's commands. But how great that assistance is and whether it is always within the same space, or can be varied at least according to diverse partial positions of the same sphere, is irrelevant to the present question, but must be disputed in the matter concerning Heaven, and we touched on something above when treating the necessary proximity between efficient cause and its effect, disputation VIII.

### *That Intelligences are Not Eternal*

51. I say sixth: created intelligences neither are nor can be truly and properly eternal, although they are incorruptible, and for that reason can be called necessary beings and intrinsically immutable as to the being of existence. We do not now dispute whether intelligences were created from eternity or could be created; for we believe with certain faith that they were not created from eternity, and according to natural reason we also think this is more consonant with their natures, although absolutely it does not imply contradiction that they be created from eternity; but concerning this elsewhere, for it pertains nothing to explaining the nature of intelligences, nor does it have anything special in intelligences more than in other permanent things, about which this is properly disputed in Physics VIII, and we touched on something above, disputation XX. Therefore the sense of the assertion is that intelligences are not properly eternal, that is, their duration is not eternity; which would be true even if they had been created from eternity. For eternity is duration intrinsically necessary and entirely immutable, both intrinsically and extrinsically; but truly created intelligences are not capable of such duration, because, although they are in some way substantially immutable, they are not so entirely. The major premise is established from what was said above about God's eternity and from the common concept of eternity and the proper signification of that word; for, although sometimes in a popular way it is usually attributed to anything that either will not

have an end, or is supposed not to have had a beginning of duration, nevertheless it properly signifies the most perfect duration having the aforesaid conditions; in which signification it is taken by us, and will be treated more extensively below, disputation L.

### *That Intelligences are Incorruptible*

52. That the minor proposition may be demonstrated, the last part of the assertion must first be explained. For that intelligences are incorruptible by their nature is certain by natural reason and more consonant with the principles of faith, as St. Thomas correctly taught, I, question 50, article 5, and with him other theologians. And from Aristotle's principles this is proven first, because if the heavens are incorruptible, much more are the intelligences that move them; for the mover ought to be proportioned to the mobile. Second, because nothing is corruptible except what has matter, or what depends on matter; but intelligences are entirely abstract and independent from matter. Third, because the rational soul is incorruptible by its nature; therefore much more are intelligences. I suppose the antecedent as certain, not only from faith, but also from natural reason, and (as is more probably believed) from Aristotle's doctrine. But the consequent is proven because every reason of incorruptibility that can be found in the rational soul is found more perfectly in angels, namely being simple things, subsistent and abstract from matter, from which intelligences are more absolutely separate than the human soul, because they not only do not depend on it, but also do not have an essential or transcendental order toward it. Finally, from what has been said about the simplicity of angels follows their natural incorruptibility. Because corruption happens only through separation of act from potency, or of form from matter; but in a simple thing there cannot be this division and separation, and therefore no simple thing is properly corruptible, as that which is corrupted. Sometimes, however, it happens that a simple thing is (so to speak) co-corruptible

due to the corruption and dissolution of that composite which it was composing, because namely it cannot naturally be conserved outside that composite. But truly intelligences are not only not composed, but also compose no substance, through whose dissolution they could cease to be; therefore they are incorruptible by their nature. And thus not only Aristotle thought of intelligences, Metaphysics XII, text 44, and On Heaven IV, text 36; and other philosophers, whom Eugubinus reports, book VIII Perennial Philosophy; but also the ancient Fathers of the Church, as is established from Dionysius, chapters 4 and 6 On the Divine Names; and Sophronius, in the epistle which is found in Synod VI, act 11; and Nazianzen, oration II On Theology; Augustine, On Ecclesiastical Dogmas, chapter 12; Gregory, Morals V, chapter 25; John Damascene, book On Decrees and Beliefs, chapter 7; Theodore, in the book Divine Decrees, chapter On Angels; Eusebius, book III On Preparation, chapter 3.

*Whether Intelligences are Necessary Beings*

53. From the fact that intelligences are incorruptible, St. Thomas speaks of them in such a way that he also calls them necessary beings and intrinsically immutable as to substantial being, as can be seen in I, question 9, and II Contra Gentiles, chapters 30 and 55, and question 5 On Power, article 3, preferring in this the position of the Commentator, On Heaven I, comment 136, and Metaphysics XI, text 41, and the book On the Substance of the Sphere, to the position of Avicenna, who had taught the opposite, book IV of his Metaphysics, chapters 4 and 6. And the reason is that that is called necessary and immutable which does not have intrinsic potency toward not being or toward being transmuted from that being which it has; but intelligences, since they are incorruptible by their nature, do not have intrinsic potency toward not being; therefore. The minor is explained because there is no intrinsic potency toward not being unless there be potency toward another being, because no thing inclines per se toward

not being, but only per accidens and secondarily, insofar as it inclines toward another being incompossible with its other being; and therefore there is no intrinsic potency toward substantial non-being except prime matter, and for the same reason prime matter alone is the intrinsic principle of substantial mutability; therefore, since intelligences lack matter, they cannot have intrinsic potency toward not being; therefore they are intrinsically necessary beings and substantially immutable.

54. And the reasoning that St. Thomas has in I, question 50, article 1, also tends toward the same conclusion, namely, that angels are only forms to which being belongs per se primarily, and therefore they do not have an intrinsic principle by reason of which being would be separated from them; therefore they are intrinsically immutable beings in being, and therefore necessary. The antecedent is explained, because complete and consummated being belongs to no thing except through form; but to form it belongs not through another intrinsic principle, but through itself, either as that by which, if it is an inexisting form, or as that which, if it is subsistent, and in this way being is said to belong per se to form. For that per se means the same as not through another; but it excludes another intrinsic principle, not however an extrinsic one. Hence it happens that a thing constituted through form, by reason of the form itself, does not incline toward another being, nor is capable of it, but only of that which comes from the form itself, and therefore a thing by reason of form cannot have intrinsic potency toward not being, but only by reason of that subject which receives the form. Therefore that substance in which there is no such subject, but which is only a subsistent form, cannot have intrinsic potency toward another being, and consequently neither toward not being; therefore it will be a necessary being and intrinsically immutable in being.

55. But there are some who do not like this manner of speaking, because angels absolutely can cease to be through God's will; therefore they cannot be called necessary beings; for what can

not be is not necessary. In which sense the saints sometimes used to say that angels are not immortal by nature, but by grace, that is by God's will, as is evident from Sophronius above; Justin, questions 13 and 14; John Damascene Orthodox, book II, chapter 3; Isidore, book I On the Supreme Good, chapter 12; Cyril, Thesaurus VIII, chapter 2. It is answered that this argument proves the first part of the conclusion and does not oppose the second. For it proves that intelligences are not necessary beings with absolute necessity (which they call logical necessity), but not that they are not necessary with physical and natural necessity. And this is the same as what St. Thomas says, that intelligences are mutable as to being through extrinsic potency, but not through intrinsic potency. In which sense Methodius excellently said, in Epiphanius, heresy 64, that it is possible for the creator alone to dissolve even immortal things. Thus also John Damascene, book II, chapter 3, joined those two things together, that angelic substances have attained immortality both by nature and divinely. We can also say they are necessary beings negatively, not positively, because, namely, they do not have from themselves whence they might lose being, although they do not so have being from themselves that they do not need the action of another who influxes and conserves it, through whose suspension of action they could lose it, which is only through extrinsic potency.

56. Why the duration of angels is not eternity. Hence it is established why the duration of angels cannot be true eternity; for this requires complete necessity of being, not only negative, but also positive, and immutability, not only through intrinsic potency, but also through extrinsic, which can belong to God alone. In which sense that of I Timothy 6 can be correctly understood: "Who alone has immortality," as the Fathers explain. You will say that this reasoning only proceeds concerning eternity per essentiam, about which it is sufficiently clear that it cannot belong to created intelligences, because it includes entirely independent duration. But truly besides eternity per essentiam there can be given participated eternity, of whose nature

there would not be such independence, nor intrinsic necessity. In this way theologians say that created beatific vision is measured by participated eternity. It is answered that it is true that the reasoning made directly proceeds only about eternity per essentiam, about which alone the conclusion posited is understood, because that alone is truly and simply eternity. But whether the proper duration of intelligences, since it is created and necessary from itself, although dependent on another, should be called participated eternity, or only aevum, is perhaps only a question about the mode of speaking, about which matter we shall speak below, when treating the durations of things, disputation L. Now according to the common use of the word and according to the received description of eternity, by which it is said to be the total simultaneous and perfect possession of interminable life, we say that intelligences do not properly enjoy eternity from their nature but aevum, for eternity requires complete immutability, both substantial and accidental, which created intelligences do not have, as has been shown.

### *That Intelligences are Comprehensible*

57. Finally it must be said that created intelligences are not by their nature invisible or incomprehensible, but can naturally be seen and comprehended, not only by the creator, but also by other creatures. This assertion follows from what precedes, for from the fact that an angel is not infinite in perfection, it follows that it is not incomprehensible or invisible, because, as we saw above, these two belong to God from the fact that he is infinite and most simple and pure act, so that this is the adequate reason of those attributes, and therefore from the negation of one the negation of the other is correctly inferred. And in the same way it can be inferred concerning any other attribute that belongs to God by reason of his infinity. But when we say that an angel is not by its nature invisible, we speak of intellectual vision, not corporeal; for with respect to this it is invisible,

because it is constituted outside and above the object of the corporeal eye. When also we say that a created intelligence can be comprehended not only by the creator, but also by a creature, this should be understood indefinitely and with proportion observed, not absolutely and universally. For any intelligence can be comprehended either by itself or by any superior one, because the power of understanding is either equal or greater than its intelligibility. But truly it cannot be comprehended by inferior intelligences, because their powers do not equal the perfection of such an object. All these things, with proportion observed, are easily established from what was said above about God's incomprehensibility.

58. The Holy Doctor St. John of Damascus is explained. But if someone objects the words of the Damascene, in book II On the Orthodox Faith, chapter 3, where he thus speaks of angelic nature: "Whose form and substantial definition God alone has perspicaciously and thoroughly known," it should be answered that those words are either said by way of exaggeration, or it should be understood that only the creator has that knowledge from himself and by his nature, not communicated by another. Or certainly it can be said that the particle "alone" does not exclude the angels themselves, but other foreign natures, especially human nature. Or certainly God alone is said to comprehend that nature perfectly, both as to natural things and as to free acts, or also as to supernatural things; but we have spoken only of the comprehension of angelic nature as to natural things.

## SECTION IV

## WHAT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON ABOUT THE INTELLECT AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE INTELLIGENCES

## Disputation XXXV

1. After having discussed the substance of the intelligences, it remains for us to speak about their powers, faculties, properties, and operations, which can be distinguished into three topics: namely, intellect, will, and external action or operation. As regards the first point, we have demonstrated above that intelligences are of an intellectual nature; whence it follows that there exists in them both act and power of understanding. But what this power is in them, what intellection is, and how it occurs or is possessed, is so uncertain to us when we rely on natural light alone, that we can scarcely affirm anything except this alone: that intelligences[34] understand whatever we understand in a more perfect manner than we do, and consequently more things than we do. This can easily be proved from the fact that they are of superior perfection in the intellectual order and are actually separated from bodies, which usually impede efficacy in understanding. But how great that superiority is and what degree of perfection it attains is unknown to us, because we neither intuit those intelligences in themselves, nor is there any effect from which we could measure that degree of perfection.

### *What the Philosophers Have Thought About the Present Question*

2. Hence the philosophers easily erred when they wished to define something about this question. For Aristotle and the Commentator seem to have held that all intelligences are in some way pure acts in understanding, and especially they think this about any intelligence understanding itself, for they indicate that each one understands itself through its own substance, not only as through object, species, and principle, but also as through the very act and intellection itself. This can be gathered from Aristotle, Metaphysics XII, text 51, where, although he seems to speak particularly about the

[34] [intelligentiae], 1960; alit. om. "Missing in some editions." Cf. BHF, 1960, t. V, p. 576.

first and uncreated intelligence, nevertheless, if his arguments are examined, they will either be invalid or will equally conclude about all intelligences; such is that argument that if intellection were not its substance, the continuation of understanding would be laborious for it. The Commentator teaches this more expressly there, saying that in things abstracted from matter, the intellect (that is, the thing understood) and the intellect (that is, the power of understanding) and the intellection (that is, the action of understanding) are the same. He holds the same view in comments 30 and 39. Concerning the intellection by which one intelligence understands others distinct from itself, Aristotle says nothing in particular about created intelligences; whence he seems to signify that, just as the first intelligence by understanding itself understands other things, so also does each intelligence. If this is true, it clearly follows that, just as the intellection by which any intelligence understands itself is its substance, so also is the intellection by which it understands things other than itself, especially other intelligences. Furthermore, Aristotle in Metaphysics XII, texts 20 and 30, signifies that all immaterial substances are pure acts with regard to the absence of receptive potency and with regard to composition from that and act; therefore, it follows universally that intellection is not an accidental act of the intelligence, but its very simple substance.

3. As for the Commentator, some attribute to him the view that one intelligence understands another through the substance of the intelligence that is understood, so that universally the substance understood, even if it is another's, is the intellection of the other substance understanding it. But this is not only plainly false in itself, but is also falsely attributed to the Commentator, as Soncinas well proves in Metaphysics XII, question 33. The first point is evident, because it is impossible for one complete substance, subsisting and separate, to be the formal perfection of another, and especially a vital perfection, which, if it is distinct from the living thing, must arise intrinsically from it; for which reason it is of the nature of a vital act

that it be immanent, and it is of the nature of immanent action that it remain in the agent; but intellection is the formal perfection of the one understanding and a vital and immanent perfection; therefore. Add that it is absurd to say that so many immaterial substances inform another from the fact that they are understood by it, or are intrinsically or really united to it through themselves. Nor did Averroes ever fabricate this monstrosity, as is openly evident from Metaphysics XII, from comment 30 to 39. Rather, therefore, the Commentator seems to have understood that universally the intellection by which one intelligence understands others is the very substance of the one understanding, as is evident from the cited passages and text 51. Whence, if he sometimes signifies that an intelligence through its substance is the thing understood, either he speaks with respect to the intellection of itself, or he speaks in intelligible being. For, just as he says in On the Soul III that the intellect when it understands becomes the thing understood, not by really receiving it into itself, but intentionally through a medium species or act, so in the present case he says that one intelligence is actually the others which it understands, not really through them being really united to itself, but in intelligible being by reason of its substance, which is its intellection. And from this, philosophers further seem to have held that all separate substances are completely immutable in the act of understanding, as can be gathered from Metaphysics XII, text 7; and Soncinas proves this more extensively in Metaphysics XII, question 6; Javellus, question 4; Hervaeus, On II, distinction 14, question 1, article 13. Nevertheless, Aristotle never expressly taught this (as far as I have seen), but only insinuates it, insofar as he speaks about all in nearly the same way in Metaphysics XII, distinguishing hardly anything between the first and the others.

*On the Object of the Angelic Intellect*

4. Setting aside the opinions of the philosophers, so that we may say a few things about the matter, insofar as this place permits, these three things must be distinguished: the object which is understood, the act of understanding, and the principles of such an act, and we must speak briefly about each. First, it is evident that any intelligence can understand itself and its principle or cause and all the remaining intelligences, and a fortiori all other natural things of the universe. All of this, as I think, can be sufficiently proved by natural reason. First, since any spiritual intelligence is of itself actually intelligible and proportioned to the intellect, which is a spiritual power, therefore it is maximally proportioned and commensurate to its own proper intellect; therefore it will be maximally able to understand itself, indeed even to intuit and comprehend itself. Next, when an effect is comprehended, its cause is necessarily known in some way; therefore, if an intelligence knows itself perfectly through itself, it will be able to know its author. For if we arrive at knowledge of God from effects, it is evident to us that any created intelligence can know God from itself in a more perfect way. We speak, however, of knowledge or intellection absolutely, not of comprehension or intuition, indeed not even of quidditative knowledge; for we have already proved above that God cannot be naturally known in this way by a creature. But no intelligence can know other created intelligences in the said manner through itself, because it is not an effect of the others; nevertheless, it will be able to know them intuitively and quidditatively, because any intelligence is finite and of the same order and composition as the rest. And therefore each has sufficient intellectual power to be able to intuit any other as it is in itself. But if it has sufficient natural power for this, the remaining principles cannot be lacking to it, because they are naturally due, since they are coordinated to connatural action. We speak, however, of quidditative knowledge, as I said, which is not always comprehensive; for this requires a certain adequation, which one angel cannot have with

respect to all others, but only with respect to equals, if it has them, or with respect to inferiors, as we touched upon above.

5. One angel does not know the free acts of another. And the discussion concerns knowledge of nature or natural properties, not of free acts; concerning which we have from revealed doctrine that one angel cannot know the thoughts of another at its own discretion, but dependently upon the other's consent or speech. What, however, could be judged about this by natural reason is not sufficiently evident. To me, however, it seems quite probable that this can be shown by natural and especially moral reason. Because for the suitable society and governance of rational and intellectual things, it is not expedient that one should be able freely to intuit the free thoughts of another. Whence we also reasonably conjecture that the nature of each created intelligence is such that all the principles necessary for knowing the thoughts of others are not absolutely owed to it, but with some dependence upon the will of the others. But what this dependence is and what is lacking to each intelligence so that it cannot know these things at its own discretion, or what kind of speech it is by which one angel manifests these thoughts to another, although it can be inquired into within the limits of metaphysics, nevertheless, because this inquiry cannot be conveniently separated from those things which have been revealed, therefore it is rightly taken up by theologians, nor should it be transferred to this place. This must be observed in many points of this matter; for they are not to be treated according to their dignity, but according to the capacity of the place.

6. An angel can naturally know all inferior things. Finally, from what has been said, it is evident a fortiori that a created intelligence can know all inferior things contained within the order of nature, because less power is necessary for understanding and comprehending those things than for understanding other separate substances. Likewise, because all these things are comprehended under the object of the intellect, which is being, and they are in a state in which they are per se apt to be known; whence they can be

understood and known by man; therefore much more by intelligences. Furthermore, it has been discovered by natural reason that intelligences move the celestial orbs through intellect and will; therefore it is supposed as manifest that they know the celestial orbs and all the places to which or through which they are moved, and consequently also the effects for the sake of which they are moved, and by parity of reasoning all other things.

7. Here, however, various questions would immediately occur, and three especially. The first is whether they also know contingent effects; the second, whether they know the essences of possible things, which God can absolutely produce, but will never produce; the third concerns supernatural effects, or the mysteries of grace. But this last question is purely theological, and therefore nothing should be said about it, but the negative part should be supposed; because supernatural things as such exceed any natural capacity. I say as such, that is, insofar as they are supernatural, both because the discussion concerns things supernatural in substance, which are most properly supernatural and do not per se fall under natural knowledge; and also because those things which are supernatural as to mode, although they can be attained naturally by an angel under some common notion or under the notion of the possible, nevertheless not according to the proper supernatural mode which they have, as was touched upon above when treating of the omnipotence of the first cause. Whether, however, and how these can be known supernaturally, in no way pertains to the metaphysician, nor can it be known by natural reason.

8. Whether [they know] the essences of possible things. The second question also is beyond the limits of metaphysics; indeed, not even theologians can define anything certain in it, because it is contained neither in revealed truths nor in evident principles. For nothing would have prevented God from giving angels species of several possible things, or perhaps even of all. Nevertheless, theologians more probably think that He did not give them, nor is this

owed to angels, for it is sufficient for a creature to know directly those things which have been created and which are contained in them, and consequently all possibles contained in these created causes, but not those which are contained in God's power alone.

9. Whether [they know] contingent effects. Finally, concerning the first question, it must be said that it can be demonstrated by natural reason that an angel cannot naturally know with certainty and infallibly which of the contingent effects will be future. And the reason is that no created power can evidently know that something will be future except from its causes; but from causes it cannot be necessarily inferred that an effect will be future, since such causes, by the very fact that they are contingent, can fail to produce the effect. But another, higher mode of knowing future things neither can be known by natural reason nor is it possible to a finite power, especially a natural one, as theologians treat more extensively. We speak, however, of contingents insofar as they are contingent, or which with respect to all causes taken together are contingent; but of this kind are only those which depend in some way upon a free cause, as was touched upon in what precedes. Whence those effects which do not depend upon a free[35] cause insofar as it is free and are called contingent only because they can be impeded by another cause, although as contingent or from their precise relation to their proximate cause they are not known as infallibly future, nevertheless from the contemplation of all causes they can be known, because with respect to the entire collection of causes they do not have contingency but necessity, and all of this seems to be evident by natural reason. Again, although contingents that are in some way free, which are contingents absolutely, can in no way be known with certain judgment by an angel naturally, they can nevertheless be known by probable conjecture from certain signs; and in this way demons sometimes predict certain things through divination, although they are often

[35] [libera], 1960; alit. om. "Missing in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 562.

deceived and deceive and mock men, as Damascene rightly declares in book II On the Faith, chapter 4; Athanasius, question 27 to Antiochus. And let these things suffice concerning the first point for the opportunity and brevity of this place; concerning which there are more things in St. Thomas and other theologians, I, questions 56 and 57, and On II, distinctions 3 and 6.

### *On the Act of Knowing of the Intelligences*

10. Concerning the second point, that is, concerning the knowledge of intelligences, it must be said that it is not their substance, but some accident superadded to them. This is received by almost all theologians as practically certain [36]; and it is undoubtedly more consonant with the principles of faith and can almost be demonstrated by natural reason. Because a created intelligence is mutable intrinsically in acts of understanding and is not mutable in its substance intrinsically; therefore the act of understanding is not its substance; it is therefore an accident superadded to it. The consequence seems clear, and the major is proved (for the minor has already been proved above), because, since an angel is of finite power, it is not possible that it simultaneously know all things which fall under its object, which we enumerated in the first point, especially higher and lower things, why it cannot exactly comprehend one higher thing. But if perhaps there is some angel which can in fact contemplate simultaneously all actually created natural things, nevertheless not all those which can be multiplied infinitely above it, and therefore it is necessary that it have mutable intellection; therefore it does not always and necessarily persist intrinsically in the contemplation of one thing; therefore it is transferred from the consideration of one thing to that of another; it is therefore mutable according to the act of understanding. In this sense St. Augustine says in Genesis to the Letter VIII, chapter 20, that spiritual creature is moved through times, even if

[36] See Scotus, On IV, distinction 1, question 1, § Second proposition.

it is not moved through places, that is, by considering present things, then past, and afterwards future.

11. Objection. Solution. You will say that this argument at most concludes about that intellection according to which an angel can be changed; if there is any in it which is intrinsically immutable, the argument proves nothing about that. Whence Durandus, On II, distinction 3, question 5, ad 1, signifies that the intellection by which an angel understands itself does not differ from its substance. It is responded first that it is uncertain whether any intellection of an angel, even that by which it knows itself, is completely immutable naturally and intrinsically. Next, even if we grant that it is naturally immutable, nevertheless no prudent person will deny that it can happen supernaturally that, although something is an angel, it nevertheless does not actually understand itself; therefore at least in this way such intellection is mutable or separable from the substance of the angel, and consequently is something really distinct from it; for what is not really distinct cannot be separated by any power. Furthermore, even if that argument does not immediately conclude about such intellection, it nevertheless concludes mediately in this way, for if other intellections are accidents of the angel, therefore its natural mode of understanding is through composition and accidental information, and its actual life consists in intrinsic efficiency and reception of its proper act; therefore always and with respect to any object it lives and understands in this way, because it cannot simultaneously have two modes of understanding so diverse as connaturally suited to it. And this argument will receive greater force from the following objection.

12. Whether angelic intellection is a true thing, or only a mode of substance. For someone will say that the argument made at most proves that intellection is a mode distinct from the substance of the angel ex natura rei; but not that it is a proper form and entity really distinct. It is responded first by conceding that the latter is not as evident as the former. Next we say that, having admitted and proved the distinction ex natura rei, it is far more probable and can easily be

persuaded that it is a real distinction and not merely modal. For intellection is a perfect form; whence it is not only a mode, but a true form. Likewise, because it is not born from the one understanding alone, but also from the object, or species taking its place, from which it participates the intentional representation of the same object; but these, since they do not belong to the substance of the angel through itself, belong through a new accidental form flowing from it and from the object, which can scarcely be understood as only a distinct mode, and therefore is better constituted as a true entity really distinct. And this can be confirmed from a principle of faith, by which we believe that there are in angels as in men some supernatural intellects and habits or principles infused per se for eliciting them, such as the vision of God, or acts of faith. These acts and similar ones are undoubtedly proper entities really distinct from the substance or intellect of the angel, nor can they be conveniently understood otherwise. Therefore similarly it must be understood that any elicited intellection is really distinct from the angel; for the notion of intellection as such is sufficient for constituting a proper entity and is not only a modal notion; otherwise there could never be given a created intellection which would be a true thing distinct, but only a mode, and therefore whenever intellection is distinct ex natura rei from the understanding substance, it is distinguished as a true thing and perfect form in its genus, and not only as an imperfect mode.

13. Several philosophical objections are satisfied. Nor has anything been objected by philosophers against this truth that has difficulty. For what can be objected from Aristotle, namely, that these substances are perpetually living and therefore perpetually and immutably understanding, has no difficulty, for it both supposes what is false; for they do not move perpetually, but in time; and it does not rightly infer, for, although intellection is accidental, an intelligence can endure perpetually in it, because it is not laborious for it, nor is it fatigued in producing it, since that action is neither against nature nor in any way repugnant to it. But someone will insist, for at least an

intelligence will be able to cease from all intellection and remain as if sleeping, which Aristotle considers a great inconvenience, because then it could cease from moving. The consequence is evident, because, if intellection is its accident, therefore it is its act; therefore it is in potency to that act; therefore it can lack it, from another principle posited in book IX, that every passive potency is a potency of contradiction. It is responded first that, as regards the intellection necessary for moving the heaven, an intelligence can indeed, if we consider its intrinsic freedom, cease from it, but in fact it will never cease from the command of a higher cause.

14. Next, more generally concerning all intellections, it is responded that an angel can suspend or change intellection not by reason of passive potency, but by reason of freedom. For it does not repugnant to a receptive potency to have a perpetual and inseparable act, as was said above about the matter of heaven, where we declared that principle (receptive potency is a potency of contradiction) concerning purely receptive potency, which does not have a congenital act, and therefore is of itself subject to privation. Therefore, from the fact that an angel has receptive potency of its intellection, it is not repugnant that it endure perpetually in intellection; from the fact, however, that it is free, it has the faculty of changing it. But it is probable that it has some natural intellection so necessary that it is not subject to freedom, but as if resulting from nature, because if all were free, an angel could by its freedom cease from all even collectively, which is inconvenient; for then it could not be reduced intrinsically to act again, because neither could the will apply the intellect, since every action of the will supposes some action of the intellect, nor could the intellect apply itself, because it is not free. Therefore in this way it is inconvenient to admit that an intelligence can remain sometimes only in first act in the manner of one sleeping; nevertheless this does not follow, because it is not repugnant that intellection be accidental and nevertheless that some be like a connatural and inseparable property. This seems most probable concerning the intellection of itself, both

because it concerns the most proportioned and intrinsic object, and also because this action is as if the principle and foundation for the free use of others, because an angel by intuiting itself, intuits in some way all the intelligible species which it has in itself, and thus can freely use them by its will.

15. I add also that it is probable that, although an intelligence can interrupt other intellections by its freedom and consequently can suspend all other acts by its absolute freedom, nevertheless from greater perfection and reasonable use of freedom it never suspends all of them simultaneously, but is changed from one to another. Concerning this there is more extensive disputation in I, question 58, where many other things are discussed about the quality and mode of this intellection, which can neither be touched upon briefly here, nor is it the business of the present work to treat them extensively; for scarcely anything about all of them can be sufficiently defined from the principles of nature alone, and whatever is to be conjectured depends for the most part on those things which we know about angels through revelation, and therefore we leave all those things to the theologians.

### *On the Principle of Angelic Intellection*

16. What is the principal. What is the proximate. I come to the third point, concerning the principle of angelic intellection, which can be threefold or fourfold, namely: principal, proximate on the part of the one understanding, which is the potency, and proximate on the part of the object, which is either the object itself or its species, to which can be added habit, which is sometimes joined to the potency. As to the first, it is certain that the principal intrinsic principle of angelic intellection is the substance of the angel, just as in us it is the soul, and in other animals their souls with regard to knowledge proportioned to them. And the reason is that the substance of an angel does not have form, but is itself entirely form, and therefore it is itself

entirely the principal principle of its proper operation. Concerning the second, although nothing is evident by natural reason, we think it more probable, against Durandus, On II, distinction 3, question 5, that the proximate principle of angelic intellection is a potency really distinct from the substance of the angel; which is the opinion of St. Thomas, I, question 54, article 3; and the more common among theologians, On I, distinction 3, where Albert, last article, and Bonaventure, question 3; Alexander of Hales, II part, question 65, member 1; William of Auxerre, book III of the Summa, tract X, question 6. And it is consonant with Dionysius, On the Celestial Hierarchy, chapter 11, distinguishing in angels essence, operation, and power. And it can be taken from St. Augustine, On the Trinity XV, chapter 7, and book VII, chapter 6; and Anselm, in the book On the Fall of the Devil, and the book On the Concord of Prescience and Predestination, last chapter. The reason, however, must be taken from those things which we treated above, disputation XVIII, section 3, where we showed this generally by a universal reason, which comprehends created intelligences.

17. Concerning the third principle or concerning the intelligible species of intelligences, we can define almost nothing from their own peculiar nature, but only by analogy and proportion to those things which we think about the species of the senses or of our intellect, we must philosophize about angelic species, adding in them that greater perfection which will seem consonant to the greater perfection of separate substances, which nevertheless does not exceed their limitation, and separating from them those imperfections which are found in our soul on account of natural conjunction to the body.

18. For knowledge of itself an angel does not need an accidental species. From these principles theologians infer the following as more probable. First, that no intelligence needs an accidental species for seeing itself, but each knows itself through its own substance, as through an object actually intelligible maximally proportioned to it and most intimately united to its proper intellect.

And in these words is contained the reason for this assertion; for an intelligible species is usually posited, either so that an object intelligible in potency may become intelligible in act, or so that an object which was separate or distant and disproportioned may be conjoined or proportioned to the potency; but in intelligences all this necessity ceases with respect to their proper substance; therefore they do not need an accidental species for understanding themselves. And as to this part, the philosophers who said that any intelligence understands itself through itself thought well, as Soncinas noted, Metaphysics XII, question 59. And this is the more received opinion among theologians, as is evident from St. Thomas, I, question 56, article 1, where Cajetan and Capreolus, On II, distinction 3, question 3; Ferrara, I Against the Gentiles, chapter 98; and Scotus agrees, On II, distinction 3, question 8; Richard, article 6, question 1. Although there are not lacking those who contradict, but they bring no efficacious reason. See Marsilius, II, question 7, article 1; Alexander of Hales, II part, question 24; Henry, Quodlibet V, question 14, and Quodlibet XV, question 9.

19. An angel knows God through its own substance, though imperfectly. The second is that an angel cannot know other things outside itself by proper knowledge through its own proper substance, but only God, whom it does not know naturally by proper knowledge, or as He is in Himself, but through effects. The reason for the prior part is that the essence of any intelligence is finite and is not the cause of others, nor does it eminently contain them, and therefore it does not have the means to be a sufficient principle on the part of the object for knowing other things by proper knowledge. The latter part is evident from what was said above; for we showed that God cannot be naturally seen by any creature as He is in Himself, neither through His essence nor through a proper species; therefore He cannot be known naturally by a created intelligence in either way; but much less can He be thus known through the proper essence of the one understanding, because it represents the divine nature very imperfectly and

analogically. But because it is His effect depending essentially upon Him, therefore an intelligence knowing itself, through its own substance and power as through a medium known and most noble effect made to the image of God, naturally ascends to knowledge of God. Not that it knows God through this effect alone, but that this is the first medium and most accommodated to that knowledge, and that it attains that knowledge through its own substance without any superadded species.

20. An angel knows other things through infused species. The third is that intelligences need intelligible species for knowing other things, but they have them congenital with their nature, at least with respect to natural things. The reason for the prior part must be taken from that general principle, that created intellection does not occur without the concurrence of the object per se or through its species, because it occurs through intentional representation; but extrinsic objects cannot concur through themselves together with any intelligence for its intellection; therefore intelligences need intelligible species. The minor concerning inferior and material things is most well known; concerning intelligences themselves among each other, someone can doubt about it, because they are things actually intelligible. But nevertheless even concerning them it is more consonant to reason, both to avoid the imperfection, which would be greatest if each intelligence depended upon others, so that it could know them; and also on account of natural impossibility; for a created and finite substance cannot enter into an alien mind and be so intimately conjoined with it that it becomes as if an intelligible form of it, but this is proper to the divine and most simple nature. The reason for the latter part is that it pertains to the greater perfection of intelligences that they always be in first act with respect to those things which they can naturally know. This perfection does not exceed their grade and order, but rather is maximally consonant to them. Whence Aristotle seems to exclude maximally from that entire order of

intelligences that remote potency to first act, and the childish (so to speak) state of learners.

21. It follows that there is no natural way for intelligences to take species from objects, especially material ones, because they do not have senses, through which as media they might be changed by them; but they cannot be immediately changed, since intelligences are completely immaterial, while these objects are material. Therefore they cannot have an agent intellect, by which they might abstract species from these objects, because the agent intellect, unless it is conjoined to phantasms, cannot serve for producing and abstracting these species. And therefore it is necessary that intelligences have species of these things connatural to them in another, superior way. Concerning immaterial objects, it cannot be proved by as firm a reason that they do not suffice from their nature to communicate or produce a species of themselves in others; nevertheless, whatever may be the case about this, if intelligences have innate species of other things, it will be much more natural for them not to lack species of things of their own order, the knowledge and society of which is more consonant to them, and in its way more owed to them. I said, however, that they have species of natural things, both because no mention is made here of supernatural species and illuminations, and also because concerning free acts and thoughts of hearts it is probable that they also do not have congenital species; concerning which elsewhere.

22. The fourth corollary is that these species are more perfect and eminent in intelligences than in men, both because they have nobler causes, and also because they are proportioned to a nobler intellectual light and more perfect acts. This reason also proves that among the intelligences themselves there is variety and inequality in these intelligible species, according to the variety and inequality of the natures and substantial species of the same intelligences, because nobler principles of operating are owed to a nobler nature. But in what this greater nobility of intelligible species consists, whether, namely, only in mode and (so to speak) subtlety or simplicity, or immateriality

of entity, or also in greater universality in representation or efficacy for simultaneously representing several things or natures of things, is disputed extensively by theologians with many other questions which depend upon that principle and cannot be treated here according to their dignity. See St. Thomas, I, question 55, throughout, and question 58, articles 1, 2, 3, 4; and the Commentators there, and other theologians, On II, distinction 3.

23. Whether there are any intellectual habits in angels. The ultimate principle of intellectual cognition is usually habit, which besides species is added to the potency so as to add power or inclination to act to it. Concerning this principle with respect to intelligences, not only philosophers, but even theologians say very little; and only this is established among theologians, that angels are capable of infused habits by which they are elevated to supernatural intellections; which, although it is certain, does not pertain to the present disputation. Concerning natural or acquired habits, however, many absolutely think that they are not in intelligences; which St. Thomas also relates from philosophers and Fathers, III, question 10, article 6, where he himself does not seem alien to the same opinion, for, although he says that habits are given in angels, nevertheless not others besides intelligible species; but we speak of habits distinct from species, concerning which we will say more extensively below, disputation XLVI. That such habits are not in angels, the ancient theologians also seem to suppose, since they say almost nothing about these habits of intelligences. Others think that the same intellectual habits are generated in intelligences as in men.

24. I, however, think that a distinction should be used. For I do not think that intellectual virtues which are concerned with evidently known truth are acquired through acts by intelligences, nor are distinguished in them from the natural light and faculty of understanding. For these habits are only necessary because the potency either on account of some opposite inclination is not sufficiently inclined to act, or on account of some imperfection is not

sufficient to exercise the act easily and promptly, as is evident in us; for if neither of these intervenes, there is no reason for adding a habit; otherwise habits would have to be posited even in naturally operating potencies. But none of the said causes is found in intelligences with regard to the aforesaid acts of intellectual virtues, because their intellectual light is completely inclined, indeed from necessity (as to specification) it is carried to such act, and otherwise it is completely ready to operate; so much so that in these matters it does not need discourse or composition for knowing a conclusion in principles, an effect in a cause, a property in essence, and therefore it neither needs these habits nor is their cause. But truly in those things which an angel knows only by conjecture, it is probable that it acquires a habit through such knowledge, which is not an intellectual virtue, but similar to our opinion or human faith. But this can happen especially when an angel, left to its own nature, conjectures something about internal thoughts, or about future contingents. And for the same reason it is probable that it acquires something by way of habit by which it remembers past things which it had known before; but more about these things in theology.

## SECTION V

## WHAT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON CONCERNING THE WILL OF THE INTELLIGENCES

1. Resolution of the question. Since the proper and vital appetite (as is shown in the science of the Soul) does not constitute a distinct grade of life but, in due proportion, always follows upon a cognitive principle, then by the same line of reasoning by which we proved that separate substances are of an intellectual nature, it is clear that within them there is a vital appetite consequent upon intellectual cognition, which we call the will (voluntas). Concerning this will, we

may first distinguish, as we did in the case of the intellect, three things: the motion itself or act of desiring, its object, and its principle. To these we may add a fourth, which is proper to this faculty: the mode of willing—that is, the characteristic manner in which it tends toward what is apprehended as good.

2. The object of the angelic will. On these three topics a brief treatment is required, and they should be explained in the same proportion as we proceeded with respect to the intellect. The object of the angelic will extends as far as the object of the angel's intellect extends, insofar as it can be naturally known by the angel himself under the formal aspect of the good or the desirable (ratio boni, appetibilis). For an appetite that follows a cognitive power is proportioned to that power. Therefore, if the cognitive power is universal in its order, the appetite is likewise universal in its own order. From this it follows that an angel can love himself, God, other intelligences, and all the remaining creatures, each according to its own proper ratio of desirability and in the measure that due proportion requires. What precisely this proportion is, and how great the desirability is in each thing, does not belong to the present inquiry; it calls for a more extended consideration. In that consideration virtually the same account applies to every created will, taken in itself—whether angelic or human—and for that reason theologians chiefly discuss it in the treatise on grace.

3. The act of the angelic will. As regards the act of this appetite in an angel, it is more probable on natural grounds—agreeably to what was touched upon above—that it is an accidental motion really distinct from the substance of the intelligence and from the power or faculty of loving. The same arguments by which we established this for intellection establish it here as well, since appetite follows cognition and is proportioned to it. If, then, the angel's cognition or intellection is an accident, so too will be his appetition. The philosophers seem to have recognized this, as Soncinas notes on Metaphysics XII, question 9 (on the second point), inferring it from

the fact that both the Philosopher and the Commentator state that the First Mover efficiently causes in the intelligences that move the spheres a will-to-move. Yet the same Soncinas, in question 35, reports that according to the Commentator the volition of an intelligence is not other than its substance, nor is it efficiently caused by the First Principle except in the same respect that its substance is caused by that Principle. This conclusion would be more consistent if it were true that he held created intelligences to understand by means of their very substance. But since that principle is false, the consequence is likewise false. Therefore, the appetition of an intelligence is an accident inhering in it. From this it follows that it can be multiplied and diversified according to specific differences among acts—love, desire, joy, hatred, flight or fear, and sadness. Concerning these we cannot philosophize about intelligences except by reasoning from what we find in ourselves. Whether, however, the distinction among these acts is as great in intelligences as it is in us cannot be demonstrated with strict certainty.

4. The remote and proximate appetitive principles in angels. With respect to the principle of this act, it is evident that the principal or remote principle is the substance itself. As to the proximate principle, it is more probable to hold that there is a special power (potentia) really distinct both from the substance and from the intellect of the intelligence. The first point—namely, that this power is distinct from the substance—should be proved by the same reasoning by which we argued for the intellect. The second point—namely, that the will is distinct from the intellect—we infer from the great diversity of their acts and from their different modes of operation, as far as the matter allows. In this domain we can demonstrate nothing with apodictic certainty; rather, by a kind of analogy to what is in us, we philosophize about the intelligences in those respects where we are in agreement with them and where no sufficient reason for diversity appears. St. Thomas offers another reason (Summa theologiae I, q. 59, a. 2), which can be referred to the foregoing: it is drawn from the

different manner in which the intellect and will operate. The will operates as an inclination and tendency toward another, whereas the intellect operates by assimilation, as if drawing things to itself. By nearly the same form of reasoning one concludes that in each intelligence there is only one such appetitive power, as St. Thomas teaches in the same place (a. 4). For if in us this power is one, much more will it be one in angels. Likewise, if the intellective power is one, the appetitive power corresponding to it will also be one, since it is a universal power just as the intellect is. Therefore, although in intelligences there can be "concupiscence" and "anger," insofar as these names can signify purely spiritual motions abstracted from bodily passions—as we gather from the doctrine of Dionysius, Divine Names, ch. 4—nevertheless they proceed from the same power. For this power is a universal principle, and under its formal object it contains the objects of those various acts.

5. This appetitive power does not require species (species intelligibiles) in order to act, because it does not act by assimilation but by inclination. It does, however, presuppose a known object toward which it tends. As to how either the object itself, or the cognition of that object, concurs in the operations of the will, the same judgment applies to intelligences as to our own soul. Concerning other habits (habitus) that may exist in the will as principles aiding it, so that it may act more easily and promptly, it is judged uncertain—if we confine ourselves to natural reason—whether such habits have any place in the intelligences. Speaking supernaturally, however, about infused habits, especially charity and hope, there is no doubt that angels are capable of them. With respect to acquired habits the matter appears doubtful, because of the perfect strength and native inclination possessed by the will of intelligences toward its acts, and because, unlike human beings, they do not have appetites that resist one another. Nevertheless, it seems more probable to me that angels are capable of such habits. As regards the demons, there appears to be no doubt that they have many vicious habits acquired by their own

acts; and in what concerns the purely natural order, intelligences seem capable of those virtues that are in some way ordered toward another person or end, since such virtues pertain of themselves to the will. The capacity for—or even the need of—such habits does not arise primarily from the repugnance of a sensitive appetite (which angels lack), but from two other sources: first, a thing is not as strongly inclined toward another—upon which it does not essentially depend—as it is inclined toward itself; second, there can be a genuine tension between one's own good and the good of another. On these points more will be said elsewhere.

### *On the Freedom of the Intelligences*

6. Fourth, we must speak about the manner in which the angelic will operates. Briefly, it is evident by natural reason that intelligences are free in their operations. This is clear, first, a posteriori: the human will is free; therefore, the angelic will—which is more perfect—is, a fortiori, free. It is also clear, a priori: the root of the will's freedom is the judgment of the intellect, in the manner explained above. Therefore, since that root of freedom is present in the intelligences, the will in them is also formally free. In this there is no difficulty beyond those that are common to human freedom—especially inasmuch as freedom depends on grace or on the help of God, matters discussed by theologians—and, insofar as they touch upon any necessity of the divine concurrence in the natural order, those points were mentioned earlier.

7. The extent of angelic freedom. At this stage one could broach certain specific questions pertaining to angelic freedom, to the extent that they can be known by natural reason. First, does this freedom extend to all the acts of the angelic will, or are there some acts that are necessary? If there are necessary acts, which are they, and are they necessary with respect to exercise (that is, the doing of the act) or only with respect to specification (that is, the determination of which

act it is)? Second—and this is the principal question—does this natural freedom obtain only among morally upright acts, or does it also extend to evil acts? In other words, can the intelligences, considered within the natural order, sin? Some deny this, such as Durandus (In II, dist. 23, q. 1), Capreolus (dist. 22, a. 3, ad 1), and Cajetan (I, q. 59, a. 3; q. 93, a. 1), and St. Thomas lends support to their position in De malo (q. 16, a. 3). Scotus, however, holds the opposite (In II, dist. 23, q. unica), and St. Thomas inclines more toward that side in the Summa theologiae (I, q. 63, a. 1). In truth, although neither position can be conclusively proved by natural reason alone, the philosophers—who knew nothing of what is supernatural—were not entirely ignorant that moral evil could have a place among the intelligences. They recognized a distinction between good and evil angels, as Eusebius reports from Plato's Laws X (Preparation for the Gospel XI, ch. 13; XIII, chs. 7 and 9). St. Cyprian, moreover, in On the Vanity of Idols, says that the poets of the nations recognized evil angels and called them "demons"; the same is related concerning Socrates and Plato. They seem to have been led, from the effects and deceits of wicked angels, to think that there are separate substances that are morally perverse. They therefore presupposed that this is not repugnant even within the natural order—perhaps not without good reason. Since intelligences possess a created free choice, there is no reason why, even among natural objects, they could not tend toward something that is good under one aspect, while having some moral evil annexed to it under another aspect. Nor do the holy Fathers dissent; everywhere they judge this a sufficient reason why angels can sin. They assert this absolutely and without qualification—especially St. John Damascene (On the Orthodox Faith II, chs. 3 and 28), St. Gregory the Great (Moralia V, ch. 27), St. Augustine (Against Maximinus III, ch. 12), and St. Anselm (On the Fall of the Devil, chs. 4–5).

8. Whether and in what manner an angel necessarily loves God. From this it follows that an angel does not necessarily love God

above all things with a perfect natural and obediential love (amor obedientialis), whatever may be said about an imperfect love of concupiscence. For although such love accords very well with natural inclination, since it does not presuppose the clear vision of the Highest Good, there is no reason why it should be necessary with respect to its exercise; indeed, it will not even be necessary with respect to its specification, if a free but depraved affection that resists it is presupposed. These matters, however, must be treated and explained more fully in theology.

## SECTION VI

## WHAT CAN BE KNOWN BY NATURAL REASON CONCERNING THE POWER OF ACTING AND THE EFFICACY OF THE INTELLIGENCES

1. The title is explained. It is established from the two immediately preceding sections that the discussion here concerns transient action; for concerning immanent actions enough has been said in the preceding. This action, however, can be either substantial, that is, terminated to substance, or accidental, which can be multiple; nevertheless all are reduced to two heads, namely, to alteration or the production of quality, or local motion. For this action can be concerned either with bodies, or with spirits, namely, souls or intelligences themselves; concerning bodies are the proper physical motions of local motion and alteration; I omit augmentation, however, because it always happens through mediate alteration, and therefore there is the same reasoning concerning it as concerning alteration; in spirits, however, there can be either local motion proportioned to them, or some quality, which is the principle of knowing and can be called intentional by a general name.

## *That Intelligences Cannot Effect Either Substance or Quality*

2. I say first: created intelligences can effect no substance, nor material alteration of bodies. This assertion is against Plato, who posited that these inferior substances are made by ideas, if indeed he asserted this in that sense which Aristotle imposes, namely, that ideas are certain substances distinct from God, and really separated from matter, and introducing forms into matter, and thus perfecting substantial generation. It is also against Avicenna, who said that the second intelligence created by the first creates the third, and this the fourth, and so on to the last, which perfects all substantial generations by introducing form. These errors have already been touched upon and reproved above. Hence the conclusion is easily proved, because every substance comes to be, either through creation, or through the eduction of substantial form from the potency of matter, or in man through substantial union alone of form with matter; but created intelligences can produce substance in none of these ways; therefore they simply cannot. The minor as to the former part concerning creation is certain according to faith. Hence Damascene, II de Fide, c. 3, at the end, says thus: "However many there are who contend that any essence whatever has been procreated by angels, from their mouth their father the devil speaks." The same speaks St. Augustine, lib. XII de Civit., c. 24, and lib. XVIII, c. 18, and lib. IX Genes. ad lit., c. 18, and lib. III de Trinit., c. 8; and all theologians hold this for certain, as is established from I, q. 45, and q. 61, and II cont. Gent., c. 21, and In II, dist. 1, where extensively Capreolus, Albert, Richard, Gabriel, and others whom we cited above treating of creation.

3. From this place the natural reason for this truth is to be sought, namely, because infinite power is required for creating, concerning which it was extensively said there. And from the same principle the objection is to be solved, namely, why one intelligence

cannot produce another similar and equal to itself, because, since that effect does not exceed the perfection of such a cause, there is no reason why it should exceed its power. And otherwise it seems very consonant with reason, since inferior creatures can produce things similar to themselves in species, that intelligences, which are more perfect, can also produce things similar to themselves. For it is answered that they cannot for this reason, because the power of creating is not communicable to a creature on account of the infinite force required for creating, which, although it is not required on account of the perfection of the term produced, is nevertheless necessary because of the mode of production from nothing, as was said there. And hence it comes about that an angel cannot create one similar to itself, which does not arise from imperfection, but rather because it is of such perfection, that it cannot come to be except through creation; for thus heaven, although it is more perfect than an element, cannot produce another heaven similar to itself, whereas an element can, and similarly one rational soul cannot effect another.

4. The second part of the minor, which concerns the production of substance through eduction of form from the potency of matter, is to be proved simultaneously with the other part concerning material alteration of bodies; for these two actions are so connected naturally, that substantial form cannot be educed from matter, unless with preceding alteration; he therefore who cannot alter matter and dispose it to form, much less can he educate substantial form or unite it. That created intelligences can do neither of these things, St. Thomas teaches, I, q. 110, a. 2. And thus he interprets St. Augustine, III de Trinitate, c. 8, saying that corporeal matter does not obey angels at a nod. And theologians commonly embrace that opinion, which the Council of Braga I, c. 8, greatly favors, and the definition which Gratian reports from the Council of Ancyra, in c. Episcopi, 26, q. 5, and Pope Leo, epist. 91. The reasoning for this, however, is not easy, nor, as I think, can it be rendered demonstrative by us. St. Thomas therefore gives only this reason: an angel is not

composed of matter and form; therefore it cannot produce something composed of matter and form; therefore it cannot educate form from the potency of matter. This second consequence is proved, because, when form is educed, the form is not made per se primo, but the composite. The first is proved, however, because an agent ought to be similar to its effect, either formally, or eminently; if therefore the effect is composed of matter and form, the cause ought to be either formally composite, or eminently containing the whole composite; an angel, however, is not formally composed of matter and form nor does it eminently contain the whole composite, since it is certain that it cannot create matter; therefore in no way can it generate such a composite.

5. Durandus attacks this reasoning, I-II, dist. 7, q. 4, from the fact that, although form is not produced as quod, nevertheless that alone is the formal terminus of generation; therefore in order that an intelligence might be able to effect a composite of matter and form, it is not necessary that it virtually contain matter, but it suffices that it contain form. And this is confirmed, for otherwise neither could heaven generate a composite from this matter of generable things and form. The consequence is clear, because heaven is neither formally composed of such matter, nor does it eminently contain it. I add then that at least by that reasoning it is not proved that intelligences cannot change bodies to quality; for in the intelligences themselves there is given composition of substance and quality. Nor can it hinder that that substance is of another nature, just as it does not hinder that the substance or matter of heaven is of another nature. Durandus therefore brings forward another reason, because in material causes there is sufficient power for educing forms from the potency of matter; therefore it would have been superfluous to communicate that power to intelligences; but God does nothing in vain, and therefore he did not give such power to intelligences. The Commentator used a similar reasoning, VII Metaph., comm. 21, to prove against Plato that substantial forms are not infused by a separated idea.

6. This reasoning, supposing the antecedent, is efficacious for proving that the idea is not a cause necessarily required for such an effect, which Plato asserted; absolutely, however, it is not efficacious for proving that this power does not exist in intelligences. First indeed, because it is not established that there are in these inferior causes sufficient principal principles for educing all substantial forms from the potency of matter, as can be established from many difficulties posited above in the proper place. Second, because it is not superfluous, but very frequent in nature, and pertains to its riches (so to speak) and fecundity, that for the same effect many causes have sufficient power; otherwise why would the sun heat, when fire can sufficiently do this? But if you say that the author of nature provided this because fire is not always present, or cannot always appropriately heat according to the requirement of things or natural effects, this will indeed be said correctly, for in general, if we look to divine providence and intention, therefore various things were created with sufficient power for the same effects, so that, if one is absent, another can be applied; in this way, however, he could also communicate to intelligences the power of transmuting bodies to forms or qualities, even if similar power is found in other natural causes; for inferior causes are not always present, and therefore it is necessary that their absence be supplied through superior ones. It is added that God, as author of nature, does not grant to things powers of acting as alien to their proper natures, and as if extrinsically superadded, but as intrinsically accompanying the natures of things. Hence it happens that often many things can be created having power for the same effect, not from direct or primary intention of creating many causes of which each per se suffices for such an effect, but because creating those things on account of their proper end, it consequently happens that they have that power, as, for example, besides the intelligences moving the celestial spheres, there are innumerable others that have sufficient power for the same effect, which are not superfluous, because they are not created on account of that end, but on account of

their perfection, and so that they may enjoy God; thence, however, it followed by natural necessity that all are strong in that power. Thus therefore in the present case, it will not be superfluous that God gave intelligences power for transmuting bodies to forms or qualities, if such power can be connatural to the intelligences themselves, because they were not created principally on account of that action, but by a certain natural consequence they would have power for it. But if Durandus supposes that such power cannot be connatural to angels, he indeed correctly infers that it is superfluous to say that God conferred that power on them beyond the due of nature. He assumes, however, what was to be proved, and whose reason we are investigating, namely, why this power cannot be connatural to intelligences.

7. St. Thomas therefore by his reasoning attempted to bring forward some cause and root of this matter; and certainly since the nature of intelligences is unknown to us, scarcely can any other more probable or more congruent reasoning be devised. Because intelligences neither on account of infinity of power, nor because of their mode of being have proportion to transmuting matter to form, because they neither have infinite power, nor are they forms of bodies, but are entirely abstract and having a mode of being far different from corporeal things. And this is confirmed and explained, because there is no reason why intelligences should eminently contain the forms of corporeal things, because they are only certain species, more perfect indeed in essence, yet limited and finite; but in order that one species eminently contain another, it is not enough that it be more perfect than that one, as is manifestly established in the species of corporeal things compared among themselves, nor is there any peculiar reason on account of which this eminence should be attributed to intelligences. It is not similar to what was brought forward concerning celestial bodies; for, even if the heavens consist of diverse matter, nevertheless, insofar as they are corporeal and composed of essential parts, they are in some way of the same order with other bodies; hence

in some accidents they have specific agreement, as in quantity, position, motion, and perhaps also in light, and therefore the heavens have greater proportion so that through their forms they can eminently contain some forms of inferior bodies.

8. Aristotle uses other reasonings against Plato, in VII Metaph., from text 22 up to 32, which, if they are efficacious, have the same force against Avicenna, and for confirming the conclusion posited. The sum of the reasonings is because a separated idea cannot immediately transmute matter, nor any intelligence, but only through the mediation of a celestial body. He proves the assumption because a separated idea is entirely immobile, because it is immaterial and indivisible; but what is indivisible is per se immutable, from VI Phys.; therefore, if a separated idea immediately per se acted something, it would always act the same, because remaining in the same way, it always acts the same. But what is the principle of generation and corruption of things, it is necessary that it change matter in various ways, and consequently that it can in some way be changed in itself and be disposed otherwise and otherwise. Hence he concludes that separated intelligences can act nothing on these inferior things, except through the mediation of the motion of heaven. And thus Soncinas expounds that reasoning, VII Metaph., q. 25, from the Commentator, VII Metaph., and St. Thomas, q. 6 de Potentia, a. 3. To me, however, it does not seem efficacious, first indeed, because, although it proceeds ad hominem from things conceded by Plato, who posited ideas immobile, as Aristotle reports, lib. I, c. 6, text 10, nevertheless it absolutely supposes something false, namely, that intelligences are entirely immobile; for although they are not moved by physical motion, nevertheless they are moved by motion proportioned to themselves, and this suffices so that now they act in one place and afterward in another. Second, because that principle: the same disposed in the same way always does the same, is true of a natural agent as far as concerns its part, but not of a voluntary agent, which through its will alone can act, or not act; for which at most it is

necessary in a created agent that it change its will; thus, however, it is more evidently true that intelligences are not immutable as to will. Third, even if we granted that they are immutable and act naturally, the reasoning does not conclude against Plato's ideas, because from the part of the patient variety of action could arise; for the same natural agent can diversely change the patient, if it is applied to it disposed in various ways. Thus therefore Plato and Avicenna teach that the motion of heaven and inferior agents serve so that from them come various dispositions of matter, which being posited, each idea or intelligence influences form according to the requirement of the disposition, either by its will, or by natural necessity without change of itself.

9. Hence I do not see by what consequence Aristotle infers against Plato that positing ideas immutable he took away efficacy from them; for thus he argues in the said c. 6, lib. I, text 10. The inference, however, is null, as is clear from what has been said. Nor does it have greater force against separated ideas than it would have against them as they are in the divine mind; for thus also they are immutable. Therefore against separated ideas that reasoning is efficacious, that they cannot be of the same species with the forms of material individuals and be by their nature separated from matter; for a form, which by its nature is the form of matter and which by its nature is separated from matter, so that it cannot per se inform matter, are essentially diverse. If, however, they are not of the same species, therefore the idea is not the specific nature itself of individuals nor can it influence in matter a form of such species, by univocal generation, as Plato said. I omit other reasonings, by which it is proved that universals cannot be in reality separated from singulars. From which also it evidently follows that they cannot be efficient causes of those.

10. Concerning intelligences, however, the reasoning of St. Thomas, as it has been explained and confirmed, seems sufficient. Also, because otherwise it could be said that any intelligence at the nod of its will can produce from matter any thing and form even possible, at least outside the human species, because of the necessary

creation of the rational soul. The consequent, however, is absurd; therefore. The sequence is clear, because there is no greater reason concerning one form than another, since any intelligence is of a superior order with respect to any generable thing and with respect to all the grades that can be participated by it; if therefore this suffices so that it can by its power educate forms from matter, it will also suffice for any form educible from the potency of matter. The falsity of the consequent is established, because both in natural reason, and in our faith it would be most absurd to concede that angels can produce and change any things at the nod of their will. Thus many understand that of Heb. 2: "For God did not subject the world to angels." For it would be sufficiently subjected to them, if they could generate or corrupt any things by their will in this inferior world, as Victoria correctly argues, relectio. de Arte magica, num. 35. Hence St. Thomas, q. 17 de Malo, a. 9, says that it pertains to the fitting order of the universe that the lowest things are not transmuted by the highest except through media, which is done by angels, as we shall say immediately, by applying actives to passives, which order they themselves cannot change.

11. From these things therefore the assertion is sufficiently proved as to every eduction of form from the potency of matter, and consequently it is also proved as to substantial generation, which happens through substantial union alone of form with matter, such as is human alone, because that union can only be made, either by an agent disposing matter, or by one creating the soul, if that union naturally results from the soul created in such a body; intelligences, however, can naturally effect neither of these in a body; therefore they cannot unite a rational soul to its body. Also because otherwise they could also raise a man, uniting a separated soul to a body. Finally, because there is the same reasoning for this union as for the production of other forms, because it is in no way contained in the power of an intelligence, neither formally, nor eminently.

12. Objection. But someone will object: for it is not repugnant to a created intelligence to produce forms in matter,

because it is spiritual, for God is more immaterial, and nevertheless he can do this; nor is it repugnant because it is finite, for the form of heaven is also finite, and much less perfect, and nevertheless it can do this; therefore from no head is it repugnant. And this is confirmed, for an intelligence through heaven, as an instrument, produces some forms of living things; therefore it also can per se immediately.

13. Solution. To the argument it is responded that this does not come about from either of those heads taken separately, but from both taken simultaneously. For God, although he is supremely immaterial, because of his supreme eminence, just as he can by his power found matter, so he can actuate it with forms; but a finite intelligence does not have that eminence, and with that removed it does not have proportion to effecting form in matter. And therefore it is not enough that it be a more perfect form than the form of heaven, because it is not thus proportioned. Hence, from the fact that it is a more perfect form, it can only be inferred that it has a more noble mode of operating, namely, by understanding and loving, but not that it can per se effect every operation that an inferior form can.

14. To the confirmation Soncinas responds, VII Metaph., q. 25, by denying the consequence. Because although an intelligence, he says, cannot effect a form in matter in quiet and perfect being, it can nevertheless influence a form conducting itself through the mode of intentional passion, like a principal agent into an instrument, and he says that such a form, which is rather in becoming than in completed being, is made in heaven by an intelligence, and therefore, through that as an instrument, it can effect forms in matter, but not immediately. This doctrine has a foundation in St. Thomas in various places, especially In II, dist. 15, q. 1, a. 2, where he also cites the Commentator, XI Metaph.; and Boethius, I de Trin., c. 3, at the end. To me, however, it is difficult to believe for many reasons. First, because he does not speak consistently; for, if he once admits that an intelligence introduces forms into matter through heaven, as an instrument, it is necessary that he confess that the principal cause of

that effect is the intelligence; from which it follows consequently that the intelligence eminently contains such an effect or its form. But this once posited, no probable reason remains, why an intelligence cannot per se immediately effect such a form. For why will it need that circuit or that power placed in heaven, if it itself has sufficient power in itself? For by what power conjoined to itself it effects that separated power in heaven and through that acts the form, it will be able itself to act the form immediately. For what repugnance can be brought forward, on account of which it cannot act a form in quiet being (as he says), but can effect a form in that flowing being, when nevertheless this is active of a permanent or quiet form? It is added that that flowing quality impressed on heaven by an intelligence, is gratuitously devised, nor can it be sufficiently explained why it is called intentional and flowing, unless because perhaps it is posited depending in becoming and being conserved by an intelligence; but this does not remove the true nature of real and permanent quality. Therefore, if an intelligence can produce this quality in heaven, it will also be able to produce any other. For why not? And especially it will be able per se immediately to effect light in air, or celestial influences on earth; for these qualities also are quasi instrumental and flowing in that sense. Finally according to the doctrine given above, that instrumental accidental power does not suffice so that per se alone without actual influx of the principal agent, or of some one who supplies its place, it may induce substantial form in matter; therefore if an intelligence cannot per se influence, without cause is that instrumental quality feigned superadded to heaven entirely from the extrinsic. I respond therefore by denying the antecedent; for an intelligence acts nothing in heaven except motion, nor does it otherwise use that for acting than by applying it so that it may operate by its natural powers. Which was also touched upon above, disp. XVIII, sect. 3.

*On the Power of Intelligences to Move Bodies*

15. I state secondly that created intelligences have the power and efficacy to move bodies by local motion and not by any other kind of motion. This latter part follows from the prior assertion through a sufficient enumeration of parts, because besides local motion, generation, and alteration, there is no action or change that is proper except augmentation, concerning which the same reasoning applies as for alteration and generation, both because it also terminates in a certain form, and also because augmentation is accomplished through alteration and generation. Hence it is surprising that, while the prior conclusion is so certain in the doctrine of St. Thomas, some of his disciples doubt this exclusive part when they treat of the manner in which angels are in place. Especially Ferrara, III contra Gentiles, chapter 68, where he brings forward the testimony of St. Thomas, In I, distinction 37, question 3, article 1, saying that an angel effects in bodies either light, or motion, or something of this kind. But there is no doubt that the other parts of this disjunction have been retracted by St. Thomas, wherever he taught our first conclusion.

16. The prior part is certain in philosophy, and much more so in theology. For philosophers teach that intelligences move celestial bodies locally. Theologians, however, teach that intelligences assume bodies and move them, and this is evident throughout divine Scripture. Nor is it necessary to say that angels always do this by some supernatural power, as instruments of God, both because neither the effect requires this, nor does Scripture always narrate it as something miraculous and supernatural, and also because not only good angels, but also evil ones do this, to whom supernatural power is not given for this purpose, since they use this power more frequently to deceive and tempt men, as is evident throughout the books of Exodus, Job and others. The reason is that the local motion of bodies does not exceed the active power of intelligences. You might object: if material alteration exceeds the active power of intelligence, why not also local motion, especially since, according to philosophers, local motion is more perfect? I respond first that local motion is called more perfect

because it changes the movable thing less; hence it happens that it can be found even in the most perfect created things, even incorruptible ones; but it is not called more perfect because it always brings greater perfection to the movable thing, for through alteration there can come about some quality that adds greater perfection to substance or quantity than local presence, which comes about through motion. Hence from this aspect some reason for the difference can rather be taken. First, because local motion, insofar as it changes matter less, can be accomplished more easily than alteration; hence we see that it can be accomplished in some way even by man. Second, because local motion can in some way be found even in intelligences themselves; hence it is not surprising that, just as they have the power to move themselves, so also through the same power they can transfer a body from one place to another.

17. Furthermore, this power was necessary for intelligences, so that they could have some connection and association with this corporeal world, which was expedient for its perfect unity and suitable governance. The major premise is demonstrated, because, setting aside local motion, intelligences could act nothing at all upon corporeal things, nor could they naturally suffer from them. Again, they would neither contain them, nor be contained by them. Finally, they could not administer them in any way. And thus all connection and relation that pertains to any unity or governance is removed. But truly, through local motion, intelligences can have some causality in corporeal things. First indeed by moving the heavens, whose various motions and influences are the cause of the perpetual duration of generations and corruptions in these lower things. Second, by applying active things to passive ones; for setting aside the power to alter or generate bodies per se, they can procure or even impede the generations and corruptions of things only in this way. This mode, although in the physical genus it pertains to an accidental cause, nevertheless in the artificial and moral genus is reckoned as per se in some way, and therefore was very necessary in the universe, so that both natural and human things could

be administered in some way through intelligences; concerning which matter St. Thomas can be read, I, question 110 and question 113.

### *Corollaries from the Preceding Assertion on the Guardianship of Angels*

18. And hence it is evident first for what reason it can be true, what not only the holy Fathers, but also philosophers have recognized, that the care of the things of this universe has been entrusted in some way to intelligences. For, to omit the motions of the heavens, they guard diverse species of things, and protect various parts or regions of the world. Thus Plato in the Timaeus affirms that God has set daemons, that is, angels, over the entire world, who rule like leaders of flocks the whole human race according to their distributions, which God assigned to them, which Eugubinus observed, book V, chapter 12; and Clement of Alexandria reports many similar things, book IV Stromateis, from Orpheus, Menander and others, whom he says recognized that individual angels were given to individual men as guardians; and in book VI at the end, he says that angelic prefectures are distributed throughout nations and cities. Similar things about Socrates and Plato are reported by Eusebius, book III On Preparation, chapter 7, who also treats many things on the same matter, book IV On Demonstration, chapters 6, 7 and 9, book VII, chapter 2; and Epiphanius, Against Heresies, in 51; and Chrysostom, homily IV on Colossians; Damascene, book II, chapter 3: "As they have been destined and placed by that supreme artificer, each guards certain parts of the earth, and protects nations and regions, and governs our affairs, and brings help to us." And Augustine, VIII Genesis ad litteram, chapter 24, and III On the Trinity, chapter 4, and book LXXXIII Questions, in 79, confirms this so as to say that an angelic power is set over each visible thing. This Origen also confirms, homily XIII on Numbers. These Fathers were moved by certain testimonies of Scripture to hand down this dogma, such as Matthew 18, Apocalypse

6 and 14, and others. Philosophers perhaps received this by some tradition or communication with the faithful of their time; for this cannot be sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason alone, although it is quite consonant with reason that God should govern and rule these lower things through higher ones, insofar as this can be done conveniently.

19. This administration, whatever it may be, cannot be exercised by angels except through local motion, because, as has been shown, they have no other action upon bodies; but this motion suffices so that by applying certain things and removing others, they may promote or impede the course of things. Likewise, through this motion, they are sometimes ministers of divine justice, destroying and burning cities, or even killing men. Let Augustine be read, book II Against the Adversaries of the Law and the Prophets, chapter 11. Furthermore, through this motion, they accomplish certain things that appear miraculous, not because they are true miracles or supernatural works; for these exceed the natural faculty, both of the intelligences themselves, and of all causes that can be applied through them; but because intelligences have a clear understanding through natural knowledge of the power of each natural thing, the disposition of matter, and the influence and aspect of all stars; hence, if they observe all things, as they can most easily and most quickly apply all things, they can cause unusual effects to occur, either in the thing or in the manner, beyond the frequent course of natural causes, and therefore they seem miraculous to men. And in this way magicians work effects through the help of demons that seem to exceed human faculty, as Augustine notes, III On the Trinity, chapters 7 and 8, book LXXXIII Questions, question 69, and XX On the City of God, chapter 29, and book XI, chapter 11; Origen, homily XIII on Mark; St. Thomas, question 6 On Power, article 5. Nor is it surprising that angels can do these things, for even wise men, through true art applying diverse causes and materials, sometimes do things that seem prodigious to others, when nevertheless they have a true natural reason; therefore,

the greater the angels' knowledge and power to apply natural things quickly and as if invisibly, the greater is their skill in this part. Although St. Augustine also rightly warns, book XIX On the City of God, chapters 16, 17 and 18, that these works, which are done through the art of demons, are often not real, but only apparent, either through imagination, or through illusion of human senses. For sometimes such effects are of the kind that they cannot even be accomplished by angels through the application of natural causes, such as that human bodies be converted into the bodies of brutes, which St. Thomas noted with Augustine, in the aforesaid question 6 On Power, article 5, ad 6, and question 16 On Evil, article 9, ad 2, who can also be seen, II-II, question 95, and what Victoria treats, relectio On Magic.

20. Finally, it is by local motion alone that intelligences can have dealings with mortal human beings—addressing them, or inciting them to good or to evil—a capacity widely admitted by nearly all, even by pagans, to lie within the natural power of intelligences, as is sufficiently evident from what has been said. That they can do this only through local motion is clear: since they cannot immediately imprint forms or qualities upon bodies, much less can they imprint upon the external or internal senses their own acts, species, or phantasms; and for the same—or an even stronger—reason, they cannot immediately imprint acts upon the intellect or the will, or any other spiritual qualities. Therefore, they can speak to human beings only by means of local motion: either by presenting sensible objects to the external senses, or by arousing phantasms from within, drawing the animal (sensitive) spirits, or altering the organ of an interior sense; by applying active agents to passive subjects; or otherwise by changing the bodily humors, through which the vital spirits or phantasms are commonly stirred. On this matter see St. Thomas, Summa theologiae I, q. 3, and other Doctors, In I Sententiarum, dist. 8.

## Section VI

### *What Kind of Faculty is the Motive Power of Intelligences*

21. Opinion of some. From these things therefore it is sufficiently evident how necessary to intelligences is the power to move bodies locally. It is customary to ask about this motive power what it is in intelligences themselves; for many think it is nothing other than the will of the intelligence, which through itself is efficacious so as to effect motion by willing. Thus Durandus indicates, In I, distinction 45, question 2; Soncinas holds this, XII Metaphysics, question 35, and proves it, because in an intellectual thing there is no other faculty except intellect and will, because in it there are only rational powers; but the intellect cannot have the nature of a motive power, both because it only remotely concurs by directing the will; and also because it does not operate as if impelling and tending toward a thing as it is in itself, but by drawing the thing to itself; therefore the motive power cannot be other than the will. And it is confirmed, because otherwise there would be such a motive power in a separated soul.

22. The author's judgment. This opinion is probable; nevertheless, supposing what has been said above about the omnipotence of the first cause, namely, that it is rationally distinct from its will, it seems more probable that this power is not the will of the angel, but a special active virtue of such motion through action properly transient. For, if the divine willing as thus precisely conceived does not operate externally except in our way of understanding, by applying the power that it has for operating outside itself, much less will the will of a creature be able to change other things through its willing alone. Likewise, because the will of an angel does not effect the motion of heaven, for example, through its willing as through an action, because that action is in the patient, as Soncinas also admits there, and must be proven elsewhere; nor as through a principle of

acting, because an immanent act, as Aristotle taught, IX Metaphysics, is not operative outside the operator per se, and as a proper power of acting, nor is there reason why we should attribute this to this volition rather than to others. Furthermore, the rational soul cannot in this way move through its willing its own body joined to it, but only by commanding or applying motive power; therefore neither will angels be able in this way to move external bodies; for, although the power of intelligences is simply greater than that of the soul, nevertheless proportionally the dominion of the soul over its own body seems greater; or certainly no sufficient reason can be assigned why the will of the soul does not have this immediate efficacy in its own body, except that which is taken from the diversity of actions; for, since local motion is an action entirely different from appetition, it requires a distinct faculty. This reason has the same place in intelligences; therefore in them also this faculty is diverse from intellect and will. Nor can it be an obstacle that the intelligence efficaciously wills to move through the will; for it also efficaciously wills to understand through the will; from which it does not follow that it understands through the will, but that through the will it applies the power of understanding. Finally, created will is not per se active of any effect externally, but only insofar as it has a power and faculty proportioned and subjected to it. Hence also for moving itself, it is more probable to me that an angel has a proper motive virtue distinct from the will, for the same reasons.

23. Therefore, although in a purely intellectual thing there is no active power with immanent action besides intellect and will, nevertheless an executive and active power with transient action can be distinct. This power, although it is not rational of itself, nevertheless can be subject in operating to a rational power, and this is enough for it to be able to have a place in an intellectual nature. And St. Thomas seems to insinuate this opinion, Quodlibet IX, article 10, ad 2, when he says that an angel moves a body through command, yet not without active virtue, and question 6 On Power, article 7, ad 12, while he says

that the command of an angel requires the execution of virtue. And through these things response is made to the foundation of Soncinas. To the confirmation about the separated soul, however, it is responded that that argument is common, whether the motive power is will, or a special power. The consequence is therefore denied, because the soul is by its nature the form of a body; and therefore it has limited virtue toward that and a proper mode, namely, supposing information; and therefore, after it is separated, it can move no body, but only itself, for which it also has a power distinct from its will, for the same reason.

### *Whether Angels Impress Impetus When They Move*

24. Again it can be inquired concerning this faculty whether an intelligence in moving a body impresses in it an impetus distinct from the motion itself. For some think that, just as man impresses an impulse when he moves some body, so also does an angel, because local motion does not seem to be able to be accomplished otherwise. But if you object, because that impetus is a certain quality, they respond that it is indeed true, nevertheless it is entirely ordered to effecting local motion, as a certain participation of the motive virtue existing in the principal mover, and therefore it can be of the same virtue to produce this quality and local motion, and in this respect there is a different reason concerning this and other qualities. And this way of speaking can easily be defended.

25. Perhaps nevertheless it is not necessary that an angel, when it immediately moves a body, should impress an impulse upon it, but immediately the motion itself and nothing else. The reason is that impulse is only posited so as to be an instrument of the mover when it is separated from the movable thing; therefore when the mover is immediately present and has in itself sufficient motive force, it does not need an impulse as a separated instrument by which to move. Nor truly is such an impulse necessary for local motion;

otherwise not even God himself could move a body without impressing an impulse, which seems ridiculous and said without reason; for why will God not be able to effect in a body only local motion without another new effect? If therefore this impulse is not necessary from the part of the motion itself, neither will it be from the part of the mover, because it both has sufficient virtue in itself and is immediate to the movable thing. There is therefore no reason or necessity for impressing such an impulse. Just as an angel moving itself does not impress an impulse upon its own substance, but motion; for what need is there to multiply beings or instruments without cause? The same therefore will be the case in moving heaven, for example, because it similarly has proportioned virtue and presence. Finally it is explained, because, when an angel moves, it is not necessary that it will to impress impetus, but only that it will to move; for it has sufficient virtue for this and that effect of local motion is of itself feasible without another; therefore then the angel will effect only motion without another prior quality or impulse; therefore it is likely that it always moves thus, because it will do in vain through more what it can do through fewer. Indeed it is also likely that it cannot move otherwise, when it moves immediately per se; for, if through one body it moves or impels another, through that it will be able to impress impetus, because this action is proportioned to bodies. But truly when an angel per se immediately moves, that action seems superfluous and disproportioned, as the conjectures made suggest. And also in this way it is more generally defended that angels can per se impress no quality upon bodies.

### *How Great is the Motive Force of Intelligence*

26. Finally it can be inquired how great is the motive force of intelligences. But this doubt has been sufficiently touched upon above, in treating of the finite perfection of angels. Only this must be noted, that here some difficulty can be introduced, if perhaps it appears that

this virtue of intelligence is so great that through it it can destroy any corruptible things, either by applying active things to passive ones, or certainly by dividing or grinding them through very swift motion. From which it seems to happen that, considering only the nature of any intelligence, it is in its power to destroy this whole lower world, to change its order and to elevate, for example, the whole earth up to heaven, and to agitate heaven itself more quickly or more slowly, which seem very absurd.

27. To these things St. Thomas responds, question 18 On Evil, article 6, ad 7, that although an angel moves through will, it has from its nature a definite mode and power of moving, which it cannot exceed even if it wishes, and article 10, ad 8, he adds that it does not follow that an angel can move the whole earth, because it is not proportioned to its nature to change the order of the elements of the world. But nevertheless it cannot be denied that, considering nakedly the virtue of intelligences, it would be sufficient through local motion to overturn the whole universe, as regards its order and composition. Considering that power, however, as it is under the laws of divine providence, it cannot change that order; as, for example, it cannot cause a vacuum to exist, because, although it can remove one body from its place, it cannot nevertheless at the same time prevent another from succeeding, not from defect of intrinsic virtue absolutely considered, but because it cannot not be subject to the laws of the creator. And similarly, by what power an angel moves the first movable from east to west, it could move it from west to east, unless the order established by the creator stood in the way. And in this way the aforesaid opinion is to be understood, which Augustine declared in these words, XVIII On the City of God, chapter 18: "It must be most firmly believed that almighty God can do all things that he has willed, and that neither demon nor angel works anything according to the power of its nature, except what he has permitted."

28. Finally, from what has been said it is easily evident that one angel can also efficiently move another angel locally by natural

virtue. I add this, because it is certain that by supernatural virtue a blessed angel can move or detain a demon, even one superior in nature; just as, conversely, from the same supernatural order it arises that a wicked angel can have no similar action upon a good one, even if it is inferior to it in nature. But these things pertain to theologians. Considering intelligences therefore in pure nature, the assertion posited seems certain, because by what virtue an angel moves itself, it can move another, since it can also move a body; for there seems to be greater proportion between intelligences among themselves, than with bodies. Likewise they can move separated souls; therefore also other intelligences.

29. We speak however of motion not only moral, which is through command, but also of that which is through proper efficiency and impression of the motion itself. Therefore if a superior intelligence is compared to inferior ones in nature, the conclusion is absolutely and without restriction true, because the inferior cannot resist the superior; but truly conversely, speaking of the inferior concerning the superior, it needs limitation, namely if the superior does not resist, but allows itself to be moved; for if it resists, since it is of superior virtue, it cannot be conquered by another. And let these things be sufficient concerning this motion, about which theologians treat extensively what it is, and perhaps we will touch on something below, in disputing about place, and time.

30. Concerning the other intentional action, it is certain that one true intelligence cannot change another to intentional forms according to its will and absolute power, which can be proven a fortiori from what has been said about the change of corporeal matter to form. Whether truly by way of an intelligible object in act it can at least impress the species of itself or of its acts, either one intelligence upon another, or upon a separated soul, is a matter that needs long disputation, proper to theologians, and something has been touched upon by us above, disputation XVIII, section 5. And therefore let it be sufficient to have said these things about created intelligences.

# DISPUTATION XXXVI

## ON MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IN GENERAL

The consideration of substance, insofar as it can pertain to the metaphysician, terminates in the contemplation of this member or common nature; for all the lower things that are contained under material substance are below metaphysical abstraction, and therefore pertain not to the metaphysician, but to the natural philosopher. Indeed, speaking per se and directly, even material substance, as such, falls under the object of the whole of natural philosophy; indeed perhaps it is the proper and adequate object of that science or part of philosophy which is contained in the books of the Physics. Nevertheless, as I said in the prooemial disputation, it is also the office of the metaphysician to contemplate something about material substance according to this precise nature of it, both so that he may perfect and exactly declare the division of substance into immaterial and material, which the metaphysician alone can deliver and explain, and especially so that he may explain the very nature of quiddity in this substance, and prescribe the proper boundaries of philosophical consideration and assign to it its object and the principles which it ought to use for finding the proper and specific essence of each material substance.

But so many things have been said by us in the preceding disputations about material substance, that scarcely anything remains

to be said. For it has been said first of all in disputations XIII and XV about the intrinsic principles of this substance, which are matter and form, since these are counted among the genera of causes; nor could the consideration of one nature be conveniently separated from another. Then it was said in disputation XVIII about the power of acting of this substance, because it was necessary for fully considering the power and nature of efficient cause, and there consequently was touched upon (as much as metaphysics allows) the mode of generation and production of such substance, because these are as it were correlative and necessarily connected with the consideration of causes. Moreover it was said from disputation XXX about the existence of this substance, and in what way it is distinguished from its essence. And finally it was said about its suppositum and about the distinction between it and nature in material substances in disputation XXXIV. But concerning the real properties of this substance, insofar as they also pertain to us, we shall speak below when we dispute about accidents, as was also touched upon at the beginning of the preceding disputation. Therefore here we shall only add a few things which seem to pertain to declaring more fully the essential nature of this substance, namely, in what this essential nature consists and what matter and form contribute to it, either taken individually or together.

## SECTION I

## WHAT IS THE ESSENTIAL NOTION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE, AND WHETHER IT IS ENTIRELY THE SAME AS THE NOTION OF CORPOREAL SUBSTANCE

1. Meaning of the name "material substance." As to the meaning of the term, it is agreed that material substance is that which is constituted of matter and form, whether the form be material or spiritual, provided only that it be a true form of matter. Corporeal

substance, by contrast, is said to be that which by its nature has this bodily bulk which we can neither conceive nor explain except through that extension of parts which we experience in sensible substances. By reason of that extension, such things occupy place, one part excludes another from its place, and one substance excludes another. And because this extension proceeds from quantity (as we shall see below), we define corporeal substance as such by reference to quantity: it is that substance which is capable of three dimensions, whether so as to be extended in its whole self—that is, both in matter and in form—or only with respect to matter.

2. How the notion of material substance stands in relation to the notion of corporeal substance. As to the thing itself, it has been proved above that material and corporeal substance are the same in reality and are predicated reciprocally. For there is no corporeal substance that does not consist of matter and form, nor any substance consisting of matter and form that is not corporeal and quantified, at least by reason of matter. Yet we cannot deny that, according to a mental precision (praecisio mentis), the notion (ratio) of material substance as such differs from that of corporeal substance as such. Given the concept and definition of material substance—namely, that it consists of matter and form, or of substantially real act and potency—the intellect can still doubt whether every such substance is of its very essence corporeal. Not only does the mind find here a basis for making such a distinction in thought; there have in fact been many who denied the identity. Likewise, conversely, when the above concept of corporeal substance is granted, the mind can still doubt whether every such substance consists of matter and form; and there have not been lacking those who denied this. The two notions are therefore at least distinct according to the mind's precision. Hence arises the doubt which of these is essential to material substance—essential, I say, not only with respect to reality, but also with respect to our way of understanding. One may also ask whether one of these

notions is in itself more abstract and universal than the other, at least in reason.

3. Various ways of speaking to the point may be devised. One way is to claim that the notion of corporeal substance is in itself more universal, because it is not repugnant to conceive a corporeal substance without the physical composition of essential parts, even if perhaps no such thing exists in reality. Or conversely, one might say that a substance consisting of matter is something more universal than a quantified or corporeal substance, because by force of the concept of material substance as such, something common and indifferent is signified. Each part of this opinion has just the probability possessed by the opinions that assert that there could be a material incorporeal substance, or conversely a corporeal substance not consisting of matter. Nevertheless, we cannot defend either side, given what was said above about the necessary connection and reciprocity of matter and quantity, and what we also said when treating of universals. For it is repugnant that some "notion," conceived merely from a mode of signifying and conceiving, be universal if it is repugnant for that notion to be communicable to many; universality, in the case of opposites, consists in—or is founded upon—non-repugnance. Thus the true notion of deity, or of God, cannot be universal, however the common name might seem to signify it, because it is repugnant that it be found in many species or individuals. In the same proportion, it is repugnant that one notion be more universal than another if it is repugnant for it to be communicated to some thing to which the other is not communicated, and vice versa; this is directly contrary to the very idea of greater universality. Therefore, if not only de facto those two notions are always found conjoined, but even in the order of possibility they have an intrinsic connection and reciprocity wholly inseparable, one cannot conceive the one as more universal than the other—although one may be abstracted from the other—because a more universal concept implies not only the precision of one from

another, but also the aptitude and non-repugnance to exist without the other.

4. For this reason one may speak otherwise. Although the concept of a substance composed of matter and form is not absolutely more universal than the concept of body and is, as it were, a mean between "substance in general" and "body"—for so much only is concluded by the foregoing reasoning—nevertheless the concept of material substance differs from the concept of body in this: material substance as such asserts only the very notion (ratio) of substance as found in body, which is in a way a mean between substance in general and body. For substance in general expresses substance simply abstracted and indifferent to the material and the immaterial; body expresses a determinate substance as constituted by the subaltern difference of body; but substance as conjoined to the difference of body expresses neither substance with total indifference nor the formal constituent constituted by the difference of body, but the generic notion itself as existing in that species. It is one thing to consider animal in man, and another to consider man as such, or animal absolutely. Yet, although in general it is true that generic and specific notions can be conceived in all these ways, in the present case it seems false that material substance as such signifies only the common notion of substance conceived in that middle way. First, because when a genus is conceived in that way, it is not conceived as a universal or actual whole, but only as a metaphysical material part underlying such a difference and actually conjoined to it. But material substance does not express merely the common notion of substance so conceived; rather, it expresses a certain whole: either an actual whole constituted under substance in general by that difference—namely, "material"—or even a universal whole that comprises under itself all material substances and in a confused manner signifies the whole of their essence. Second, because the generic notion considered in a given species does not intrinsically include any essential difference that the same generic notion, taken absolutely, does not include; it

only connotes conjunction with such a difference. But material substance intrinsically adds an essential difference upon substance in general; therefore it does not assert merely the common notion of substance insofar as it is in body. The minor is proved: material substance is intrinsically and essentially constituted by the difference material, and by that same difference it differs from immaterial substance.

5. Objection. "Body is, metaphysically, composed of substance and the corporeal; therefore substance, insofar as it is in body and metaphysically composes it, must express something composed of matter and form. Hence material substance can signify nothing other than substance in general according to the being it has in body." The first inference is proved as follows: substance in general, insofar as it is in body, is a complete substance—this belongs to the very notion of substance in general. Therefore it is a composite substance; for in a body there is no substance—or notion of complete substance—that is simple, that is, not composed of act and potency really distinct. Every entity simple in that way which is in a body is an incomplete substance. Therefore body itself, even as it is substance—or conversely, substance itself, as it has this common notion in body—has that composition from matter and form. Hence it was rightly said that material substance as such differs from corporeal substance as such in that the former does not name an intrinsic grade of corporeity but a grade of substance as it is in a body. And this is confirmed: body, as a predicament of substance, physically signifies a composite of matter and substantial form in general, and that same essence is metaphysically composed of substance and the corporeal. Now the notion of substance fits neither matter alone nor form alone, for these are incomplete substances; but that notion names a complete substance. Therefore that notion of complete substance, insofar as it is in a body, is composed of matter and form; therefore this notion of substance is what is imported by the name and concept material substance.

6. Reply. There is here a kind of equivocation, in passing from the thing as it exists in reality to the thing as conceived or precisely abstracted by the intellect. As to the real thing, the argument does conclude that in a composite substance no notion of complete substance as such is found except through the composition of matter and form. In that sense it is true that the common notion of complete substance, insofar as it is in a body, arises from the incomplete substances—matter and form. Nevertheless, it is also true that the notion of complete substance as such abstracts from this kind of composition, so that, if we consider this notion of substance precisely, even in a body it does not have—on the basis of this common notion—the fact that it arises by composition. Hence, in this sense one must deny that the notion of substance in general includes in its metaphysical concept the composition of matter and form. This is evident because, by force of this concept, it intrinsically includes no more than an angel includes insofar as he is a substance; otherwise body and angel would not agree univocally under the notion of substance.

7. Therefore the formal argument is answered by distinguishing the consequent of the first inference. Either it is taken according to the thing, or according to the precise concept. Taken according to the thing, it is true that the very notion of complete substance which is in a body is composed of matter and form, as the proofs there rightly show. But taken according to the precision of our concept, it is not true that the notion of complete substance, even in a body, includes within its precise concept the composition of matter and form; otherwise there would be no univocal likeness between body and spirit under that notion. Nor do the proofs alleged bear against this, for they clearly proceed with respect to the thing itself in itself, not as thus precisely conceived. Hence, speaking of it in this way, we admit that such a notion of substance, insofar as it is in a body, is not simple; we deny, however, that as such it is composite. By reason of the precision of our intellect it abstracts from both and asserts only

the notion of a per se complete being, which of itself has neither composition nor simplicity, though in reality it always has one or the other, according to the difference to which it is joined.

8. Since we cannot deny that that common metaphysical grade of substance, when joined to the difference corporeal, not only arises in reality from physical composition but can also be conceived according to what it has in itself—not indeed from itself, but, as it were, from its association with that difference—we should add that in that grade, conceived thus in a body, matter and form are indeed included, yet not as matter and form as such, but as incomplete substances. For these two grades can be abstracted in matter and in form themselves: they agree in the notion of incomplete substance, yet are distinguished in their proper formal notions. Therefore, since substance as it is in a body asserts only the notion of complete substance conjoined to the difference of body, even if we grant that there it is not without the composition of matter and form, nevertheless in that precise notion we do not yet conceive the composition of matter and form as such, but at most that that substance coheres from incomplete substances present in it. And thus it follows that material substance cannot designate merely that notion of substance insofar as it is in a body, because material substance expressly and intrinsically asserts "substance composed of matter and form as such," which the notion of substance conceived under that aspect does not assert, as has been explained.

9. A further objection. "At least from this last reply it follows that between substance in general and material or corporeal substance there is a middle concept—lower than substance in general and co-distinct from spiritual substance, and also different from the concept of body or of material substance. But that is false, since no such concept can be devised that does not convert with body." The consequence seems clear: a complete substance arising from incomplete substances really distinct is said to be a concept more precise and abstract than the concept of material substance. Yet in that

concept the general notion of complete substance is truly contracted and determined to a special mode of complete substance not found in angels; therefore that would be a middle concept.

10. Reply. A concept may be called more precise in two ways. In one way, because, taken absolutely, it is more universal—and in this sense the consequence must be denied. For in reality the concept of a complete substance consisting of incompletes really distinct is not more universal than the concept of body or of material substance. In another way, a concept may be called more precise because it is conceived and constituted by more abstract notions—or notions more common in themselves—even if the concept constituted from all of them is not itself more universal. In this way, the concept of a complete substance arising from incompletes can be called more precise than the concept of material substance, because the notion of incomplete substance is more universal than the notion of matter, and the notion of composition as such is in itself more universal than the composition of matter and form as such. Therefore that concept can be said to be more precise, though not more universal; and, to use proper terms, it may be said to be more precise in mode, not in thing. Moreover, substance can be conceived in two ways as really composed of substantial act and potency. In one way, such composition is taken as the constitutive difference of the substance; and thus, however such a substance is understood—as truly and really composite in its essence by force of its own constitutive difference, whether that composition be understood by reference to incomplete substances in general, to substantial parts in general, or to matter and substantial form—then we are no longer conceiving substance in general, even as it is in a body, but a substance essentially inferior to substance in general and essentially co-distinct from spiritual substance. For the difference indicated—namely, "a substance really composed of distinct realities"—suffices to contract the notion of substance and to distinguish it from spiritual substance, which is simple, that is, which essentially excludes that composition. (We are not speaking of

composition of substance as to suppositum, but as to nature; nor of composition of reason, but of thing and from distinct realities.) In another way, composition may be understood in the notion of substance not by force of a constitutive difference, but only from its conjunction with the contracting difference; in that way no lower grade of substance is directly conceived, but the very notion of substance is conceived while connoting a conjunction with a lower difference.

11. One must note that a generic notion is contracted by a specific difference not only in such a way that with it it composes a subaltern or ultimate species, but also in itself the genus, in a certain manner, participates that perfection and is raised or lowered to the order to which that difference pertains. Thus the genus animal, contracted by the difference rational, in the very grade of sentience and in its faculties shares a distinctive mode of perfection; and the genus quality, contracted by the difference grace, is elevated to the supernatural order, so that the very notion of quality in that quality becomes supernatural. Likewise, contracted by spiritual differences, it is spiritual and indivisible; contracted by material differences, it has a certain divisibility and extension of parts. In sum, the generic notion, from its conjunction with the specific, participates in itself a nobler or a less noble mode of being. This arises from the complete identity which in reality the contracting difference has with the genus contracted by it, and because they are founded on the same real principles, at least according to real identity. For this reason, too, the mode of being which the genus derives from its conjunction with the difference does not constitute another peculiar difference, but proceeds from the same difference and is convertible with it, and in its own way pertains to that difference's formal effect, on account of the identity just mentioned, as has been proved. Accordingly, in this latter way the notion of substance as it is in a body can be understood to be composite and to include matter and form—not, to be sure, according to the special formal notions of matter and form as such, but according

to the grades of substance which they include; for in virtue of those grades they complete the entire notion of substance that is found in corporeal substance. And we say that that notion of substance, insofar as it is in a body, includes matter and form in the aforesaid way, because physically and in reality it is founded upon these principles, although metaphysically the notion of substance conceived even there does not expressly state composition and union out of several incomplete substances, but simply a complete substance. In all these respects the same account holds of corporeal substance as such and of material substance as such, because in either case the notion of substance can be taken either merely as the common notion of substance existing there, or as the proper notion of material and corporeal substance as constituted in a subaltern species—and it is no more signified under one aspect by the name material substance than by corporeal substance, or conversely.

*Resolution of the Question*

12. One must therefore say that the essential notion of material substance and of corporeal substance is the same, and that it consists in this: that it is a substance composed of matter and form. In this description substance plays the role of genus, and the remainder that of difference, which is expressed in physical rather than in metaphysical terms. The whole of that essential physical difference is encompassed metaphysically by the difference material, when one says that a body is a material substance. Hence that difference is rooted, in its very foundation, in those physical principles—namely, matter and form—inasmuch as from them there arises one complete substance, of a kind and mode different from a simple substance, a mode of substance or of composition signified by the difference material. The same is signified by the other difference corporeal, which is likewise founded, in its roots, partly in matter and partly in substantial form as such; for it also belongs to the notion of body that

it be a complete substance composed of matter and form. The only apparent difference is this: the difference conceived and expressed as corporeal includes an ordering to quantity; hence corporeal substance should be defined as a substance capable of quantity. On this account, according to our manner of conceiving, the difference material seems prior to and more essential than corporeal. For that aptitude for receiving quantity, precisely as it is conceived as a kind of capacity or receptive potency for quantity, is conceived as a certain property or attribute presupposing an essence which is the reason for that aptitude; and that essence is nothing other than composition from substantial form and matter as such.

13. From these points it is finally understood how the essential notion of material substance is wholly absolute, not essentially including any relation to an accident—not even to quantity. This pertains to the absolute perfection of substance, as we shall say below. Thus, although matter and substantial form include between themselves essential transcendental relations by which each is mutually ordered to the other, nevertheless these relations and their termini are contained within the complete substance itself. The whole substance, as such, does not essentially express a relation to an accidental form, because it is not ordered to that per se and primarily. And although it is capable of such an accident, this follows concomitantly from the absolute perfection of its nature, not because it was instituted primarily for that end—as we explained above when treating of the material cause of accidents.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE CONSISTS IN THE SUBSTANTIAL FORM ALONE, OR ALSO IN MATTER

## Section II

1. The reason for doubt. The reason for doubting is that Aristotle in many places signifies that form alone is the essence of material thing; for in Metaphysics I, chapter 7, text 52, he says that reason, that is, form, is the quiddity and substance of the thing. "It is necessary (he says) that flesh, and each of the others be its reason, or nothing; for because of this both flesh is, and bone and the others, not because of matter." And similarly, in book VII, chapter 11, he calls form "what it was to be" of the thing; and therefore he signifies that it alone is put in definition, not truly the material part, and perhaps for that reason in other places he refers both parts of definition to the genus of formal cause, as is clear from Metaphysics V chapter 2, and Physics II, chapter 3, and On the Soul II, chapter 2.

### *The Opinion of Averroes*

2. Because of these and similar testimonies of Aristotle, Averroes, in Metaphysics VII, comments 21 and 34, says that matter is not of the quiddity of material substance, even if it pertains to its intrinsic constitution, but is only as it were a vehicle or support of the form which is the whole quiddity of material substance. And before Averroes Alexander insinuated this opinion, in Metaphysics II, text 12; and Themistius, in On the Soul III, text 9 and 38; but later Jandun followed it, in Metaphysics VII, question 12; Niphus, disputation XIII; and under probability Soncinas defends it, solving arguments to the contrary, in the same book VII, question 26. And it can be proven first, because each thing is such through its own entity, and through the same is distinguished from others; but material substances are not distinguished among themselves through matter; for, since they differ among themselves in species, they do not differ in matter; therefore matter does not pertain to their quiddity. And it is confirmed, for the essence of man and horse differ in species as regards physical nature and essence; but they do not differ except in forms; therefore their essence consists in forms alone; for the matter is the same in both.

Second, because if matter is of the essence, therefore part of matter will be part of essence; therefore an integral part, for example, hand or head, will be an essential part, because it is some part of essence. But the consequent is false, because otherwise a mutilated man would not have the whole essence of man, and consequently would not be man. Third, because, if matter in general were of the essence of material substance, therefore in species such matter would be of the essence of such substance, and in the individual this individual matter would be of the essence of this individual; but this is false, because, with all the matter varied through continuous nutrition, the same man always remains numerically. And in resurrection, although the soul is not given the same body numerically which it had before, but one made from other matter, it will be the same man numerically who was before.

### *The True Opinion*

3. The contrary opinion nevertheless, namely, that matter is of the essence of material substance, is true and commonly received. Avicenna taught it, in Metaphysics V, chapter 4, where he says that the quiddity of natural thing is from the composition of matter and form, and he teaches it everywhere. St. Thomas, especially in I, question 75, article 4, and I Contra Gentiles, chapter 21, and book II, chapter 81, and On Being and Essence, chapter 2, where Cajetan, question 4; Capreolus, In IV, distinction 44, question 1, article 1; Scotus, In II, distinction 22, question unique, and Metaphysics VII, question 16; Giles, Metaphysics VII, question 2, and others there. And it is taken from Aristotle, Physics V, chapter 1, where he says both matter and form are the nature of natural things; but in reality nature is the same as essence, as has been said above, although the etymology of the name is diverse. Hence Averroes is not sufficiently consistent with himself, when in Metaphysics VII, text 27, he confesses that the nature which species have in generable things is something composed of

matter and form, which is true of integral or total nature. There are also other testimonies of Aristotle and other serious authorities, which we shall immediately adduce. But to prove this opinion by reason, it is necessary to proceed gradually through some propositions.

*Resolution of the Question*

4. I say therefore first: material substance complete, just as it is truly and per se one, so it has one quiddity and essence. This proposition seems self-evident from the terms; for one follows being, hence each thing just as it is being, so it is one being; but being is said from to be or essence; therefore what is simply one being, must have one being, and consequently one essence, especially speaking naturally and of natural unity; if therefore material substance is properly and per se one being, it also has one essence. But it is certain and indubitable that material substance is properly and per se one being; therefore it properly and per se has one essence.

5. Second conclusion. I say second: material substance, as it is a being per se one, is not form alone, nor matter alone, but the composite of matter and form. This also is certain almost from the terms; for in no species of material substance is form alone said to be the whole species; for neither is soul man, nor is the form of water water. But concerning matter this is clearer, unless one errs with the ancient philosophers, saying that the whole substance of generable things is matter and they differ only by accidents. Hence Aristotle, in Metaphysics VII, chapter 7, denies that substantial form is generated, but the composite, since nevertheless it is certain that material substance per se one is generated. Hence also St. Augustine, in City of God XIX, chapter 9, praises Varro saying that man is neither soul alone, nor body alone, but something consisting of both; which Damascene also asserted, in book III On Faith, chapter 3. But the same reason applies to all material substances, and also to material substance in general. Finally this is clear from what was said in the

preceding section; for material substance as such is complete substance; but neither form nor matter per se is complete substance; therefore material substance does not express form alone nor matter alone, but the composite of both; for that this composite is per se one, has been sufficiently declared above, when we dealt with material and formal cause, and will be more evident from what is immediately to be said.

6. Third conclusion. I say third: the integral essence of this substance is not matter alone, nor form alone, but a certain nature composed of both, which is per se one in the nature of nature or essence. This is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics VIII, text 15, saying that the quiddity of material substances is per se one, because it consists of act and potency, which are united per se. And it is proven by reason, first, because this substance is per se one by composition, therefore it has one essence; therefore that cannot be form alone, nor matter alone; therefore it is a nature composed of both. The first consequence is proven from the first conclusion, because substance per se one is being per se one; but being per se one has one essence. But it can be objected; for Christ, as subsisting in two natures, is simply one being per se, and nevertheless does not have only one essence, but two. It is responded that the instance is not to the point. First indeed, because that mode of unity and composition of many natures in one person is not natural; but here we speak of being per se one in natural mode; for such being primarily has unity from unity of essence. Then there is a difference, because Christ does not have unity from the immediate union of natures among themselves, but only from their union in the same person; but natural substance first and per se has unity from the union of matter and form among themselves, and therefore, if such is that union that it constitutes being per se one, such also it will be that it constitutes essence per se one.

7. Hence that first consequence is confirmed; for, if material substance is per se one, since matter and form are included in it, either this is because of the unity of suppositum alone, or also because of the

unity of essence. Not the first; therefore the second. The major is evident from sufficient enumeration of parts. For whoever would say that material substance is per se one because of the unity of composite, abstracting from one suppositum or essence, will not satisfy; for, although this abstraction can be made by the mind, nevertheless in reality there cannot be a composite per se one, unless it be either one suppositum or one nature or essence, which is the same. But the minor is proven, because unity of suppositum in material substances arises from unity of nature, or mediating through it, when the suppositum is proper and connatural, as we now speak. Which I declare thus: for either we think that in the whole material suppositum there is only one simple subsistence which terminates the whole nature and matter and form, and thus such subsistence supposes integral unity of nature, so that it can adequately terminate it and embrace matter and form in it; therefore that unity, which arises from the union of matter and form with subsistence abstracted, is unity of essence, and thus unity of proper suppositum supposes unity of essence. But if we think that matter and form have partial subsistences, the same or with greater efficacy the same is concluded, because from matter and form one suppositum will not arise, unless their subsistences are conjoined to compose one adequate subsistence; but they cannot be so united, unless the same matter and form according to their essential entities are united among themselves, which union of nature must precede by order; for, just as essence is prior to subsistence, so union in essential entities must be prior to union in partial subsistences. Therefore, if from these arises one total subsistence, much more from those will arise one essence. Therefore material substance is per se one not only by reason of one suppositum, but also by reason of one essence.

8. And hence the second and third consequence of the principal reason are easily proven. Because it has already been shown that from matter and form, as in each of them there is some essence not complete, but partial, apt to be united to another, some complete

and per se one essence is composed; this therefore is the proper and adequate essence of composite substance. The consequence is proven, first because that essence is the essence of some thing and not of another except material substance. Second because material substance is complete being; therefore it ought to have complete essence; but the essence of matter per se alone, or the essence of form per se alone is not complete, because neither of them is complete being or complete nature, since each is by its nature instituted to complete substance; therefore neither of them is complete essence; therefore neither is the whole essence of material substance. Third, because essence ought to be proportioned to the thing; therefore composite being ought to have composite essence; but material substance is one composite being; therefore the integral essence of it ought to be one by composition; therefore it is not form alone, which is simple, nor matter, but the composite of both. The first consequence is proven, both from due proportion, and also because that is of the essence of thing which intrinsically and per se primarily constitutes the thing; but composite being is intrinsically and per se primarily constituted through composite nature.

9. The objection is satisfied. You will say: artificial being is composed of matter and form of art and nevertheless its essence consists in form of art alone, as many think; therefore it is not of the nature of composite being that it have composite essence, and the same argument can be made about other accidental composites. It is responded first that there is not equal reason, for being composed of substance and accident is not properly one being, because it is not per se one, and therefore, if we speak adequately of it, it properly does not have one essence, but includes many, not per se, but per accidens unity. But speaking formally of these composites, their essence is said to consist in accidental form, because they express that formally, and connote the subjects. Which is not so of composite substance; for it is per se one, and therefore ought to have essence per se one; for man does not only express formally soul, but humanity, which is not soul

alone, otherwise humanity would be spiritual and immortal, just like soul, which is plainly false; therefore humanity is integral essence composed of soul and body, and the same is true of other material things. Nevertheless there are not lacking those who in this equate artificial things with substances, and constitute the difference between artificial things and other accidental composites in this. But we must not dwell on this, for it refers nothing to the present matter, especially because, if there is any difference, it is only in the use and signification of the name, not in things.

10. Hence from this very difference between substance and accidents I argue fourth. For in the definition of material substance matter is placed; therefore it is of its essence. The consequence is clear, because substance differs from accident in this, that it is not defined through something added, but through intrinsic and essential principles. Nor is it sufficient what some assert, that accident is defined through something added of another category, but substance of the same; for, although this is true of incomplete substance, such as matter itself or form, it is not true of complete substance; for, as I was saying in the preceding section, matter expresses transcendental relation to form, and form to matter; but substance composed of both is something altogether absolute, not expressing relation to extrinsic, unless perhaps as to end or to efficient principle. Add that, if matter is not an essential part of substance, it is scarcely understood in what way it is placed in the category of substance, because it is neither placed directly, since it is not integral substance, nor also reductively as an essential part of substance. You will say it is reduced as vehicle of form. But certainly by almost equal reason it could be reduced to quantity, especially according to the Commentator, because it is also vehicle of quantity. And moreover substance, which is directly placed in the category, does not need a vehicle, since it is being per se absolute and integral. But material form, which in its way needs something sustaining or a vehicle, is not placed directly in the category of substance, just as neither is matter, indeed not even rational soul,

although it is subsistent, is placed directly in the category of substance; therefore matter ought to be reduced to that category not only as vehicle of form, but especially as material part of substance; but it is not a part, unless essential; therefore.

11. Finally we can argue, because the properties of material substance are taken not only from form, but also from matter; but properties follow essence; therefore not only form, but also matter pertains to the essence of this substance. The major is clear, because not only from form, but especially from matter do lower substances have that they are corruptible, and celestial substances from that condition of matter also have that they are incorruptible; likewise these substances have not only from form, but also from matter that they are corporeal, whether corporeal is circumscribed by essential difference or by some property. Hence man is simply corporeal and mortal, by reason of his essence and nature, even if his soul is incorporeal and immortal. Again these substances have not only from form, but also from matter that they are natural beings and mobile; hence some motions are natural not only by reason of form, but also by reason of matter. Finally not only form, but also matter contributes in some way to the operations of substances, so much so that St. Thomas deservedly said, in I, question 75, article 4, that if body contributed nothing to the rational soul for its intellectual operations, it would not be united to it per se, nor would body be of the quiddity of man, but soul would be man; therefore matter is part of essence in material things.

12. Fourth conclusion. I say fourth: matter is of the essence of material substance as a certain beginning and foundation of essence, which is completed and fully constituted through form. This conclusion is evident almost from what has been said above about the causality of matter and form, and as regards this matter is correctly said to be in these things as it were a receptacle of form, or also as it were vehicle and support with respect to those forms which need sustaining. Hence however it cannot be concluded that it is altogether

outside essence; but it is correctly concluded that it is only as it were foundation and beginning of essence itself. Likewise this is included in the notion of first subject, which is supposed to form and through it is actuated and receives complement of perfection.

### *Solution of the Arguments*

13. The testimonies of Aristotle are explained. Finally from this assertion the foundations of the contrary opinion are easily solved. For Aristotle, in the places cited at the beginning, intends nothing other than what we have asserted in this last conclusion, namely, that form is the reason and term constituting the essence of thing, but not that it alone is the whole essence. And in the words there cited from Metaphysics I, according to the common reading, Aristotle does not say that flesh is form or reason, but that of flesh and of each similar thing there is or is given form or reason, by which namely it is constituted. But if, as some moderns read, he says that flesh is reason, it must be understood through synecdoche, so that the whole is named from the more principal part. It can also, when he says that form is reason or quiddity of thing, be understood by antonomasia, because it is the principal part of quiddity; or it is also understood causally, because form is what principally constitutes the quiddity of thing, and distinguishes it from others. Let St. Thomas be read, I, question 75, article 4.

14. To the first reason from the same last conclusion it must be responded that it excellently proves that matter is as it were a certain beginning of essence, not truly that it is altogether outside essence. Because, so that substances may differ in species, it suffices that they differ in form nor is it inconvenient that various essences distinct in species be similar in foundation and material principle. And therefore material things, which differ not only in form, but also in matter, are said to differ not only in species, but also in physical genus. To the second reason from the same root it is responded that not all

material parts are essential, because not all are necessary so that form can complete with matter that composite in which the essence of thing consists, and therefore that matter is simply essential which is necessary for this; but the rest is said to be of the integrity or complement of thing.

15. To the third, as regards essence in species, it is true that it is of the essence of thing that it be constituted through such species of matter as its form by its nature postulates; for, if we imagined rational soul to be united to celestial matter, one essence of the same nature with the essence of man would not arise. Hence theologians correctly conclude that the divine Word assumed body from the matter of these generable things, from the fact that it assumed the true essence of man. But it must not be understood that, from the fact that matter in general is of the essence of substance in general, it follows that of each substance distinct in species there is also matter distinct in species as regards the proper essential species of matter, because it can happen that many forms diverse in species postulate matter of the same substantial nature, although they require various dispositions in it.

16. But as regards the unity of individual, it must be confessed absolutely that material substance, to be the same numerically, requires not only the same form numerically, but also the same matter numerically; and this unity will be so much more perfect in the whole substance as it is greater in both principles, not only formal, but also material. For the unity of the whole arises from the unity of parts. And because the same proportion is of singular thing to its singular principles, which is of specific thing to common principles. Just as therefore species in general has principles determined in species, so singular thing determined ought to have proper principles in individual and in particular. Finally by this reason theologians conclude that it pertains to the unity of resurrection of the same men that their souls be united to the same bodies numerically, concerning which matter I have disputed at length against Durandus, in the second tome of the third part, disputation XLIV, section 2. But this

unity of matter is not always equal, because at least gradually it can sometimes be varied, as St. Thomas taught, I, question 119, article 1, and then it is considered to persevere the same, as it were by a certain continuation, by reason of which and especially by reason of form, the individual physically remains always the same, concerning which matter has also been said above, in disputation VI on the Principle of Individuation, section 3.

## SECTION III
## WHETHER MATERIAL SUBSTANCE IS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM MATTER AND FORM TAKEN TOGETHER, AND THEIR UNION

1. This question can be treated concerning any whole with respect to its parts and composite with respect to its components; nevertheless it conveniently falls into this place, both because the first and principal natural composition is from essential parts of substance; and also because it is necessary for exactly declaring the nature of composite or material substance.

### *The First Opinion Positing Real Distinction*

2. There are therefore various opinions in this matter. The first affirms that composite substance is really distinct from its parts, not only from individual ones (which is certain and indubitable among all), but also from those taken together, not only according to some real mode which it adds to the parts themselves, but also because it is true entity really distinct from them. Thus think many expositors of Aristotle, in Physics I, text 16, where Aristotle generally insinuates this part. And Hervaeus holds it, Quodlibet II, question 15; Capreolus, In III, distinction 2, article 1; Cajetan, III, question 6, article 5, to 1

Durandus; Ferrara, IV Contra Gentiles, chapter 81; Javellus, Metaphysics VII, question last. St. Thomas favors it, In III, distinction 2, question 1, article 3, questioncule 3, to 3, and In IV, distinction 16, question 1, article 1, questioncule 3, to 2. Scotus holds the same, Metaphysics VIII, question 4, and In III, distinction 2, question 2; and there Lychetus; Meyronnes, distinction 1, question 10; Anthony Andreas, Metaphysics VII, question 18; Zimara, Theorem 75; and Avicenna holds the same, book III of his Metaphysics, chapter 4. And Aristotle favors this opinion in various places; for in Metaphysics V, chapter 14, text 19, he says: "Six is not twice three, but once six." Similarly, in book VII, chapter 17, he says that the syllable ba is not b and a. And in book VIII, chapter 6, text 15, he says that the whole is something besides the parts. And in On the Soul II, at the beginning, and often elsewhere, he distinguishes substance into form, matter and composite, thinking that the composite is a thing distinct per se.

3. The foundation of the first opinion. The foundation of this opinion is that many things in reality itself are attributed to the whole composite substance which do not belong to the parts even taken together, and conversely. For the whole is what is generated per se primarily, not however the parts taken together, nor even their union; for, since union is a relation, it cannot be the terminus of generation. Similarly the whole is corrupted, even if the parts remain, as is clear in the death of man. Again the whole is composed of parts taken together and united; for neither do separated ones compose; and yet the whole does not compose itself, as is evident per se. Finally the whole is what acts, is moved, walks and similar things, which cannot be attributed to the aggregate from union and parts. Therefore the whole is some thing besides that aggregate.

4. And hence a second reason could be taken, because, if composite substance were not something distinct from parts taken together, it would not be one being more than a heap of stones is, or a house, or certainly than white body as such, because all these are multitude of their parts taken together and united in such a way. A

third reason would be, because, if the whole substance were nothing other than essential parts taken together, therefore by the same reason the same substance, as it consists of integral parts, will not be other than the integral parts themselves taken together; therefore integral and essential parts will be the same among themselves; because things that are the same to one third thing, are the same among themselves; but the consequent is plainly false; therefore.

### *Second Opinion Admitting Modal Distinction*

5. Because of these arguments others are convinced to admit distinction from the nature of the thing between parts and whole, in which they agree with the preceding opinion; but they deny that that distinction is properly real, but only modal. Because they think this is both necessary and suffices for the truth and propriety of all the locutions which are proposed in the arguments made, and because the whole as whole expresses some real mode, which the parts do not express, however much taken together or conjunctly. But it is not necessary that they express some altogether distinct thing; for neither can it be understood what kind of thing that is, or why beyond parts taken together and united it should be constituted.

### *Third Opinion Denying All Distinction in Reality*

6. The third opinion, and more received, is that composite substance in reality itself is not something distinct, neither really nor modally, from essential parts taken together and united, but at most by reason and our mode of conceiving and speaking. The Greek expositors of Aristotle hold this more frequently, Physics I, cited place, especially Alexander, Themistius, Philoponus, Simplicius; and Averroes favors it, comment 17. Durandus also holds it, In III,

distinction 2, question 2; Gregory, In I, distinction 24, question 1, article 1; Paludanus, In III, distinction 1, question 1; Niphus, Metaphysics VII, disputation XIX, where Soncinas, question last, considers both parts probable. And St. Thomas more favors this opinion, book IV Contra Gentiles, chapter 18, to 5, thus writing: "Concerning humanity it must not be understood that it is a certain form arising from the conjunction of form to matter, as if it were really other from both, because since through soul matter becomes this something in act, as is said in On the Soul II, that third form consequent would not be substance, but accident." And I, question 11, article 2, to 2, he says that heterogeneous whole is multitude, namely, of parts united. He also favors it in those places, which the first opinion adduces; for in the former he only says that, when humanity is said to be body and soul, it is materially true: "Just as by the name of whole (he says) parts are understood, and not that the whole properly speaking is its parts and not something constituted from parts." Where he only says there is impropriety in speech, for which distinction of reason suffices; he does not however posit distinction, but identity of thing, which he declares through that particle "materially." And in the same way he says in the other place that the whole is predicated of parts taken together, although improperly. And in this way St. Augustine also says, Trinity VII, chapter 4: "Man is nothing other than soul and body"; and City of God IX, chapter 3, he commends Varro because he judges man to be neither soul alone, nor body alone, but soul and body together. Which words St. Thomas refers, I, question 75, article 4, in the argument But on the contrary. Indeed, in the Athanasian Creed it is said: "Rational soul and flesh is one man." And Aristotle, in On the Soul II, chapter 1, says that soul and body are animal, just as pupil and vision is eye. The same almost in Physics IV, text 33, and Metaphysics V, text 31; Avicenna, Metaphysics III, chapter 2. And this opinion is true.

## *Resolution of the Question, & Approbation of the Third Opinion*

7. First assertion. Nevertheless, so that it may be explained, it must be said, first, that composite substance is distinguished really from singular parts, not adequately (so to speak) and totally, but through inclusion of another part. This assertion is received by all. And its first part is clear, because composite substance includes some thing really distinct from singular parts taken individually. For man compared to soul includes body, which is a thing distinct from soul, and compared to body includes soul, which is a thing distinct from body. Therefore some real distinction intervenes there, at least that which is through inclusion of some distinct thing. But that no greater distinction intervenes is proven, because it is impossible to conceive the whole composite substance, without including in it each part composing it; therefore it is impossible to distinguish singular parts from composite substance, except through inclusion of one part and addition of another. And it is confirmed, for, if the distinction were greater, it would be necessary to distinguish composite substance from part as two altogether distinct entities; but this is impossible. Which is clear, because either the whole would be distinguished from part as simple entity from simple, or as composite from simple. The prior mode cannot be said, otherwise it would not be composite substance, which is distinguished from part. But if the second is said, I ask from which parts such composite is composed. Certainly not from others, except those from which it is distinguished individually; therefore it cannot be distinguished from them, except as including from included.

8. Second assertion. I say second: composite substance is distinguished in reality itself from matter and form together or taken aggregately, as including both of them and adding real substantial union of them among themselves, which is something in reality itself

distinct from them and from their aggregate, not as really distinct thing, but as real mode. This whole assertion can be easily proven. For that the whole composite substance cannot be distinguished from the aggregate of two parts except as including them, is sufficiently left proven from what was said in the prior assertion. But that it adds something in reality itself besides that aggregate, is proven because there can exist in the nature of things the aggregate of those parts without the whole existing; as in the triduum there existed the aggregate or collection of body and soul of Christ, and his humanity did not exist. Nor only in distant places, but also in nearby ones, indeed in the same space they could be simultaneously, the whole composite substance not yet existing, if that presence were only local; therefore composite substance as such adds something in reality itself to the aggregate of two parts, separable from them and consequently distinct from them, according to the principles posited above concerning distinctions of things. But that what composite adds to each part is nothing other than substantial union, is proven because without this union it is impossible for the whole substance to arise, whatever else is imagined to be added to its parts; but with this union immediately from both parts the whole results, even if all other things are removed from the middle; therefore the whole substance adds this union to the aggregate of its parts. Finally that this union is not a distinct thing, but only a real mode, has been sufficiently proven above in disputing about the causality of matter and form.

9. Third assertion. I say third: the whole substance is not distinguished from parts taken together and united really or from the nature of the thing or in reality itself, but only by reason. The authors of the last opinion contend this conclusion. And the prior part about distinction in reality is proven; for either the whole is distinguished from parts taken together and united, as including from included, or as altogether condistinct from them; neither of these can be said; therefore in no way is it distinguished in reality. The consequence holds from sufficient enumeration. For neither can a third middle be

imagined, namely, that two extremes are distinguished in reality, and yet that one includes another and nothing besides another, and conversely; for this is maximal identity in reality. But the minor, as regards the posterior part, is more evident than that it needs new proof; for in the first assertion we proved that the whole cannot be distinguished from one or another part without inclusion of it, and consequently in the second assertion we left it manifest that it cannot be distinguished from their aggregate, except by including it; therefore by equal reason it cannot be distinguished from parts taken together and united, except by including both part and union. Indeed neither can the whole and per se composite be conceived by mind as not including those three things, namely, both part and union; therefore this composite cannot be distinguished from parts taken together and united, as something altogether condistinct; for thus is said to be distinguished what does not include another.

10. But the other part of the minor, in which the point of difficulty seems to be, is proven, because nothing can be understood or devised which in reality itself it adds to parts taken together and united. For first of all, whatever that is imagined to be, it is not necessary; for if you mentally separate that and understand parts existing and united, you will understand the whole to exist without another addition; therefore it is not to be imagined gratuitously. Then either that is some thing having proper entity really distinct, or it is only real mode; neither can be said; therefore. The prior part of the minor seems evident per se, both because that entity cannot be accident, since it is said to compose substance essentially. Nor can it be substance, because it is neither matter, nor form, nor composite, which members adequately divide material substance, according to Aristotle. Nor truly can that entity be said to be the whole composite, since composite is said to add that entity above matter and form and their union; and also because otherwise in the death of man, for example, not only would humanity cease through disjunction of soul and body, but also that entity would perish, which is openly false. And

moreover because then material substances would be essentially composed not only of matter and form, but also of that third entity, which is most absurd, since it cannot be explained what that is, nor for what end it is constituted. Nor in man could it be said whether it is spiritual or material. And finally because it would proceed to infinity; for I ask whether the composite of matter and form and that entity is distinguished from all those taken together and united, through addition of another entity; for to affirm this is both very frivolous and then it will be necessary to proceed further without terminus. But if that is denied, then concerning that composite is conceded what we intend, and thence it becomes consequent that this is rather true of composite from matter and form alone united among themselves.

11. Finally the other part is proven, that namely, that addition cannot be a new real mode, because in the whole composite no such mode can be devised besides the union of parts, which per se contributes and is necessary for the composition of the whole. And the argument made above can be applied here; for, with matter understood, and form, and their union, we understand the composite to result, even if no other mode intervenes. You will say that for the substantial composite whole to result the mode of subsistence is necessary, which is distinct from union. It is responded that now we speak of the composite which immediately results from matter and form united, which is humanity, for example, or integral nature, to which nature it is true that the mode of subsistence is added, in that way which has been declared above; nevertheless from that results, formally speaking, another composite, which is material suppositum, which also from its components taken together and united is not distinguished in reality. Hence general doctrine is taken and confirmation; for in any other composite the whole is not distinguished in reality from parts and their union taken together; therefore the same will be of composite substance compared to its parts and their union taken together. The antecedent must be understood principally of actual and real wholes, for potential whole,

such as genus with respect to species, according to its reality is the same not only with all species, but also with singulars; but whole which has only composition according to reason, such as species with respect to genus and difference, in reality is not distinguished from singular components, but only by reason.

12. Therefore omitting those things which are done through reason, concerning real wholes the antecedent is proven by induction. For white, for example, as it is a certain accidental whole, in reality is not distinguished from body, whiteness and union taken together; therefore the same will be, proportion kept, in substances. Some respond by denying the consequence, because from accident and subject one essence does not result, nor one per se, just as from matter and form. But from this difference at most it can be gathered that there is another genus of one more perfect between matter and substantial form, than between body and whiteness, and in another way and more per se those two are compared in the nature of potency and act of the same genus than these; for this suffices so that from the force of that there arise per se one and one essence, and not from these. But I do not see what that refers to greater distinction of substantial composite from its parts taken together and united, than of accidental composite from its components and their union. For in both composites we understand that proportioned union of components suffices without any other addition, so that composite exists. Nor does that which is per se one have this (so to speak) perseity from some other addition; for rather that could obstruct per se unity, because it would make aggregation minimally necessary for the substantial being of the whole; but that per se unity arises from such union, and such aptitude of things capable of being united; just as also, according to true theology, from the humanity of Christ and the divine Word arises one composite person, which is truly and per se one; but it cannot be imagined that in that composite there is something distinct from Word, humanity and union taken together, as I touched upon in the first tome of the third part, disputation XXXV, section 3, at the end.

13. The same distinction can be made in integral whole, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous. For John of Naples, Quodlibet II, question 7, without cause constitutes difference among these, saying that heterogeneous whole is distinguished from parts, but not homogeneous, which is said without any foundation, because reasons proceed equally in both; for when proportioned parts and union are posited, whatever else is asserted in any whole is fictitious. Wherefore (to conclude all in one word) whatever whole, of whatever kind it may be, requires proportioned union of parts, and is nothing besides parts taken together and thus conjoined. Hence also a heap of stones, which is especially thought to be the same as parts, besides individual stones and their multitude, requires their proximity; for, if they were in distant places, they would not compose a heap; and thus a heap is nothing other than all stones taken together and constituted in such place and proximity. But a house, because it requires greater union and composition of parts, for beyond proximity it requires order and position and some artificial conjunction, and therefore has greater unity, nevertheless not greater identity or distinction from all parts taken together and their union. And again white physically is more one, because physical union of whiteness to subject is greater; but identity and distinction is of the same proportion. Therefore composite substance keeps the same nature to its parts and their union taken together; therefore there is no distinction in reality itself among these.

14. But that there is some distinction of reason, the foundations of other opinions prove this at most and from the very mode of speaking it becomes sufficiently probable; for because of this distinction of reason, those locutions in which parts are predicated of the whole are considered improper. And finally it can be declared; for aggregate from parts and union is conceived in some way through the mode of many; but the whole itself is more conceived through the mode of one, as if it were some simple thing; therefore this suffices for some distinction of reason.

## Section III

### *Response to the Arguments*

15. Why the whole, not parts, is said to be corrupted and generated. To the foundations of the contrary opinion it is responded first of all that whatever is attributed to the whole, can be attributed to parts taken together and united according to the thing or according to identity; but according to the mode of conceiving it is not properly attributed, and for this distinction of reason suffices. And to singular locutions it is responded that the whole is generated as adequate terminus which becomes; but form or its union is formal terminus by which the whole becomes; and therefore the whole is a distinct thing, both from form and from its union, not however from the whole reality of matter and form and union, taken collectively. Similarly, for the whole to be said to be corrupted it suffices that union of parts be dissolved, as happens in the death of man, because then that whole entity no longer remains with every real mode, which is of the nature of the whole. And thus the whole is only made to be distinguished both from singular parts and from their multitude without union, not truly from them and union taken together. Moreover parts are said to compose the whole divisim or individually, and thus the whole is distinguished from them. Nor does it matter that they do not compose unless when they are united, because even then singulars compose and not aggregate or collection of them and union. Finally the same is true of other locutions, that the whole acts, or is moved, etc.

16. To the second reason it has already been responded by denying the consequence; for, so that composite substance may be more per se one than other beings per accidens, greater distinction is not required, but greater union and greater proportion of its parts. For Aristotle posited in this, Metaphysics VIII, last chapter, and On the Soul II, chapter 1, per se unity of substantial composite from matter and form, not in that greater distinction.

17. To the third it is responded that it only proves that the whole substance, as it arises from all substantial and integral parts, and as it arises from essential ones, both taken together and united, is altogether the same thing; but it does not correctly infer that integral parts are essential, or conversely, because in this a comparison is now made of singular parts among themselves. But the testimonies of Aristotle from others already adduced are easily explained; for he only intends to teach that the whole is not singular parts or their multitude taken aggregately without proper union.

18. To the foundation of the other opinion it is responded that distinction of reason suffices for the aforesaid propriety of speaking. Nor is it true that the whole adds to parts another real mode besides union; for neither can such mode be understood any more than that it adds new and distinct thing, as has been sufficiently proven.

# DISPUTATION XXXVII

## ON THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF ACCIDENT IN GENERAL

After our consideration of created substance, there follows in order a contemplation of accident, for we have said that these two members adequately divide created being. Before we descend to the individual genera of accidents, however, three topics concerning accident in general present themselves for treatment. First, concerning the common concept of accident as such, whether it possesses some unified nature and what that nature might be—and this we shall accomplish in the present disputation. Next, in the following disputation, we shall compare accident as such with created substance, so that by comparing these members among themselves we may have a more precise knowledge of that division. Finally, third, we shall present the divisions of accident, and especially that division into nine genera.

### SECTION I

### WHETHER ACCIDENT IN GENERAL EXPRESSES ONE CONCEPT OR OBJECTIVE NATURE

*The Prior Opinion, Which Denies This*

1. Authors who think that there cannot be an objective concept that is common unless it is univocal and generic, if it is common to essentially diverse things, will consequently deny that accident has one common concept. And thus nearly all those who, from that principle, deny an objective concept of being think in this way, because they hold it as certain that there is no common genus for the nine categories of accident, just as being is not a genus for the ten categories; for only those things differ categorially that do not agree in genus. It is added that Aristotle sometimes seems to deny not only a common genus but absolutely every common predicate to these genera, which must be understood especially of the commonality of objective nature, since it cannot be true of the commonality of name alone. The antecedent is proved from Metaphysics V, text 12, and book X, text 14, where he says that those things are properly diverse that agree in nothing; and in Posterior Analytics I, chapter 11, he says that a proposition in which the genus of one category is denied of another[37] is immediate, because they have no common predicate; and we have added other arguments above when treating of being.

*The Posterior Opinion, Which Affirms This*

2. Nevertheless, the contrary opinion is held primarily by all those who think the same about the concept of being. Then Soncinas and others, who say that the objective concept of being is the disjunct "substance or accident," necessarily suppose that both parts of that disjunct have one common objective concept. But this opinion is to be explained and proved in the same proportion as the similar one about being. For first, according to that view, it must be said that to this word "accident" there corresponds in the mind one formal concept not

[37] alio, 1960; alit. illo. Cf. BHF, t. V, p. 658.

merely of the word, but of the thing primarily signified by the word. This is proved first by experience, for one who hears this word and knows its signification does not stop at the word itself, but conceives something signified through it, nor is his mind drawn to conceive several things insofar as they are several or diverse, nor does it remain as if hesitant and doubtful among several significations; therefore it is a sign that he forms only one concept of the adequate signification of that word. Second, because that word, as it is taken here, that is, insofar as accident is distinguished from substance under being, does not signify from multiple impositions, but from one, because it is neither an equivocal word nor one signifying one thing properly and another by metaphorical translation. And finally because it cannot be imagined to what things it might have been instituted for signification by various impositions; otherwise, as many impositions or translations of that word could be imagined as it contains things under its adequate signification, which is intrinsically improbable. Therefore it signifies from the force of one imposition; therefore, since concepts are expressed through words, whoever first imposed that word for signification had one formal concept, which he wanted to express by that word, substituting it so that it might signify conventionally what the concept represented naturally; therefore by the same reasoning there corresponds in us one formal concept adequate to the original signification of this word. Third, because, if the formal concept of accident is not one, how many will there be then? Perhaps there are nine concepts of the nine primary genera of accidents? But this is incredible, both because of the multitude of concepts, and also because we can scarcely define, even after long inquiry, whether there are nine supreme genera of accidents, or more, or fewer. And some things exist that have scarcely ever been conceived by unlearned men, although all men form the concept of accident. Finally, nothing solid and well-founded can be judged about the formal concept of accident, if it is believed to be multiple and not one.

3. Hence the aforesaid opinion consequently infers that the objective concept of accident is one by reason, abstracted from all inferiors. This is proved because one objective concept corresponds to one formal concept; for the formal concept takes its unity from its adequate object; but the adequate object of that concept is not one merely by aggregation; therefore it is one by some abstraction, at least according to reason. The minor can be proved by all the arguments made about the objective concept of being, which here have greater efficacy, or at least greater clarity, because the formal concept of accident cannot simultaneously represent quality, quantity and other genera according to their proper natures, since neither can one finite and confused formal concept distinctly represent all these things according to their proper natures, nor could that objective concept be definitely and truly predicated of quality and the individual genera of accidents, but either the predication would be false, while so many things are simultaneously predicated of one thing, or it would be ambiguous, or at most a disjunctive predication, so that it would be the same to say "whiteness is an accident" as to say "whiteness is quantity, or quality, or relation, etc." Therefore all these things are not conceived as they are, from the force of this word, or concept of accident; therefore they are conceived under some one nature, in which they agree. But this is to grant one objective concept of accident. And from this also an a priori argument is taken, namely, that all the genera of accidents, although they are dissimilar in their proper natures, are similar in something through a real agreement that they have either in affecting substance, or in some other similar nature, as we shall treat in the following section. But the entire foundation of abstracting an objective concept that is in some way one according to reason is similarity or real agreement among several things; therefore by reason of this agreement there can also be granted in accident a common objective concept.

4. And from this it also follows that this objective concept is abstracted by reason, because, as it is represented through the formal

concept, it does not actually and expressly include any specific and generic nature of accident, but only the abstracted nature of inhering. And this abstraction according to reason consists solely in this. But that this abstraction is not greater than of reason is clear a fortiori from what was said above about being and about universal predicates, for the concept of accident is also compared to those things from which it is abstracted as something common to particulars; therefore it cannot be distinguished from them more than by reason, although with some foundation in reality, in the same way as other common predicates, for the reasoning is the same.

*Resolution of the Question*

5. This question cannot be precisely defined until we treat ex professo of the analogy or univocation of accident, which we shall accomplish in disputation XXXIX, section 3. In the meantime I think a distinction should be used. For accident can be taken either for accidental entity according to itself and according to its reality alone, or for any formal nature of accident that is placed in the categories. This is also customarily said in other terms: that accident can be considered either as something, or as said to happen to something, for, although everything that is in itself an accident happens to something, not conversely does everything that is said to happen to something constitute a true and proper accident. In this way accident is also customarily distinguished into predicable accident and categorial accident, and physical accident, or that which expresses true entity or accidental mode. I say therefore that categorial accident, or that which is divided into nine genera, cannot have one objective concept, because it includes many things that are not true and proper accidents. But physical accident has one objective concept, and this the arguments of the posterior opinion prove. Both parts, however, will be understood and confirmed more fully in the cited place and much more from the treatment of all the categories.

## SECTION II
## WHETHER THE COMMON NATURE OF ACCIDENT CONSISTS IN INHERENCE

1. The negative part of this question can be shown by various arguments, if we suppose before all else that the discussion here concerns the essential nature that per se primarily constitutes the nature of accident. For, although accident happens to something, and as such is outside its nature, nevertheless it in itself, just as it is a being, necessarily has some essence or essential nature; therefore the nature of accident cannot be inherence itself. The consequent is proved because either we speak of actual inherence, and this is not the case, because this is not essential to many accidents, especially according to our faith, which teaches that accidents are sometimes preserved without actual inherence, although it is evident that a thing cannot be preserved without its essential nature; or we speak of aptitudinal inherence, and this cannot be said, first, because there are certain accidents of whose nature actual inherence is part, so that by no power can they exist without it, such as figure and place; therefore it is essential to them; therefore the common nature of accident is not sufficiently explained through aptitudinal inherence. Second, because, conversely, in those accidents that can be separated from the subject, that very aptitudinal inherence is either a certain relation, or a certain genus of power, for, just as there are active and passive powers, so also informative power; but the common nature of accident abstracts from the determinate natures of accidents; therefore it cannot consist in relation or power, which are determinate natures of accident, otherwise, either every accident would be respective, or every accident would be a certain quality. Third, there seem to be certain accidents that have neither inherence, neither actual nor aptitudinal, such as relation according to being toward, and action as transient action, and

especially the mode of existing per se of a separated accident, or creative action, if that is an accident, which it will undoubtedly be, if it is terminated only to an accident. And from this finally the other member is easily excluded, if perhaps it should be said that inherence is taken confusedly, abstracting from actual and aptitudinal, for primarily this nature does not seem to be one through abstraction, just as we said above that being, as it is divided into being in potency and in act, does not express one abstracted nature. Then because neither of those natures belongs to some accidents, and in others neither is essential, as we have objected. Finally, it is otherwise objected that that nature seems to extend more widely than accident; for material substantial forms truly and properly inhere in matter both actually and aptitudinally; therefore.

### *Opinions Are Related*

2. In this matter there are various opinions. The first opinion is that the essential nature of every accident consists in actual inherence to the subject. Thus the gentile philosophers seem to have thought, who believed that it could in no way happen that an accident be preserved outside the subject. Aristotle and the Commentator seem to be in this opinion, as Niphus treats at length, Metaphysics VII, disputation 1, and it can be taken from the same Aristotle there, chapter 2, and Physics I, chapter 4, text 29; but it should be understood that actual inherence is said to be of the essence of accident according to this opinion in the way that we said above that existence is of the essence of any actual entity, for, just as a created thing can be deprived of existence if it is destroyed, but not if it remains in its entity, so an accident can be deprived of actual inherence, insofar as it can be destroyed; but remaining in its actual entity it cannot, according to the philosophers' understanding, be deprived of actual inherence; and thus they thought it was nothing other than the very accidental entity itself. This would be especially

true if, as the ancient philosophers seem to think, accidents are not proper things, but only modes of one first subject.

3. This opinion is rejected. But this opinion, as I said, is condemned by the Catholic faith, at least as not being able to be universally true. I have applied this limitation, for, if someone should say that quantity alone is separable from substance and can remain without actual inherence, and therefore in it alone it is not of its essence actually to inhere, but it is of the essence of all other accidents, one who (I say) would contend thus, would not err in faith, because for those things that faith teaches about the mystery of the Eucharist, it suffices that quantity alone remains separated from the subject; for the other accidents inhere in it. And one who would think thus could give some account of the difference between quantity and other accidents, that it is closer and more similar to substance. Hence it seems peculiar to it that it somehow exercises its function around itself, for quantity itself is quantified; indeed, from this it also seems to result that it does not have its essential nature in order to substance, but in order to itself. Hence in the mathematical sciences it is considered so abstractly as if it existed per se without any order to substance.

4. Nevertheless, supposing the mystery of faith, it is far more probable that qualities really distinct from substance and quantity can also be preserved without actual inherence, as I said in tome III, part III, disputation LVI, section 3, at the end. Hence, concerning all accidents really distinct from substance and among themselves, we suppose as certain that actual inherence is not their essence, but a mode distinct from them ex natura rei, namely, the mode of union of form to matter or subject, as I have explained above, disputations XV and XVI, on formal cause, and the cited disputation LVI, part III, section 2. Whether it can be sufficiently proved by natural reason against the philosophers that it does not contradict that an accident be preserved separated from the subject, I touched upon in the Commentaries part III, question 77, article 1, and I certainly think it

simply cannot be demonstrated by man. Especially since neither the real distinction of quantity from substance is sufficiently demonstrated from reason alone, as we shall say below, and the separation of qualities from every subject seems impossible even to some Catholics. Therefore they can, as I said in the cited place, sufficiently solve the arguments that can apparently show this to be impossible, and with these solved, it immediately becomes probable per se that what is not shown to be contradictory can be done by God. To this can be added probable reasons by which the real distinction of accident from subject is shown and that there is not between them intrinsic and essential dependence, since they are things of different genera.

5. The second opinion, extremely opposed to the preceding, is that inherence is in no way of the essence of accident, neither actually nor aptitudinally. Thus holds Scotus, In IV, distinction 2, question 1, and Metaphysics VII, question 1, and there Antonius Andreas, question 1, where also Soncinas, question 1, has followed this; and Flandria, question 2. The same holds Zimara, theorem 3, who cites the Commentator, Metaphysics IV, comment 2, for this opinion; undeservedly however, as we shall say. The foundations of this opinion have been touched upon at the beginning of the section.

6. The third opinion is that at least aptitudinal inherence is of the essence of accident. This is more frequently received in the school of St. Thomas, as Cajetan treats at length, opusculum On Being and Essence, chapter 7, question 15; and Javellus, Metaphysics VI, question 1; Aegidius there, question 2; Jandun, question 9; Hervaeus, Quodlibet IV, question 9; Capreolus, In I, distinction 24, question 1, article 3, ad 1 against conclusions 5 and 6. And it is taken from St. Thomas, In III, question 77, article 1, ad 2, and In IV, distinction 12, question 1, article 1, question 1, ad 2. And this opinion, understood of accidents having proper entities and as they are distinguished from accidents that are only modes, or that only denominatively extrinsically, is true.

*The Question Is Decided*

7. In order that we may deliver doctrine more generally, however, since here there is discussion of categorial accident in its entire breadth, in which it cannot have one objective concept, as I said in the preceding section, and consequently neither one proper essential nature, as we can also use the distinctions often suggested here. For among categorial accidents some are only extrinsically denominative, others intrinsically affecting; and among these again some are those that have proper entities really distinct from subjects, others that are only modes modally distinct ex natura rei, according to what was said above, disputation VII.

8. I say therefore first: proper inherence is not of the nature of those accidents that only denominate extrinsically. This is proved by induction, because clothing does not inhere in the clothed person, nor does the surrounding place inhere in the located thing, nor does transient action inhere in the agent. Nor does it matter that these inhere in others, both because perhaps this is not always true, as is clear in clothing, and also because it is as if materially, not according to their proper nature as such, which must be taken from their relation to what they denominate. Hence the a priori argument is that not all accidents express a respect of being in, but some of being from, others of being around, or something similar. Therefore either in this there cannot be given one description common to all categorial accidents, or more general words must be used, as if we should say that accident is a form in some way affecting or denominating a subject, or that of which the accident is said to be. For we cannot describe the nature of accident more briefly, since it is very broad and includes many things under itself. When therefore it is said "form," it is supposed that the discussion concerns accident in the abstract, and rightly so; for under this aspect accident is most distinguished from substance under being, and as such it more properly has unity per se. Again when it is said

"form," it must be understood whether it is a form properly informing, or modifying, or affecting in any other way, so that both entities and accidental modes are comprehended, or denominating, as are accidents only extrinsically denominating, which do not properly and strictly inform those things that they denominate, and yet that mode of denominating sometimes suffices for constituting some genus of accident, as we shall see later. And therefore I have not used the word "inherence," because that word strictly signifies intrinsic information and conjunction; if however it is taken more broadly for any relation of form, whether intrinsically or extrinsically denominating the subject actually or aptitudinally, thus it can be said that to inhere is in some way of the nature of accident. But I said "affecting in some way," to distinguish accident not only from substantial form, but also from every substantial mode. For primarily that word diminishes and indicates that accident does not constitute a thing in its being simply, in which it is distinguished from substantial form, nor does it pertain to the complement of its entity, but is an affection superadded to an entity already complete in its order, in which it is distinguished from substantial mode, according to what we explained above, disputation XXXV, section 1. Hence, for greater clarity's sake, it could be said that accident is such a form as affects or modifies the subject, existing outside its nature. And the definition thus explained is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, at the beginning, and books VII and IX Metaphysics, at the beginning, and wherever he treats of the common nature of accident or its division into nine genera, for he always says the nature of accident consists in this that it is being of being, and he distinguishes accidents through various modes of regarding substance. And in the same places the Commentator asserts the same, and Metaphysics XII, comment 3, and in this sense the common description by which accident is said to be "in another" can also be explained. Thus also being is adequately divided under being into being in another and being per se, although that division can also be explained otherwise, as will be more evident from what follows.

9. I say second: an accident that from itself has proper entity really distinct from substance, has from its intrinsic essence aptitudinal inherence in substance. This is proved, for primarily it is certain that such an entity is per se apt to inform substance in such a way that it inheres and is sustained by it; for it could not actually befit that entity, unless in it there were supposed an aptitude or capacity for that mode; but that aptitude cannot be something in reality distinct from such entity, as is easily clear from the arguments by which we proved above that the capacity of matter is not distinguished from matter, nor the aptitude of informing from substantial form. And all agree in this, because it would be superfluous to imagine that distinction without any foundation or indication, and because otherwise one would proceed in the same way to infinity. Again that aptitude for affecting substance belongs per se primarily and from the primary end of such entity and is the same with it; therefore it is of its essence. The assumption is proved because accidental entity is instituted from its nature for nothing else than to affect substance. And it is confirmed, for by a similar cause we said above that the aptitudes of matter and form for mutual union are essential to them. And similarly we shall say below that powers and acts are naturally specified from objects. These examples dissolve the foundations of the contrary opinion, as we shall immediately see.

10. I say third: an accident that is only a mode of being essentially includes not only aptitude, but also actual affection or conjunction with the thing of which it is the mode. The arguments made above prove this and it follows necessarily from what was said above about the nature of mode. And for this cause also I said, in the cited tome III, part III, disputation LVI, section 1, at the end, that if there are any accidents in the substance of bread that are not distinguished from it as thing from thing, but as mode from thing, those did not remain in the Eucharist after consecration. Therefore the essence of these accidents does not consist in the aptitude of affecting, but in this that they are actual affections and in reality are the very

entities so disposed, and therefore, if they remain in reality, they are inseparable from their subjects and cannot lack actual union with them. Finally, in them the aptitude of affecting and actually affecting are not distinguished in reality; therefore they are essentially actual affections.

11. What accident commonly taken says essentially. I say lastly: although it is of the nature of accident as such to be in some way an affection of subsistence, nevertheless it is not of its nature to be an immediate affection of substance, but in this also it abstracts from immediate or mediate relation to substance. This is proved because there are certain accidents that immediately affect substance, such as intellect, quantity, etc., about which there is no difficulty; but others there are that regard substance through the mediation of other accidents, as immanent acts and habits do not affect substance except through the mediation of powers, and corporeal qualities through the mediation of quantity; about which matter we have said much above, disputation XIV, section 4. But there is no accident possible, at least according to the natures of things, or that is properly and completely an accident, that does not ultimately regard substance as its first subject and principal end, because, although one thing inheres through the mediation of another, nevertheless all tend to this that they perfect and adorn substance, or in some other way serve it.

### *Arguments Are Solved*

12. The arguments for doubting posited at the beginning are largely solved from what has been said; for to the first member of the entire partition made there, we concede that actual inherence is not of the essence of accident as such. To the second member also, we concede that aptitudinal inherence, as distinguished from actual, is not the adequate nature of accident as such. We say nevertheless that it is the proper and adequate nature of those accidents that have proper entities and truly and properly are forms informing their subjects. But

when it is objected that this aptitude is a relation or power, it is answered that it is not a categorial relation, but includes a transcendental relation that is included in nearly all absolute beings, and especially in incomplete entities and accidents, as will be more evident from the discourse on all the categories. To the other objection about power, it is answered that that aptitude is not a power, which is a certain species of quality, but is the very essence of accidental form, which per se is apt to inform substance in its own way.

13. To the third member, we concede that inherence taken most broadly as it abstracts from actual or aptitudinal and from intrinsic or extrinsic affection, is of the essence of categorial accident in general. Likewise, if we speak of physical accident, or that which intrinsically and really affects, whether it is a mode or a distinct thing, thus also we say that inherence taken more properly, abstracting nevertheless from actual or aptitudinal, is of the essence of accident, and thus most properly and adequately being can be divided into being per se and in another, or into substantial and accidental entity properly and according to itself taken, comprehending under those modes both substantial and accidental ones. To the argument, however, it is answered that it is false that that nature is not abstractable, for from first and second act a common nature of act is abstractable; but form as informative and as informing are compared by way of first and second act; therefore the common nature of accidental form can be abstracted, which prescínds from actual or aptitudinal information or inherence. Nor is the example of the abstraction of being from being in act and in potency similar, for there being in objective potency is taken, which is nothing positive other than itself constituted in act, nor is that potency real intrinsic, but either non-repugnance or denomination from extrinsic potency. But it would be similar if being in potency and in act were taken for real active or passive potency, and its act; for thus truly the nature of being abstracts from whether it is potency or act. And in this way in the

present case accident abstracts from whether it is informing aptitudinally or actually. Although it can also be said that aptitude for informing can be taken in two ways. One is, as it expresses physical aptitude by way of first act per se distinct and separable from actual information. And in this way all that we have said proceeds. But otherwise aptitude for affecting can be taken, as it is understood to be in any thing or mode, even if it most actually affects; for what actually affects is apt to affect, which can be called logical aptitude; but because this aptitude in reality is sometimes by way of potency separable from act, sometimes however only by way of act, therefore we say that accident as such prescinds from aptitudinal inherence, that is, potential, and from actual. Nor does it matter that actual inherence is an accident, or something outside the essence of some accidental form, which can happen and often does so happen, that what is essential to one thing is accidental to another, as is clear per se.

14. To the instances, however, it must be answered individually. The first was about relations according to being toward; to which it is answered that real relation, whatever it may be, according to its whole self inheres, and thus, even in the very being toward, being in is included; because relation according to its whole self is a form of that which it refers to another, as more broadly below in its place. The second instance was about action, about which it is said that action, as action is, is a form extrinsically denominating, and therefore as such does not require proper inherence, but such[38] relation, as suffices for that mode of denomination and quasi-extrinsic information. The third instance was about the mode of existing per se of a separated accident, about which I have often said elsewhere. For primarily it is doubtful whether it is a positive mode. Then, if it is a positive mode, it is not of the natural order, but supernatural, nor is it a proper and (so to speak) integral accident, but a terminus of the existence of a certain accident, namely, of quantity, to whose genus it is reduced, and for this it

[38] talem, 1960; alit. saltem. "En algunas ediciones, saltem, con lo que varía bastante el sentido."

suffices that it affect it in some way and quasi-adhere to it, when it is constituted divinely in the manner of substance. And the same must be said about the creation of a separated accident. About which matter we have also said much above, treating of creation. The last instance was about substantial forms. About which it must be said that, although they truly have a mode of union to matter with dependence on it as sustaining and an aptitude essential to themselves for that union, in which there is a certain agreement between accidents and substantial forms, nevertheless it is only an analogous agreement; for the aptitude of substantial form is by way of act of the same genus with its receptive, and therefore composes per se one thing with it, and their union is substantial. But in accident the mode of inhering or affecting is of far inferior character. Hence when inherence is attributed to accident, as proper to it, it is taken as it especially expresses this imperfect mode of affecting substance, which is entirely outside its latitude; and thus it does not belong to substantial forms.

### *Corollaries of the Preceding Doctrine*

15. From the decision of this question other questions that are customarily asked about accident in general are defined. For it follows first from what has been said that accidents are not defined except through substance, or through that of which it is an affection, which Aristotle taught, Metaphysics VII, chapters 1 and 4, text 12, and chapter 5, text 19, where for this reason he says that substance is prior to accident. He says moreover that accidents cannot have perfect definition, because perfect definition is one that so explains the essence of a thing that nothing added outside the essence is posited in it; but in the definition of accident the subject must necessarily be posited, because without it inherence cannot be explained, which we said is of the essence of accident. Likewise, the essence of accident is imperfect, and therefore can only be defined in an imperfect way, since definition is accommodated to the thing defined. But its imperfection

consists in this that it is only being of being or affection of being; therefore the proper mode of defining it is through relation to the subject. And experience itself and the mode of explaining the concept of accident sufficiently confirm this also.

16. Only a certain difficulty touched upon above about quantity and about mathematical abstraction can be urged against this, by which quantity seems to be conceived and defined without any order to the subject. It is answered nevertheless, first, that the mathematician abstracts from sensible subject, that is, affected with sensible qualities, but does not abstract simply from subject, because he considers quantity as a material and corporeal thing, and consequently existing in matter or substance, and therefore he is said to abstract from sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter. The response is taken from the doctrine of St. Thomas, I, question 85, article 1, ad 2, and opusculum 70, question 5, article 3; and Albert holds the same, Metaphysics V, treatise III, chapter 2; Javellus, Metaphysics VII, question 1; Antonius Andreas, Metaphysics VI, question 3. I add then that the mathematician does not consider the relation to the subject expressly, but very implicitly, because he does not consider the essence of quantity, but only the properties and proportions and figures that arise from the extension of quantity, to which it is irrelevant that quantity be conceived as a form inhering in a subject, or the very quantified extended thing, in which surfaces and lines exist. And quantity itself in itself is quantified and extended; therefore it can be abstracted and considered according to those affections that belong to it under that aspect. And according to this response, intelligible matter, from which the mathematician does not abstract, according to Aristotle's testimony, Metaphysics VIII, text 15, is nothing other than the very continuity or extension of quantity, as St. Thomas also explained, Posterior Analytics I, text 42, and Metaphysics VII, text 35; there Alexander and other Greeks. And Themistius, Physics III, text 71, and On the Soul I, text 17; Simplicius,

On the Soul III, text 25; and Aristotle favors this, in the same places, Metaphysics XI, summary 2, chapter 1, and book XII, text 44.

17. Second, it follows from what has been said that it is of the nature of accident to have some subject proportioned to it by its nature, since every relation has some certain terminus toward which it tends; but this inherence is by way of a certain transcendental relation, whose terminus is the subject itself. Accident therefore in general regards that which can be affected accidentally, also absolutely and in general; but determinate accidents regard determinate subjects, and according to capacity proportioned to themselves, because it is necessary that proportion be preserved between act and potency. But it is not to be understood that to each accident there must correspond a subject to which such accident is connatural or due; for this does not pertain to the essence of accident, but to the peculiar condition of the subject, which is not universally necessary, as is evident from merely contingent accidents, and from those that inhere violently, or that are merely indifferent, as is especially said of artificial forms. And the same theologians say of supernatural qualities. Therefore only on the part of accident is it necessary that it determine for itself by its nature a subject that it adequately regards, because this pertains to its essence, for, since it is essentially a certain affection, it must be an affection of something having capacity.

18. The objection is satisfied. From which there is incidentally solved the argument that is customarily made here about proper passion, which is demonstrated of its subject through proper definition, from which Soncinas infers that it is demonstrated of passion that it inheres in the subject, and consequently inherence is not of the essence of passion, because essence is not demonstrated of anything. But he does not infer correctly, for the proper definition of passion must be given through the subject; for Aristotle therefore said that proper passion is predicated per se in the second mode, because the subject is posited in the definition of the predicate; therefore such definition supposes or contains the inherence of passion in such

subject; therefore it is not a middle term for demonstrating that. Through such demonstration therefore at most another connection can be shown that can be on the part of the subject with such passion, whether that be by way of efficiency or natural resultance, or by way of connatural debt, which connection we already said does not pertain to the essence of accident as such. Add that sometimes it can be demonstrated of some accident that it is an accident, and consequently that it is apt to inhere; but then, either the demonstration will not be made through the definition of accident nor a priori, but through effects, or it will not be demonstrated absolutely that it is apt to inhere, but with respect to this or that subject, and then the demonstration will finally have to be resolved into the property or definition of such subject.

19. Other things that can be treated about accident in general and absolutely have been treated above, such as whether it has proper existence, disputation XXXIV, section 11, whether it composes one per se with the subject, disputation XIV, and whether it is composed in itself from proper act and potency, disputation XIII. And therefore nothing else occurs to be said here.

# DISPUTATION XXXVIII

## ON THE COMPARISON OF ACCIDENT TO SUBSTANCE

Many matters pertaining to this comparison have been noted in the preceding discussions, when we explained the very division of created being into substance and accident. There we found it necessary to declare two things especially: namely, how great a distinction exists between substance and accident, and how substance surpasses every accident in perfection. Moreover, when we treated of causes, we compared accidents to substance either in the relationship of form and matter, or in the relationship of efficient cause and effect. Therefore few things remain to be said in this place, principally on account of Aristotle in Metaphysics VI at the beginning, where he compares substance with accident both as to duration in time and as to knowledge, which two points must be briefly explained by us.

### SECTION I

### WHETHER SUBSTANCE IS PRIOR IN TIME TO ACCIDENT

1. The reason for doubt is that Aristotle, at the beginning of Metaphysics VII, chapter 1, says that substance is prior to accident in

reason, in knowledge, in time, and in nature. But on the contrary, either substance and accident are compared absolutely, as they exist in the nature of things, or as they exist in this or that particular composite. In the former way, it is indeed true that some substance is prior to every accident; yet this is verified in uncreated substance, but not in created substance, which we are now discussing. And according to Aristotle it cannot be verified in any way, because since he supposes the world to be eternal, he must necessarily admit that uncreated substance is not prior in time to created substance; therefore it cannot be prior in time to accident, because since created substance does not exist without accidents, it is not prior in time to accident. If, however, the comparison is made with respect to the same thing, we must speak of substance capable of accidents, because substance will be neither prior nor posterior to accident with respect to that supposit in which there is no accident. But in substance capable of accidents, substance is not prior in time to accident, because no such substance ever lacks some accident; therefore in no way can it be verified that substance is prior in time to accident.

*Resolution of the Question*

2. In this question there is scarcely any difficulty concerning the matter itself, but in explaining the sense of the Philosopher, given his principle of the eternity of the world, there are diverse opinions among authors. Therefore, as concerns the matter itself, it is certain that substance as such, abstracting from created and uncreated, is prior in duration to accident, because some substance is eternal, but every accident is temporal. But truly, comparing created substance absolutely to accident, it is not really prior to it in time absolutely and simply, as the reasoning made at the beginning proves, because there is no moment in which it would have been true to say that some created substance exists, for which it could not also truly be said that some accident exists in it, because if the substance is spiritual, at least

intellect and will are in it; if, however, the substance is material, at least quantity will be in it, and some quality will not be lacking. Hence neither absolutely nor relatively, that is, by comparison of the same supposit, does it seem that it can be verified simply that substance is prior in time to every accident. Therefore only permissively or indefinitely can it be verified that substance is or can be prior in time to some accident or accidents, not indeed with respect to different things, for in this way even one substance can be prior in time to another, but with respect to the same; for thus any substance can of itself be prior in time to many accidents, namely those which do not flow intrinsically or are not joined by necessary connection to such a substance.

*First Exposition of Aristotle*

3. But as concerns what Aristotle said, Averroes, in Metaphysics VII, commentary 4, says that substance is said to be prior in time to accident because it is separable from accidents, and not conversely, since (he says) no accident is found without substance, but some substance is found without accident. In these words he indicates that Aristotle speaks of substance absolutely, as it comprehends also the first; for that alone is separable from all accidents. Nevertheless this does not seem sufficient for resolving temporal priority, because with respect to God alone the comparison would be made inappropriately, as I said, and with respect to others there is no precedence in duration, given the eternity of the world, at least with respect to all accidents. But if the comparison is made only with respect to some accidents, it is not necessary to have recourse to substance separable from all accidents, for even other substances are prior in time to many accidents.

*Second Exposition*

4. Therefore the same Averroes, at the end of that Commentary, indicates that any substance is said to be prior in time to its accidents because, if the accidents are contingent and separable, they either are, or as far as depends on themselves, can be posterior in time. If, however, they are inseparable accidents, in any individual substance at least prime matter precedes in time any accidents proper to such substance. But this exposition fits less well than the preceding. First, because it is not universal; for in incorruptible substances, substance in no way precedes in time its own proper and inseparable accidents. Hence the Commentator indicates that Aristotle speaks only of generable substance and compares it to its proper accidents, which is false, for manifestly he speaks of substance absolutely, as is clear from the context, since he immediately adds that it must be investigated how many kinds of substance there are and whether any is separable. And moreover, even in material and generable substances it is false that matter in the same thing is prior in time to every accident; for matter, as informed by some form, is not prior in time to the accidents which follow upon the form; but in matter, as it precedes in time such a form, quantity also precedes, which is the proper accident of matter itself, especially according to the opinion of the Commentator. But what Soncinas responds, that the dimensions of matter are not accident in act but in potency, seems ridiculous to me, because quantity, in the way it exists in matter, is its accidental act, truly affecting and informing it in its genus. It follows that it is not likely that Aristotle would prefer substance to accidents solely by reason of matter, which is the most imperfect thing in the order of substance. But if this cannot be said of the other comparisons in knowledge and nature, neither can it reasonably be said of this one either.

*Third Exposition*

5. Therefore others respond differently that substance is said to be prior in time to accidents, not in that property by which something is called prior in time that is prior in duration, or that exists before another has existence, for the arguments made prove evidently that neither substance in general is prior in time to accident in general, according to the opinion of the Philosopher, nor is created substance in general prior in time to accident in general even according to truth, nor finally is each substance in particular prior in time to its accidents. They say therefore that what is prior in time is called by Aristotle what is prior in separability, because what is separable from another can, as far as depends on itself, exist without it. And this seems consonant with the mind of the Philosopher, for when he had said that substance is prior in time, he adds the proof, because none of the other categories is separable, but depends on this one. But if you insist that substance is not really separable from accidents, since it has a necessary conjunction with them, some respond that substance indeed of itself, insofar as it is substance, is separable; but from another source, insofar as it has the character of a cause, it can happen that it never really exists without the coexistence of accidents, but this is accidental to the notion of substance as such. And what St. Antoninus Andreas says amounts to the same thing in Metaphysics VII, question 2, although he attacks this very manner of speaking. For he says that substance is said to be prior in time to accidents because it does not depend on them, even if it necessarily causes them. And Niphus holds the same thing in substance there, disputation II.

6. Objection against the preceding exposition. But against this, Javellus and others rightly object, because this is not priority of time but of nature; but Aristotle distinguished these priorities; hence in the words and reasoning cited above concerning separability he does not seem to prove priority of time but of nature, and he seems to have left priority of time without proof, as Niphus notes. But it can be responded that priority of nature there signifies priority of perfection or causality, while priority of time signifies priority of separability.

Which, although explained in the said manner is only a certain priority in the consequence of subsisting, which is also usually called priority of nature, nevertheless here it is called priority of time, both to distinguish it from the other priority of nature, and also because per se and as it were by aptitude it is a certain priority of time, although accidentally or from another source it is not reduced to act. And according to this exposition it can be said that Aristotle proved both members by that single argument, lest he seem to have omitted one without proof. For from the fact that accident is inseparable while substance is separable, it is excellently inferred both that it is prior in nature or perfection, and in time, in the aforesaid sense. This exposition displeases only in this, that in Aristotle being prior in time never has that signification, but only signifies real priority in existing, as is clear from the Postpredicaments and from Metaphysics V, chapter on the Prior; therefore it could be added that with that aptitudinal priority (so to speak) it is joined that in the same thing substance always precedes in time many accidents, even if it does not precede all; conversely, however, no accident precedes in time the substance of which it is an accident; for this is sufficient, as I said above, for substance to be called permissively or indefinitely prior in time to accident. For Aristotle did not add a distribution.

*Fourth Exposition*

7. Finally it is explained that substance is said to be prior in time to accident only because some substance is separated from every accident and exists in reality without it, which is the first exposition of the Commentator, which St. Thomas follows, as I said, and thus the Thomists defend it. But if you ask what this relates to priority of time, for one thing to be prior in time to another it is not enough that it be separable from it according to real union or inherence, but it is necessary that it also be so according to coexistence; although God is separable from all accidents in the former way, he is not so in the latter

way, supposing that some accidents are eternal, indeed even time itself, for although they are not in God, nevertheless they exist simultaneously with God himself. Alexander of Hales responds to that passage that it does not repugnant to substance as such to exist without accident, even according to coexistence. But this is already reduced to priority only as to the consequence of subsisting. But Javellus, in question 3, says that for God to be called prior in time to accident it is enough that God now exists, and now accident is not in him. But this is frivolous, because being prior in time to accident does not mean negation of inherence, but of simultaneous coexistence; otherwise an angel would be said to be prior in time to the light of the sun, because now the angel exists and the light of the sun is not in it. Alexander indicates another response, which Soncinas embraces, namely that God is said to be prior in time because he exists and is measured by a prior duration than time is, namely by the duration of eternity. But this is a forced exposition; for Aristotle never mentions eternity properly and rigorously taken, nor does he make a comparison of it to time. And moreover, if created things were coeternal with God, although God can be said to be prior in duration by priority of perfection in that very duration, nevertheless not by priority of precedence; but when something is said to be prior in time, according to common usage, and especially in Aristotle, it is not compared in perfection of duration, but in precedence of existence, whether that is measured by proper time, or by eternity or aeviternity; for this makes no difference.

### *Resolution & Approval of the Third Exposition*

8. Therefore only the third exposition satisfies me, which Alexander of Aphrodisias also indicated, namely that Aristotle taught nothing other than what we have said to be true in the matter itself, that substance, namely, can of itself precede its accidents in time and is

really so prior to many; but that it is coeval with some accidents is accidental to the notion of substance and accident as such and arises from some other causality. Which perhaps Aristotle would also say, supposing the eternity of the world, concerning the notions of substance and accident compared in general.

## SECTION II
## WHETHER SUBSTANCE IS PRIOR IN KNOWLEDGE TO ACCIDENT

1. Aristotle, in the cited place, not only said that substance is prior in knowledge, but also that it is prior in reason or definition to accident. This priority consists in this, that accident cannot be defined except through substance by an essential and proper definition; but substance, because from its essence it includes neither accidents nor relation to accidents, does not need them to be exactly defined. And thus this part is left explained from what was said in the preceding disputation.

### *Reason for Doubt*

2. From this, however, arises a difficulty concerning the present comparison, because either there is discussion of distinct and proper knowledge, such as God and the intelligences have; and this comparison will not be different from the prior one; for thus it is the same to be prior in knowledge as to be prior in definition. For that priority does not consist in this, that knowledge of substance precedes in time knowledge of accident, for this is not necessary, as is clear in God and the intelligences. Therefore it consists only in this, that knowledge of accident per se requires knowledge of substance, but not conversely; but this very thing is to be prior in definition. Or there is discussion of confused and imperfect knowledge, such as men can

attain, which seems to be Aristotle's meaning; for he makes this comparison with respect to our knowledge; but in this sense it is false that substance is prior in knowledge to accident, because we men know accidents before substance; for since we receive knowledge from the senses, we perceive intellectually first what can be elicited first from sensible species; but that can be elicited first which is closer to our senses; but accidents are closer to the senses, since they alone are per se sensible.

### *The Sense of the Question is Opened*

3. Concerning this comparison it must be briefly noted that it can be made either on the part of knowable things, or on the part of the knower, especially man. In the former sense the question is what is prior knowable per se; in the latter, what man knows first. Hence it is understood that this latter question does not pertain to the present matter, where we intend to compare the very notions of substance and accident according to themselves; but that human knowledge turns first to one rather than the other makes no difference for declaring the perfection of the things themselves, since that order can arise from the peculiar condition of man. Therefore the former comparison is the one which is made at present, and I think Aristotle made only that one; but the expositors added the other, which we shall touch upon briefly, because it pertains properly and ex professo to the science of the Soul.

4. One thing can be said to be prior in knowledge to another in multiple ways. Therefore, to declare both Aristotle's mind and the matter itself in the former sense, it must be noted, secondly, that one thing can be called prior in knowledge to another in three ways: namely, by nature or perfection, by independence (which is another mode of natural priority), and by generation or time. But this last member has no place in the comparison which is made only on the part of the things themselves, because it does not per se require that

one be known before another in time, and therefore, when Aristotle says that substance is prior in knowledge to accident, he does not speak of the origin or temporal order of knowledge, because it is impertinent, and either really does not exist, or does not arise from the notion of substance itself, but on the part of man, and contributes nothing to declaring the perfection of substance; for rather those things which are less perfect are usually prior in generation and time.

*Resolution of the Question*

5. Therefore the other two priorities of nature remain; and that one which is of independence coincides with priority of definition, as the reason for doubt posited at the beginning correctly proves; which can also be called a certain priority of knowledge, for since accident by its nature depends on substance for its perfect knowledge, but conversely substance does not depend on accident, substance can deservedly be called prior in knowledge to accident for this reason.

6. But besides this mode of priority there is another, which consists simply in greater perfection, and thus substance will be called prior in knowledge to accident, from the fact that it is suited to produce nobler knowledge. And the Philosopher seems to have intended this sense. This is clear, both because on the part of the things themselves no other mode of priority can be conceived, and also from the proof which he adds, saying: "And then we think we know each thing especially when we know what man or fire is, rather than when we know their accidents." Therefore he does not say that substance is prior in knowledge because its knowledge is had first; indeed, he seems to suppose that imperfect knowledge through accidents is often had first. He calls it prior therefore because its knowledge is what especially satisfies the intellect. And therefore Aristotle thought nothing should be distinguished about distinct or confused knowledge, perfect or imperfect, for things per se are not

compared except to the proper and quidditative knowledge which they per se require. Therefore to declare this Aristotle also added that even in accidents themselves the essence of each is prior in knowledge to its accidents or properties. And thus explained there remains both Aristotle's mind and the matter itself, because truly on the part of the things themselves no other comparison can be made here.

7. One can only object, because for perfect knowledge of a thing it is not enough to know the essence unless the properties are also known; therefore perfect knowledge of substance depends on accidents; therefore substance cannot be simply prior to accident as to perfect knowledge. It is responded, first, that the comparison, to be made correctly, ought to be made with precision of substance from accidents; for if the very knowledge of accidents is taken insofar as through it knowledge of substance is in its way perfected, because accidents are properties or affections of substance, thus the knowledge of substance which includes knowledge of accidents will be more perfect than the knowledge of substance alone taken precisely, for thus comprehensive knowledge is more perfect than quidditative. Hence it is said, secondly, that knowledge of a thing is twofold: one is called definitive, which, properly speaking, rests in knowledge of the essence and quiddity of the thing; the other is demonstrative, through which properties are shown of the subject. Therefore in substance its proper knowledge is definitive or quidditative knowledge; and for this to be perfect in its order, it does not require knowledge of properties, because this pertains only to the other knowledge, which is demonstrative; which is no longer formally and directly knowledge of substance, but of those things which inhere in substance. Hence Aristotle rather seems to compare these two kinds of knowledge among themselves, and to prefer in each thing that which terminates at the essence. And because the notion of essence is found simply and perfectly in substance alone, therefore he concludes that substance is prior in knowledge to accidents. And these things can be sufficient for

understanding Aristotle and for explaining the aforesaid comparison, insofar as it could be made on the part of the things themselves.

### *The Same Comparison is Made with Respect to Us*

8. But to satisfy the other part also briefly, I note that there are some who say that with respect to us and by way of origin, substance falls into our knowledge before accident, at least as to confused and imperfect knowledge, although as to distinct and proper knowledge substance is known through accidents. Thus Soncinas holds in Metaphysics VII, question 13; and Javellus, question 3. And indeed the latter part of this opinion is manifest from experience itself, nor is there controversy about it among authors. For we do not arrive at knowledge of substances as to their proper genera or proper differences except through accidents or properties, by means of certain effects or sensible signs. But as to the former part it is proved by the said authors, because the intellect cannot conceive accident except by conceiving substance, since the whole being of accident is toward substance; for which reason Aristotle said that accident cannot be defined except through substance; therefore the conception of substance is necessarily presupposed for the conception of accident. And they bring many other reasons, which I omit, because they are not very difficult and will be easily understood from what follows. But others think that we conceive accidents before substance. Thus Hervaeus holds in Quodlibet III, question 12; and Richard in II Sentences, distinction 24, article 3, question 3. And it is taken from Scotus in I Sentences, distinction 3, questions 1, 2 and 3; and Antonius Andreas holds it in Metaphysics VII, question 4; and Jandun, question 3; and Niphus, disputation IV. And it is proved, because although substance according to itself is more perfect and intelligible, nevertheless with respect to us accident has greater power to change the intellect, because our intellect is not changed except by

means of species impressed on the senses; but species of substance are not impressed on the senses, but only of accidents; therefore accidents are what first change the intellect; therefore they are conceived by the intellect before substance.

### *Resolution of this Point with Some Concord of Opinions*

9. Among these opinions the latter seems to me absolutely true; but it must be understood so as not to exclude substance entirely from the first concept of the intellect. But it must be noted that when it is said that accident is known first, it is not to be understood of accident in the abstract, but in the concrete, as Hervaeus expressly declares, and Soncinas also noted, and experience confirms, and from the reason made with due proportion applied. For sensible objects, which move the sense, are not accidents in the abstract, but in the concrete, as they are in reality; for whiteness does not change sight, but the white thing does, as Aristotle notes in the work On Sense and Sensible Things, because actions are of singular subsisting things. Therefore the exterior sense indeed sees accident, but not abstractly, but concretely, and therefore it is said to see whiteness per se, but substance per accidens, in On the Soul chapter 6, because it sees the white or colored thing, in which substance is included in some way; therefore similarly the intellect, although it is first changed to knowledge of some accident per se sensible, nevertheless not so that it conceives it in the abstract, but in the concrete. From which it happens that substance is not entirely excluded from that first concept, because in that objective concept of concrete accident substance is necessarily involved, as it were covered and wrapped up in accidents. Hence we can say that the thing per se and formally first known is accident; but the thing adequately and as it were materially known is substance or the composite of substance and accident, which is conceived by way of one thing subsisting in such accidental form.

10. But if the authors of the former opinion had wished to say only this, the opinions would easily be reduced to concord. Nevertheless some expressly deny that accident is first conceived even in the concrete; hence they want the substance itself to be conceived naked, as substance is. And consequently they say that the first species impressed on the intellect by virtue of the agent intellect represents only substance as such, and not accident. Indeed, since the Thomists elsewhere hold that the intellect does not directly know the singular, consequently they will say that the cogitative power first conceives singular substance rather than its accidents; but the intellect conceives substance in the universal, at least under the common concept of substance. But this opinion thus expounded seems to me improbable; because if we speak of the cogitative power, since it also first knows through a species impressed by sense or phantasy, it cannot first receive a species representing substance. For through sensation or phantasm only accident is represented per se, but substance only per accidens; how therefore can it happen that it first impresses a species of naked substance? Although therefore we grant (which is sufficiently controversial) that the cogitative power sometimes forms a concept of singular substance as such, it is nevertheless not credible that this is the first concept formed from the force of impression of the senses or phantasy, but at most it is compared afterward by some inquiry and as it were discourse, such as can exist in that power.

11. Ascending therefore to the intellect, we must philosophize in the same way, for the agent intellect, as soon as sense, imagination, or the cogitative power apprehends a sensible object, impresses on the possible intellect a proportionate species; therefore it cannot impress a species representing substance alone. And experience seems to teach this sufficiently; for if while the sense apprehends accident, the intellect contemplated naked substance, we would immediately discern intellectual apprehension from sensitive, which nevertheless we cannot do except after long discourse and reflection. Moreover, because either through that species or concept

substance is represented absolutely without any respect to accident, and this is impossible, not only in the first concept, which happens without discourse from the force of impression of the object, but also after long reasoning and discourse, as Toletus correctly taught in book I On the Soul, chapter 1, question 6; and experience proves this to me sufficiently, for after long inquiry about substance, we cannot express its notion except either through negations or through relation of subject of accidents. But if that first concept is relative, it cannot not presuppose the concept of accident. Therefore substance cannot first be conceived in that way, but only as involved and contained in the concrete of accident. Nor do the reasons of Soncinas or Javellus prove anything more, except that the first concept ought to be of a thing or concrete by way of something subsisting.

12. Accident in the concrete first known is not conceived under the notion of inhering. And from this I infer that, although the thing first and per se known is really accident, nevertheless it is not known formally by the intellect from the force of that concept under the notion of accident, that is, under the notion of inhering in something, but only under the notion of this sensible and material being. Indeed not even from the force of that concept is it discerned whether that object is composed of form and subject, or something simple, but only precisely and abstractly is it conceived by way of one thing. Which the mystery of the Eucharist shows us sufficiently; for we do not conceive substance more where it exists under accidents than where it does not exist. Therefore the formal conception of accident as inhering, and of substance as sustaining or standing per se, is afterward acquired by discourse, and especially from changes of things; for while we see accidents change around some subject, we understand that the subject itself changes. Hence, if comparison is made between these express and formal concepts of accident as accident is, and of substance as substance is, it seems indeed that there is no necessary order between them, as they are in us, because at the beginning we seem to conceive substance and accident by way of correlatives, since

we begin to discern them only through that mutual relation; but afterward we can indifferently be excited to knowing either directly, and indirectly or obliquely the knowledge of one is always terminated in some way to the other, because, as I said, the conception is always connotative or relative, although this arises in accident from its imperfection, but in substance from our own. But about these things more extensively in the science of the Soul.

# DISPUTATION XXXIX

## ON THE DIVISION OF ACCIDENT INTO NINE SUPREME GENERA

1. That the consideration of the ten supreme genera belongs also to the dialectician. This division is set forth not only by the metaphysician but also by the dialectician in that part of logic where he treats of the categories (praedicamenta). Yet in a higher and more exact manner it pertains to the First Philosopher (that is, to the metaphysician), as is clear from what we have said about the object of this science. The dialectician does not consider the ten supreme genera of beings in order to declare their natures and essences precisely—for that would fall outside his task, since dialectic is merely an art that directs the operations of the intellect so that they are carried out methodically and with reason. Hence he deals directly and per se with the mind's concepts, insofar as they can be guided by art—that is, with the form and ordering of concepts, to the extent such ordering can be given by art. Now because the mind's concepts are about things and are grounded in things, the dialectician does treat of things, but not in order to explain their essences and natures; he treats of them only with a view to coordinating the mind's concepts. In this way he handles the ten genera with a view to establishing the ten categories. For a category, taken logically, is nothing other than a suitable arrangement of genera and species down to individuals under

some supreme genus—an arrangement the dialectician supplies for the sake of framing definitions, predications, and demonstrations. Under that aspect, and only under that aspect, he touches upon the things to be placed in the categories and upon the division of being into its highest genera. For this reason many interpreters of the categories have said that the dialectician treats in the categories more of names than of things. This, I think, should be understood not as if mere names were admitted into the categories, but rather that the dialectician regards the things to be placed there chiefly with respect to the meaning of the name (quid nominis), and less with respect to the what-it-is of the thing (quid rei), so far as suffices for laying down the first heads or genera of things under which the remaining genera and species are coordinated.

2. How the metaphysician treats the supreme genera of beings. The metaphysician, by contrast, presents this division directly and by proper office, so as to inquire into the proper notions and essences of things. On that basis, when he divides under these genera he proceeds through all the genera of beings—at least as far as those specific notions that abstract from sensible matter (and, where relevant, from intelligible matter). As for those genera that are more material, he touches on them only to the extent necessary for completing his divisions, as we explained in the proemial disputation. Since, then, we have already discussed substance, it remains for us to speak of the division of accident into nine genera; and thus the division of being into the ten genera or categories will be complete and explained. Afterward—just as we did in the case of substance—so too in each of the genera of accidents we shall survey all their subaltern or specific grades, as far as the scope of metaphysics will require or allow. Concerning this division three points must be considered in common: namely, its immediacy, its sufficiency, and finally its character or analogy.

## SECTION I
## WHETHER ACCIDENT IN GENERAL IS IMMEDIATELY DIVIDED INTO QUANTITY, QUALITY, AND THE OTHER SUPREME GENERA OF ACCIDENTS

1. The first difficulty. The reason for doubting is that accident seems able to be divided in many ways into fewer members, which would comprehend those nine under themselves; therefore it is not an immediate division, but one implicitly containing and passing over (so to speak) several more immediate ones. The antecedent is clear first, because accident seems to need dividing first into complete and incomplete. For that these two members are found among accidents cannot be denied, both because certain accidents are placed directly in a predicament, others reductively; and also because partial and integral accidents are given; therefore, just as substance is divided into complete and incomplete for these causes, so also is accident. Hence, just as that division is adequate to substance, so this will be to accident. And, just as in substance it was necessary for constituting the supreme genus, so in the present case it seems more necessary for constituting and distinguishing the supreme genera. Because otherwise either the division of accident will not be adequate, insofar as it is distinguished from substance under being, or it will not comprehend all things that are contained in the divided. Because the nine supreme genera contain under themselves only complete accidents.

2. The second difficulty. And hence arises the second difficulty, why, namely, the division of accident into first and second, or into singular and universal, is not here premised, just as substance was divided into first and second; because there is no doubt that those two members are also found in accidents and exhaust the divided, and

consequently are more immediate, since they are found in each predicament of accident.

3. The third difficulty. The third and principal difficulty is that accident can be optimally divided into that which is a proper real form inhering in substance and that which is only a real mode affecting substance outside the reasoning and complement of it. For that these two modes of accidents are given is certain to us and proven above. That they are very diverse among themselves is clear from the very reasoning of affecting substance, which they have very differently, and from the diverse mode by which they are distinguished from substance; and finally from the very reasoning of entity, and of real mode, which pertain to the primary differences of being, as we declared above, disputation VII. That finally those two members adequately divide accident is clear, because they include immediate opposition and contradiction; hence one cannot think of a middle or an accident that is not either an entity or a mode affecting substance. From this it finally results that all nine genera of accidents are contained under those members, which therefore can be subdivided into them. Therefore by this reasoning also that division is not immediate, but mediate.

4. The fourth difficulty. The fourth general difficulty concerns many other agreements and differences that are found among those members, by reason of which several more immediate divisions can be constructed. As, for example, accident could be divided into absolute and respective, and the absolute again into quantity and quality, and the respective into respective according to being or predicamental, which is properly called toward another, and respective according to being said or transcendental, which can be further divided into the other six genera. Again accident could be divided into spiritual and material. And again these two members could be subdivided into others down to the ultimate species of accidents. Likewise accident can be divided in general into permanent and successive, and thus further down to the ultimate species. And finally it can be divided and

most properly into accident intrinsically affecting substance, and only extrinsically denominating, so that the prior member is subdivided into the first three predicaments, but the posterior contains under itself the last six, as many wish.

5. On the contrary, however, it is argued that if that division were not immediate, it would neither be doctrinal nor sufficient in rigor. The first is clear, because division, to be rightly handed down, ought to proceed through all proximate differences or modes down to more remote members, otherwise it will very imperfectly explain the nature of the divided. The second is clear, because by what reasoning so many mediate or remote members are numbered, many more could be numbered which would more distinctly declare the amplitude of accident; therefore no certain reasoning of that division can be given, unless it be immediate.

### *Notes for the Resolution of the Question*

6. Concerning this question I find almost nothing said by authors, because they scarcely explain this division in particular, but confound it with the division of being into ten predicaments; nevertheless, since they hand it down as somehow immediate, a fortiori they will say the same about the present division. All nevertheless seem to place immediateness in this alone, that the supreme genera, since they are primarily diverse, agree in nothing, according to the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 9, and book X, chapter 5, where he places this distinction between things that properly differ and things that are diverse, because the former differ in something, for they are also one in something; but the latter do not differ in something, but by themselves, because they agree in nothing; such are the supreme genera of predicaments. Nevertheless this response alone does not seem sufficient for explaining this matter; for when the supreme genera of accidents are said to agree in nothing, either the sense is that they agree in no transcendental predicate,

whether univocal or analogical, or that they have no proper common genus. The prior sense is manifestly false; and therefore in the opposite sense it cannot be denied that, just as the predicaments of accidents both among themselves and with substance have some agreement in the reasoning of being, so in the reasoning of accident they have among themselves some agreement, which they do not have with substance, which must be in some reasoning more proper to themselves, and consequently also more immediate to themselves than the reasoning of being is; therefore, in like manner, it cannot be denied that among certain predicaments of accidents there are some proper and peculiar agreements, which are not common to other genera of accidents, as the proposed reasons for doubting manifestly prove; therefore the genera of accidents cannot be said to be primarily diverse because they have no agreement of this kind. But the posterior sense is true, as we shall see more broadly in section 3; that nevertheless does not suffice for satisfying the difficulties posed, or giving the reason why, just as being according to some general mode of existing is first determined to accident as such, then to more determinate or particular accidents, accident in general is not thus understood to be determined through certain modes common to many predicaments of accidents, before it is contracted to proper predicaments or genera of accidents.

7. It should be noted therefore that one division can be called more immediate than another in two ways. First, because it is given through fewer members, which can be subdivided through all members of another division. Second, because the differences or modes contracting the divided in one division, per se and according to the proper mode of conceiving founded in things, are a medium between the divided and other members of another division, as sensible is between living and rational; and we shall bring forward several examples of each member in what follows.

*Resolution of the Question*

8. It should therefore be said that the mentioned division is not so immediate that other more immediate ones cannot be thought out, if we speak absolutely about any division through fewer and more general members; nevertheless, insofar as accident can be proximately and adequately divided into members that are primarily diverse genera, that division is immediate and most apt of all for handing down doctrine. The prior part is sufficiently proven by all the examples and arguments placed at the beginning; for they show, as I said, that certain predicaments of accidents have among themselves some agreements or similarities not common to all accidents, according to which other divisions can be constructed through fewer members further divisible into things of diverse predicaments; therefore according to that mode of conceiving, other divisions through members more immediate to accident in general can easily be thought out; for whatever is common under accident to many genera is conceived as more immediate than those. But the posterior part is declared because no common genus can be given to diverse predicaments of accidents, as we shall say more broadly in section 3; therefore in whatever way accident is divided into fewer and more common members further divisible into things of diverse predicaments, it is not divided through members that are true genera; therefore, if it had to be adequately divided through members that are primarily diverse genera, that is, which do not agree in another genus, it could not be divided otherwise. But it was necessary to hand down the division of accident into all primarily diverse genera in the said mode, so that the quiddities and genera and species of all things could be investigated and known according to the method of doctrine.

9. The objection is satisfied. You might say that by the same reasoning the division of being into substance and accident should not have been premised to us, but being should be immediately divided into ten genera. It is answered that this could indeed have been done, but it would not have been so fitting, nor is the reasoning the same, both because it was necessary to explain the common reasoning of

accident, which is essential to all accidents, and to compare it with substance, and also because the reasoning of accident as such is essential and positive, and all modes by which genera of accidents are constituted and distinguished proximately determine essentially the very reasoning of accident as such, and not the reasoning of being; and therefore under accident the nine genera are optimally and immediately divided. But in other divisions of accident, which seem to be handed down through fewer members, either no essential coordination is found according to reasoning between the modes constituting such members and those which determine the genera of accidents, or those modes are not positive, but negative; or they are not essential, but extrinsic and accidental; or finally primarily diverse genera cannot be conveniently subdivided under them. Because sometimes things of the same predicament, only specifically distinct among themselves, are contained under those diverse members; and conversely, things of diverse predicaments pertain to the same member; all of which will be declared more fittingly by running through the individual examples proposed above.

10. In what some place the reasoning of complete and incomplete accident. The first objection therefore was about the division of accident into incomplete and complete; in which it must first be explained what is understood by the name of complete and incomplete accident. For some understand that only concrete accidents are complete accidents; but incomplete are accidents in the abstract. Because concrete accident signifies the whole composite, which is properly complete; but abstract accident is only the form, which is something incomplete, by its nature ordered to constituting such a composite. Hence through accidental action abstract accident is not made per se, but concrete, because, namely, action per se first tends to complete being, and therefore Aristotle said that through heating not heat is made, but the hot. Finally substantial form is an incomplete thing; therefore much more accidental form taken in the abstract.

11. Their opinion is refuted. But this opinion cannot be proven; for either the concrete of accident is taken by reason of the formal alone, or by reason of the whole composite from material and formal; under the prior reasoning it can truly be called accident, under the posterior it cannot be called accident as much as being per accidens, as Aristotle calls it, Metaphysics VII, chapter 6, and has been said by us in disputation IV, section 3. Wherefore equivocation about the name of accident must be avoided, which we can declare in the manner in which Aristotle distinguished the name of accident, Metaphysics V, chapter 30, where he says accident is sometimes called something because it happens fortuitously, which is only called accident because it occurs per accidens; but properly accident is said to be what is present in something outside the essence of the thing; so therefore the concrete of accident by reason of the whole composite can be called accident, because things of diverse genera are congregated in it per accidens; although that per accidens does not signify fortuitous congregation, but only accidental conjunction of several things; nevertheless that composite cannot properly be called accident, as it is distinguished from substance, since substance is included in it. For which reason those rightly think who deny that these concretes so considered are placed in a predicament, because they can be placed neither in the predicament of substance nor in the predicament of accident. And because in predicaments not beings per accidens, but per se can be placed. A fortiori therefore such concrete so viewed cannot be called complete accident; because what is not accident cannot be complete accident either. Indeed, nor can it properly be called complete being, because truly only per se one being is properly complete being. Hence, if the subject of that composite is complete substance, the composite itself from substance and accident will be more than complete, and therefore will be properly being per accidens.

12. But truly, if we speak of that concrete by reason of the formal alone, so it can indeed be called complete accident;

nevertheless there is no reason why the same accident in the abstract should be judged incomplete, because concrete for the formal only says the accidental form itself, according to the truer and commonly received opinion of St. Thomas, and the Commentator, Metaphysics V, text 14. Who consequently say against Avicenna, in his Logic, that concrete and abstract accident signify formally and principally the same and differ only because concrete says the form itself as actually informing the subject and constituting the concrete itself, but abstract says precisely the form itself as if it were per se. But this difference is not sufficient for whiteness to be called incomplete accident, rather than white; because actual inherence, which white expresses more, is only a certain mode of accidental form, which does not complete it in the reasoning of accident. Hence it cannot be doubted that separated quantity is as complete an accident as conjoined. Nor does it matter that the accidental form itself is instituted for affecting the subject, because we do not say that accident of this kind in the abstract is complete being, but is complete accident, which is very different; for accident, however perfect in itself, is incomplete in the breadth of being. And therefore that reasoning only proves that abstracts of accidents are incomplete beings, not however that they are incomplete accidents. Indeed rather, the same should be said of concretes by reason of formal significations. Wherefore in this there is no similarity concerning substantial forms; for they are both incomplete beings and also incomplete substances, which is more perfect for them than to be complete accidents. Finally, what was adduced about the term of action makes nothing for the present matter, because natural action tends to the composite, whether that is properly one, or per accidens; it also tends to form not in itself, but in the subject, and therefore it is said to tend more to concrete than to abstract, even if both are complete in the order of accident.

13. In what the reasoning of complete and incomplete accident truly consists. Therefore incomplete accident should be distinguished from complete, both in concrete and in abstract; for

either reasoning can be found in either member; nevertheless, because in abstracts the reasoning of accident is conceived (so to speak) more pure and precise, in them both members should be explained; for it can then easily be applied to concretes. Therefore complete accident is said to be what in the reasoning of accidental form is integral and total form; but incomplete accident is said to be what has the reasoning of part with respect to the complete. This explanation is clear, both from the property of terms, and from proportion taken to complete and incomplete substance, which we declared above in this way; for, just as substance in its order is compared to whole and part, so also accident in its order. From which it results that, just as substance can be complete or incomplete physically or metaphysically, so also accident. But accident is said to be physically complete which neither is nor is ordered from itself to compose per se another accident, because then it truly has the reasoning of whole or integral accident. But I say it should not be ordered to composing another accident, because, although it is ordered to composing with substance one composite, this does not take away the reasoning of complete accident, because that composite is not true accident. I add that, although sometimes one accident is ordered to actuating or receiving another, as, for example, potency to act, or act to potency, nevertheless this does not prevent either from being able to be complete accident; because either has integral species in its reasoning and does not compose with another one per se, but only per accidens. Therefore accident will be physically incomplete which physically composes or integrates some per se one accident; as parts, for example, of continuous quantity, while they are in the continuous, are only incomplete accidents; also degrees of intension of the same heat can be called physically incomplete accident. And point can be called incomplete accident by its nature. From which it results that the same accident according to diverse reasonings can be called complete and incomplete, as is commonly judged about line or surface; for, insofar as it has proper extension, it is complete quantity; but insofar as it is terminus or bond

of another quantity, it is judged incomplete. And the same quality begun or in remiss degree is essentially complete, but entitatively or intensively is incomplete. Motion also, insofar as it is the very terminus in becoming, is judged something incomplete; nevertheless insofar as it is passion of the subject or mobile it has some complete reasoning of accident and constitutes its predicament, as we shall see.

14. But metaphysically accident is called complete which has the integral essence of some accident. Where immediately a question occurred whether genera of accidents can be called complete accidents, or only ultimate species or individuals. Or if those are complete accidents, a question arises about differences, why, namely, they are not also complete accidents; for, just as difference is part, so also genus, and just as genus, so that it can be said of species is conceived somehow by the mode of whole, so also difference. But these should be expedited in the same way as we treated similar things about substance. For it should be said that all genera which are placed in the direct line of some predicament of accident are complete accidents; which is clear from the very mode of conceiving and signifying; for quantity, heat, habit and similar things are conceived and signified as integral accidentals, whether they are conceived under general reasoning, or under specific; because either expressly, or implicitly they say the whole form or whole essence of it, and by the mode of whole. In which there is great distinction between difference and genus; for difference is always signified by the mode of part, at least as to its formal signification. Therefore properly incomplete accidents metaphysically are differences of accidents, and genera, if they are taken precisely as parts, not however taken absolutely.

15. From which finally it is answered to the first instance that that division of accident into complete and incomplete, either is presupposed as virtually or proportionally contained in the similar division of substance, or certainly can more fittingly be applied to individual predicaments of accidents, namely, that there is complete and incomplete quantity, and quality similarly, and so of others. For

under the general reasoning of accident scarcely anything can be judged simply incomplete, or have the reasoning of part, unless one descends to particular genera; because the reasoning of accident is imperfect and most common, and therefore insofar as it is from itself, it is entirely included in any mode, however imperfect; which reasoning will be examined in section 3. Add that that diversity, taken in that generality, is not absolute but respective, for, as I said, accident that is complete under one reasoning, is incomplete under another. Likewise it is not always essential difference, for sometimes remiss accident is called incomplete, although it is essentially complete. Finally it is not always diversity of things, but of intentions or from our mode of conceiving, as is clear in differences and species of accidents. Because of these things therefore accident has been divided absolutely into nine genera, not into complete or incomplete. So that it is clear in passing that when accident is said to be divided into nine genera, genus is not taken properly and rigorously, but as it includes all things that are constituted in each predicament, whether directly or reductively. And so when accident is said to be one thing quantity, another quality, etc., quantity or quality is not taken insofar as it is rigorously genus, in which way it is only complete quantity or quality; otherwise the division would not be adequate to the divided; therefore quantity is taken (and the same is true of others) in its total amplitude, although afterwards for constituting the proper genus of such predicament the proper reasoning of complete quantity should be taken; let this be noted for all predicaments here, lest it be necessary to repeat it.

### *The Second Objection is Expedited*

16. How accident is divided into universal and singular. In the second example about the division of accident into singular and universal, or into first and second, there is nothing for us to delay over, for that division, insofar as it is metaphysical, is more a division of the

one than of being or accident, and so it was treated above, disputations IV, V and VI. But insofar as it pertains to the intentions of what can be subjected and what can be predicated, it is more dialectical than metaphysical; and in either way it is general to all beings, nor does it have anything peculiar in accidents. And in this regard there is diversity between substance and accident, for in substance, because of the peculiar reasoning of standing under, it was necessary to distinguish the reasoning of first substance from the reasoning of second, but in accidents there was no necessity. Hence neither is individual accident accustomed to be called first accident with respect to universal predicates; for, although in existing the singular is in its way prior to the universal, nevertheless in this, as I said, accident has nothing peculiar, but it comes from the common reasoning of singular and universal.

### *Concerning the Third Objection Other Divisions are Explained*

17. How accident is divided into entity and mode. In the third difficulty we admit all things that are said there about that division of accident into thing and mode; from this however it only results that that division is more immediate in the prior way declared above. Nevertheless in this place it is not necessary; first indeed, because that division formally taken is more general, and befits substance proportionally, and can be given of being in general; and for that reason we touched upon it in disputation VII, sections 1 and 2. Second, because that division does not contribute to dividing the primarily diverse genera of accidents, for under the same predicamental genus can sometimes be included accidents that have proper entities and those that are only modes of beings, as are in the genus of quality heat and figure. From which it is understood that those two members, through which that division is handed down, per se and formally do not mediate between accident in general and the

modes by which it is determined to the supreme genera of accidents; for accident is understood to be determined to the genus of quality abstracting from whether it is proper entity, or only mode of being.

18. Absolute and respective accident. Almost the same should be said about the division into absolute and respective. For this division also pertains more to the common reasoning of being than to the proper reasoning of accident. And besides, if respective, as is insinuated there, comprehends transcendental respectful things or according to being said, there is no accident that is not respective; hence it cannot divide accident. But if respective is taken properly for the predicament toward something, so there is no utility in that division, both because, by this very fact that only one genus is said to be toward something, all the rest are said to be absolute; and also because through this appellation of absolute scarcely anything common to the eight genera of accidents is explained, besides negation of toward something itself.

19. Spiritual and material. Permanent and successive. In the same way one should philosophize about the division of accident into spiritual and material, for these two members also transcend almost all beings; and they are found primarily in substances, and consequently in many genera of accidents; hence they are not apt, so that through them we descend to dividing the primarily diverse genera of beings. Neither are they properly medium between accident as such and the modes by which it is determined to supreme genera; for accident is determined to quality abstracting from material or immaterial. And the same should be said about natural or supernatural accident and similar things, especially about permanent and successive, which is touched upon in the last example. Although those members, according to the opinion of many, are not always essentially different, concerning which we shall see below.

20. Common and proper. And by the same reasoning the division of accident into proper and common makes no difference for the present, which is accustomed to be handed down more broadly in

the division of predicables; for this division per se and formally does not vary the reasoning of accident, but its emanation from the subject. And the same a fortiori is true of separable or inseparable accident. But if among these there is essential diversity, it formally comes from modes or differences of predicaments of accidents. Hence sometimes in diverse predicaments, sometimes in the same, that variety of accidents is found. And thus in passing we have explained not only the division intended in this place, but also others that are accustomed to be handed down about accident; for we proposed those reasons for doubting for this principal cause.

## SECTION II
## WHETHER THE DIVISION OF ACCIDENT INTO NINE GENERA IS SUFFICIENT

1. From two headings that are required for sufficiency, great difficulty arises in this question. One is, that all members be distinct, lest some coincide into one, and thus there be fewer than are numbered. The other is, that besides these there are no others, which are distinguished from these by genus.

### *Difficulties Concerning the Distinction of the Members of the Said Division*

2. Concerning the first, while we now suppose that quantity and quality are distinct, in almost all the rest there is difficulty; for relation in reality seems to be nothing distinct from all absolutes. Action, granted that it is distinguished from the first three predicaments, nevertheless both essentially includes relation, and (which is more difficult) in reality it is not distinguished from passion. Concerning where and when, there is especially great difficulty how they are distinguished from time and place, which are placed under

quantity, and a more serious difficulty is about the duration of each thing (which seems to be placed under the predicament when), in what way it is distinguished from the existence of each thing; for it seems to be distinguished in nothing, and therefore there is no reason why it should be placed in the proper predicament of accident. Besides there is difficulty about habit, because habit is nothing other than clothing, if it is taken in the abstract, or being clothed, if it is taken in the concrete; but clothing is nothing other than some substance affected with such figure or quality. But if in it only the extrinsic denomination is considered, which it gives to the clothed man, that especially is nothing real, so that it deserves to be named among real accidents, and then, even if it is conceived as something accidental, it is nothing distinct from place, for clothing is not compared to the clothed except as proximate place surrounding him. Finally, position seems to be nothing distinct from where or existence in place, or if it adds anything it can at most be either some relation of parts of the located to parts of place, or certainly some quasi-figure resulting in the located from such position, as appears in one sitting or standing, etc. Therefore there is nothing in this genus that is not contained in others.

3. And the difficulty is increased concerning this very point, for those nine genera, as we said, are numbered not only as distinct, but also as primarily diverse; but it seems impossible for there to be so many first genera. First indeed because of the common difficulty about accident, in which all agree, concerning which we shall speak ex professo in the following section. Second, because many of these predicaments agree in some essential differences; therefore it is necessary that they agree in some genus, for as is said in the Antepraedicaments: Of genera not subalternately posited there cannot be common differences; therefore genera which have common differences are subalternately posited. But genera are said to be subalternately posited which are so related that either one is under the other, or both under some third genus, as is taken from Aristotle,

Topics IV, chapter 2, and Topics V, chapter 3, place 41. The first antecedent is proven; for being spiritual or material are differences of accident, and yet are common to many of the said genera; similarly, being absolute form or respective; likewise, being proper form or mode; and finally, being properly inherent, which is most common to quantity and quality, or being only extrinsically denominating, which most befits action, habit and containing place.

### *Difficulties Concerning the Sufficiency of the Division*

4. The first difficulty. Concerning the other point no lesser difficulties occur. The first and principal is, because either under accident we distinguish all real denominations that are outside the substance of a thing, or only those that are taken from intrinsically inherent form; in this latter way without doubt there would not be so many genera of accidents, as the prior arguments convince; but in the prior way many things are which are not contained under these. This is clear first from these denominations being seen, loved, etc. For it cannot be said that denominations of this kind are only of reason, for they are taken from real form and real relation, no less than the denomination of agent. Hence the same difficulty can be declared otherwise; for the same dependence insofar as it denominates agent or patient, is said to constitute two genera of accidents, namely, of action or passion; therefore the same immanent act, insofar as it denominates the agent itself actively, for example, seeing, and the object passively seen, will constitute two reasonings or two genera of accidents.

5. The second difficulty. And this difficulty can be extended second to several other denominating forms, for the surface of containing body, as extrinsically denominating another contained or located thing, is said to constitute a special genus of accident; therefore, as it actively denominates the locating thing, it will constitute another genus of accident. And the same argument applies

to clothing, as it denominates the clothed, or the clothing; for why are agent and patient, as such, placed in diverse genera of accident, and not locating and located, as such, and clothing and clothed?

6. Third. Third, from artificial things many real denominations arise, which cannot be recalled to the said genera of accidents; for example, a vessel being gilded is a real denomination, which nevertheless pertains to none of the said genera. Likewise army says some peculiar form in such collection of men, which cannot be excluded from the reasoning of accident, because it is being per accidens, otherwise neither house as such, and much less number would be placed among accidents. But if someone says that army is recalled to figure by reason of such composition, or to relation by reason of order, by the same reasoning we could exclude position or habit from the peculiar genus of accident.

7. Fourth. And there is a fourth difficulty similar to this, because in human affairs or morals there are several denominations, extrinsic indeed, yet real, which cannot be recalled to the said genera, such as being king, teacher, and similar things. For these are not sufficiently excluded because they are beings of reason; for, although these denominations apprehended as inherent or intrinsic are beings of reason, nevertheless, as they are in themselves, they are truly denominations taken from real forms, although extrinsic; therefore either all extrinsic denominations should be rejected from the genera of real accidents, or there is no reason why these should be rejected. For also other denominations, if they are apprehended as inherent, will be beings of reason, as is clear in the denomination of creator; which, if it is apprehended as taken from something temporal coming to God, is only relation of reason. And this difficulty extends to human acts, insofar as they are denominated free or moral; for this very denomination is extrinsic; likewise, insofar as they are denominated studious, or morally depraved, or prohibited, or commanded. Likewise this difficulty has place in the congregation of men, insofar as it is denominated city or republic, which denomination does not arise

from position or figure arising from such order, but is moral and of diverse reasoning from others.

8. Fifth. Fifth, in physical things also we find motion, which is true accident, and is not contained under those genera. But if you say it is excluded, because it is something incomplete and in becoming, by the same reasoning action and passion should be excluded; for they also speak of incomplete things and in becoming. Or certainly, if you say motion is recalled to action and passion, either it will be recalled as common genus to them, and so those two will not be supreme genera; or as in reality the same with them; and so also action and passion would not be to be distinguished, because in reality they are as much the same among themselves as with motion, and as they are distinguished by relation to agent and patient, so motion has proper relation to term. Besides there are in physical things causalities of formal, material and final cause, from which these causes are denominated causes in act; why therefore do those not constitute proper genera, just as action? For, as we saw in what precedes, action is nothing other than causality of agent; but other causalities are also real, and no less happen to their causes than action to agent; therefore equally they ought to constitute proper genera of accidents.

9. Sixth. The sixth difficulty can be taken from metaphysical things, for this division, since it is metaphysical and adequate to accident, as it is distinguished from substance in its total breadth, ought to comprehend all accidents of created substances, even immaterial ones; but in those substances some accidents are found which are not comprehended in these genera; therefore it is insufficient division. The minor is proven especially concerning two accidents. One is where, for those substances, since they are not immense, are somewhere definite; and since they are not immutable, they change their very where, which is a sign that this is some accident in them; but that where is not through circumscription of extrinsic containing place, as it is in corporeal things; therefore it is an accident generically diverse. But if someone says that also in corporeal things

there is intrinsic where distinct from circumscribing place, hence the difficulty is increased in two ways, far from being solved. First, because hence it follows that in corporeal things two genera of local accidents (so to speak) should be distinguished: one, of extrinsic containing place, another, of intrinsic where. Second, because also corporeal where is generically diverse from where of immaterial substances; for the former is quantified, but the latter indivisible. The other accident of immaterial substances is their proper duration, for, if in inferior substances duration is numbered among accidents, and is called time or when, why not also in immaterial substances? But if it is distinguished, certainly it is an accident generically diverse, for it is of far other reasoning, since it has neither succession nor extension.

10. Seventh. Seventh, among accidents are numbered not only those that immediately happen to substance, but also those that happen to accidents, otherwise neither figure, nor habit, or similar things would be to be numbered in accidents. But truly accidents of accidents are much more numerous than those that are contained in other genera; therefore. The minor is proven, because to each genus of accidents Aristotle attributes certain accidental properties which do not pertain to other predicaments; as to quantity he attributes being measure; which reasoning is not of the essence of quantity, neither is it quality or anything similar, and the same is true of other similar properties. Nor is it sufficient to say these properties are reduced to those genera to which they are attributed, otherwise neither should the remaining predicaments be distinguished from substance, because they can be recalled to it, since they are properties of it.

11. Finally, we can take arguments from Aristotle, who in the Postpredicaments numbered several accidental denominations, besides those that are contained in the said genera of accidents, such as being simultaneously, prior, and to have, in some other signification, etc. Why therefore do those not constitute several genera of accidents, when all extreme genera are numbered?

### *Opinions of the Ancients*

12. Formerly there was no lack of those who either increased or decreased the number of predicaments. The Pythagoreans posited twenty predicaments, as is taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics I, chapter 5. But Plato sometimes recalls all things to one genus of being, as in the Sophist; but sometimes to four, as in the Philebus. But others posited more, others fewer, as can be seen in Simplicius and Venetus, at the beginning of the Predicaments; and Philoponus, Prior Analytics I, chapter 2.

### *True Resolution & the First Reasoning of Sufficiency is Examined*

13. Now truly, the philosophical dogma about the number of ten predicaments, and consequently about the number of nine genera of accidents besides substance, is so received that it is judged almost temerarious in philosophy to call this into doubt. Therefore let us suppose that as certain from common sense and the mouth of all. And let us investigate the reasoning of the sufficiency of that division. For what some want, that it should be taken as believed from the authority of many saying so, is not philosophical. But what others say, that this truth is known per se, is not true; for what is the evident and immediate connection between those extremes? Commonly, therefore, the reasoning of this sufficiency is accustomed to be taken thus, for, substance being passed over, which is per se and constitutes the first genus, the genera of accidents ought to be distinguished through relation to substance. Therefore either accident intrinsically affects substance, or only extrinsically. If intrinsically, either absolutely or relatively. And absolutely, either by reason of matter, as quantity, or by reason of form, as quality. But relatively, or toward something. But if extrinsically, either in order to active potency, or to passive, or to

neither of them. In the first way action is constituted; in the second, passion. But if in the third way, it must be further distinguished, for either such affection befits through the mode of measure, or not. And again, if through the mode of measure, either it is measure of quantity absolutely, and where is constituted, or with certain order of parts, and position is constituted, or it is measure of duration, and time is constituted. But if it does not have the reasoning of measure, habit is constituted. This reasoning or sufficiency is taken from St. Thomas, Metaphysics V, lecture 9. And modern writers embrace it.

14. How many difficulties the preceding reasoning of sufficiency suffers. It is nevertheless difficult from many points. First, because all six last predicaments are falsely numbered among forms extrinsically denominating. For passion does not denominate extrinsically, but intrinsically, as is known per se. But if it is said to denominate extrinsically, because it regards extrinsic agent, by the same reasoning every relation, indeed and every habit and immanent acts will be said to denominate extrinsically, because they regard extrinsic terms or objects. Some respond[39], although passion sometimes intrinsically inheres, nevertheless not always; for when someone is moved locally, or is clothed with a garment, or is bound with chains, he suffers something, although the form from which he suffers does not inhere in him, because neither the place which he enters inheres in him, nor the garment with which he is clothed, nor the chains with which he is bound. But this is not rightly said; for every physical and true passion inheres in the patient; for no one is truly said to suffer because of extrinsic denomination, as Aristotle openly teaches, Physics III, chapter 3, and On the Soul III, chapter 2; and there the Commentator, St. Thomas and all. Otherwise, just as action was divided into transient and immanent, so passion would have had to be divided. Nor do those examples prove anything, for the mutation that is in local motion intrinsically inheres in the mobile

[39] See Hervaeus, Quodlibet I, question 2; Fonseca, Metaphysics V, chapter 7, question 2, section 2.

according to true philosophy; for the proper term of that motion is not extrinsic place, but something intrinsic to the mobile itself, as we shall declare below, in the predicament where. But while someone is clothed with a garment, if we imagine this to happen without his local mutation, there is no passion there, just as when a column is surrounded by flowing water or air, it suffers nothing. Therefore passion only intervenes between putting on the garment, insofar as local mutation is mixed there. Similarly chains, if they are considered precisely insofar as they are locally conjoined to members, do not effect physical passion; but insofar as they affect with pain or alteration, they are not themselves the form of passion, but instruments; but the passion which they effect inheres intrinsically. Therefore no passion is extrinsically denominating form. Besides position does not inhere extrinsically, but intrinsically; for sitting and standing are intrinsic modes.

15. How St. Augustine proves this sufficiency. Therefore St. Augustine, in his book on the Categories, chapter 8, whom Isidore imitates in book II of the Origins, chapter on Categories, more clearly distinguishes these nine genera of accidents into three classes, because three are within substance: quantity, quality, and position; three are outside: where, when, and state; three are partly within and partly outside: relation, action, and passion. But concerning where itself there is great question whether it is outside or within; and concerning when, as we shall see later. Augustine is also opposed because many qualities can be said to be partly within and partly outside, if it suffices for this to have a relation to external things. And sometimes passion is in no way outside, if it is merely immanent. Furthermore, in the prior sufficiency no reason is given why measures of quantity and duration constitute categories, and not the measure of intensity or perfection. Nor does it appear why, just as place is said to have the nature of a measure, clothing cannot have it; for equality between garment and the one clothed is also required; indeed, as I argued above, clothing has the nature of a certain place. Finally, no reason is given why the

extrinsic predicate not including the nature of measure should be only one, when many others seem to have been probably numbered among the arguments.

### *Another Account of Sufficiency is Examined*

16. Certain Scotists deduce this sufficiency differently, namely, that one accident is absolute, another respective; the absolute is quantity or quality; the respective, one is intrinsically supervening and being something, another extrinsically supervening. And this again either pertains to causality, or to measure, or to order. If to causality, either actively or passively, and thus action and passion are constituted. If to measure, either of permanent quantity, and thus is where, or of successive, and is when. If to order, either of parts, and is position; or of the whole, and is state. But in this sufficiency there are some difficulties touched upon in the preceding; and furthermore there is mixed in it that distinction of relations supervening intrinsically and extrinsically, which is both considered by many to be falsely contrived, and at minimum is most uncertain, and therefore unsuitable for explaining something certain. And finally in all those subdivisions, no reason for them is given, but they are assumed voluntarily, and in them the accounts of some categories are not correctly explained, as, for example, that state is the order of the whole; for place can also be said to be the order of the whole, and other things which we shall treat in their proper places.

17. What kind of account of sufficiency Ockham assigns. Ockham, in his Logic, part I, chapter 41, and Quodlibet V, question 22, collects this sufficiency differently from the sufficiency of questions that can be asked about primary substance, namely, how great it is, of what quality, etc., and thus he numbers nine questions. But he gives no account of this number in the questions themselves, and thus leaves the same difficulty.

## *Whence the Sufficiency of the Division May be Obtained*

18. Therefore I think it is true what they report Avicenna to have said, that it cannot be demonstrated by proper reason and a priori that there are so many supreme genera, and not more or fewer. Hence Aristotle nowhere attempts to demonstrate this, but always assumes it as certain. And it can be explained in this way, because, just as concerning the subject of a science it cannot be demonstrated whether it exists, but this must be assumed, so also metaphysics does not demonstrate, but assumes being, and by parity of reasoning does not demonstrate a priori that there are some first genera contained under being; for the reason is the same for both. Indeed, those who think being does not have an objective concept will say that being is assumed to exist in no other way than by assuming these supreme genera to exist. I add that universally it is probable that whenever degrees, genera, or species of things are divided, it cannot be demonstrated a priori that there are so many and not more, except only when the division is reduced to two contradictorily opposed members; for then it is necessary that all things comprehended under what is divided be contained in one or the other of those members. But when the division is made through several differences or positive modes, I do not see how it can be demonstrated a priori that there are so many members to be divided and not more. Just as in what we said above, although only four grades of substances are divided by us, it is not demonstrated that there are not more, at least possible ones, but only shown that there are not more known to us, and from this at most it can be conjectured that there are not more possible ones. So therefore I think concerning the ten supreme genera, namely, that their sufficiency is not otherwise established for us than because from all the effects we experience, no more genera of beings become known to us; but all these are found to be first diverse in their accounts, so

that they agree in no other genus; but that this is so cannot better be shown than by responding to the difficulties proposed. But this cannot be done exactly in the present question, because those difficulties touch upon the matters of all the categories and depend on their perfect knowledge; and therefore we shall briefly indicate some things here and the treatment of individual categories must be awaited in the rest.

### *Whence the First Diversity Among Genera of Accidents is Taken*

19. It is attacked. So that we may speak about the difficulty of the first heading, it must first be seen what distinction is necessary for multiplying the supreme genera of accidents, and whence it should be taken. For how much the genera of accidents should be distinguished from the genus of substance has already been treated above. Therefore some say[40] that for distinguishing the genera of accidents a mutual real distinction of the things contained under those genera is necessary, because they are also distinguished as real beings, and they have supreme diversity, since they agree in nothing, nor are they mixed among themselves, as Aristotle says in Metaphysics VIII, last chapter, and Posterior Analytics I, chapter 11. And therefore they seem to require real distinction. But according to this opinion there would indeed be few categories of accidents. For, as will be evident from what follows, just as only two categories are really distinct from substance per se, namely quantity and quality, so also the same only are in the categories of accidents really and per se distinct among themselves. But I say per se, because by reason of these categories, which are really distinguished among themselves, others can be distinguished really either from some of these, or among themselves, as action, for example, of alteration, because it tends toward quality and is really identified with it, is really distinguished from substance

[40] Paul of Venice, in his Metaphysics, c. 21.

and quantity and from all things from which that quality is really distinguished, and the same is true in all other accidents. For that in all the rest that real distinction does not intervene per se is evident, because neither are relations distinguished from their foundations, nor are the six last categories proper beings, but at most modes of beings, as will be evident from the discussion. Indeed, not even quality according to its whole latitude is really distinguished from quantity, for figure is not a thing distinct from quantity, but a mode of it, whence it is not distinguished really from substance per se, but through quantity. Finally we showed above that for distinguishing universally the genus of accident from substance, real distinction is not necessary; much less therefore will it be necessary among accidents.

### *Second Opinion*

20. The second opinion, and very common, seems to be that at least modal distinction among diverse genera of accidents is necessary, which is true actual distinction and from the nature of the thing, antecedent in the thing to the operation of mind; so that either one genus of accident is a mode of another, or both are distinct modes of some third thing. And this at least seems to be proved by the foundation of the preceding opinion, that these genera are distinguished under being and are first diverse. Second, it is confirmed further, because things that are distinguished by subaltern genus or species in the same category of accident must be distinguished at least modally; therefore much more those things that are distinguished by categorical genus. The consequence is evident, because much greater is the diversity and distinction among categorical genera, since they cannot have some common differences, which things of the same category can have. And the antecedent is evident, because specific distinction is true and essential distinction; therefore, if it is between real extremes, it is the distinction of real essences, for distinction of

reason alone among things that are real is not sufficient for them to be called essentially diverse, as divine wisdom and justice cannot be called essentially distinct. Third, the difficulty touched upon at the beginning urges this, because if this distinction at least does not intervene among supreme genera, no reason can be given why ten rather than more or fewer are distinguished, because according to reason, either more modes can be distinguished, or these can be reduced to fewer headings. Fourth, because, for some genus of accident to be distinguished from the genus of substance, at least modal distinction between them is necessary; therefore also for distinguishing supreme genera of accidents among themselves. The consequence is evident, because the genera of accidents are as much first diverse among themselves as from substance.

21. It is disproved. But this opinion cannot be defended universally; for first concerning all categorical relations it seems most probable to me that they are not actually distinguished on the part of the thing from their foundations, neither as a thing, nor as a mode distinct from the nature of the thing, but only by reason or connotation of the other extreme. Then, concerning action and passion among themselves it is almost the common opinion that they are not actually distinguished from the nature of the thing, and yet they constitute diverse categories. For this reason especially Soncinas, Metaphysics V, question 13, and Javellus, question 16, who says the same about relation and foundation, depart from the said opinion; and it will be established more broadly from what will be said below about action and passion. Furthermore position and where, if they are taken proportionally for intrinsic position and where, or for extrinsic ones, cannot be distinguished among themselves from the nature of the thing. Indeed, place taken for extrinsic place is not distinguished from the nature of the thing from surface, but only by connotation. The same is also true of clothing, as it has the nature of state, and denominates the clothed person; for no real mode is added by this clothing above quantity, and its figure and position. The same finally is

true of when, whether its form is duration in common, or time, because neither duration from the thing that endures, nor time from motion is distinguished from the nature of the thing. All of which we now take as more probable for us, but they are to be proved in what follows. Therefore I think that, if the number of categories beyond those three that are really distinguished among themselves were to be completed only from other accidental modes actually distinct in the thing itself and first diverse, both among themselves and from those three categories, only two others could be added to those three, namely dependence or action, and where, or at most three, if perhaps some relations speak of proper modes distinct from the nature of the thing, concerning which later.

### *Third Opinion & its Approval*

22. Therefore there is a third opinion, which considers that distinction from our mode of conceiving founded in the thing suffices for the distinction of categories, which is called by some distinction of reasoned reason, by others it is called formal distinction. So think Soncinas and Javellus, and more broadly Capreolus, In I, distinction 8, question 2, to 18 and 19; Ockham, In I, distinction 24, question 2, to 1 for the first opinion, and distinction 3, question 3, where he treats of relations, and In II, question 2, and Quodlibet V, question 22; Henry, in the Summa, article 32, question 5. And this same thing is held by those who say categories are distinguished according to diverse modes of predicating about primary substance, which is the foundation of all categories. As St. Thomas speaks, Metaphysics V, lecture 9, and Metaphysics XI, lecture 9, at the end; and Alexander of Hales, Metaphysics V, text 14, where the Commentator also signifies this. But since the mode of predicating follows the mode of being, as St. Thomas says in the prior place cited above, therefore it comes to the same thing to say categories are distinguished according to diverse modes of being, as St. Thomas speaks, On Truth, question 1, article 1,

and several others from the aforesaid authors, provided we understand that those diverse modes of being need not be actually distinct on the part of the thing, but have sufficient foundation, by reason of which they can be so distinguished by reason that from them arise modes of predicating first diverse according to the account of conceiving and abstracting diverse genera.

23. But this opinion so explained is sufficiently proved from what was said against the others, for if the categories of accidents are not distinguished among themselves really, nor from the nature of the thing, or modally, they can only be distinguished by reason, because no other mode of distinction remains, though nevertheless it is necessary that some distinction intervene among categories. Again, since there is latitude in distinction of reason, it seems necessary that this distinction among categories be maximal; for first it cannot be of reason reasoning alone, because this has no foundation in the thing, but is feigned or arises only from comparison of the intellect; whence it can be multiplied infinitely; therefore it must be such distinction of reason as has foundation in the thing. And because the genera of categories, as conceived and abstracted by us, are first diverse, therefore it is necessary that the foundation of this distinction be such that from it arise relations or modes of denominating primary substance, which cannot be reduced to one generic concept. Therefore, although among the forms themselves or quasi-forms of diverse categories there is not always actual distinction in the thing, nevertheless their distinction according to reason is always taken from comparison or relation to things distinct in the thing itself, as between action and passion, from comparison to the principle of acting or suffering, and so concerning others. All of which will be established more broadly from the discussion of all the categories.

*The Foundations of Other Opinions are Resolved*

24. First. Nor do the motivations of other opinions just set forth stand in the way. For to the first it is responded that for distinguishing various genera under being it is necessary that all those things be real, not however that they be actually distinct in the thing, because the distinction of some genera can be according to reason. And it must be taken with the same proportion, when they are said to be first diverse, namely in that genus of diversity or distinction which they participate; for according to that they are not reduced to one common genus.

25. Second. To the second, the antecedent is first denied; for according to the opinion of many, in the category of quality the same form of heat, as it is the term of motion, is in the species of passible quality, and, as it is the principle of acting, it is in the species of power. And the same surface, as it affects intrinsically the containing body, is in the species of surface; but as it contains something else, it is in the species of place under the same genus of quantity. And (what is more certain) the relation of likeness and unlikeness are specifically diverse, although in the thing they are not distinguished in the same foundation. Nor does it matter that specific distinction is called essential; for this itself must be understood proportionally, namely, concerning real distinction, or concerning categorical, or conceivable distinction. Nor is it similar concerning divine attributes; for those, even if they are distinguished by reason, on account of the infinity they have in the genus of being, mutually include each other essentially; whence in the latitude of distinction of reason they are distinguished less than diverse genera or species.

26. Third. To the third it is responded that from here the first difficulty touched upon at the beginning of the section is rather more easily resolved; for to that whole difficulty it is responded in one word that it is correctly proved by the induction made there that distinction from the nature of the thing among all categories is not necessary. But how individual genera of accidents are to be distinguished among themselves in particular, we cannot say in this place, unless we first

declare the account of each exactly; and therefore we cannot say more about that difficulty now.

27. Fourth. To the fourth it has already been responded above, when we were treating of the distinction of substance and accident, that either greater distinction is required between substance and accident than among genera of accidents among themselves, or certainly, although physical accident is distinguished from the nature of the thing from substance, metaphysical or categorical accident does not always so distinguish in the thing, but sometimes by our conception and connotation of something extrinsic.

## *Whether Some Common Genus Can be Given to Many Categories of Accidents*

28. The opinion of some. In confirmation of the first difficulty posed at the beginning, another difficulty was sought, namely, whether these genera of accidents are so distinguished that neither all nor some of them can have some one common genus. For some moderns do not think it inconvenient for some common genus to be given, either to all those members, or to some of them; for the arguments made above seem to prove this. And the agreement in some genus does not prevent that division of nine genera, and of as many categories of accidents, from being conveniently handed down and having been necessary; because that division was given so that all things might be artificially reduced to certain classes, which we could use more easily for knowing the natures of things and so that the essence of a thing could easily be distinguished from accidents. For this it would not have sufficed to have distinction through two or three members, even if that were possible, and therefore it was necessary to distinguish in accidents those genera which speak of diverse relations to substance, caring nothing about confused agreement in some superior genus. It is added that we never read expressly in Aristotle that diverse categories cannot agree in one genus. For in the place

cited above, from Metaphysics VIII, last text, he does not say this openly, but only says being is not placed in the definitions of first genera, and consequently is not a genus, but he does not say no other thing can be a common genus. But in book X, chapter 5, he indeed says that things that differ in figure of predication differ in genus; nevertheless he says the same about the corruptible and incorruptible, and yet a common logical genus is not therefore excluded. Rather, from that place it can be taken that genera of categories are not necessarily first diverse, for there the distinction is constituted between things different and things diverse, for diverse things differ not by something, but by themselves, because they agree in nothing; but the different (he says) differs by something different; therefore it is necessary that there be something the same in which they differ; but this same thing is either genus or species, for everything different differs either in genus or species. Where he does not place things that differ in genus among things that are diverse, but among things that are properly different. And he adds examples of things that differ in genus in this way, saying: "In genus indeed, of which there is no common matter, nor mutual generation, such as those of which the figure of predication is different"; therefore things that differ in category differ in genus, not as first diverse.

29. The true and common opinion. Nevertheless it must be said with common opinion that all these members are distinguished under being or accident as first diverse genera, that is, not contained under any superior genus, neither all, nor any of them. This is the opinion of Aristotle, in the cited places, and especially Posterior Analytics I, chapter 11, and therefore he is accustomed to call categories genera by antonomasia; whence in chapter 9 of the Categories, he thus concludes: "Concerning the genera therefore proposed, let what has been said suffice." And Porphyry, in the chapter on Species, says that in individual categories there are both species, which are placed under genus and contain under themselves only individuals, and genera, which contain species under themselves and

are contained under genus, and some genus, which is only genus and not species. And Damascene, in his Dialectic, chapter 36, when he had distinguished the ten categories, says: "But it should be known that each of these genera is a supreme genus." And again: "But of these ten categories, that is, supreme genera, substance alone is one, the remaining nine are accidents." And this is the common opinion of all philosophers, who therefore teach that the supreme genera of individual categories do not consist of genus and difference, nor are properly definable, but are simple concepts.

30. From what was also said in the previous section it is established that no sufficient reason for that division can be given, unless all its members are supreme genera. And the same reason applies to the number of ten categories; for a category is nothing other than the due disposition and coordination of essential predicates, from which those things that are predicated in quid of an individual are placed above it in a straight line, ascending from inferiors to superiors; but this line, just as it begins from the lowest, that is, from the individual, so it is not terminated except at some supreme genus, otherwise no sufficient reason can be given why it terminates in one genus rather than another. Nor will a reason be able to be given why substance does not constitute two or three categories, namely of body and spirit, or of corruptible and incorruptible body, and spirit, or at least of corruptible and incorruptible substance, which Aristotle calls generically diverse. And conversely, there will be no reason why action and passion do not belong to the same category, and so concerning others. Finally the reason must be a priori, because the mode of contraction or determination of being or accident to these supreme headings of categories is not through true composition through difference which can be outside the account of genus, which account Aristotle touched upon in Metaphysics II, and which we declared above concerning the division of being into substance and accident. But concerning the present division of accident into nine genera, it

will be explained in the following section, and therefore we shall say nothing more here about this first part of that confirmation.

31. The genera of diverse categories agree in no essential difference. But to the other part of the same confirmation, it must be denied that the genera of diverse categories agree in any essential difference properly contractive of genus. For, although there are some concepts common to many categories, which are predicated of them by way of differences, as are those which are numbered in that argument, nevertheless either they are only negative concepts, or they are not univocal, but analogical, or certainly they are not differences contracting some common genus outside whose account they are, but simple modes determining some transcendental account which they intrinsically include; as, for example, those two members corporeal and incorporeal are very equivocal and analogical; for they can both divide being into substance and accident, and only in the second way can they have the account of differences, with respect to complete substance, which they do not include in their precise concept; but not with respect to being or accident, which they necessarily include in their concepts however precise. But concerning the difference of absolute and respective it must be said that the account of absolute consists in negation, and therefore does not constitute an essential difference common to many categories. But if you insist, because that negation has some positive foundation which is circumscribed by it, it is responded that it indeed has some foundation, but not one and the same which is common to all absolute accidents; for often negation is common, although its foundation is diverse. For prodigality and avarice lack the honesty of liberality, but from diverse foundation. So therefore all absolute accidents agree in lack of respect; but that negation belongs to each from its proper mode of affecting, per se first diverse from any other. Whence that negation also belongs to substances in its own way. But respective, if it is taken according to its proper account, constitutes one genus; but if it is taken broadly, it cannot constitute genus, because it is something transcendental found

in all genera, as was touched upon above and will be declared more broadly in what follows. And through these things the response to other examples is also evident.

### *The Place of Aristotle from Metaphysics Book X is Explained*

32. But before we respond to the second heading of the difficulty posed at the beginning, the place of Aristotle from Metaphysics X, chapter 5, must be explained, by which it seemed to be proved that a genus common to things of diverse categories can be given. Which is indeed difficult, although no interpreter has declared the sequence of that context, except one Alexander of Hales, who admits a certain equivocation in the words of that text. For when Aristotle says that things that differ are the same in something, he takes "differ" properly; but when he adds: "But this same thing is either genus or species," Alexander says it should be understood that this same thing in which different things agree and diverse things differ, is genus or species. Whence when Aristotle adds: "For everything different differs either in genus or species," Alexander says "different" should be taken for "diverse," insofar as it is common to different properly and first diverse. This exposition, if we consider only Aristotle's intention in that text, seems indeed incredible; for, since there he treats almost only of difference of words, and assigns proper signification, in which different is distinguished from diverse, it would seem most inappropriate that he would use that equivocation of voice. Nevertheless the exposition seems necessary, considering the sequence of the text; for, if Aristotle had called things different in genus which have agreement under genus, he would not have said that things differ in genus which do not have common matter, for this generic difference rather consists in lack of common physical genus; whence immediately rather he adds that things differ in species which agree in genus; therefore he understands things to differ in genus

which do not agree in genus. And he suggests two modes, namely, of differing in physical genus, as in those which do not agree in matter, and in logical genus, as in those which are distant in category. Therefore, when Aristotle takes "different," so that he distinguishes it into different in genus and different in species, he takes "different" as it is common to diverse and properly different, for to differ in genus is not properly to differ, but to be diverse, because that in which things that properly differ are the same, is only either genus or species (as Aristotle says there); but those things which differ in genus are not the same either in species or genus. For as the words themselves suggest, to differ in genus does not signify to differ under genus, but to differ, that is, not to agree in genus, just as to differ in species is not to differ under species, otherwise individuals would differ in species, because they differ individually under species. According to this interpretation therefore, that place of Aristotle rather confirms the common opinion.

### *That There are Not More Genera of Accidents Than Nine*

33. It remains that we respond to the arguments posed in the second place, by which it seemed to be proved that the number of categories of accidents should be increased. And in the first argument indeed it is asked concerning these denominations "seen," "loved" and similar ones, to what category they belong, and universally it is asked in those arguments, if extrinsic denomination, or the form from which it is taken, sometimes directly constitutes some category, why does it not always constitute one whenever the denomination is taken from something real, and in what way all such denominations are contained under these nine categories; or, if these denominations cannot properly constitute a category and genus of accident, what reason of difference should be applied, or what rule should be observed for constituting such extrinsic categories of accidents. And indeed many of the arguments proposed there seem to prove that not all these

denominations are taken from some accidents or forms which are directly placed in some category of accident, insofar as they so denominate. But the reason or general rule perhaps cannot be handed down as one in all cases, but this can come about from diverse headings.

### *To The First Difficulty Concerning Acts Denominatively Extrinsically*

34. What conditions the extrinsically denominating form requires to be placed in a category. But so that we may explain this in some way, it should be noted that that category which is constituted through extrinsic denomination requires three principal conditions from the part of the denominating thing. First, that, although it is not an inherent form, it nevertheless has some mode of form, that is, of perfecting or actuating that which it denominates; for the common account of accident includes that it be some kind of form of that to which it happens. Second, that that denomination be per se distinct from the other genera of categories, so that it is not intrinsically included in any of them, because categories must be unmixed and first diverse. Third, that such denomination not be quasi-composite or aggregated from forms of several categories, because in categories only beings are constituted insofar as they are somehow per se one and incomplex. Therefore the extrinsically denominating form, if it has all these conditions, will be constituted per se and directly in some of the said nine genera; but whenever extrinsic denomination, although it is in some way real, does not directly belong to any of the nine genera, it is always from defect of some of the said conditions.

35. Therefore immanent acts, insofar as they denominate objects as known or loved, do not constitute a peculiar categorical genus, indeed not even a peculiar account or species of some category, because, as we shall declare later, in the very entity of the immanent act three accounts can be considered, namely, of action, insofar as they

actively flow from potencies, in which way they look to the category of action; and of passion, insofar as they intrinsically in some way change the potencies themselves; and of quality, insofar as they are certain forms informing the potencies themselves. And under this account the denomination of these acts passes over in some way to objects; therefore they do not constitute under that account a peculiar genus or species of accident. First indeed, because that account of denominating comes from such quality by virtue of the formal effect which it gives to its potency, for through it the potency is carried toward the object, and thence the denomination of the object is taken. And thus it is intrinsically included in the very account of such quality. Whence it also happens that it does not denominate the object as form or perfection of it, but only as term toward which it tends. And, although in the mode of denominating it is signified by way of passion, nevertheless it does not participate in the true account of passion. And therefore in this it is not similar concerning real action and passion, for passion is true affection of the subject. But action, although it is not affection of the acting potency as such, is nevertheless like exercise of it, and therefore is compared to it by way of act, and thus also speaks of a relation altogether distinct, according to the conceived account, from the relation of passion.

### *To the Second Difficulty Concerning Place, Clothing & Similar Things*

36. From here it is easily responded to the second, in which place as denominating the locater and located, and clothing as denominating the one clothing formally and the clothed, are compared with action and passion. For the similarity of account is denied, because form as informing and as denominating the informed, does not speak of two diverse accounts, but one and the same diversely signified; but place and clothing are related as forms, and thus to place a surface is not to effect, but to inform, and therefore it as

locating and as denominating something else located does not constitute two categorical accounts. And similarly state, which is formally clothing and denominates the clothed, is one and the same extrinsic form, whose information intrinsically includes those two; just as whiteness can also be called whitening, and the subject is called whitened.

### *To The Third & Fourth Difficulty Concerning Artificial & Moral Denominations*

37. To the third it is responded that artificial denominations, if they are simple and in some way per se, belong to the said genera, and of this kind is that denomination of the gilded, which belongs to the category of state, and the same is true of similar ones; but if they are denominations taken from aggregation of things of several genera, thus it is not necessary that they be contained under one category, but it suffices that according to parts they be reduced to those. And of this kind I think is the denomination of army, people, republic and similar ones. Through which the solution to the fourth is also evident; for other moral denominations, which are touched upon in it, are taken from immanent acts, as they are terminated toward objects, concerning which it has already been said. And for a special reason those denominations are sometimes called of reason, because they do not require real existence of the denominating thing, but are taken from what has preceded.

### *To the Fifth Difficulty Concerning Motion & Other Causalities*

38. To the fifth concerning motion, as it is compared to action and passion, there are various ways of responding, concerning which more broadly below in the category of passion. Now I briefly think that motion generically taken, as it is said of every change, is the same

as passion, for motion is the act of the movable and passion of the patient, and, just as motion affects the movable in order to the term, so also passion. But if motion is considered precisely as it is the way to the term and denominates its becoming, it does not constitute a special categorical account, either because it only speaks of the term itself in imperfect being, and thus is reduced to the category of that, or certainly on account of two accounts touched upon above in immanent acts, namely, because that denomination both is intimately included in the formality of passion and action, and because it is not compared to the term by way of form affecting the subject, but only by way of way or relation tending toward the term; for thus (as is probable) generation, as it happens in primary matter, has the account of passion of accident to that; nevertheless, as it denominates the generated term, it does not constitute a special categorical account, nor is it related as accident of it.

39. In what category the causalities of other causes than the efficient are situated. But what is touched upon in the same argument concerning the causalities of other causes, must be resolved thus. Final causality says no mode distinct from the causality of the agent in the thing; it only speaks of intentional relation of the causality of the agent itself to the end; for which reason that causality is usually called rather intentional than real and metaphorical motion, and therefore it was not necessary to constitute a peculiar category on account of this causality. But the causality of form is nothing other than its information, which intrinsically belongs to the being of that thing which is constituted through form; therefore information no more than form constitutes a special category. Therefore each information is reduced to the category, genus and species of its form. For just as information of substantial form, because it intrinsically belongs to the constitution of substance, is not accident, but something belonging to the category of substance, so proportionally it must be said concerning information of quantity, quality, etc. And from here it also happens that abstract and concrete of accidents belong proportionally

to the same categories, because, as we said above, the concrete of accident, as it formally belongs to genus or category of accident, only adds actual inherence or information of subject. But the causality of matter, insofar as composite consists from it, for the same reason does not constitute a special genus of being as the causality of form, because it is also intrinsic causality belonging to the constitution of some being, especially the causality of primary matter with respect to composite, which is per se one. Whence it is probable that such causality of matter in the thing is not a mode distinct from the causality of form, as was said above. But insofar as matter is cause of generation of the thing, thus it must be said that passion as passion belongs to material causality, because it is the effection of subject, as it is patient, which respect belongs to material causality, at least in order to the effect in becoming, as I declared above. But this later effect does not have place in form, because form as form is not cause of generation, but rather effect.

40. The objection is satisfied. You will say: if the account of cause, either all or some, constitutes a special category of accident, why not also the account of effect as such? For this should respond proportionally to the account of cause as cause. I respond that the reason is ready at hand from what was said. For if in effect the thing made is considered, thus it is placed in a category, or rather in all categories, for only created things are constituted in those, which all are certain effects; although for the constitution of category, or for the division we are now treating, it does not matter that things are actually effected or caused, or that they can be caused; for in either way things are of the same nature and essence which is presently considered. In which sense it is true that a thing in act and in potency is of the same genus and category. But if in effect the categorical relation is considered, thus it is placed in some category together with the relation of cause. If finally we speak of effect as to the pure and formal denomination of effect, thus for the same reason it does not constitute a special category distinct from the rest, as we said above that motion,

insofar as it is the way to the term, does not constitute a special category; because to be an effect is the same as to be the term of motion or production. Whence in all effects such respect or denomination is included intrinsically, either in action, if it is taken actively, because every action acts something; or in the category of passion, if it is taken passively, for through every passion something is made. I except only passive creation, which, as it is the becoming of its term, is not true passion. But that under that consideration does not have the account of accident, because, since it does not suppose the term, but rather tends toward constituting it, it cannot regard it as subject, nor accidentally affect it, which reason is also common to any passion or change insofar as it tends toward the term, and denominates its becoming or having been made. And therefore under that account either it is reduced to the category of its term, or certainly it is included in the account of action or passion.

### *To the Sixth Difficulty Concerning Certain Accidents of Angels*

41. In the sixth difficulty it is asked that we explain whether accidents of immaterial things are placed under these genera. And, because in other things the matter is clearer, this is specially inquired concerning the where and durations of angels. Which matter is to be explained ex professo while disputing about the genera of where and when. And therefore it is briefly said that, insofar as these are accidents of angels, they are comprehended under these genera, even if they are in them in a diverse way than in corporeal things. For, just as angelic substances have a diverse mode of being than corporeal ones, and nevertheless belong to the same category, so also the accidents of these substances taken proportionally can have univocal agreement in their proper genera, by reason of which they belong to the same categories, as we shall see in individual cases.

### *To The Seventh Difficulty, Concerning Properties of Categories*

42. In the seventh difficulty it is asked concerning the properties which Aristotle attributes to individual categories of accidents, whether those also constitute proper genera of accidents. To which it must be said briefly that some of those properties consist in actual or aptitudinal relation, which belong directly to the category of relation or are reduced by reason of aptitude or connotation, as to be equal, or unequal, etc.; others add only negation, as not to have a contrary; others connote only something extrinsic, as to have a contrary; others explain the intrinsic mode of proper entity, as to have intension. And all these properties do not add some new genus, as is sufficiently evident from the declaration itself. But when the property of some accident is positive, and speaks of a proper and special mode of affecting the subject whose property it is, then that property will belong to the proper genus of accident, yet it will always look to some of the nine genera numbered above; for thus figure can be said to be a property of quantity, and state, of power, and yet they belong to the genus of quality. But concerning the account of measure, which is there specially touched upon, I think it does not belong to the essence of any accident, indeed it is not even a real intrinsic property of any category, but is only a certain denomination in order to acts of reason, concerning which matter we shall speak broadly in treating of quantity.

### *To the Last Difficulty, Concerning Postpredicaments*

43. In the last difficulty it is asked why Aristotle placed certain things or denominations in the postpredicaments, if the division of accident through nine genera is sufficient. But the response is easily evident from what was said; for concerning motion it has

already been said, but other denominations are not taken from affecting forms, but from coexistence, or from connotation of another extrinsic thing, as to be simultaneous, or prior, or to have opposite; and universally, to have as such does not speak of the account of form; for even subject has accidents, and whole has parts, and even something altogether extrinsic is said to be had. Therefore in these denominations no proper account of accident intervenes, unless perhaps insofar as some relation can intervene in them. And therefore Aristotle, so that he might explain all formulas of speaking or denominating which can contribute to handing down doctrine, declared those in the postpredicaments.

## SECTION III
## WHETHER THE AFORESAID DIVISION IS UNIVOCAL OR ANALOGOUS

1. The reason for doubting on both sides. The reason for the difficulty is that no mode of analogy seems to be able to intervene here; for accident is not said of other accidents through attribution to some one thing contained under accident, as is evident per se. But that all things are beings or accidents through relation to substance does not suffice for analogy among them, because that to which all refer is not contained under the concept of accident. Just as created substances are also substances through some attribution to the uncreated, and nevertheless they are univocally substances. Nor can analogy of proportionality intervene here, because accidents are not extrinsically or metaphorically accidents, but properly and intrinsically; but proportionality does not constitute analogy, unless where metaphor or impropriety intervenes in some of the extremes, as was said above. For genus is also said of species according to proportionality, which does not exclude truth and propriety of the thing. But on the contrary it is because, if accident were univocal, it

would be a genus, and consequently there would not be nine supreme genera of accidents.

### *First Opinion, that Accident is Analogous*

2. In this matter almost all who hold that being is analogous to substance and accident, also hold that accident is analogous to the nine genera. So holds Cajetan, On Being and Essence, chapter 7, question 15, to 4, in which it was inferred that accident would be a genus, if being-in were essential and common to all accidents. The same holds Soncinas, Metaphysics IV, question 1, where to 1 he says the genera of categories are first diverse, because they agree in no univocal account, and book XII, question 47, article 1, he also says nothing is univocally common to first diverse things. Which Alexander of Hales also suggests, Metaphysics V, text 33, at the end, where the Philosopher also favors; for he denies that things which differ in categorical figure can be resolved into one. But it can be understood of one genus. But this response stands in the way, and consequently favors this opinion St. Thomas, Against the Gentiles I, chapter 32, reason 3, where he proves nothing is predicated of God and creatures univocally, because nothing is predicated of them as genus or species, etc.; which reason can be applied to accident; therefore either it must be confessed to be a genus, or denied to be univocal. And in the same way Porphyry favors, both by enumerating five predicables, beyond which he does not acknowledge any other common and univocal predicate, otherwise that would be a certain universal, distinct from the rest; and also because in the chapter on Species he considers being not to be a genus for no other reason than that it is not univocal. Furthermore Aristotle, Posterior Analytics I, chapter 11, teaches that that proposition in which one supreme genus is denied of another is immediate, because there is no predicate superior to any of them through which it might be demonstrated. But

the said authors do not explain what kind of analogy this is, nor on what it is founded, or of which genus of accidents accident is first said.

*Second Opinion, that Accident is Univocal*

3. For which reason others also from St. Thomas's disciples hold that accident is a univocal predicate to the nine genera. So holds Soto, in chapter 4 of the Antepredicaments, question 2, to 1; and the same thing Javellus supposes, Metaphysics VII, question 1, to 3 of Anthony Andreae objecting, if inherence is common and essential to quantity and quality, it will be that accident is a genus; for he responds, that for something to be a genus it does not suffice to be common to those of which it is said and to be predicated in quid and univocally, unless it also speaks of a determinate nature, and therefore it is not a genus. Therefore he supposes it to have other conditions, namely, to be predicated in quid and univocally. And from here is collected the proper reason of this opinion, namely, because accident as such is common, not only according to name, but also according to account, and that account is immediately participated by all those genera to which it is common, without any order of them among themselves; therefore it has everything required for univocation. The consequence is evident from everything said above concerning the analogy of being; but the antecedent is evident as to individual parts, because accident in common is defined to be being in another, in the sense declared in section 1, which account is common to all the said genera; nor does it belong to any through respect to another. For when Aristotle said accident is being's being, by the name being he understood being simply, which is substance, as all understand and is also established from Metaphysics VII, where for this reason substance is said to be prior in definition to accident; but he never said one accident is prior in definition than another; therefore all accidents participate that account without any order among themselves; therefore nothing is lacking to it for true univocation. And it is

confirmed, because secondary analogates are usually defined through order to the first analogate; but the genera of accidents neither under the common account of accident, nor as such accidents, are defined through respect to any of the said genera of accidents; therefore.

### *The Difficulty of Both Opinions is Opened*

4. Although these authors admit that accident is univocal, nevertheless they do not admit it to be a genus. But Soto gives the reason, because accident is not predicated in quid; because it does not signify (he says) formally the quiddities of accidents, but their being in substance. But he assumes something false in this reason, because accident does not say actually to inhere, but aptitudinally, which is of the quiddity of accident, as we saw above. Also, because all accidents agree in some account not only accidental and extrinsic, but also essential, which can be abstracted by one concept and signified by one word; but this account is signified by the name accident, and not by way of form, so that it is predicated in quale; therefore this predication in quid is as much: quality is accident, as this: body is substance.

5. Therefore Javellus suggests another reason, and Soto declares it more, namely, that accident is not a genus because it does not have differences outside its account; for every mode by which accident can be determined to quantity, quality, and similar things, is also accident; but it is of the account of genus that it be outside the account of differences, that is, that according to precise concepts it is not included in them, nor is per se said of them, as is established from the doctrine of Aristotle, Metaphysics III, text 10. This reason is consonant with the doctrine of Scotus, In I, distinction 3, question 3, article 2, and distinction 2, question 2, where according to the doctrine of Aristotle he says being is not a genus, not because it is not univocal, but because it is predicated in quid of some difference.

6. But Ferrariensis attacks this reason in similar case, Against the Gentiles I, chapter 32, saying that it correctly follows, if a predicate

is so common that it does not have differences outside its account, that it is not a genus, as Aristotle plainly teaches; nevertheless the proximate cause of this thing is that such predicate cannot be univocal; for, if it were univocal, it would have differences, of whose understanding it would not be. Because being outside the concept of differences is not of the first and essential account of genus; for that is only a certain negation; but the positive account of genus is; therefore that negation is concomitant, or necessarily consequent upon the account of genus. And therefore it is correctly inferred a posteriori that what does not have that condition is not a genus; but much better it follows a priori that whatever has the positive account of genus also has that condition. And therefore it is repugnant to say something is univocal and predicated in quid of many essentially diverse things, and does not have differences outside its account; because this is to say something has the complete positive action of genus, and not the negative property per se consequent upon such account. And he confirms, for every univocal thing speaks of one form abstractible from inferiors, which is essentially divided into several things; therefore either through differences properly taken, of whose understanding it is not, and the intended is obtained; or through diverse modes of being, and this is repugnant. First, because two species of quality, for example, are quidditatively accidents, and nevertheless agree in the same mode of being. Second, because modes of being are not of the essence of created thing, since in creatures being is distinguished from essence; but the diversity of accidents is essential. Third, because in whiteness, for example, there would be two quiddities, one of accident and another of difference, and thus neither would be said in recto of whiteness, because part is not predicated of whole, nor would whiteness be one simply. For Ferrariensis forms these reasons concerning being, which are applied with the same proportion to accident.

7. But this objection is not of great moment. For that genus must be a nature so limited that it can be prescinded from the

differences by which it is contracted, belongs per se primarily to the account of genus, as is taken from Aristotle, in the cited place, and Topics IV, chapter 6, places 64 and 71. Nor does it matter that that property is declared through negation; for through that negation a positive property and condition of generic nature is circumscribed, namely, that it be a nature so limited and precise, that it is apt for composing metaphysically with difference a specific nature; but this belongs essentially to genus as genus not only concomitantly and consecutively, but essentially. Which is evident, because it is essential to species to be composed of genus and difference; but genus essentially regards species; therefore it is of the essence of genus to have aptitude for composing species; but in this aptitude is essentially included that it be a nature according to account precise from difference. Just as conversely it is of the account of difference that according to account it be precise from genus, for these two are compared as metaphysical act and potency. Whence also a proportional argument can be taken, for it is of the account of primary matter that it be an entity distinct from form, which distinction, although it is negation, through it nevertheless the limitation and potentiality of matter is indicated, which is necessary to it so that it can be an essential physical part apt for composing the whole by way of potency; therefore by proportional reason it is of the account of genus that metaphysically it be outside the account of difference.

8. What is required for the quidditative account of genus. Therefore it must be denied that the integral quidditative account of genus is contained in this, that it be a univocal predicate and in quid and common to several essentially diverse things, unless it be of determinate nature, which can have differences outside its account. This particle is sufficiently suggested in the account of genus, when it is said to be that which is predicated in quid of several differing in species; because species to which genus speaks relation, is constituted through proper difference added to genus. Whence, although it is admitted that accident is univocal and predicated in quid, it must be

denied that it is predicated properly of several differing in species, but of several first diverse or differing in genus, because supreme genera are not species, even if they have a common univocal predicate which is quasi-transcendent with respect to those. Nor does it matter that accident is predicated of whiteness and blackness, for example, which differ in species, because it is not predicated of them according to immediate relation and relation (in which way the account of genus should be understood), but through intermediate genera first diverse.

9. But to the confirmation of Ferrariensis the posterior part of the dilemma should be chosen, namely that such common predicate can be determined through intrinsic modes which are not proper differences. For we have already declared above, in treating of the concept of being, what kind of determination that is, by which a common transcendent predicate can be limited to determinate natures without proper composition with differences in which it is not included, but through confused or distinct conception of intellect alone. And indeed, if the objections of Ferrariensis were effective, they would prove no less concerning analogous concept than concerning univocal; but neither proves either. For to the first it is responded that two species of quality agree in generic or categorical mode of being, nevertheless they do not agree in that mode of being in which things of another category agree; but accident is distinguished into supreme genera through various modes of those, not through modes of the same category. Therefore, although accident is divided through modes of being into various genera, nevertheless it is not said only of things first diverse through those modes, but also of things distinct under those modes. Add that, although the differences of whiteness and blackness are proper differences with respect to color or quality, nevertheless they are not with respect to accident, but with respect to that they are only first diverse modes of being, because they have no common genus, but only accident itself which they quidditatively include. In the second argument equivocation is committed, because, when we treat of modes of being, we do not understand concerning

being of actual existence, but concerning essence or concerning aptitude of being, or rather of inhering in this or that way. But the third reason is of lesser moment, for it only follows that in quality there are two quidditative concepts, one confused and common of accident, another proper of quality, which does not prevent the concept of quality from being simply and per se one, because the account of accident is per se determined to that, nor does it prevent accident from being predicated of quality not by way of part, but by way of potential whole. And the same must be said concerning that mode by which accident is determined to be of quality, if it is conceived abstractly, especially since its concept from the part of the thing and formal account conceived is not other from the concept of quality itself, but only from mode of conceiving, as we said above. Therefore those reasons are not effective against the said opinion.

10. The greater difficulty for me is in applying the aforesaid reason or response to the matter in which we are engaged. For either there is discourse concerning accident as it abstracts from complete and incomplete, or concerning complete accident. In the prior way, although it is true that it cannot have differences outside its account, because accident cannot be contracted except through accident at least incomplete, just as we said proportionally concerning substance, nevertheless it is not true that accident so conceived is univocal; because, just as substance is not said univocally of complete and incomplete substance, or of species and differences of substance, so also accident is not said univocally of complete and incomplete. For the proportion is the same; for the account of accident simply and per se first is saved in accidental form, which properly and per se regards substance; but in accidental differences it is only secundum quid; nor can differences properly be said to be accidental forms, but something of accidental form. But if there is discourse concerning complete accident, the response given cannot proceed, as it seems; for, if accident thus taken is univocal, it cannot be denied that it has differences outside its account; therefore nothing will be lacking to it

for true account of genus. The antecedent is evident first, by argument made from similar concerning substance, because, for that to be genus, it suffices that complete substance be contracted through incomplete. Second, because in truth complete accident is not intrinsically included in the concept of incomplete accident; but every difference of accident is incomplete accident. Third, because otherwise supreme genera could not be assigned in individual categories of accidents, because quantity cannot be contracted except through difference which is incomplete quantity, and so concerning others.

11. It can be responded that in the account of accident there is nothing incomplete, because the account of accident is very imperfect and such that it is served integrally and completely in any least accident, even if under inferior accounts of accidents it is considered incomplete, as, for example, point is something incomplete in the account of quantity; but in the account of accident it is complete accident, because it inheres as truly as any perfect accident. But this response is not without difficulty, as is evident from what was said above concerning the division of accident into complete and incomplete; for it can hardly be given sufficient reason why those two members have place in any category of accident, and not in accident as such. Nor does it seem that it can be denied that integral forms, for example, of quantity and quality, have among themselves some real agreement which they do not have with their constituting or contracting differences, because differences precisely and formally taken are not proper forms; just as in substantial forms there is given agreement in common account of substantial form, which does not belong to differences by which the common concept of substantial form is contracted to this or that species of substantial form. And by that concept, which is directly common to substantial forms, the complete substantial form in common can be said to be conceived, which concept is no doubt that it has differences outside its account; therefore by parity of reason we can reason in accidental forms. Therefore it is difficult, given univocation of accident, to give reason

why some generic concept of accident to the categories of accidents cannot be abstracted. And therefore others, so that they may flee this difficulty, deny univocation; but they are led by argument from inconvenience alone, and do not declare how without order of accidents among themselves there is analogy. Therefore this is the difficulty of this controversy.

### *Resolution of the Question*

12. Accident, as it comprehends nine genera, is analogous. Therefore in this matter I think first that accident in its whole latitude, as it comprehends nine genera, is not univocal, but analogous. This conclusion I am most persuaded of especially on account of those genera of accidents which only extrinsically surround or denominate; for those are not inherent with that propriety, with which other accidents inhere which are true informing forms. Which can easily be established by reality and examples. For who would think, with that propriety and truth clothing affects or informs the clothed man, with which whiteness the white man, or knowledge the knower? Also in what way can action, as action, be thought to affect or inform the agent, in whom passion is not received, with the same propriety as the patient in whom it inheres? Therefore I think accident primarily belongs to those accidents which properly inhere and affect their subjects; then by translation, or very imperfect similitude that name has been derived to others which in some way imitate that account. Whence it is probable to me that analogy of proportionality intervenes here; for those are called most properly accidents, which inhere; but from here those things are called accidents which are around substance, as state, containing place. Also those which are from substance; for certainly to be in and to be from seem to be relations so diverse that not except according to a certain proportionality has the name of accident been taken from them, and therefore action, as action, just as it does not say to be in properly

taken, but to be from the agent, is very analogically and improperly called accident of the agent, or rather to happen to it, insofar as it denominates it with a certain denomination, which is contingently said of it, and can belong and not belong to it. Therefore, since accident, as it is common to nine categories, comprehends under itself both those things which properly and internally inhere, and also those which are adjacent to or surround the thing and actions which flow from the thing and do not inhere in it, it cannot under this common account be univocal to all those things which it embraces under itself. And from here is taken a general rule, namely, all those things which are said to happen to something through extrinsic denomination alone, are called accidents only analogically, because those contingently imitate in mode of denominating, although nevertheless they do not truly inhere, but are related in the manner of inhering things. Which categories have this mode of only extrinsically happening, will be established from the treatment of individual ones.

13. Second assertion. Second it must be said that it is probable that accident, as it is said of entity and of accidental mode, is not univocal; nevertheless it seems more probable that that diversity alone does not always suffice for constituting analogy. In this assertion, what we understand through entity or accidental mode, must be supposed from what was said above, disputation VII, concerning distinctions and in disputation XVI, concerning accidental form. Whence the prior part of the assertion can be persuaded, for accidental entity has proper mode of informing and inhering; but accidental mode does not so; therefore they seem to agree analogically in the account of accidental form and in the account of accident, for accident signifies the same as accidental form. Also, the account of being seems to be found in a far more diverse way and more diminished in those things which are only modes than in those which have proper entity; therefore, since the account of accident includes the account of being, that also will be found diminished and only secundum quid in accidental modes, in comparison of accidental

entities; therefore accident will be said analogically of these. A sign of which also can be that accidental entity at least through power can be conserved per se and without subject, but accidental mode can in no way exist unless actually conjoined and modifying the thing whose mode it is.

14. Nevertheless the posterior part of the conclusion seems to be sufficiently proved from the fact that in the same category of accident are contained not only species which have proper accidental entities, but also those which are only modes of other things; as in the genus of quality is contained heat, which has proper entity, and figure, which is only a mode, and density, which is also a mode, indeed some think the same concerning power, others think the same concerning immanent act, even if it is quality. Therefore quality is said univocally of proper forms or entities and of qualifying modes; therefore also accident is said univocally of those; for, since accident is of the essence of quality, quality cannot univocally belong to those to which the account of accident does not belong simply and univocally. From which we further collect that, even if entity and accidental mode belong to diverse categories, that diversity in the account of mode and entity does not suffice for constituting analogy; for concerning this there is the same reason, whether such accidents are of diverse categories, or of the same. And the reason a priori is that that diversity of entity and mode from itself does not constitute either relation, or subordination among all those things which are such. Whence, although one is more imperfect than another, nevertheless it is not called accident through relation to another, and therefore this is not sufficient for analogy. Especially because, although mode is from its genus less perfect than entity, nevertheless in particular some mode can be more perfect than some entity, as substantial mode is more perfect than accidental entity; therefore that diversity of perfection does not always suffice for constituting analogy.

15. Third assertion. From these therefore I say third: although accident in its whole amplitude is not univocal, nevertheless with

respect to some it cannot be denied that it is said of them univocally. It is proved first from what was said, because at least it is said univocally of all species of the same category, as of heat and cold. Second, because it is also said univocally of entity and accidental mode, at least when they do not have relation or dependence among themselves. Third, because it also univocally regards quantity and quality, insofar as they are proper accidental forms really distinct from subject and informing it. For with respect to those no reason of analogy can be found; for either it will be analogy of proportionality, and this not, for true agreement and real similitude intervenes there; or it will be analogy of proportion, and this also cannot be said, because of neither is it said through relation to the other, as seems evident per se. For what some say, that it is said first of quantity, because quality inheres in substance through mediate quantity, is openly false; for rather quality from its genus is more perfect than quantity, since it is found in spiritual things. But that in corporeal things qualities suppose quantity, not only is not indication of analogy, but also is not argument that quantity is more perfect than any corporeal quality, because it is only supposed as a certain necessary condition, or by way of passive potency; but quality is by way of act; therefore there is no reason of analogy between quantity and quality with respect to accident. Therefore in these ways there is some univocation in accident, although it itself is not univocal in its whole latitude; for it is not repugnant for the same name to be univocal with respect to some, although it is not with respect to all its significations, as we said above while disputing concerning being.

16. Objection. But a difficulty immediately arises which was touched upon above, namely, that some concept of accident common to many categories is given, which is properly generic. For, although from what was said it is sufficiently obtained that accident cannot be a genus to all nine categories, because as such it is not univocal, but analogous, nevertheless some more contracted concept of accident will be able to be genus to some categories, as if accident is taken only

properly for that which truly inheres or intrinsically affects subject, or more strictly for entity and proper accidental form, so that it is distinguished from mode and is common to quality and quantity alone. For thus it is something univocal and quidditative and can have differences outside its account, as was declared above.

17. Solution. It is responded by denying the consequence, because no concept can be abstracted from things of diverse categories so univocal with respect to some, that it does not from some part include analogy with respect to others, or transcendence repugnant to the account of genus. As, if intrinsically affecting accident is taken as something common to entity and accidental mode, although according to that account it can have univocation, nevertheless as such it comprehends many things under itself which are not directly placed in any category, for example, the mode of inherence, which per se intrinsically affects both the inhering form, and also the subject to which it inheres; and although under such account it is incomplete accident, nevertheless absolutely and in the latitude of being perhaps it is not more diminished being than mode of location or passion, which constitute proper categories. By which it happens that concerning such concept of accident it is truly said that it cannot be so abstracted that it is common to complete accidents alone, that is, which are directly placed in categories of accidents, and therefore it cannot be genus, nor have differences outside its account, nor lack all analogy.

18. Again, if accident is taken for proper entity and accidental form, thus it only seems a certain concept composed of two simpler analogous concepts; for the concept of form as such is analogous to substantial and accidental form. But that mode, which is added when it is called accidental, cannot be so determinate and proper to some accidents, that it is not from itself common to all; for all have accidental mode of affecting; therefore that agreement is quasi-transcendental, and therefore cannot constitute generic concept, even if otherwise it is univocal with respect to some, or even if from

conjunction of several analogous concepts it is taken as proper or determined to such significates. But the reason a priori seems to be, that these supreme genera have a certain primary diversity in mode of affecting, which appears most clearly in quantity and quality, and therefore there is no agreement between them according to their proper accounts, but only in the account of happening (so to speak), which from itself is common to others. Therefore more is required for the account of genus than for the account of univocal predicate, even in quid; for for univocation it suffices to have proper and uniform or immediate relation to several according to the same account; but for genus beyond this it is necessary that it have neither transcendence in its formal account, nor analogy with respect to some, which is also necessary for the account of proper universal. And thus far concerning this division.

# DISPUTATION XL

## ON CONTINUOUS QUANTITY

Why quantity is placed first among the accidents. Aristotle, both in the book of Categories and in Metaphysics V, and in other places, wherever he enumerates the highest genera or categories, assigns the first place among accidents to quantity. Although quality is more perfect according to its genus, nevertheless, with respect to our knowledge, which is chiefly concerned with corporeal things, quantity is in a certain way prior and serves as the foundation of other accidents. Therefore, we have judged that this same order should be preserved. Although the notion of quantity is usually abstracted from both continuous and discrete quantity, for greater clarity and brevity we do not institute a disputation concerning quantity taken in common, because its essential character can scarcely be declared in such generality. Hence Aristotle, in the Categories, having given no definition of quantity in common, immediately divided it into continuous and discrete. Since therefore the essential character of quantity, insofar as it is a true accident distinct from substance, is found in continuous quantity (for discrete quantity, as we shall say below, is only a multitude of several quantities or quantified things), in this disputation we shall explain all things that pertain to continuous quantity. In the following disputation we shall treat discrete quantity, and complete other matters that pertain to the comparison and

consideration of both. First, however, we shall premise some general points so that at least the meanings of the terms may be understood.

## SECTION I
## WHAT QUANTITY IS, ESPECIALLY CONTINUOUS QUANTITY

1. In this section, we intend to declare not so much what the thing is, as what the names signify, and at the same time to summarize in brief what Aristotle teaches about quantity in Metaphysics V, chapter 13, where he first assigns a general description, then divisions of quantity.

### *Aristotle's Description of the Quantified is Explained, with Certain Difficulties Proposed*

2. According to Aristotle's view, therefore, it must be said that the quantified is that which is divisible into those things that are in it, each of which, or any one of which, is apt to be one something and a this something. Here someone might first ask why Aristotle defines not quantity, but the quantified, since for explaining the nature of quantity the concrete term is not as suitable as the abstract. For things are called quantified not only those that are quantified per se, but also those that are quantified per accidens. Hence that entire definition can apply to all of them, as we shall immediately say. Therefore, the nature of quantity is not conveniently explained through it, but at most it indicates what things are usually called quantified.

3. And furthermore, what seems more difficult, that entire description applies to many things that are not quantified, and does not apply to some things that are usually called quantified. The first part is proved first, because among substances, that which consists of matter and form is really divisible into those that are in it, that is, are

formally within it, since it is composed from them. Second, this substance is divisible into its substantial integrating parts. Nor is it sufficient to respond that substance has this by reason of quantity; for even if substance were understood to be preserved without quantity, it would be divisible into its substantial parts, since those always remain really distinct. And the same argument can be made about material accidental forms, such as whiteness and similar things, which are divisible into entitative parts, and this in two ways, namely, either according to extension or according to intension, and they have this latter divisibility per se and in no way through quantity. Furthermore, there are certain substantial or accidental modes that are divisible, and are in no way quantified. The antecedent is clear, for the union of the soul to the body is divisible, for when one part of the body is removed, a part of the union of the soul to that part is removed, while another partial union to the remaining parts of the body remains. Similarly, the mode of presence that an angel has in its adequate place is divisible, since one part of it can be removed while another remains, and yet these modes, since they are spiritual, are not quantified.

4. The other part, namely, that some quantified things are not divisible in this way, is clear. For first, heaven is quantified, and is not divisible in that way. Also, a natural minimum is not divisible, although it is quantified. And perhaps the same is true of the heterogeneous body of perfect animals; for it cannot be divided without at least one part ceasing to be the this something that it was before. Furthermore, the same is clear about time, motion, and other successive things; for these are quantified according to everyone's view, and yet they are not divisible into those things that are in them, for the parts of which they consist are not in them, but some are future, others have already passed. And then, in the same way that these are divisible into their parts, those parts are not such that after division each of them is apt to exist per se, or to be one something, for since those parts consist in succession, they cannot be so divided that both remain simultaneously in the character of a whole. Finally,

number is a certain quantified thing, and yet as such it is not divisible; this is clear because it is actually divided; but it is contradictory to be simultaneously in act and in potency. Or certainly, if number is divisible in some way, even the number of angels will be divisible, and yet it is not considered to be something quantified.

### *The Definition Is Explained, & the First Difficulty Is Solved*

5. Nevertheless, Aristotle's description is sufficient and excellent, especially if we consider his mind and intention in that place. For in that entire book V of the Metaphysics, he declares not so much the essences of things as the various significations of many terms, and thus through that description he explains more what this name "quantified" signifies than what quantity properly and according to its essence is; although while manifesting this, he simultaneously hints through a certain effect or sign more known to us what quantity itself is. Therefore, for two reasons he uses the concrete name "quantified" rather than the abstract. The first is because concrete terms are more known to us, and from them, as from effects, abstract terms can more easily be known. And thus when the quantified is said to be that which is divisible, etc., it is signified through this that quantity is that from which a quantified thing has that it is divisible in that way, in which the proper nature and essence of quantity is already hinted, as we shall declare more broadly below.

6. The second reason is to indicate the peculiar condition of quantity, which is not only a form by which another thing is quantified, but is itself also called quantified, because it is not only itself the reason on account of which other things become extended and divisible, but is also itself extended and divisible in itself. For it cannot itself extend another thing unless it is simultaneously co-extended with that thing, and has its own proper parts corresponding

to the parts of its object[41]. Therefore, the same form, insofar as it extends the parts of substance, is called quantity, as we shall say below; but insofar as it itself has parts extending themselves by their nature, or (so to speak) excluding each other from place, thus it is also itself called quantified, and as such it is also divisible. For this reason, therefore, it could be described not only in the abstract mode, but also in the concrete mode.

*The Individual Parts of the Definition Are Explained*

7. Having explained the defined term, to solve other difficulties that proceed against the definition, the definition must be briefly explained. In which it is first said: the quantified is divisible into those things that are in it, that is, into those things that are formally and really in the quantified thing itself. This clause is placed to exclude those things that are contained in something only virtually, like elements in a mixture. For although a mixture can be resolved into elements, nevertheless that thing is not quantified from this fact, nor formally under this aspect, because elements are not in the mixture formally, but only virtually. From this it is understood in passing that the parts of the quantified, into which it is actually divisible, are in the quantified thing itself according to their partial entities, for although before division none is one something and a this something, but they have this through division, as Aristotle says here, nevertheless according to that entity in which they can become a this something through division, they are really and formally in the quantified thing itself before division.

8. But it is added in the definition that such parts ought to be such that even after division each one, or any one of them, that is, each individual one of them, whether there are two or more, can be one something and a this something, that is, can remain per se, as a certain whole separated from others. Through this clause are excluded from

[41] obiecti, 1960; alit. subiecti. Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 14.

the nature of quantity all composites that, although they can be divided or resolved into their components, cannot do so in such a way that each can remain per se as one something and a this something, which will be established from the solution of the arguments. It is also tacitly insinuated in that clause that every quantified thing, even if it is minimal, is always divisible into those things that are in it, so that after division each of those things into which it is divided is one something, and consequently that divisibility, as far as it depends on the force of quantity, cannot be terminated unless division reaches non-quantified things, which is found in discrete quantity alone according to its proper nature, not in continuous quantity, because the former is composed of units that are not numbers, while the latter consists of quantified parts and cannot exist without them.

*The First Part of the Second Difficulty is Solved*

9. Through that clause, therefore, is excluded the resolution of composite substance into matter and form, because, although these truly are in the composite, nevertheless they are not apt so that after separation each of them is one something, because at least the form immediately perishes. Nor does it matter that in human death both separated parts remain, because at least on the part of matter it does not remain per se as one something, but always remains as a part of another composite, which is not per se necessary in the proper division of the quantified. Nor does it matter that God can preserve form and matter per se after separation, because that is beyond the natures of things; but here is discourse about the divisibility that a thing has from its nature. And thus satisfaction has been given to the prior difficulty about the division of composite substance into essential parts.

10. But what pertains to the other part about the division of material substance into integral parts, it was well answered there that material substance is not divisible in this way except by reason of

quantity. Hence when it is said that the quantified is that which is divisible, either it must be understood that it is divisible per se and by reason of itself, if the description is to be accommodated to quantity alone; or, if it is generally attributed to everything quantified, it must be attributed proportionally; for what is quantified per se is divisible per se; but what is quantified per accidens, or through another, will be divisible in the same way. Therefore material substance, just as it is quantified through another, is also divisible in the same way. And the same must be said proportionally about qualities and other material accidents insofar as they are divisible, about which matter is to be spoken more broadly below. But the objection from that supernatural case, in which God would preserve material substance without quantity, supposes many things to be treated below. First, that substance can be so preserved; second, that so preserved it has integrating parts, and their union; third, that it could then be divided into those parts that would remain per se after division. Having supposed the first two, however, about the third it must be said that substance so existing is not naturally divisible by physical and natural action, about which divisibility Aristotle speaks, and can be called properly quantitative division. And the reason is that a body is not naturally divisible by natural action except insofar as one body expels another or its parts from the place that it previously occupied; hence this division never occurs unless some impulse and local motion intervenes. But substance lacking quantity could neither impel another body, nor be impelled by it, nor could it be excluded from its place by another body, because it would not be in place in a quantitative way nor would it be impenetrable in place with any body, and therefore it would not be naturally divisible. But that such substance in that case could be divided by God into its parts matters nothing for the present, because that is neither natural division, nor would it be quantitative, but could be called entitative.

11. And from this the response to other instances about divisible modes is easily clear. For first, in them material and

quantitative divisibility does not have a place. Then this is explained from that clause, "each of which or any one of which is apt to be one something," through which all those things are excluded; for they can be increased or diminished, but not properly divided. For a thing is properly divided when, union being removed, the parts that were united are preserved separately; but it is diminished without division when something of it is destroyed and does not remain. Thus therefore it happens first in the intensive latitude of quality; for some degree can be removed from an intense quality, and in that sense it can be said to be broadly divisible; nevertheless two degrees of the same intense quality cannot (at least naturally) be so separated that each remains in the nature of things and is one quality; therefore that mode of divisibility that belongs to quality by reason of intension is very different from that which belongs to quantity by reason of extension. The same is almost true in the mode of union of the soul and the mode of local presence of an angel, for although they have some extension or divisibility, as the argument proves, for they can be diminished and, one part being lost, remain according to another, nevertheless they cannot be so properly divided that after division each divided part remains as one whole, because neither can the soul retain simultaneously two entirely divided inadequate unions, nor can an angel have two presences in no way united and continuous among themselves. Add that whatever divisibility these modes have is taken in some way from relation to something in some way quantified, as in the union of the soul from relation to the body, and in the presence of an angel from relation to true or imaginary space, which is related in the manner of a quantified thing.

### *The Second Part of the Second Difficulty is Satisfied*

12. Thus therefore it is established that nothing is divisible in the aforesaid way that is not quantified. But that there is also nothing quantified that is not divisible in this way will be explained and easily

shown by responding to the instances placed in the other member. The first was about heaven, which is quantified, and not divisible. To this it is usual to respond that something can be divisible in two ways: first in reality and execution, and in this way it is not of the nature of the quantified; in another way by designation of the mind, and in this way it is of the nature of the quantified to be divisible, insofar as in any quantified thing one part can be designated outside another. But, because this with respect to continuous quantity is more extension itself than divisibility, we can add that it is one thing to speak of the quantified precisely from the force of quantity, another by reason of the subject or matter in which quantity is. In the first way everything quantified is divisible, which is from itself, even in reality; in the latter way it can happen that by reason of the subject the same divisibility cannot be reduced to act, and thus it happens in heaven. Add that, although it cannot be divided by a natural agent, it can be divided by divine power. And the same must be said about a natural minimum. But about the heterogeneous whole there is no difficulty, because it can also be naturally divided, and the divided parts, although in the character of substance they do not remain of the same nature, in the character of the quantified they remain, and this is what pertains to the present matter.

13. But about successive things there would not be much concern, even if they were not comprehended under this definition, because they are not quantified per se, but per accidens, nor do they have extension entirely positive, but including negation, as we shall see below. Nevertheless, to satisfy every opinion, it must be said that in each quantified thing the parts ought to be in it proportionally and according to the mode of being of such an entity. Therefore in successive things parts are in them in a successive mode, and the whole is divisible into them, at least by designation of the mind; for thus several days are in the same time and are divided in it by the mind, and in reality one continuous motion could be divided into two,

not that are simultaneous (for this is against the nature of the successive), but that become successive in discrete succession.

### *Division of Quantity Into Continuous & Discrete*

14. In the last objection is touched the division of quantity into continuous and discrete, which Aristotle immediately gives after that definition, signifying that the definition applies to both members. But Aristotle adds that magnitude is that which is divisible into continuous things. This is not to be understood in the composite sense (so to speak), but in the divided sense, that is, magnitude is divisible into those things that are continuous before division, not that they remain continuous after division; for this involves contradiction, unless either continuity is understood to have to belong to individual divided parts in themselves and with respect to other parts of which they consist, or the division is made by mental designation alone. But Aristotle does not there declare what things are continuous, for he supposes this from what he had said above about the one, and from the Categories, where, in the chapter on Quantity, he says those things are continuous that are joined by one common terminus, which definition we shall more fully declare in the following sections, together with the subdivision of continuous quantity into line, surface and body, which Aristotle there adjoins.

15. But multitude or discrete quantity Aristotle describes saying it is that which is potentially divisible into non-continuous things, which is to be explained in the same way, namely, into those things that were not continuous. From this arises the difficulty touched upon, in what way, namely, that which is actually divided is potentially divisible. But it must be said that here that response about division by designation of the mind especially has place. For, as I shall say below, number does not have proper unity except in order to the mind, and thus it has divisibility only in order to the mind, which can

separate one unit from others and a partial number from the total. Hence the divisibility of continuous and discrete quantity is of different natures, and therefore it is not incongruous that the same number is actually divided by the division of the continuous, but potentially by the division of the discrete; just as conversely the same magnitude is indivisible by discrete division, but divisible by continuous division.

16. But why the number of angels, even if it seems divisible by the mind in this way, is nevertheless not discrete quantity, we shall treat more broadly in the following disputation; now we say briefly that spiritual multitude is not divisible in a physical and sensible way, in which way it must be taken when it is said that the quantified is that which is divisible. This multitude can also be excluded through that clause "each of which or any one of which is apt to be one something," for that "one" must be understood of quantitative one. But Aristotle adds a limitation to this division and to both its members, saying that multitude is a certain quantity, if it can be numbered, magnitude, if it can fall under measure, that is, if it is finite, signifying that infinite multitude or magnitude is not continuous and discrete quantity; in what way this is to be understood, we shall explain in the following disputation, last section.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER THE QUANTITY OF BULK IS A THING DISTINCT FROM MATERIAL SUBSTANCE AND QUALITIES

1. Before we inquire into the essential nature of continuous quantity and the distinction of its species, it is necessary to suppose that it is a true and real entity, which we cannot more conveniently declare than by explaining its distinction from other things, which we intend in this section. In which we chiefly treat of this quantity of bulk,

which we experience in bodies and call the quantitative body, which although it is only one species of continuous quantity, as we shall see below, nevertheless in a certain way it includes the others, and is more sensible, and in it the present difficulty more appears, and therefore it must be specially applied to it.

### *The First Opinion of the Nominalists is Reported*

2. It is therefore the opinion of some, especially the nominalists, that the quantity of bulk is not a thing distinct from substance and material qualities, but that each of these entities through itself has this bulk and extension of parts that is in bodies; but that same entity is called matter, for example, insofar as it is a substantial subject, but is called quantity insofar as it has extension and distinction of parts; and they say the same proportionally about material forms and qualities. Hence they infer that in each material composite there are as many quantities as there are material entities really distinct, which can so penetrate each other, just as the entities themselves do. Thus thought Aureolus, according to Capreolus, In II, dist. 18, a. 2; and Ockham, In IV, q. 4, and Quodl. IV, q. 29, up to 33, and Quodl. VII, q. 25, and most broadly in the treatise on the Body of Christ, c. 17, and following, and in Logic, c. on Quantity; Gabriel, In II, dist. 10; Maior, In II, dist. 12, q. 2; Adam, In IV, q. 5; Albert of Saxony, I Phys., q. 7. Although these authors expressly enough deny the real distinction of quantity from substance, whether in reality they have some actual distinction from the nature of the thing, at least modal, or only of reasoned reason, they do not sufficiently declare; for more frequently they speak in such a way that they seem to posit no distinction in reality. But when they say that material substance can sometimes remain without its quantity (for thus they think about the body of Christ in the sacrament of the Eucharist), they seem to admit some distinction from the nature of the thing.

3. Foundations of the preceding opinion. First. The foundations of this opinion are, because the distinction of things is not to be introduced or asserted without reason or compelling necessity; but here there is no reason or necessity, no effect from which the real distinction between quantity and matter, for example, can be sufficiently gathered; therefore. The minor is proved, because if there were some effect, it would be especially real distinction, or the situation of the parts of substance, for, by this very fact that a thing is understood to have one part outside another, both in its entity and in place, quantity is already understood. But material substance has both of these through itself, nor does it need for them an accident that is quantity really distinct; therefore there is no necessity of such quantity. The minor is proved as to the first part about entitative distinction, because each entity is distinct from another through itself; therefore similarly partial entities are distinguished by themselves. And from this the other part is also clear, because those things that are distinguished in their entity can also be constituted in diverse places in reality; for there is no contradiction in this.

4. Second. Hence I argue second, for if quantity is a thing distinct from substance, therefore God will be able to separate them, and preserve material substance without that quantity; but substance so preserved would be quantified; therefore it is impossible for quantity to be a thing distinct from such substance. The consequence is clear, both because if substance retains being quantified without that entity, therefore there is nothing that such entity can confer to it. And also because a formal effect cannot remain without its form; therefore if being quantified remains without that distinct quantity, therefore it is not its formal effect; therefore neither is it itself anything. But the major is clear from what was said above about distinctions in general, and because no essential dependence can be feigned between those two things, so that one cannot be preserved without the other, and because if God preserves an accident really distinct without substance, much more will he be able to preserve substance without any really

distinct accident. But the minor is proved, for that substance would have distinction of parts, because those things that were distinct cannot coalesce into one simple entity; it would also have their union, because it could not be divided into every part of itself; finally it would have local situation of parts, both for the reason made above, and also because it could remain locally immobile; for what contradicts this? But these alone are what make a thing quantified; therefore.

5. Third. Third, because preserving in material substance every accident really distinct from it, God can make it so that that thing is not quantified; therefore substance does not have this effect from some really distinct accident, but at most from some mode distinct from the nature of the thing. The consequence is evident, because since no form can actually be in its subject[42] and inhere in it without its formal effect, substance could not retain that accident without being quantified. The antecedent is proved, because God can reduce a two-foot body to a one-foot situation without corruption of any entity, and thus a two-foot quantity will become one-foot without corruption of any thing, and for the same reason he can again reduce that to half a foot, and finally can reduce the whole to a point, in which state it will no longer be quantified.

6. Fourth, Ockham argues, because substance through itself is receptive of contrary qualities, indeed this is most proper to it, witness Aristotle, in Categories, c. on Substance; therefore there is no mediation between substance and qualities of a distinct thing, which is quantity; otherwise that also would be susceptive of contraries for a greater reason, because it would more immediately receive them in itself.

### *The Second & Common Opinion*

7. The contrary opinion is common among theologians and philosophers; St. Thomas holds it, III, q. 7, a. 2, and In IV, dist. 12, q. 1,

[42] suo, 1960; alit. om. Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 23.

a. 1, where Scotus also holds the same, q. 2, and In II, dist. 2, q. 9; Durandus, Richard, Maior, and other doctors commonly in that dist. 12, IV Sent.; Capreolus, in the place cited above; Hervaeus, Quodl. I, q. 15; Giles, Theorem. 36 and following on the Body of Christ; Albert the Great, I Phys., tract. II, c. 4; Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 19, and others frequently. And Aristotle much favors this, for in III Metaph., text. 17, and more broadly in books XIII and XIV, he expressly proves that quantity is not substance, and against the Pythagoreans he proves that the dimensions of quantity cannot be really separated from matter or substance, because they are its accidents. And I Phys., text. 13, he says that substance and quantity are not one, but many, and everywhere he so distinguishes quantity from substance, just like quality, as is clear from the same place cited, and from the book of Categories, and VII Metaph., text. 8, where he says: "Length, and breadth, and depth, are certain quantities, but not substance; for quantity is not substance, but rather that to which these first belong." Also II de Anim., text. 65, he says substance is sensible per accidens, but quantity per se. Also Phys. I, text. 33, he says substance is not per se divisible, but through quantity. And we shall report other places below. Averroes and other interpreters think the same in the cited places.

### *The Opinion Really Distinguishing Quantity From Substance is Approved*

8. First proof of the true opinion. And this opinion must be held absolutely; for although it cannot be sufficiently demonstrated by natural reason, nevertheless from the principles of theology it is convinced to be true, especially because of the mystery of the Eucharist. From which also natural reason itself, illuminated, understands that this truth is more consonant and conformable even to the natures of things themselves. The first reason therefore for this opinion is that in the mystery of the Eucharist God separated quantity from the substances of bread and wine, preserving the former, and

converting the latter into his body and blood; but this could not have been done unless quantity were distinguished from substance from the nature of the thing. Nor could modal distinction have sufficed, because substance cannot be a mode of quantity, as is known per se; therefore quantity ought to be a mode of substance; but a mode is not so separable from that thing of which it is a mode that it can exist without it, as was shown in the preceding; therefore quantity is not only a mode, but a thing distinct from substance.

9. Response of the nominalists. The nominalists respond by denying that the quantity of the substance of bread remains in the Eucharist after consecration, because the intrinsic extension and situational presence of parts of the substance of bread does not remain, but they say the quantity of whiteness and other qualities remaining there remains, and they concede that this quantity is distinguished from the substance of bread. For they do not universally affirm that every quantity is the same as substance, but that each quantity is the same as that thing which is proximately quantified through it. Whence it happens that they admit several quantities in the same composite, one of substance, and another of whiteness, and another of heat, and so of other material qualities; indeed both one of matter, and another of form, if it is material.

10. This is refuted. Nevertheless this response primarily contradicts the common opinion of theologians, who think that after consecration the quantity of the substance of bread remains, indeed that it is the subject of other accidents remaining there, as was more broadly treated in the third tome of the third part, disp. LVI. And it can be proved from the effects that we experience in those consecrated species, which it is impossible to save without many and continuous miracles. The first and principal is, because the consecrated host is so quantified and extended in its place, that naturally it cannot simultaneously be in the same place or be penetrated with another consecrated host, or with any other body; but this cannot come from the quantity of whiteness alone, or of other qualities; therefore. The

minor is proved, because qualities with their proper and (so to speak) entitative extension are penetrable, both among themselves and with the quantity of the substance of bread; for they were simultaneously with it in the same situation; therefore for the same reason they are penetrable in the same space with any other qualities, and with any substance, if nothing else exists. Therefore either it must be said that consecrated species from themselves do not contradict being simultaneously in any place with another body, but God alone by special power prevents this lest the mystery be revealed, which is quite absurd, or it must be confessed that there remains in the consecrated accidents some thing from its nature contradictory, and impenetrable in place with other substances. But this can be no other than the quantity of substance, by reason of which one corporeal substance is naturally impenetrable in place with another; therefore.

### *What is the Natural Necessity of Asserting Quantity that is A Thing Distinct from Corporeal Substance & Its Qualities*

11. And from this is taken the natural reason, on account of which this thing that we call quantity distinct from substance is necessary in bodies. For we see in material substance many things extended in themselves so joined among themselves that they intimately penetrate each other and exist simultaneously in the same space without any contradiction among themselves. Again we see one corporeal substance and one integral part of the same body contradict another in the same space, so that they cannot penetrate each other; therefore it is necessary that this effect and this contradiction come from some thing distinct from substance and qualities, since these alone among themselves do not have that contradiction.

12. The objection is answered. But the authors of the contrary opinion can say that this contradiction of bodies or corporeal parts among themselves in the same space comes indeed from the quantity of matter, which has this nature, that it does not contradict

being penetrated with the quantity of form or of material qualities in the same space; but it has contradiction with the quantity of other matter. Therefore these authors will deny that the quantity of matter itself is distinguished from the substance of matter itself, but they will say that the substantial parts of matter through themselves have this bulk and thickness by reason of which they exclude each other and extend in space. And in this they will constitute some difference between the quantity of matter and of forms, both substantial and accidental material ones, that these all are acts actuating, and from this part are more subtle than matter, and more penetrable both among themselves, and also with material potency. But matter, because it is coarser through the mode of potency, therefore, although it can be penetrated with its acts, nevertheless its parts per se are impenetrable in place. And this response and opinion thus explained cannot easily be evidently impugned, stopping in pure natural reason.

13. Nevertheless, partly by natural reason, partly with the mystery adjoined, it is most sufficiently disproved. For, either the quantities of form and qualities are truly and univocally quantities with the quantity of matter, or not, but are only called quantities through a certain proportion, because namely they are co-extended to the quantity of matter, so that matter alone is understood to be quantified per se, the rest through it, insofar as they are extended in it. If these authors say the first, as they really seem to say, without reason they constitute that difference between the quantity of matter and of forms, since it is of the nature of true quantity to confer this bulk to the quantified thing. And then they do not save the mystery, for we see the quantity of whiteness does not[43] have that same nature of expelling another body from the same place, and of rendering the very parts of whiteness impenetrable in the same place. But if they would say the second, they would indeed speak more consistently, standing in natural reason alone; nevertheless the mystery could in no way be

[43] non, 1960; alit. om. "Este non falta en algunas ediciones, variando bastante el sentido." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 28

saved, unless by feigning continuous miracles. Because it is necessary that they confess no true quantity remains in the consecrated accidents, and consequently neither any thing that renders them impenetrable in place, both with other bodies, and with their integral parts among themselves. It is added also that if no true quantity remains, those accidents will not remain bound together among themselves, nor in one third thing. Also, those qualities could not naturally be intensified, because they would be in no subject; all of which contradict experiences, to save which it will be necessary to feign individual miracles. Finally also in natural reason it is quite voluntarily said that matter alone has quantitative extension per se and through its pure substantial entity; but all other things that are in matter are quantified per accidens and without proper quantity.

14. Second proof of the true opinion. The second principal reason taken from the same mystery is, because under the consecrated species is the body of Christ the Lord with its natural quantity, and yet it does not have extension of its parts in order to place, as is established from faith; therefore the actual extension of the parts of substance in order to place is not the quantity of substance itself; therefore it is another thing mediating between substance and that extension in order to place. The major is certain among theologians, few excepted; and I confirmed it broadly in tome III, disp. XLVIII, sect. 1, and disp. LI, sect. 2, where also by other natural arguments I showed that the actual extension of body in order to place is not the quantity of body. Especially because situational extension is nothing other than the local presence that body has in its space; which presence arises from partial presences of individual parts, and therefore it also is itself extended and quantified per accidens, as we shall say below; but this presence is not quantity itself, as seems known per se, for quantity always remains the same, even if body changes presence and situation of parts in order to place, that is, even if it sits or stands, or stops here or there.

15. But if they say that quantity is not the actual occupation of place or space itself, but is that extension that body has in itself by reason of which it is apt to occupy this or that space, and to have this or that situation of parts, but that extension is not a thing distinct[44] from substance, if they say this (I ask), I inquire further whether Christ in the sacrament has this extension which can be called aptitudinal in order to place. For if he has it, they falsely say that the body of Christ lacks quantitative extension in the Eucharist; but if he does not have it, besides that absurdity, that that body will lack its proper quantity in the sacrament, it follows ad hominem against the nominalists that that extension is distinct from the nature of the thing from the substance of the body of Christ and its qualities; and since it has been shown to be also distinct from actual extension in place, it happens that there is given between substance and actual extension in place a median extension distinct from the nature of the thing from those, which is quantity. But if they admit this, they will say in vain that that extension is a mode distinct from the nature of the thing from substance and separable from it, and is not a distinct thing, since their reasons proceed equally against both, and other reasons prove it to be not only a mode, but also a distinct thing.

16. The escape is blocked. But perhaps they will say that that natural aptitude that body has to extensively occupy and fill place is the very integrity of material substance, and adds no thing to it, nor a real mode distinct from the nature of the thing, but only according to reason and our mode of conceiving, that thing is called substance, insofar as it is per se; but is called quantified, insofar as it is apt to occupy extended place, and that aptitudinal extension or aptitude to local extension is called quantity, and that distinction of reason suffices to constitute the diverse category of quantity; just as we shall say below about duration or when, and other categories. And thus

[44] distinctam, 1960; alit. divisam. "Otras ediciones divisam." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 29.

they will save both that the quantity of the body of Christ remains in the altar sacrament, and is not distinguished from substance.

17. But against this evasion, ad hominem indeed we can object because the nominalists do not philosophize thus about quantity, but call quantity itself the situational extension in place, which is quite absurd. Nor is it less that what follows from that, namely, that the body of Christ in the Eucharist lacks its quantity. But simply there occurs only to object that according to that mode of explaining, quantity is really removed from things, and substance alone is said to be per se apt for that local extension; but that distinction of reason, if there is no distinction in reality, seems more invented to save the mode of speaking, than to posit in reality true quantity, which the ancient philosophers posited in substance as its proper accidental form, no less than quality. Which arguments are probable, but that alone is efficacious which is taken from the impenetrability of dimensions, and was explained in the prior discourse.

18. And it is confirmed briefly, for if the quantity of substance is in that way the same as substance, I ask whether it is the same as matter, or as material form, or as the whole composite. Not with matter alone, nor with form alone, because each is by its nature so composed in its entity, that it is apt to be extended in place according to parts. Nor can it be the same as both; otherwise those two quantities of matter and form would penetrate each other in place. You will say that is not incongruous, because those quantities are partial, and from them one integral quantity is composed, which alone is impenetrable with another integral quantity of substance, and not with quantities of qualities. But first that composition from many partials, which are related as act and potency, is unintelligible and plainly contradictory to accidental form. Then in man there is not that composition from the quantity of body and soul, and yet there is as complete corporeal quantity and impenetrable with other bodies, as in other natural things. Finally if the quantity of matter is considered

precisely from its force, matter itself is so extended, that its parts are impenetrable among themselves and seek diverse partial situations, and the same is true of the quantity of material form, whether substantial or accidental, that from its force the parts of such form have the same extension and impenetrability among themselves; therefore it is a fiction what is said, that this contradiction arises from composite quantity.

19. There is therefore in material composite one entity simple as to essential composition, and really distinct from the whole substance and from qualities having proper reality (which I say because of figure, which is only a mode of quantity), from which entity formally comes this corporeal bulk, by reason of which bodies occupy extended places and are naturally impenetrable among themselves, and with this entity other things that do not have proper quantity can be penetrated (so to speak), and which can either be the subject of such entity, like matter, or be simultaneously in the same subject with that entity as in proximate subject, like material qualities; and therefore all these are simultaneously among themselves, because they are joined in some way with the same quantity, and through it they have extension and only by reason of it they have contradiction with any other corporeal thing in the same space.

## *The Foundations of the Contrary Opinion are Satisfied*

20. First. To the foundations of the contrary opinion response is made. To the first indeed by denying the minor; for it has already been sufficiently declared what are in the order of nature and grace sufficient signs of this distinction, and what effect is found in corporeal substances, on account of which such entity is necessary; and this will be more established from the following sections, where we shall more fully declare the proper formal effect of quantity; for every form is for the sake of its formal effect. But to the argument in

form, I concede that there are in matter and material form parts entitatively distinct per se, which I shall show below; I also concede that those parts can be separated by places, even if they are understood to be without quantity really distinct, by divine power; just as also two angelic substances can be separated by places. Nevertheless I deny that a thing is quantified from this precisely that its parts are in distinct partial spaces, but from this that they necessarily postulate from themselves such extension in space. For it is one thing to be able to be in diverse spaces, which belongs also to two incorporeal things; another to be naturally unable to be except in diverse spaces, which does not belong to two angels; therefore the former does not require quantity, and therefore could belong to parts of matter, even if they were deprived of quantity; but the latter entirely requires quantity. Hence if parts of matter were without quantity, they could be indifferent, either in the same where, or in diverse ones. Therefore that they are so disposed, that they necessarily require from the nature of the thing diverse situations, this comes from quantity. But why matter has this very disposition through a thing distinct from itself and not through itself, a posteriori is established from the signs and effects enumerated above; but a priori there is no other reason, except that the offices of matter or form and of quantity are primarily diverse, and therefore require diverse entities. Also because, just as matter per se is neither formed, nor white, etc., so neither is it per se quantified, because it is limited to its potentiality alone; but substantial form also is limited to its effect and substantial nature, and the same is proportionally true of qualities.

21. Second. To the second, there are not lacking those who deny that God can preserve corporeal substance without quantity; whose opinion is in no way to be approved, and we shall reject it below; for it proceeds from false estimation about the formal nature and effect of quantity. Having admitted that case, therefore, I deny that then substance or matter would be quantified. But to the proof I concede that then that substance would have distinction, composition

and union of parts. I also concede that the parts of that substance can be preserved by God with distinct wheres, as the reason made there proves; nevertheless all these things do not suffice that substance be quantified, unless it has this corporeal bulk, by reason of which it both contradicts other bodies in the same situation, and its parts naturally expel each other from the same space, which that substance deprived of quantity would not have; for it could equally be penetrated with other bodies in the same situation as angelic substance, and its parts could indifferently be in the same where, and in diverse ones, as was said. You will say: therefore such substance would not then differ from the substance of an angel. It is responded that it would differ very much. For that substance, as I said, would be composed from parts, not only essential, but material and substantially integrating, by reason of which both it is capable, and by its nature postulates corporeal bulk of quantity; but angelic substance is indivisible, and incapable of quantity.

22. Third. To the third I deny what is assumed; for it is impossible that in material substance every accidental form really distinct from it be preserved, without it remaining quantified, as the argument correctly proves. Although God penetrates two bodies in the same place, he does not render them non-quantified, nor from two quantified things does he make one quantified thing, but preserving the distinction of quantities he constitutes them in the same space. Thus therefore, although God would constitute a two-foot body in a one-foot space, not by condensation, but by penetration of parts, he would not render it less quantified, nor would he reduce two parts into one, but would place them in the same space, which is far different. And the same response is about any reduction of a quantified body however great to the briefest space, in which there is some extension, through penetration of parts. But about the reduction of the whole quantified thing to indivisible space, there is controversy whether it is possible; nevertheless to me the affirmative part is undoubted, supposing the mystery of the Eucharist, as I said in tome III, III p.,

disp. LII, sect. 3. Nevertheless I deny that substance thus constituted in indivisible space would not be quantified, for the body of Christ is quantified also in the sacrament, although it is also in an indivisible point. And the reason is that, as I said, quantity is not actual extension in space, but aptitudinal, and body can retain this, even if it is not actually in extended space, as I treated broadly there about the body of Christ.

23. Fourth. To the fourth it is responded that substance is susceptive of contraries, as first subject, but quantity, as proximate subject.

## SECTION III
## WHETHER THE ESSENCE OF QUANTITY CONSISTS IN THE NATURE OF MEASURE

1. We have shown that quantity exists; now its essence must be more exactly declared, from which also will be more established what is the necessity of this accident that we call quantity.

### *First Opinion Affirming*

2. Some authors therefore think that the nature of quantity is placed in this that it is measure. Thus holds St. Thomas, opusc. 52, On the Nature of Place, at the end. And it seems to be the opinion of Aristotle in the category of quantity, both because from the nature of measure he proves that speech is a species of discrete quantity distinct from number; and also because there he distinguishes various species of quantity that can only be discerned under the nature of measure, as St. Thomas says above about surface and place. And there is the same reason about time. From which this reason can be constructed; for that is the essential nature of quantity which is common to all its species, and under which they can be adequately distinguished, and

not under another; but such is the nature of measure alone; therefore the essential nature of quantity consists in it.

### *The Contrary Opinion is Proved*

3. The contrary opinion is that of the same St. Thomas in other places, and more common among doctors, as we shall report more broadly in the following section. Which, to declare and confirm more exactly, it must first be explained in what the nature of measure consists and how manifold it is. And from this it will easily be established that this cannot be the first essential nature of quantity. Indeed more universally we shall gather that the essence of no real entity can primarily and per se be placed in the nature of measure, and therefore no real category can be constituted from this nature. And finally we shall also simultaneously declare whether measure can be attributed to quantity as its property, granted that it is not its first essential nature.

4. Therefore the nature of measure can be taken in two ways, namely, actively and passively, that is, that a thing is apt to measure another, or that it is apt to be measured by another. Here we do not treat of passive measure, but active; for all doctors speak of this measure when they treat the present question, although if we look at the thing itself, the same could be asked about measure taken passively. For substance through quantity seems to have that it is measurable. And Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 13, said that magnitude is a certain quantity, if it can fall under measure, and he said multitude is, if it can be numbered, which is the same as being measured. Therefore the question can be treated under both natures, and from one sense the other will easily be resolved.

5. Measure can be considered in act and in aptitude. Again it must be considered that measure can be taken either in aptitude or in act, that is, which is apt to measure another, or which actually measures it; therefore here also is discourse about measure in

aptitude, not in act. For it is certain that being actually measure is not only not the essence of quantity, but indeed not even a real property always belonging to it. This will easily be clear from the act of measuring, which must also be known to understand aptitude itself.

6. Therefore to measure something in act is nothing other than to apply the quantity of one thing to another, so that through it the other can be known or made known; for thus we measure cloth with an ell, and similar things. Hence measure will be called that which is apt so that through it the quantity of another is known; for in this sense Aristotle's description must be taken, X Metaph., c. 2: "Measure is that by which we know quantity"; therefore to measure will be to use something as a means to know the quantity of a thing; finally both are sufficiently established from the signification of the word and from the very use of measuring. But the act of measuring does not seem to be cognition itself, for rather this is the effect of measurement; it is therefore a certain application of measure to the measured, which man uses as means to know the quantity of a thing. But this application sometimes made only once suffices to make known the quantity of a thing, as when the measured thing is adequate to the measure or smaller than it, for then through equality or through proportion of excess the quantity of the thing is known, and then measurement is said to be made through accommodation alone of one to another, or collation of one with another. But sometimes measure applied once does not show the quantity of the thing, but it is necessary to repeat the same application many times; in which way we use a palm to measure an ell, and a foot or pace to measure a stadium. And then measurement is said to be made through repetition. Which mode of measuring per se primarily seems to be proper to number, and is not exercised around continuous things except insofar as some number of parts is apprehended and distinguished in them; and it always begins from unity and is perfected through repetition of several units. And this latter mode of measuring in a certain way comprehends the former, especially with respect to continuous quantity, about

which we treat, because it also is made through repeated accommodation of measure; for that in the prior mode accommodation is made only once, is not because it is formally another mode of measuring, but either because measurement is not perfected, but only begun, or because the quantity of the measured thing is small. Which things almost all Aristotle comprehended in the cited place immediately subjoining after the definition of measure: "But quantity is known as quantity, either by one, or by number," that is either by one measure applied, or by repetition and numeration; "but every number is from one." For the former words seem to be understood about continuous quantity and measure of magnitude, the latter about number, because number is not measured by accommodation alone, but by numeration which is made through repetition of units, and therefore is said to be measured by one.

7. First inference. And from this it is understood first that we measure no thing except insofar as it has quantity, or is taken through the mode of quantity; but according to diverse mode of quantity there is various measure and nature of measuring. For there is quantity properly so called, which is the quantity of bulk, another through metaphor or analogy, as is the quantity of perfection, virtue or intension, and we measure both in one thing through another. Which in the quantity of bulk has already been explained; but in the quantity of perfection it is clear, for in this way through the most perfect species of a genus we measure others according to approach or recession from it. In which way that common axiom is true: "The first in each genus is the measure of the rest," about which we have noted some things in the Aristotelian index, lib. II, c. 2, and lib. X, c. 2. Similarly, in this way we measure the perfection of an image through the exemplar, and the perfection of knowledge from the object, and to this also pertains that we measure the truth of cognition from the known thing, insofar as truth itself is like the perfection of cognition. And in the same way we can measure the intension of quality either through quality supremely intense, or through a definite degree and its repetition. Therefore in

both quantities this action of measuring has place; nevertheless just as quantity is primarily said of the quantity of bulk, by analogy or proportion of others, so also the nature of measure. And this is what Aristotle said, X Metaph., c. 2: "To be measure is most properly of quantity"; for from this it comes to others. Which can also be understood from the very act of measuring, which in these measures is very diverse; for in proper quantity measurement is made through sensible application of measure, so that through the medium of sense, like a certain experiment, we are made certain about the quantity of the thing. But in the measure of perfection measurement is made especially through collation of the mind, comparing one with another, although, if the perfection is sensible, sometimes it is also made with the aid of the senses, as when we compare an image with the prototype.

8. Second inference. From this further it is understood that in proper continuous quantity measure as measure is always through human accommodation, because there is no greater reason that this thing measures that, than conversely, if the things themselves are looked at according to themselves. Nor also is length of such quantity more by its nature measure, than of greater or lesser; therefore human imposition always intervenes in these. But as to perfection, the nature of measure is often founded in the things themselves, and this in various ways; sometimes in the excellence and perfection of the thing, as whiteness is the measure of colors; sometimes in some causality at least exemplary or objective, as the knowable is the measure of knowledge; sometimes in both simultaneously, as God is the measure of all beings. Although the nature of measure itself has foundation in the thing, nevertheless the very use of measuring is always through extrinsic denomination from some act of our cognition, or which is ordered to obtaining cognition.

9. Being actually measure can be the essence of no thing. From these therefore it is manifestly convinced that being actually measure, neither of quantity, nor of anything can be the essential

nature, indeed not even a real property. It is proved because being actually measure is only extrinsic denomination in the measure itself, coming from an act of reason comparing one thing with another; but extrinsic denomination is neither of the essence, nor a real property of quantity; therefore. Wherefore not only is this true in the measuring thing, but also in the measured; just as being known is extrinsic denomination in the known thing, so also being measured, because this is nothing other than being known through such medium that through a certain commensuration or comparison can make known the quantity of the thing. You will say: the relation of the measured to the measure is real, witness Aristotle and common opinion, as we said above, although the relation of measure to the measured is of reason; therefore being measured is not extrinsic denomination. It is responded first, when the relation of measure is said to be real passively taken, it is not understood about the measured in act, but about the measurable thing; as knowledge is said to be referred to the knowable by the relation of measured to measure, even if it is actually measured by no intellect, because it is from itself apt to be measured through that.

10. Second it is said, explaining this more fully, that being measured is taken in two ways. In one way, as it signifies the showing or certification of the quantity of the thing from comparison to another, and in this way we say it is extrinsic denomination, and can only found a relation of reason. In another way a thing is said to be measured, that is, commensurated to another by its nature; which commensuration is found among the things themselves, even if no one uses one of them to know the other. And this commensuration is what is thought to be a real relation on the part of the measured thing; for that commensuration consists in some conformity or proportion, arising from some exemplary or objective causality. Hence that commensuration is of far other nature than the nature of measure, about which we now treat. And furthermore it can be added, that in continuous quantities, about which we now treat, of which one is

measured through another, that mode of commensuration is not found, because one quantity is not per se the cause of another, nor by its nature is one more ordered to another than conversely; but there is found between them a relation of equality or inequality, which is reciprocal, and of the same nature in both extremes.

### *It is Shown that the Nature of Measure Is Not Essential to Quantity*

11. And from this finally it is concluded that the nature of measure, even taken in aptitude, cannot be the first and essential nature of quantity. It is proved, because either this is understood of the measure of the substance itself, which quantity affects, which can be called intrinsic measure, or of the measure of another quantity, which is extrinsic. The first cannot be said, because quantity is not the measure of its proper subject; for measure ought to be an extrinsic thing, as Scotus well noted, In II. dist. 2, q. 2; Durandus, q. 5; and it is clear, because, if quantity is the measure of the substance to which it inheres, either it makes known its perfection, and this not, as is clear per se, or it makes known its bulk or magnitude, and this not, because this would not be so much to make known the substance as itself, because substance does not have another bulk than quantity itself; but quantity cannot be said to be the measure of itself, because measure implies relation to another. For measure is that through which we know the quantity of a thing, as is clear from the definition given above; but we do not know the quantity of a thing through the very quantity of it, but through application of another, as is established; therefore. Hence, although quantity can make itself known through the mode of an object per se knowable, nevertheless not properly through the mode of measure, nor is that nature of making itself known other than the nature of the intelligible, which is transcendental, and thus also belongs to quantity. And it is confirmed, for measure ought to be homogeneous with the measured, lib. X

Metaph., c. 3; but quantity is not homogeneous with the substance in which it is; therefore it does not measure it, but renders it measurable by another quantity. But if this nature of measure is taken passively, namely, so that quantity is said to measure by aptitude the subject in which it is, because it renders it measurable, even in this way it cannot be the nature of quantity, both because therefore quantity renders a quantified thing measurable because it renders it extended; therefore this is a prior nature of quantity than that; and also because quantity insofar as it can be measured, insofar as it can be equal to a measure, either once, or many times applied; therefore it belongs to quantity earlier according to nature to be equal, or unequal, than to be measure; but that is not the first nature of quantity, but its property, as is established from Aristotle; therefore much less the nature of measure. And finally because that measurability (so to speak) is only a certain aptitude that the magnitude of the thing can be known through extrinsic medium; but the essence of no thing consists in aptitude that it be known; therefore neither can the essence of such entity, namely, of quantity consist in aptitude that it be known through such medium, especially extrinsic and as it were per accidens.

12. And almost the same reasons can be made, if the other member is chosen, namely, that one quantity is apt to measure another, both because this nature also is posterior; for therefore one quantity can be assumed as measure to make known another, because it is extended and consequently equalizable to another; and also because this aptitude is in order to a very extrinsic act, and accidental to quantity, namely, that it be assumed by man as extrinsic medium to indicate other quantities; and finally because being able to be medium to know some truth can never be the essence of any thing, but is founded in some nature of cause or effect, which come from the very being of the thing, or suppose it; therefore much less can the essence of quantity be to be able to be extrinsic medium of cognition through the mode of measure. And for the same reason the essence of no thing can consist in the nature of measure proportioned to itself; as that

whiteness is the measure of other colors cannot be the essence of whiteness, but supposes its essential perfection, in which is founded that it can be assumed by the intellect as measure.

### *How the Nature of Measure is an Attribute or Property of Quantity*[45]

13. Finally we can add that the nature of quantitative measure or according to extension is in some way an attribute of quantity. I call it an attribute, to signify that it is not a property that adds to quantity some thing or real mode, which is sufficiently established from what has been said. But it is numbered among attributes, because beyond the proper nature of quantity it connotes something in order to the intellect, which always accompanies quantity; for thus equal or unequal are numbered among the properties of quantity, as will be said below. And in the same way true and good are numbered among the attributes of being, as was declared above. But in this there is to be considered a difference between measure taken passively and actively, for passive measurability absolutely and without any restriction, or any condition required on our part, accompanies quantity. But about measure taken actively, distinction is needed. For it can be taken remotely, or proximately. In the first way it accompanies quantity that it has aptitude that it can be instituted and destined to measuring, from the force of extension that it has; but that it be proximately apt to measure, the nature of quantity alone does not suffice, unless there is adjoined, as I said above, human institution and accommodation to measuring.

14. What conditions are required in measure. Hence for this several conditions are usually required in measure. One is that it be known, certain, and fixed, because measure is compared to the measured like principle to conclusion. Hence, just as a principle

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[45] quantitatis, 1960; alit. accidentis. "En otras ediciones accidentis." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 42.

cannot confer certainty to a conclusion, unless it is known, certain and invariable, so neither will measure be able to make known the magnitude of a thing, unless it is fixed and certain. And into almost the same thing falls back what is usually said, that measure ought to consist in the indivisible; for the sense is not that it ought to be indivisible, for rather this contradicts the measure of magnitude, but the sense is that it ought to be so constituted, that it is neither minimally increased or diminished, but constituted within certain and indivisible terms. But the other condition is accommodated to men, namely, that measure be of small quantity; for thus all human measures are reduced to some minimum, no longer divisible, as in coins to the as, and proportionally in weights and other measures of continuous quantity. And the reason of this condition arises from the preceding, that measure ought to be known, easy and indivisible in some way, all of which in human fashion are more easily found in designated small quantity than in greater. Finally it is usually required, that measure be proportioned and homogeneous to the measured, for some length is to be measured by length, breadth by breadth, weight by weight, duration by duration, and so of others. And the reason is that this measurement is made through accommodation and comparison of measure to the measured in equality, as was said; but this accommodation is not made except among those that are homogeneous in some way. All of which are taken from Aristotle, X Metaph., c. 2 and 3, where around those chapters, and around c. 4 we have noted that these conditions are properly required in the measure of the quantity of bulk which from human imposition is assumed for measuring, nevertheless in the measure of perfection not so properly, but with proportion they are preserved; for the measure of perfection need not be minimal, but rather maximal, except insofar as it is usually simpler and more indivisible, it is said to be minimal. Nor also need it be homogeneous rigorously, that is, univocally, or under the same predicamental genus, but it suffices that it have some formal agreement with the measured things, under which they can be

compared with it; for thus, as we noted there, the first being is the measure of perfection of the rest.

### *An Objection is Dissolved*

15. But there remains an objection against this last assertion, for Aristotle, in the cited place, expressly proves that the nature of measure is a property of unity; but unity is not quantity, but the principle of discrete quantity; therefore the nature of measure is not a property of quantity. It is responded that being measure through repetition or numeration is a property of unity, nevertheless being measure through accommodation belongs properly to continuous quantity. But you will urge: since measure through accommodation is no less proper than through repetition or numeration, why is the nature of measure absolutely attributed first to unity rather than to magnitude? It is responded first because of a certain priority of nature, for unity from its nature without other human imposition has all things required for the nature of measure; for it is both more known than multitude, and its principle, and is not only minimal, but simply indivisible in the nature of discrete quantity. And from this also it happens that the nature of measure is not attributed to continuous quantity, except insofar as it participates in some way the conditions of unity; for it is reduced, as we said, to a certain mode of indivisibility, that it can be measure, and cannot exercise the office of measuring except through the mode of unity or its repetition; for while we measure a rod with a palm, we do not otherwise recognize its magnitude, except because it is of one, two or several palms, and thus there seems to intervene there a certain analogy of proportionality.

16. It is added also that unity, to be certain measure, does not need another measure, for since it itself is indivisible, it is also immeasurable quantitatively under that aspect, and therefore is apt by its nature to be first measure. But continuous quantity, that it can be taken with certainty for measuring, it is necessary that it first be itself

measured, as can be seen in all artificial measures. Whence it happens that in them it is necessary either to go to infinity, measuring one through another, or certainly to commit some circle, which is especially done by taking measures in some way of diverse natures. As in coins, for example, the value of the greater is measured by repeated smaller ones. But the value of the smallest coin will have to be measured by weight; but weight will have to be measured by another kind of measure. And in such circle it is necessary to stop at some measure, which through designation in certain quantity is first taken, and deputed to be the rule of others; which insofar as it had certainty, and could put on the nature of measure, insofar as it was reduced to some indivisibility and unity. Many other things Soncinas, Javellus, and others dispute about this nature of measure, X Metaph., from the beginning; but all things that seem to be of some moment are comprehended in what we have said[46].

## SECTION IV
## WHETHER THE NATURE AND FORMAL EFFECT OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY IS DIVISIBILITY, OR DISTINCTION, OR EXTENSION OF THE PARTS OF SUBSTANCE

1. Concerning this question there is diversity of opinions, which is partly placed only in diverse use of words, partly also in the thing itself.

### *Two Opinions are Reported*

2. Therefore many authors say that the first nature of quantity is placed in this that it constitutes the quantified as per se divisible into

[46] Leg. Thom., In I, dist. 19, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

parts of the same nature, insofar as they are quantified. Thus think some disciples of St. Thomas, like Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 21, and Javellus, q. 20, and Capreolus signifies, In II, dist. 3, q. 1, a. 3, ad ult. against the second conclusion of Scotus, and dist. 19, q. 1, ad 2 against the first conclusion; and Albert, lib. I Phys., tract. II, c. 4; Scotus, in Categories, q. 18, where he proves that opinion, first, from the definition of the quantified given by the Philosopher, and explained above, 1 sect. Second, because according to various modes of divisibility the species of quantity are divided; for continuous quantity differs from discrete, because it is divisible into parts that were joined by a common terminus; but discrete is divisible into those that did not have a common terminus; and continuous quantity, insofar as it is divisible according to one, or two, or three dimensions, is distinguished into several species. Third, because this divisibility per se primarily belongs to quantity, but to others by reason of that.

3. But this opinion does not please others, but they say that extension of parts, that is, that a thing has part outside part, is the proper office of quantity. This opinion, as to the first part denying that divisibility is the formal nature of quantity, Scotus holds, V Metaph., q. 9; and Anthony Andreas, q. 10; who are founded especially in this, that divisibility is a certain respect, which cannot be the essence of quantity, which is an absolute thing. Which reason is not of great moment, for divisibility is rather understood through the mode of a certain capacity or passive potency, and at most can be conceived as including a transcendental respect; which does not contradict absolute entity, especially accidental, as quantity is. But as to the latter part they teach that, besides the cited authors, Durandus, In I, dist. 34, q. 1; Niphus, lib. V Metaph., disp. IX; Lovanius and Soto, in Categories; and as to both more broadly Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 13. q. 1, sect. 2 and 3. Whose principal foundation can be that divisibility is not what primarily belongs to quantity, but this aptitude belongs by reason of extension; but the essential nature of each thing is what primarily belongs to it; therefore. The major is clear, for a thing is

therefore divisible, because it has in itself distinction of parts; therefore this is a prior nature than the nature of divisibility; nor can there be in quantity another nature prior to that; for, if someone should ask why quantity has distinction of parts, no other reason can be given, except that it is per se of such nature. For material qualities have distinction of parts, insofar as they are in a quantified and extended subject; and similarly substance or matter, because it is affected by quantity, has extension of parts; but quantity itself not through another, but through itself, nor can another prior reason be conceived in it itself whence it has this, except that this is its essence.

4. Nevertheless, although we may concede that this opinion is true in what it affirms, it unjustly criticizes the former view. For the authors who posit divisibility as the formal nature of quantity understand by it nothing other than extension or the division of parts. Capreolus expressly states in the passage cited that division is taken in two ways. First, as it signifies the separation of one part from another; and in this way divisibility is not of the formal nature of quantity. Second, as it only signifies the negation of one from another; and thus he says it is taken when divisibility is posited as the formal nature of quantity. But for parts to be extended seems to be nothing other than that one excludes another, or is not another. Therefore divisibility is the same as extension as regards what is signified, except that the former term is taken from the aptitude for division, whether real or intellectual, insofar as in quantity and through quantity we conceive one part to be outside another. This aptitude, when taken strictly with all that it includes or connotes, is rather a certain property than the formal nature of quantity—a property (I say) that does not add to quantity any thing or real mode distinct from it, but only connotes something extrinsic, just as we have often said concerning the attributes of being and other similar things, and as will also be said in what follows. It is not new in dialectic or philosophy for a property to indicate the root and essence of a thing by name. The other name is taken from the local situation of a quantified thing and its parts; for we

properly conceive as extended that which has parts occupying extended or divisible space. Hence, if the matter is carefully considered, the latter name is taken from a property no less than the former, as I shall now demonstrate.

### *What Extension Is Proper To Quantity, & Concerning This The Former Opinion*

5. The greater difficulty is how this extension which is said to pertain to the essential formal nature of quantity, or to its primary formal effect, should be understood. For many understand that the very distinction of parts in their proper partial entities is the extension essential to quantity, and so proper to it that it can formally belong to no thing except through quantity itself. Capreolus insinuates this opinion in the place cited above; for he explains that the divisibility which quantity confers is only that one part is not another. And he has the same view more extensively in II Sentences, dist. 18, q. 1, where he says that substance without quantity does not have parts, and that if God were to conserve matter without quantity, it would not have parts, because quantity is of the intrinsic and formal nature of parts, as they are parts, so that, although matter or material substance is prior in nature to quantity as its subject, nevertheless matter as actually having parts is not prior, but posterior in nature to quantity, because through quantity it actually has such parts and their union. Soncinas follows this opinion in V Metaphysics, q. 19, and therefore in q. 22 he thinks it implies a contradiction for matter to be conserved without quantity. And this opinion is very common among Thomists[47].

6. Their foundation is that if quantity did not formally confer this extension upon matter, it would be supposed to have some extension of itself before quantity; but this is impossible. First, because quantity would then be superfluous in matter, since it would be necessary for no effect. Second, because, since matter is pure

[47] See Ferrariensis, I Physics, q. 3.

potency, no distinction of parts can be understood in it except through quantity, for act is what distinguishes, VII Metaphysics, text 49. Third, because matter would then already be composite before quantity, which is repugnant, since the first composition is from act and potency, VIII Metaphysics, text 8, which composition cannot be pre-understood in matter according to itself. This is confirmed because only extension explained in the aforesaid manner is inseparable from quantity, even by absolute power; therefore it is a sign that this alone is essential. The antecedent is clear, because in the mystery of the Eucharist every other extension has been removed from the quantified body of Christ except this, that one part of His body is not another, even in the Eucharist.

### *Extension of the Parts of Substance as Regards Entity Cannot Be an Effect of Quantity*

7. But this opinion cannot be proven to me by any argument; for I think a twofold distinction between the parts of matter that are subject to quantity must be considered: one entitative, the other situational. For the matter that is in the head under the quantity of the head is a partial thing distinct from the matter that is in the foot, and is distant from it in situation. Concerning situational distinction, there is no doubt that it proceeds radically from quantity; but concerning entitative distinction I judge this to be false and impossible.

8. First indeed, because I judge it impossible in general for any thing that has true and proper reality to be distinguished from another similar thing by another entity distinct from itself. First, because every simple thing, just as it is being through itself, so it is transcendentally one through itself; therefore through itself it is undivided in itself and distinct from any other. Second, because for things to be distinct is nothing other than for this to be this and that to be that, for in these positives, with anything else prescinded, this negation is sufficiently founded, that this thing is not that, in which

distinction formally consists. Third, because otherwise one would proceed to infinity, for if one thing were distinct from another through another entity, I ask by what it is distinguished from that third entity; if through itself, the same could be said of the prior entities, and precisely for this effect that third is superfluous. If through another, one will proceed further, and so to infinity. As in the present case, if this matter is distinguished from that matter through quantity, by what is it distinguished from quantity itself? Certainly not through quantity, since that is the other extreme of that distinction; therefore through itself; therefore by the same reasoning it will be able to be entitatively distinguished from other matter through itself. Just as matter is not really distinguished from form through quantity, but through its own entity; therefore in the same way one part of matter can be entitatively distinguished from another through itself.

9. Second, this is explained because matter is created and has being prior in nature to receiving quantity; therefore it is also understood prior in nature as having its whole entity, in which it receives the whole quantity, and diverse parts of its substance, in which it receives diverse parts of quantity; therefore it does not have the distinction of parts from quantity. They respond that matter of itself or prior in nature has parts in potency, not in act. But I ask what it is to have parts in potency; for if this is to have them united and composing one whole, and not as entities actually divided and distinct, thus it is true that those parts are in potency; yet this is irrelevant to the matter, for even under continuous quantity those parts are in that way in potency and not in act, although they will be better and more truly said to be beings in potency than parts in potency. But if to have parts in potency is in reality not to have them, but to await them from quantity, this is plainly impossible. First, because those parts are substance; but quantity cannot formally give anything to substance. Second, because those parts are the subject of the parts of quantity; but an accident cannot formally give entity to its subject. Third, because a whole is nothing other than its parts taken

together and united; therefore if matter of itself and prior in nature to being understood to have quantity has its integral entity, it also has the entity of its parts.

10. Perhaps they will say this rightly concludes concerning parts as regards entity, but not as regards partiality, or as regards the being of parts. But this too is nothing, because the being of parts adds nothing above their entity, except either a predicamental relation, which is irrelevant to the proposition, since it is posterior to the composition and union of parts and results from it; or the union between partial entities for composing one whole, and this also is supposed by order of nature between the parts of matter of the same continuum. Second, because the whole entity of matter is supposed, and consequently the whole entity of its parts, and they cannot all be supposed as actually divided; for that is impossible; therefore as united. Third, because the union of these parts, by which the totality of the entity of matter immediately arises per se, cannot formally be made through any accident, otherwise one per se could not be made from those parts, nor one substance; therefore that union is also substantial, and consequently belongs to matter of itself, and as it precedes quantity.

11. The third argument is taken from that hypothesis, that God conserves material substance without quantity. For no one (as modern authors better note)[48] can reasonably deny that this can be done by God. For if God conserves quantity without substance, how can it be denied that He can conserve substance without quantity, since the dependence of accident on substance is much greater than that of substance on accident. Likewise, because these are things absolutely and really distinct; therefore just as one can exist without the other, so conversely the other can be conserved without the one; concerning which argument more can be seen in Gabriel, In IV Sentences, dist. 1, q. 1; Ockham, in Quodlibet IV, q. 37; Scotus, In II

[48] Soto, in praedicam. quantit., q. 2; Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 13, q. 1 et 2; et alii.

Sentences, dist. 12, q. 2. Finally, because from that hypothesis no probable contradiction can be inferred, as we shall now show. Given therefore that miracle, in that substance there would be and would be conserved the whole entity of the parts of matter that was there before, therefore just as they were entitatively distinct before, so they would also remain entitatively distinct, because one thing, really distinct from another, cannot be so identified with it that from both one simple thing is made, because that would not be the conservation of preexisting parts or entities, but their conversion into one third simple thing; if therefore the whole matter is conserved, its parts are conserved as entitatively distinct; therefore that distinction is not formally through quantity, since it can remain without it. And the same argument is made concerning the union of those parts; for the parts of matter would not remain in that case all divided among themselves; for that is no less impossible than that a quantum be divided into every part of itself; therefore they will remain united and composing one matter; therefore this union or substantial integrity also does not pertain to the primary formal effect of quantity.

## *Response to the Foundation of The Opposite Opinion*

12. Whether matter before quantity should be said to have some extension. Diverse opinions. Neither are the foundations of the contrary opinion effective. And in the first place it is asked whether that distinction and substantial composition which is understood to belong to matter of itself and from its parts substantially integrating it prior in nature to receiving quantity, should be called a certain extension of matter itself. For some judge it should be entirely denied, on account of the arguments insinuated in that foundation. Hence others say that matter indeed has integrating parts of itself, but not parts of extension; or that it has part and part, but not part outside part. So Fonseca above, with Paul of Venice, ch. 12, book V

Metaphysics. Others do not hesitate to call it extension, because, as we reported from Capreolus above, the extension of parts is only that one is not another; but the parts of matter have this of themselves, and not through quantity; therefore matter has some extension of itself. Just as numerical distinction is also judged to be a certain extension; in which way also a multitude of angels can be said to have discrete extension. Or just as intensible quality has latitude of degrees in its entity, which could be called a certain extension, but now has its proper name, and is called intension, because that whole latitude is concerned with the same part of the subject. Nor does it follow from this that the extension of quantity is not necessary, because it is of a far different nature; for the former is only entitative, and as it were transcendental; but this is quantitative, having its proper effect, which we shall soon explain. Nor does it matter that matter is pure potency, because this does not exclude that it has its proper entity, in which it can have substantial distinction and composition of parts of itself, for it suffices for this that it actually has its partial essence or substance. Hence, although the first essential and physical composition is from matter and form, the first integral composition is from the substantial parts of matter.

13. The author's mind. And indeed, as regards the thing, this latter response is excellent, and consistent with what we have said. But whether the word extension should be used seems to be only a question of name; and therefore to remove the controversy, either that word can be omitted, saying that matter has of itself a multitude of parts, not extension, or certainly we can use that word not simply, but with an addition, namely, calling it entitative or substantial extension.

14. Hence to the confirmation the assumption is denied, namely, that in the body of Christ in the Eucharist no other extension is found except this, that one part is not another; or that no other is inseparable from quantity. For in the body of Christ in the Eucharist, besides the substantial distinction of the parts of matter, there is also quantitative extension of parts. Because, although the parts of that

body are not actually extended in place, nevertheless they are actually so extended and ordered among themselves, that, if they were not supernaturally impeded, they would also actually have to have extension in place; which extension they have from quantity and it is impossible to be deprived of it, if they are not deprived of quantity.

### *The True Extension of Quantity is Explained*

15. Therefore it must be said that the extension which quantity confers consists in this, that a thing affected by quantity, by virtue of it is naturally disposed to have extension of parts in relation to place, so that by the nature of such an accident it must necessarily occupy extended place. Hence for the use of terms we can distinguish threefold extension: one is entitative, which does not pertain to the effect of quantity, as has been said, but can be found between the parts of substance and quality without quantity. Another can be called actual local or situational extension. And this is posterior to quantity. Another finally is quantitative extension, which can be called situational by aptitude, and in this we place the formal nature of quantity. This is explained between two matters or two bodies, for that the matter of this body is substantially and really distinct from the matter of that body, it does not have from quantity, as the arguments made above prove, but from its proper entity. But that those two matters are so affected that they must necessarily be extended or separated in place, this proceeds formally from quantity. What therefore we observe in diverse bodies or as it were total matters, must also be understood in the parts of the same body or matter united among themselves. And this opinion thus explained we prove in no other way than from sufficient enumeration of parts. And because material substance does not have this effect of itself, but from quantity, as was shown in section 2; and no effect prior or more inseparable than this is understood by us in quantity; therefore its essential nature

cannot be better explained than through this formal effect, since the essential nature of a form consists in relation to its formal effect.

16. Objection. Solution. You will say: this extension, as it has been explained, consists only in a certain aptitude for expelling similar quantity from the same place; but this aptitude cannot be the essential nature of quantity, both because quantity as such is an actual form giving its formal effect in act, and not some aptitude; and also because if it provides some aptitude, that is rather a certain property than an essential nature, just as we said above concerning the nature of measure, and concerning divisibility taken for aptitude, and the same is true of others which we shall enumerate below. It is answered first that we can hardly ever explain the essences of things, as they are in reality, except through relation to some property; and we seem to do enough when we explain it through that property which is first of all and proximate to the essence of the thing. Then we do not say that the essence of quantity consists in the aptitude for expelling another body, or resisting lest it enter the same space; for this aptitude formally taken is rightly numbered among the properties of quantity. But we say that being a form giving corporeal bulk or extension to things is the essential nature of quantity. But what it is to have corporeal bulk, we cannot explain except through relation to this effect which is to expel similar bulk from the same space, not indeed in act, since by the absolute power of God such an effect can be impeded while the formal effect of quantity is preserved, but by aptitude, as we said a little before concerning the body of Christ in the Eucharist. Nor does it matter that quantity while it inheres actually makes something quantified, for this itself is to render a body so actually disposed that insofar as it is quantified it requires by itself the aforesaid extension in place. For from an actual form only the proper and primary effect of it follows by itself first and by absolute necessity in act; but other effects can follow only in aptitude, because they are not properly formal effects (although they are usually called secondary), but are either reduced to material effects, or to effective ones by natural resultance.

17. Conclusion from what has been said. From which it is incidentally understood that the formal effect of quantity is more properly explained through extension than through divisibility. For divisibility can be taken either metaphysically and in relation to the intellect, understanding that one part is not another. And in this way divisibility does not belong to things through quantity, but to each through its entity. Hence even if this divisibility is taken in relation to real separation, absolutely and broadly taken, whether it is done in any other way and by any agent, thus also for a thing to be divisible into integrating parts and of the same nature is not a formal effect of quantity; for just as God can conserve two distinct matters without their quantities, so He could separate or divide either of them into parts; for there is no repugnance, since they are distinct in reality, as has been shown. But if divisibility is taken in relation to physical action, whether it is explained through designation or through real separation, although it necessarily presupposes quantity in the divisible thing, nevertheless it does not proximately belong to it by virtue of the formal effect of quantity, nor by virtue of that alone, but it is necessary that actual local or situational extension also intervene. For if the parts of a quantified thing are not actually extended in place, they cannot be sensibly designated as divisible, and much less can they be really divided by physical motion. For physical division either is made through repugnance and exclusion of one part, while another body is introduced into its place, or through some other motion or physical alteration, which also presupposes a quantified body extended in place. Therefore this divisibility is very remote for explaining the essential nature of quantity. But extension, as it has been explained, is very proximate and suitable, because we do not conceive quantity except through corporeal bulk; but we cannot conceive and explain this except through local extension, or at least through relation to it.

*First Objection Against the Superior Doctrine*

18. But still some objections remain. The first is that God can conserve matter without quantity extended in place or space; therefore extension, as it has been explained by us, cannot be the formal effect of quantity; since matter through its entity without quantity has the capacity and aptitude to be extended in place.

19. First response. To this objection some respond by denying the assumption, because, quantity being removed, extension cannot remain in the parts of matter, because those parts retain no order among themselves; therefore much less can they retain order in relation to place. The consequence is clear, because this latter order essentially presupposes the former. And the antecedent is clear, because the order of parts in the whole pertains to the essential effect of quantity. For this reason theologians commonly say, In IV Sentences, dist. 10, that the body in the Eucharist retains the extension of the parts of the body among themselves, or in the whole, because that is an essential effect of quantity. But if you ask how the substance of water, for example, would remain without quantity, as regards existence in place or in space, some respond that it would be nowhere, nor would it have real presence or proximity to any space. Thus Thomists think, who judge the same concerning spiritual substance operating nowhere, namely, that it is nowhere, as is treated in I, q. 33, and below, treating the predicament of place, we shall say something, and we shall show this opinion to be false; for no thing can be understood which does not exhibit its real presence somewhere, whether it should be said to be there locally or not. Now therefore concerning material substance deprived of quantity we shall easily admit that it would not be somewhere locally circumscriptively or in that physical way in which bodies are accustomed to be in place. But we ask where it would be presentially.

20. Second response. Others therefore respond that the parts of that substance would flow together to an indivisible point. Soto impugns this opinion in the predicament of Quantity, q. 2, because, quantity being set aside, material substance cannot be moved locally;

but that flow to the same point cannot happen without local motion. But that response is not to be rejected as impossible, because without doubt God could constitute that whole substance in a point without a new miracle, because there would no longer be natural repugnance between its parts. And, although substance thus existing is not movable in a physical way, or by physical contact, it would nevertheless be movable in the way that spiritual substance is, especially by God. Yet that opinion is false, insofar as it posits that mode as unique and necessary, which I shall immediately show.

21. Others therefore say that in that case that substance could be placed either in indivisible space, in the aforesaid manner, or in divisible space, so however that the whole would be in any part of it; because, since it would not have extension, it could not be whole in the whole and part in the part; thus Fonseca holds above. He also adds that in either way that substance would be conserved, it would not have that presence through successive motion, but through instantaneous change made in the same instant in which the substance would be deprived of quantity; by which change all the parts of that substance would be placed in a point, or in all parts of space, even distant ones, without passage through the medium.

22. The author's response. I indeed consider it possible for that substance to be constituted in the whole space and whole in any part, for if God in the sacrament of the Eucharist has thus placed the body of Christ even as quantified, much more could He do this in a material substance deprived of quantity. Nevertheless, I do not consider this mode to be possible without a new miracle, even given the prior miracle of separating substance from quantity. This is because it is not natural to material substance or its parts to be able to have real presence in diverse places, even partial ones, as is evident, since under quantity they do not have this, nor are they prevented by quantity from having it, but material substance itself has this limitation from itself. In this there is a great difference between substance even taken in the nude and spiritual substance, for the latter by its nature is

apt for that mode of existing in a divisible place, as if by replication of the presence of its whole substance in all parts of the place adequate to it; but material substance by its nature is not capable of such presence; therefore neither would it become naturally capable of it through the removal of quantity.

23. Hence I further add that this mode of presence is believed without cause to be necessary so that material substance deprived of quantity might be conserved in space or divisible place. First, because if God were to conserve two material substances simultaneously without quantity, it would not be necessary to constitute them in the same space simultaneously, so that where one were whole, there the other would necessarily be whole; for what necessity of this thing can be imagined? He could therefore constitute one here, another at Rome, just as two angels are in diverse places. Therefore, by parity of reasoning, if He conserves without quantity several parts of the same matter, it is not necessary that He make all of them simultaneously present to place, so that where one is, another necessarily is. The consequence is evident, because just as two matters, so also two parts of the same matter are really[49] distinguished among themselves; but that parts are united does not remove their distinction; therefore it does not remove the fact that they can be present in distinct places or partial spaces. In this, material substance lacking quantity is not rightly compared with angelic substance; because the latter does not have a multitude of parts through which it could be present in distinct partial places; but the former will retain parts of this kind.

24. This is confirmed and clarified by example, for if a vessel full of wine mixed with water were deprived of quantity, and the whole substance of the vessel and the liquid contained in it were conserved, it would not be necessary for the substances of the vessel and liquid to be constituted in the same point; therefore even the substances of

[49] realiter, 1960; materialiter, alit. et ed. Vivès. "En otras ediciones, entre ellas la de Vivès, se lee inexplicablemente materialiter, en lugar de materiae realiter." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 59.

water and wine, although they are imperfectly mixed among themselves, would not necessarily be placed both in the same point or space; therefore, even if that liquid were pure water, it would not be necessary for all its parts to be placed in the same point or space in the said manner. For what difference does it make to these matters that the parts of water are more united among themselves than with the parts of wine, since that union does not remove distinction, as has been said? Moreover, whoever posits that the substance of Peter, for example, deprived of quantity, is present to the whole space in which it previously was with its quantity, really admits that the parts of that substance remain present to the same partial spaces and distant among themselves as they were before; for the substance of the head would remain in that upper space, and the substance of the foot in the lower; it is only added that conversely the head is also in the lower place, and the foot in the upper. Why therefore would it be repugnant to conserve (so to speak) one simple presence in individual parts without that repetition? For the substance will not thereby have greater extension of parts, but will have only a unique one, and not frequently or infinitely replicated, as in the other case.

25. I therefore consider true the opinion that Soto holds above, namely, that in that case the substance can be conserved present according to itself as a whole to the whole space in which it previously was, and according to its parts to the parts of it. Indeed, if God does not wish to add another change besides the removal of quantity, it will remain so by the nature of the thing. I demonstrate this as follows, because now while substance is under quantity, although it is constituted in place by means of it, nevertheless presence in the space in which quantified substance is conceived to be, is not only a mode of quantity, but also of the substance itself; because, since substance and quantity are diverse things, although one is intimately in another, it is necessary that the mode of presence of one be distinct from the mode of the other, because it intrinsically affects each of them and is identified with it. If therefore quantity is removed and

substance is conserved and no other local change is made in the substance, the substance will remain with the same substantial presence, and with the same distance or proximity to the center and poles of the world; and thus it will remain present as a whole to the same space and through its parts to the same parts of space.

26. Nor does it thereby become quantified, because it would not remain with corporeal bulk, nor extended quantitatively, but only presentially; nor would it resist other bodies from being able to fill that space; nor would its parts be present to diverse partial spaces because they could not, or it would be repugnant for them to be in the same; but, because they could be with either mode, they are found present to those spaces, and have not been changed; or certainly because by God's will they are so constituted.

27. Hence it is also gathered how it should be understood, so that it may be true, what is frequently said, that constituting part of substance outside part is the formal effect of quantity, which Soto above simply admits; he says however that it is a secondary and extrinsic formal effect, and therefore can be conserved by absolute power without a formal cause. He says the same thing about the union of parts. But this response does not please me, because it is very slippery and confused; for it is not understood what such extrinsic formal causality might be. And it is universally false that some formal effect is properly supplied without a cause. It must therefore be said that that particle "outside" can be taken in various modes, for part to be outside part can be taken entitatively only. And in this mode it is not an effect of quantity, but of the very entity of the thing. Second, it can be said outside part presentially only, just as one angel can be said to be outside a human body when it is in another place. And this "outside" is not a formal effect of quantity, but of the very mode of presence. Third, one part is said to be outside another through natural repugnance of being within. And thus it pertains to the formal effect of quantity and is not found in a body lacking quantity. Fourth, it can be added that to be outside expresses actual local quantitative position,

and this pertains to the predicament of where, or position, as we shall see later.

28. Hence I also judge false what some hold, that the parts of material substance deprived of quantity necessarily remain confused and all immediately joined among themselves as to substantial union. For even if we grant this can happen if God wills it, nevertheless that it will necessarily happen thus cannot be persuaded by any probable reason. Therefore I consider that if God preserves a human body without quantity and adds no miracle or extraordinary change, it will be the case that the substance of the hand is immediately conjoined to the substance of the arm and not of the head, and so for the rest; for according to the true opinion, the substantial parts integrating this substance are not united immediately through quantitative surfaces, as Soto rightly touched upon above, and can be established from what we have said here and will be more established from what is to be said; but they are united by their proper nexus and substantial bond. Since therefore quantity is separated from them, they can retain the same substantial union that they previously had among themselves, with no new union made among them; therefore those that were previously united immediately, will so remain afterward; but those that were only united through the intervention of other parts, will be conserved. Whence it happens that, if the order of parts in the whole is taken only entitatively and substantially, it does not pertain to the formal effect of quantity, but to the very substantial composition of such a thing. Just as the order of degrees in quality, from first, for example, to eighth, is not an effect of another thing, but pertains to the intrinsic integrity of such an entity. When therefore authors say that the order of parts in the whole is a formal effect of quantity, it must be understood of such an order by reason of which those parts will necessarily have a similar order in place from the nature of the thing, unless impeded, which, in one word, can be called quantitative order.

## Section V

### *The Second Objection is Resolved*

29. Another objection can be taken from condensation and rarefaction; for we see that the same quantity can naturally occupy a greater and lesser place without addition or diminution of quantity; therefore the formal effect of quantity does not consist in the radical extension of parts in order to place, that is, that they are so affected and exclude themselves from the same space. The consequence is evident, because under the same quantity the same parts are constrained to a briefer space. This objection touches upon a most difficult physical question, about the mode in which condensation occurs, which we cannot treat incidentally here. If therefore we hold that quantity is lost in condensation and acquired in rarefaction, there will be an easy response, as far as the present difficulty is concerned; yet we will fall into other no lesser ones, namely whether matter is simultaneously acquired or lost with quantity, or whether the same remaining is informed by greater and lesser quantity; for both have the greatest difficulty. But holding that quantity is neither added nor removed, but its mode is changed in condensation and rarefaction, it must be said that quantity indeed extends substance and gives it corporeal bulk; nevertheless, taken in itself and absolutely, it does not determine a certain limit in that extension considered in order to the space it can fill, but according to the mode of greater and lesser condensation the limit of this extension is defined. This happens without penetration properly taken, because it happens through intrinsic change in the mode of quantity itself. But more on this elsewhere.

### *The Third Objection is Satisfied*

30. The last objection, or rather interrogation, can be in what way it pertains to the essential nature of quantity to give the aforesaid

extension and bulk to substance; for it seems rather to belong to quantity per se firstly that it itself have this bulk and extension of parts in itself, and consequently and secondarily, that it give it to substance. I respond that both belong to quantity per se firstly without repugnance, because whatever quantity has, it has for substance and on account of substance. Therefore quantity was instituted primarily to give this effect to substance, and therefore was made of such a nature that it consists of parts, which by their nature expel themselves from the same space; which parts adhering to parts of matter communicate that property to them; and thence it is derived to material forms and other corporeal accidents.

## SECTION V

## WHETHER IN CONTINUOUS QUANTITY THERE ARE POINTS, LINES AND SURFACES WHICH ARE TRUE THINGS, REALLY DISTINCT AMONG THEMSELVES AND FROM THE QUANTIFIED BODY

1. What we have said thus far about continuous quantity applies most especially to body, which without any controversy is the first and principal species of quantity. But concerning the other species which are usually assigned under continuous quantity, and concerning their first principle, which is the point, there is a special and greater difficulty. And therefore these must be discussed individually.

### *Reasons Why Points Seem to be Nothing*

2. First argument against terminative points. Second. It seems therefore that a point is nothing real or positive in the nature of things; and if a point is not, neither will a line be, and with the line removed,

the surface must necessarily be removed, both because with the principle removed, the principled thing is also removed, and also because with that which is indivisible simply removed, the other indivisibles according to one or another dimension are consequently removed; for the reason is the same for all, as will easily appear from what is to be said. The first antecedent is therefore proved, first, because a point can be understood as twofold, namely, terminative and continuative; therefore either only one of them is given, or both; neither can be said; therefore neither is given. The minor is proved as to the first part, because first of all no point is in fact terminative only, because none can be imagined that does not intercede between parts of a line, whether those parts of the line make one straight line, or oblique, or even describe an angle at that point; for in whatever way they are united in a point, they are continuous; just as the surfaces of a cube of a body, even if they are joined in an angular line, are continuous; therefore no terminative point is given. Second, because there is no reason or necessity for imagining such a terminative point; for what effect does it have in the nature of things? You will say to finish and terminate a line. But against this, because, if you mentally separate such a point, the line will remain equally finite, indeed neither greater nor lesser than it was previously understood, because an indivisible added does not make greater, and consequently neither does one removed make less; therefore such a point is superfluous in the nature of things.

3. First argument against continuative points. And hence the other part is further concluded, namely, that continuative points are not given, and a fortiori neither both simultaneously, because a point that is continuative of two parts, is terminative of each; if therefore a point is not necessary for terminating the whole line, therefore neither for terminating parts; therefore neither for continuing. Second, because, if a continuing point were necessary, it would be maximally for the union of parts; but parts can be immediately united by themselves without the intervention of a point, just as other things are

immediately united by themselves. For if those parts are united in a point as in some third thing, therefore they are immediately and per se united to it, otherwise we would proceed to infinity; therefore they will be much better united immediately among themselves.

4. Third. Fourth. Third, because, if such points are given, infinite points are given in the continuous really distinct among themselves; for if they were finite, either the line would consist of those alone, or it would have finite parts, into which alone it could be divided. But both are impossible. But it is no less impossible for infinite points to be given in the continuous, for thence it clearly follows that there can be an infinite in act according to multitude, because no more inconveniences can be inferred from an infinite multitude of any things whatever in act than from an infinite multitude of points in the continuous; because, although that multitude of points is conjoined to other continuous parts, nevertheless it is really in act in the nature of things. Fourth, because, if a continuing point is given, it is necessary that it be really distinguished from the parts it continues, because there is no greater reason why it should be the same with one than with another; nor can it be the same with both simultaneously, since those are distinguished among themselves; therefore God will be able to separate points from parts of a line, because it is not repugnant for a thing really distinct from the rest to be separated from them; therefore by the same reason God could separate all points of a line collectively taken from the line while conserving the parts of the line. But from this follow two impossibilities: one, that a continuous would remain divided in its every part; another, that an infinite multitude of points entirely discrete would remain in things.

5. Fifth, this same difficulty touched upon in points has a place in lines existing in finite magnitude; and the same is true of surfaces. And moreover a special difficulty occurs, for it follows that in a body of a foot, for example, there is a line of simply infinite length, and closed between two extreme points, which is an open repugnance.

The consequence as to the first part is evident, for what is simply infinite in act is what actually has infinite equal and non-communicating parts; but in such a magnitude there are infinite equal and mutually non-communicating parts of a line, and united; therefore they compose one actually infinite. The minor is proved, for in a foot-long magnitude two lines of the same length among themselves can be designated, somewhat distant in the intervening latitude; therefore between those are infinite equal lines containing parts of that latitude, which lines are all parts of one, because they are united in the extreme points of that longitude. And a similar argument is common about the gyrative line, which circles all parts of the continuous, proportional indeed in length, but equal in thickness, according to which all parts of that line have equality with respect to some certain length; and yet they are infinite, just as the proportional parts are.

6. Sixth, because there is no subject in which such a point can be; therefore such a point cannot be given. The minor is proved, because either that subject is divisible, and this is not the case, because it is a disproportionate subject, nor can it be adequate to an indivisible point; but here we inquire about an adequate subject. Or that subject is indivisible, and concerning that I ask whether it is substance or accident; if accident, we will again ask for the subject of that, and moreover that philosophical inconvenience will follow, that one quantitative indivisible will be immediate to another in the continuous. But that it should be substance seems impossible, otherwise in matter itself there would be points (so to speak) and lines, and substantial surfaces, which is unheard of. A seventh argument, similar to the preceding, can be constructed, because a point cannot touch the parts of a line, so as to continue them among themselves; for in what does it touch each of them? For either in another indivisible, and so the whole line will consist of points, or in a divisible part, but it cannot happen that an indivisible touch a divisible. But if you say it does not touch in something determinate,

and in this way it is not repugnant for an indivisible to touch a divisible, against this is first, because in this way the discourse by which Aristotle, in Physics VI, proves that an indivisible cannot be moved continuously, is violated. Second and especially, because this response overturns the most powerful mathematical reason by which a point is usually proved to be given, namely, because a perfectly spherical globe touches a perfect plane in a point. An eighth argument can be taken from various places of Aristotle, in which he signifies that these indivisibles are not in act in things, but only in potency. For in Metaphysics I, texts 42 and 43, and more clearly in book III, chapter 5, text 17, he says, just as Mercury is not in the rough stone in act, but in potency, so are surfaces in the middle of the parts of a body. And in Physics VIII, chapter 8, text 65, in the book On the Common Movement of Animals, chapter 2, he says there is no substance of indivisibles. And in On the Soul II, chapter 6, text 25, he says a point is known by negation.

### *Various Opinions are Related*

7. This matter has seemed most difficult to all philosophers, and therefore they have been divided into very many dissenting opinions, which must be individually related and examined, so that we can investigate what is more probable. There are therefore two extreme opinions: one absolutely denying that point, line and surface are positive things; another simply affirming that these are true things, and really distinct among themselves and from body, existing not only in the extremities of bodies, but also intimately in the whole body, and between all its parts. But there are other middle opinions, which in various ways partly affirm, partly deny.

### *First Extreme & Absolutely Negative Opinion*

8. The first opinion is held by Durandus, In II, dist. 2, q. 4; Ockham, in his Dialectics, chapter on Quantity; and Gregory, In II, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 1. This opinion does not deny that in a quantified body there is true real length and breadth; for this is so evident that it can be denied by no one, since it is established that a body is divisible in those three modes, and this is often asserted by Aristotle and demonstrated in mathematics or geometry, as we shall touch upon in what follows. But the said authors deny that in a quantified body there is given some thing distinct from the rest, which has length without breadth, or breadth without depth. But they affirm that the body itself per se has all these dimensions, and insofar as it is considered by us, as it precisely has length, it is called a line; as it is considered by us with length and breadth, it is precisely called a surface. But they say a point in reality is only something privative, but is conceived by us in the manner of a positive lacking all extension. The foundations of this opinion so explained have been touched upon in the reasons made, and will be more proposed in treating the opinions of others.

### *Second Opinion Extremely Contrary & Absolutely Affirming*

9. The second opinion, extremely contrary to this, seems to be that of St. Thomas, as appears from Opusculum 39, chapter 2, and On Truth, q. 28, a. 2, ad 10, and Quodlibet VII, a. 9, ad 2, and is common in his school, as can be seen in Capreolus, In II, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 3, and in dist. 18, q. 1, a. 3; Soncinas, Metaphysics V, q. 20; and Hispalensis, In II, dist. 2, q. 2, a. 4; and Soto, in Predicaments, chapter on Quantity; and the same is supposed by Cajetan, in Logic, chapter on Quantity, and III p., q. 4, a. 2. In the same opinion is Scotus, In II, dist. 1, q. 3, and more clearly dist. 2, q. 9. It is also taken from Alexander, Metaphysics III, chapter 5; and this opinion is extensively defended by Burlaeus, Physics I, text 15.

10. This opinion is founded first on Aristotle, who wherever he treats of quantity, supposes that points and the rest that follow from them are given. Hence he defines the continuous as that whose parts are joined by a common term; but those bodies are contiguous whose ultimates are simultaneous, as appears from the chapter on Quantity, and from Physics V, chapter 3. But these locutions suppose these terms to be both indivisible and positive; for if they were divisible, they could neither be simultaneous, nor could one term according to the same be common to each part, for there would be parts in it, and thus according to diverse parts of itself it would touch others. Hence in that also there would be continuity and it would be necessary to seek another common term for its parts. Finally, whoever says term or extreme, says indivisible, because otherwise it cannot be extreme. Similarly to be a term or extreme cannot be said of privation, if we speak properly. Especially because Aristotle says contact is made in these extreme terms; but contact is not made in privation, but in some positive thing. And the same force has what he says about place and the placed thing in Physics IV, chapter 4, that they have equality in these extremes; which cannot be true, unless extremes are taken as indivisible according to depth; and therefore in the same place he says surface is place. Moreover otherwise the difference he constitutes between contiguous and continuous could not be saved; for if extremes, by reason of which those things that are continuous are said to be simultaneous, are only privations of further extension, in the same way in two continuous parts there are two privations of further extension, because neither of them proceeds further; therefore there is no difference; therefore Aristotle speaks of positive terms. Hence, in On the Soul I, chapter 4, text 70, he says points have position in the continuous, which cannot rightly be said of privation alone. Finally, wherever he discusses quantity, he posits these three species of quantity as real and positive, body, surface and line. And he always indicates that all philosophers before him recognized the same species of quantity, from whom, especially from the Pythagoreans, he differs

in that he does not posit them as separated, but in physical and natural bodies, as is established from Metaphysics III, chapter 5, and more extensively in book XIII, chapter 2. And thus all the ancient expositors of Aristotle are in the same opinion. Moreover the whole science of geometry seems to suppose that lines and surfaces are given, concerning which it demonstrates many things, as can be seen in Euclid.

11. First reason for the second opinion. The reasons for this opinion are taken especially from certain effects or indications, partly mathematical, partly physical. And concerning the point indeed there is the common argument, for a perfectly spherical body touches a perfectly plane body only in a point; this Aristotle affirms, On the Soul I, chapter 1; Euclid demonstrates, book III, proposition 16. And the reason is because otherwise it would be necessary for there to be some plane extension in the globe, because bodies that touch each other are made equal in that in which they touch each other; but only what is plane can be made equal to a plane body; if therefore a globe touched a plane in some extension, it would necessarily have in itself even plane extension, and thus would not be perfectly spherical, both because plane and spherical include repugnance in figures; and also because in that plane extension the extreme parts would be more distant from the center of the globe than the middle ones, which is repugnant to a perfectly spherical figure. Some respond that there cannot be real contact between two such bodies. But this is so incredible per se that it needs no refutation; for what can prevent that real contact? Also, even if the sphere were heavy, it would be impeded by the plane from descending, or if it overcame by weight, it would carry the plane with it; but how can these things happen without real contact? Others indeed admit that those two bodies touch each other, but not in some determinate thing, but in an indeterminate part, which they call touching indivisibly in a divisible thing. But this response first says something most difficult to believe, because that contact does not happen successively, or in indeterminate time, but

totally simultaneously in a moment, as we suppose; therefore it must necessarily be determinate contact, and consequently in some determinate thing. For an angel, and much more God, sees clearly in what those two bodies touch each other, and in what they do not touch each other; therefore, if that in which they touch each other is extended, he sees how much it is by designating a term, either intrinsic, so that contact is made up to that and not beyond, or extrinsic, namely, that contact does not reach here, but is made in the whole remainder. Then, the reason made is not solved, because, if contact is not made in an indivisible thing, therefore it is made in some extension, whether determinate or indeterminate; therefore in plane extension; but this is repugnant to a perfect spherical figure, whether it is said to be determinate or indeterminate.

12. A similar argument to this is made regarding lines in a perfectly round column or cylinder, because falling upon a perfectly plane thing, it cannot touch it except in a line, for the same reason. And the same is true of a perfectly square cube, for if it touches a plane body through an angle, it cannot touch except in a line. Similarly two solid and perfect planes cannot touch each other except in a thing indivisible according to depth. And in this most evidently, in my opinion, the response about indeterminate contact is refuted, because those bodies cannot penetrate each other in any part whether in determinate or indeterminate depth; but they cannot touch each other according to any depth unless they penetrate. And a similar reason can be made about a white surface, as it is presented to vision, because it does not terminate vision according to any depth even indeterminate; therefore according to surface alone. The same argument is that light is not received in a dense and perfectly opaque body, except in the ultimate surface; for if it penetrated some parts, as to those it would already be transparent; therefore there is given an ultimate indivisible surface, in which light is received.

### *Third Middle Opinion, Admitting Terminative But Not Continuative Indivisibles*

13. To these and similar experiences (to now touch upon the first middle opinion) some say that they indeed convince that these terminative indivisibles of parts of quantity are given, and therefore those are to be admitted in the extremities of bodies, but there are not such continuative indivisibles in the middle of bodies; for the former suffice to save all that Aristotle teaches about points, lines and surfaces, and all the demonstrations of geometry, and finally all the experiments we have brought concerning these indivisibles. But the latter bring us innumerable difficulties, especially those that touch upon the matter of the infinite, and are otherwise convinced by no sufficient reason. And there are those who attribute this opinion to Aristotle, because he never asserts that in a line, for example, there are infinite points in act, but in potency; therefore two extreme points, by which it is terminated, are in act in it; but the rest are said to be infinite in potency, because in whatever part the line is divided, two points will result, and, just as it can be divided to infinity, so they will result to infinity; which St. Thomas seems to explain thus, Opusculum 36, saying: "In a line there are indeed two points in act, as its terms, which fall into its definition, and infinite others in potency, according as it is divisible to infinity potentially."

### *The Third Opinion is Disproved*

14. Nevertheless against this opinion stands the reason we objected in the beginning, because in reality there are no terminative points in things which are not also continuative, for although they do not always continue parts of a straight line, they nevertheless always continue either a straight, or curved, or circular line, or at least lines ending in an angle. But if this is sufficient for it to be called a

terminating point, there will also be in the middle of a body, as in the center of a globe, a point in which all lines are united that are drawn from the circumference to it; and in the heavens (as philosophers want) there will be two immobile points, which they call poles, although an infinite multitude of lines converges in them. And similar arguments are made about a line, because there is none in things which does not intercede between some parts of a surface, whether in a plane surface, or in a concave one, or at least in surfaces making an angle, as in a pyramidal body; therefore it is repugnant to say that terminative lines and points are given, and not continuative ones.

### *Fourth Middle Opinion Admitting One Ultimate Surface, & Denying Other Indivisibles*

15. On account of these arguments there is another middle opinion, which denies that any points or lines are given in act as a matter of fact, because with the opinion just cited the authors of this opinion think that continuative lines or points are not given in act; and otherwise the arguments made convince that no points are given in things which are not continuative. But concerning surface they say that in any body there is given one that is terminating and not continuing, and they concede this to be in act, and besides it no other indivisible to be in act according to any dimension. The first part is evident. For in any body, for example, in a globe, there is in act a certain ultimate surface indivisible according to depth, as if enveloping the whole body, and through the inner face (so to speak) terminating all parts of the body, but through the outer face terminating or continuing nothing; therefore there is given in bodies some surface terminating and not continuing, even if this is never found in point and line.

16. And as to this part this opinion is without doubt true. And its reason can be given, because this differs between surface and point or line, that surface can only continue parts of a quantified body

from a double face or part, because it is only indivisible according to depth, and thus only from that double part can parts of a body concur in it; but because bodies are finite and terminated, it is necessary that at some surface the extension of the depth of a body stops on one part, and on the other there is no depth of the same body which is continued with another; and therefore there is given a surface terminating and not continuing. But lines and points can terminate parts of surfaces or lines concurring to them not in two ways only, but in infinite ones; for to one line in a circle infinite surfaces are understood to concur; but to a point from every part below, above, and from every side finally; in which a point even exceeds a line; for the more indivisible a term is, the more ways parts of that dimension can converge to it, which can be continued by such a term. Hence therefore it happens that lines or points are never given which in some way are not continuative; because, since they are never outside physical bodies, various parts always concur to these terms which are united in them, although this is not always equally in all, for in the middle of a body we understand there to be confluence and continuation from every part; but in those points or lines which are conceived in the extreme surface of a body, only from some side, or from the lower or upper part, is confluence of parts that are continued understood, but not from every part.

17. As to this therefore there is true difference between surface and line with point; but from this this opinion infers another discrimination posited above, which is thus declared. For that a terminating surface is in act in things, besides the indications brought above by us, which this opinion also uses, that reason seems to convince that all bodies are finite in act and intrinsically terminated; but they are not finished or terminated except by some surface, so proper to itself that it is not common to others, from which one body has that it is not continuous to another, and that it can be contiguous, touch another, and be placed and be placed, and receive certain extreme accidents, especially figure, which Aristotle said is received in

surface, Metaphysics III, chapter 5, text 17. But this reason does not have place in a line; because since it can be finished with some continued extension and circulation or reflection into itself, it does not need some extreme term by which it is finished; nor can any term even be devised in it by the mind, which is so the ultimate term of parts of one line, that beyond it the same line does not extend through any way or position. Therefore a line does not need such a term by which it is finished, but is finished by itself as a whole, just as a circular line is intrinsically finite in itself; for every line that is considered in any body, although it is not circular, is nevertheless one by continuation within itself, in which it agrees with the circular, even if it differs in the description of angles and other figures, according to our mode of conceiving. By this reason therefore a line does not need actual points, and the same reason has place in surface, which also is one and finite in itself by continuation and circulation into itself, nor can a term be found in any part of it, beyond which parts of the same surface do not extend; and therefore it is not finished by pure termination, but continued with other parts in the manner of a circle; for the same cause therefore lines are not given in act in surface. But body as to the extension of depth, although as to internal parts it does not need actual surfaces, because as to them the same reason, made about surface and line, has place in body, for by a certain integrity it is one, and parts compared among themselves do not need a term by which they are finished, because each is finite to another, nevertheless the whole body so that it be finite in itself and disjoined from others which touch it, or can touch it, it is necessary that it actually have some ultimate surface by which it is terminated.

### *The Fourth Opinion is Refuted*

18. Nevertheless this opinion does not seem to speak consistently, while what it affirms about the ultimate surface, it universally denies about points and lines. For if the arguments made

from effects and indications efficaciously prove that an ultimate surface is given in act, no less do other similar ones, which we have adduced, prove that lines and points are given in act in that very ultimate surface. For if from the indivisible contact of plane bodies or of place and the placed, extreme terminating surfaces are sufficiently inferred, why are not lines and points actually existing in extreme surfaces inferred from the indivisible contact of a globe or cylinder on a plane? They respond that the reason is because a globe does not touch a point that is a true real being, but one that is reduced to act through designation. They also say otherwise that a globe touches a plane in a point, not formally, but eminently existing in the middle magnitude. Or they also say otherwise that the globe and plane have negative contact, not positive; insofar as they do not stand apart, they are said to touch each other negatively, because they touch each other in no positive thing. But all these things first assign no reason of difference, for in a similar mode I will say two planes touch each other not in an indivisible surface which is actually a true real being, but which is only in potency and is reduced to act through designation; or they touch each other in surfaces which they contain not formally, but virtually, or they touch negatively, and not positively.

19. Then absolutely the response is not intelligible to me; for real contact is made in some entity which truly and formally is in things, for contact itself is real and is made properly and formally on the part of the thing; therefore it is made in true entity which is formally in the thing; and yet it is made in an indivisible thing; therefore there is in the thing itself formally such indivisible entity. Unless perhaps it is said that that entity is there in potency, and not formally, because it is not separated per se, but united to parts; for thus there will only be a difference in the use of names; nevertheless the same will be true of the ultimate surface, because it also is not separated per se, but united. And the divisible parts themselves are not in that mode actually in the whole, that is, actually divided, but in potency. Nor are there lacking those who speak thus, so as to say parts

are not actually in the continuous except through designation. But they use that singular locution in vain, because it neither serves to explain the thing, nor is it true in rigor. For whoever says parts are actually in the continuous, does not say they are actually divided, for the opposite is included in the proper nature of a part, but says they actually compose that through their partial entity, which is not fictitious but true; hence to be through designation, if the designation is true, does not exclude being in the thing itself, but rather supposes it, otherwise designation would fall upon something imaginary or fictitious. But if this is true of designation that is made by the intellect, much more of that which is made by such contact. Therefore the reason taken from contact urges in points or lines, just as in surfaces.

20. And this can be further declared in this mode. Let us imagine that there is in a globe some thing, or accident, which through contact adheres to a plane (which, although it perhaps cannot happen naturally, nevertheless can well by absolute power), and the globe leaves a trace of its contact in the plane, then that which remains, whatever it may be, will remain in some real entity truly and formally existing in the plane. Hence, just as from accidents which are understood to remain in the surface alone an argument is taken that a terminating surface is actually given, so from the aforesaid contact it can be taken to prove that points and lines are given in the terminating surface. And thence also that response about negative contact is more disproved, both because the same can be said of any bodies whatever, as has been shown; and also because, if the contact were not positive, a bronze globe falling upon glass would not break it, nor move it from place, which is incredible per se. But that reason about the intrinsic term of a finite body does not seem efficacious to other authors, because they think it is sufficiently finished in its parts through negation of further extension; if nevertheless that reason is admitted, as it is indeed probable, it has nearly the same force in lines and points, for surface itself is also finite, and therefore must have a term by which it is finished. And this can be confirmed, for if fire, for example,

creeping through straw and continuously growing, always has a terminating surface in any instant, in which generation reaches a certain term, therefore all those surfaces remain in the fire itself augmented and continuous. The consequence is evident, both because it is a greater inconvenience that infinite surfaces are made and corrupted successively, than that they remain united and continued in the same fire, since they are permanent beings, and it is not repugnant to them to remain simultaneously; and also because, when fire progresses beyond the terminating surface, there is nothing by which the preexisting surface is corrupted, because the part of fire that is generated does not repugn it, but it can be terminated and joined.

### *Fifth Opinion Admitting Indivisibles in the External Surface, & Not In The Middle Of Bodies*

21. Wherefore someone could say, either by declaring the previous middle opinion, or by devising a new one, just as an ultimate terminating surface is given in act, and not between parts of bodies, so lines and points are given in that surface of its own, even if they are not given in the middle of bodies. Which lines and points are said to be terminating, not indeed because they continue no parts, but because they are in the ultimate term of a body; and because, at least from that part where the extension of a body does not progress further, they do not continue, but terminate.

### *The Fifth Opinion is Disproved*

22. But that opinion, even explained in this mode, does not speak consistently. For first of all from it sprout forth nearly all the difficulties that are in the common opinion; because, if there are points in the extreme surface, in it alone there will be infinite and infinitely infinite ones, and similarly lines; or certainly there will be one line having infinite parts of determinate length, as is usually said of

the gyrative. From the other part that distinction does not satisfy, because, although there are not such clear experiences about indivisibles existing interiorly in parts of a body, nevertheless, if they are once shown in the ultimate surface, from parity of reasoning we understand them to be in the middle of bodies; because, if they are in the ultimate surface, it is only so that they terminate and continue; but the same continuity is found in the middle of bodies; but termination, although it is not simply and totally, is nevertheless partial and through designation not fictitious, but to which some true thing underlies. As an arm, even if according to interior parts it is continuous to the hand, is nevertheless truly finite; therefore in its partial quantity it ought to be terminated, not indeed by a pure term and proper to itself alone, but common to the hand, with which it is continued; and this reason proves even about surfaces, that if an ultimate terminating one is given, intermediate continuing ones are also given.

23. And this reason is further declared from continuity taken. For let us suppose a rod, which was continuous, is divided so that no quantity of it is lost, and the disjoined parts remain entirely simultaneous and contiguous, so that no quantity whatever is interposed (which at least by divine or angelic power can be done is not doubtful), then therefore I inquire why these parts were previously continuous, and now are not. Certainly for no other reason, except because they lost the common term they previously had; but that term is nothing other than a surface existing in the middle of a body. Perhaps those who admit only a terminating surface will say that those parts are now not continuous, not because they lost something, but because they acquired proper terminating surfaces. But first I make the same argument in lines and points; and I take two perfectly spherical bodies continuous among themselves, or two pyramidal bodies continuous in an angle; because these suppositions imply no repugnance, as seems evident per se. Let those two globes, or two pyramids, therefore be disjoined, and now let them only touch each

other, and I inquire why they were previously continuous, and now are not. It must be answered consistently that this was done because through disjunction they acquired two terms they did not previously have. But these terms are nothing, except points in globes, or lines in pyramids. And moreover the reason is common for all, because continuity is real unity; therefore it cannot consist in the privation of terms alone; therefore in some real positive by which extremes are united.

24. But it can be said that there does indeed intervene a real mode of union by which the parts themselves were immediately united among themselves, which the resulting terms impede; but that this mode of union is not a surface or line. Just as matter and form are united through a mode of union, which is not a surface, or something of this kind. But first in the same mode I will say that through division there results a mode of termination which is not a surface, but as if a mode of existing per se, or certainly just as some say about subsistence or existing per se that it consists in privation, so in the present it could more easily be said that things are discontinuous through the lack of this union, without another positive term.

25. And moreover in this union through continuation a peculiar reason occurs, on account of which parts do not seem to be able to be immediately united among themselves, through a mode of union alone, unless they are united in some indivisible term, because those parts are divisible to infinity; but they are not united per se and immediately in something divisible, otherwise quantity or extension would be diminished by reason of continuation alone, because a divisible part would be as if penetrated with a divisible part, because, as we said above in treating of matter and form, two things cannot per se and immediately be united among themselves, unless they are intimately present and as if penetrated in the same space. But this union, which is through continuation, happens so that the parts that are united, according to everything that is divisible in them, remain outside themselves and in diverse parts of space; therefore it is

necessary that they be united through the intervention of some indivisible thing which on account of its inextension can be totally intimately conjoined to each part, and thus unite them.

26. Moreover a physical reason is usually made here, taken from that principle that natural agents act uniformly differing through extended space and equally disposed or resistant, as appears in the sun illuminating air, for it illuminates parts nearer to itself more; but this uniform difference is continuous in the whole patient; therefore no intermediate part can be designated which is totally equally bright; therefore there are some middle indivisible surfaces, in which light is received in some total degree. But those who deny intermediate surfaces will deny this ultimate consequence, because for uniformly differing action it suffices that whatever designated part of the patient, the nearer it has been to the agent, the more light it has. But against this stand two things: First, because, if we suppose the medium is not continuous, but contiguous, as air and water, it must necessarily be confessed that in the ultimate surface of air and in the surface of water contiguous to it there is some determinate degree of light, because in a determinate subject and at an intrinsically determinate distance there cannot not be a determinate effect; therefore, by parity of reasoning even if air were continuous at that very distance which we can designate by mind, there would be the same determinate degree of light; therefore there would be there a subject capable of that, which cannot be except a surface; otherwise the action would not be uniformly differing. The second is because, while the sun illuminates air, or heaven near to itself, it is necessary that in the convex surface of heaven contiguous to the sun a determinate degree of light be received, which is diminished uniformly differing in that whole heaven up to the concave surface of the same heaven, and in that ultimate concave surface there will necessarily be light in another lesser determinate degree, for the same reason made above. Let the prior degree of light therefore be as eight, the posterior as four; now the reason is thus concluded. That light is diminished by a certain

continuous and uniform difference from the eighth degree up to the fourth; but it cannot continuously pass from one degree to the other extreme except through the middle, otherwise there would not be uniformly differing diminution; therefore it is necessary that in some intermediate subject there be light as six and as five, etc. But this cannot be except in an indivisible subject, because otherwise the action would not be uniformly differing; therefore there are given in the middle of a body indivisible surfaces, because the subject of that degree cannot be another, as has been declared.

27. Moreover from the continuity of motion, and its beginning and cessation, arguments not light are taken by philosophers to prove that indivisibles are given, not only in extremes, but also in the middle of bodies. But these, because they are more fully treated in the books of Physics, must now be omitted; for they depend on many principles that are handed down there; but we shall touch upon some below, in treating of the succession and continuity of motion and time and of the intension of qualities.

### *The Second Opinion, Simply Admitting These Indivisibles, is Preferred to The Others, & the Question is Resolved*

28. Among the aforesaid opinions therefore those indeed which are middle, or partly deny, partly affirm, seem to me surely less probable, because they cannot speak sufficiently constantly and consistently, both in the assertions they propose, and in the reasons by which they confirm them. And this, as I think, the reasons and discourses made convince. But the other two extreme opinions are both full of difficulties; it does not seem doubtful however that the latter opinion is Aristotelian, and received by the consensus of graver philosophers. Also it is more consonant with the principles both of geometry and of philosophy, and more apt for giving reason of many effects and for speaking in many philosophical things. But the contrary is only founded on certain inferences of some things, which seem

either difficult to believe, or to contain inconveniences; to which probable satisfaction can be given. And therefore we judge that the common opinion which affirms that these indivisibles are given, both terminating and continuing, in quantity, is to be preferred. Which it is not necessary to confirm with new reasons, for those that have been adduced seem sufficient to us.

29. Whether indivisibles are to be said to be in act, in the continuous. But truly, so that this may be more declared, it can be asked, when we say these indivisibles are in the continuous, whether it is to be understood that they are in act, or that they are in potency. For Aristotle, St. Thomas and others, while they say these indivisibles are in the continuous, often declare them to be in potency; but we seem to teach that they are in act. There can be great equivocation in these very words, and therefore they must be explained. For "in potency" can be understood in two modes, as I have often touched upon in the above: in one mode, so that it includes negation of actual existence; in another mode, so that it denotes negation of actual division. In the former mode those understand Aristotle who simply deny that these indivisibles are actually given; but it remains to be inquired by these whether this potency can in some mode be reduced to real act; for if it cannot, how is it true that indivisibles are in the continuous, even in potency? If however it can, when, or how will that potency be reduced to act? They will respond, as I think, that that potency cannot be real, because they judge the indivisibles themselves not to be real beings, but mere privations; but because they are conceived by us in the manner of positive beings, therefore the continuous itself is also conceived as existing in potency to indivisibles which can result from it to infinity. But, if we must speak openly, this is nothing other than to say these indivisibles are beings of reason, and there is in the continuous some foundation so that they can be conceived or imagined. That this is alien to the mind of philosophers speaking thus, is sufficiently evident per se.

30. Those therefore who admit at least that terminating indivisibles are actually in the continuous, declare that in the middle of a body these indivisibles are in potency, because in whatever part the continuous is divided, they will result in act. And because this can be done infinitely, therefore they are also said to be infinite in potency. But as it pertains to points and lines, this cannot be verified, because however much the continuous is divided, lines or points will never result so terminating, that they are not continuing, which was proved above; therefore, if there are no lines or points in act which are continuing, lines or points will never result from the division of the continuous in act; therefore neither are they in potency. Wherefore, those who admit the ultimate surface in act respond that it is verified optimally and absolutely in the said mode that there are infinite surfaces in potency in the middle of a body. But concerning line and point they say it is verified only physically by designation; mathematically, either by designation or by conformation of figure; but logically and through the power of God it is verified even according to real existence.

31. The individual things are explained; for speaking physically, the reason made convinces that points or lines cannot be reduced to the act of existence through that division or physical action. But they are said to be reduced to act by designation, because the mind conceives surfaces as divided as terminated by proper terms. Nevertheless from the exposition itself it is established that this reduction to act is not true, but imaginary. For I ask whether by that designation the mind truly conceives that term as something real positive, and thus it is necessary that it be in the thing; or it conceives only privation through the mode of the positive, and this is to conceive or imagine a being of reason. And thus we are devolved to what we inferred before, that this being in potency is nothing other than that there is in magnitude a foundation for imagining these beings of reason. And similarly that reduction to act through designation is nothing other than actually conceiving a being of

reason, taken from the thing with some foundation. Which can be taken not only from the division of the continuous, but also from the very union of parts of the continuous.

32. Nor truly is mathematical reduction, as it is declared by these authors, of another nature than the aforesaid. For they say mathematicians in a straight line, or plane surface, designate or determine points by mind or reason, not which are, but as if they were, so that by that as if sign they declare the continuity or termination of the continuous. And they call this mode through designation, which is not diverse from the preceding, as is evident per se. But they are said to do this through conformation of figure when from one straight line or surface they make a triangular or quadrangular one; for then they say indivisibles result in the angles terminating, or joining lines and surfaces; result (I say) not in the thing, but by designation of the mind; for in the thing there is nothing but privation of further tendency, or privation of division. Whence it happens that even this reduction to act is only as to the actual fiction of a certain being of reason. And at most there is a difference, because in those figures there seems to be greater foundation for imagining those terminating indivisibles, than in plane and straight figures.

33. But according to logical potency lines and points are said to be in potency, because, if God (which He can do) conserved a separated surface, then truly there would be lines in potency in that surface, because, if such a surface were divided, lines would really result actually existing and terminating, because then the divided surface on that part where it was divided would not be continued with another, and therefore there would necessarily be there a terminating and not continuing line, which would be a line in act; and the same is to be said proportionally of points in a separated line. But first this declaration is as alien to the mind of Aristotle, as it was outside his faith, or even thought, that there could be given a separated line or surface. Then this opinion conjoins two things, which taken together seem incredible to me. One is that a line in act according to itself is a

true real being in essential being, and a true species of quantity, because, if it were not such, it could not be separated, even by the absolute power of God; for God cannot make that something exist which according to itself is outside real latitude. Another is that nevertheless a true line cannot be in things in a natural mode, but miraculous and never thus far done, and about which many doubt whether it is possible, namely, that it be separated per se, or in a surface separated from a quantitative body. For if a line is a possible real being, it is also a natural being in its mode; therefore it is naturally possible; or speaking more properly, it is an accident according to the nature of some substance; for it is not an accident of the divine and supernatural order; therefore it can be in some substance in a natural mode; therefore either it is simply impossible, or it cannot be only in that abstraction. Finally, even admitting that case, it is said without sufficient foundation that through the division of a separated surface terminating lines would result, because, just as they themselves say those parts were previously continuous by themselves, so they could and should say that after division they are also terminated by themselves, or through negation of union or further extension. Especially because they themselves doubt about points whether they would be positive entities even in a separated, straight and finite line. And thus they understand that line terminated without a positively terminating thing; why therefore not thus understand surface? which if surface, why not also body? But now let us return to the arguments made above.

### *How It is to be Understood That Indivisibles Are in the Continuous in Potency*

34. When therefore these indivisibles are said to be in the continuous in potency, I do not think that that diction "in potency" is to be understood as excluding real existence, but as excluding real division. The former part is proved by the reasons made, and the latter

follows from the former. Whence it happens that, if being in act is taken as opposed to being in potency in the former mode, thus points are actually in the continuous, even if they are in potency in another sense. And that this is the mind of Aristotle appears from the places adduced above, in which he equally teaches about all these mathematical beings that they really are in physical bodies, even if they are abstracted by the mind; and in the Physics for this reason he says an indivisible cannot be moved per se, but can per accidens, namely to the motion of the continuous in which it truly exists. Hence also he says a point has position in the continuous. Finally he speaks about these in the same mode, just as about parts of the continuous, which he says are in potency in it. So also St. Thomas, in the said Opusculum, previously says thus: "In a line there are several points, and really divided among themselves," that is, distinct, "as its two terms, and similarly in its continuation." And yet below he says in a line there are two points in act and infinite in potency, which is to be understood in another mode. For terminating points as such are only two with respect to one line (but terminating points are called those which are in extreme surfaces with respect to a straight line, which is understood to be in the depth of a body); nevertheless terminative points are said to be infinite in potency, even in order to real existence, because those which are actually continuing a line, never become terminating, but through division of the continuous the continuing point is removed and two terminating ones result. And because that resulting can be done to infinity according to the division of the continuous, therefore terminative points are said to be infinite in real and physical potency in its mode, because that resulting is always done through some physical power, just as also the continuous is divisible through some physical power into always divisibles. From all these things therefore the common opinion seems sufficiently declared and confirmed, namely, that points, lines and surfaces are true real entities existing in magnitudes or in bodies, not only in external surfaces, or terms, but

also internally between all parts of the magnitude itself and between all its dimensions.

### *Point, Line & Surface Are Really Distinguished Among Themselves & From Body*

35. From which finally it is concluded that all these are not only in things, but also are in some mode really distinguished among themselves. To declare and prove this, I suppose, although these indivisibles are in magnitude, nevertheless magnitude itself is not composed of those alone, which the Philosopher proves extensively, Physics VI. And that reason sufficiently demonstrates this, that since indivisibles insofar as they are such, if they are immediate, touch each other according to their wholes, and are entirely in the same indivisible space, the extension of magnitude would not grow from those alone. But I said it is not composed of those alone, because, supposing the opinion we follow, it is not to be denied that these indivisibles intrinsically enter into the constitution of continuous quantity; for the integral entity of it arises neither from parts alone, nor from indivisibles alone, but from all simultaneously. For since there are two things of its nature, namely, both that it be extended and that it be continuous, it has the former from its parts, the latter from indivisibles. And therefore if a point, for example, is compared to a continuous terminated and finite line, it is concluded in it, and the same is proportionally of the rest, although if a continuing or terminating point is precisely compared with parts it continues or terminates, or one point with another, thus neither includes the other. For this cause therefore I said in the assertion that these are really distinguished in some mode; for if they are considered as composing and composed, thus they are distinguished as including and included, or in the manner of part and whole; but if they are compared precisely, thus they are really codistinguished as two parts, or two components;

for although points are not parts, they are nevertheless components in some mode, as has been said.

36. Thus therefore the conclusion declared seems evident to me, supposing the opinion we follow. For one part of a line is really distinguished from the remaining parts of the line, as designating toward the end of the line some small part, that is really distinct from the remaining magnitude of the whole line; therefore much more the ultimate terminating point, supposing that it is given in the thing itself, will be really distinct from the whole remaining entity of the line. And by the same reason, a continuing point of parts will be really distinct from them, both because it is related to individual parts as terminating, and also because it cannot be really the same with both parts simultaneously, since the parts themselves are really distinguished among themselves. Nor can it be the same with one only of them, since there is no greater reason about one than about another.

37. And it is confirmed first, for two bodies, for example, placing and placed, touch each other in some thing, and in some they do not touch, and in one they have real equality, in others they do not have it; therefore those things in which they touch and have equality, are really distinguished from others in which they do not touch nor have equality; since those two in which they touch are as if penetrative and entirely simultaneous; but the remaining quantity that is in one body, is entirely impenetrable with that which is in the other. Therefore the ultimate surface is a thing distinct from the remaining body, and the same proportional reason is of any other indivisible with respect to the quantity it terminates.

38. And it is confirmed second, for here it cannot be sufficiently understood that a point or any terminating indivisible is only a mode distinguished ex natura rei and really identified to the quantity it terminates. For that term, according to that mode of entity it has, is something indivisible, as is supposed; therefore it cannot be really identified to a divisible thing. The consequence is evident, both from disproportion, and also because I ask to which part of the

divisible it is identified; for none can be determinately designated, because there is no greater reason about one than about another; hence by parity of reasoning it will be identified to the whole quantity; but it is unintelligible that an indivisible mode terminating a line in one extremity of it, be the same in reality with the whole line. For how can it be the same with the whole, unless it is coextended to the whole, or if it is thus that mode in the whole line, how does it terminate it more in one part than in another? Which reason proves that an indivisible point cannot be identified with any divisible part of a line, whether taken determinately or indeterminately.

39. Finally from these it is also easily concluded that the indivisibles themselves, as points, for example, compared among themselves, are really distinct, for they are codistinguished so that one in no mode composes another. Also in reality they are distant in place, as appears of two extreme points terminating a line, and the same is true of any points of the same line, because between any two points a line mediates. And the same reasons can be applied to lines and surfaces with proportion.

### *Response to Arguments Against Terminating Indivisibles*

40. No point or line is given purely terminating. Otherwise concerning surface. It remains to respond to the arguments made in the beginning. To the first it is responded that indivisibles are given in magnitude, both for termination, and also for continuation. And to the arguments against the former part we concede that a point or line is never found naturally purely terminating; which does not result from the fact that a positive term is not necessary for intrinsically terminating quantity, but from the fact that lines and surfaces separated from bodies are not found in things; but in the same body there is no part of a line or surface, which is not conjoined to other parts from each extreme; but among surfaces there is given some

purely terminating, as was said above. And to the replication that, with such a term removed, quantity would remain as finite and limited as before, it is responded, if this separation is made only by precision of mind, thus there indeed remains in the intellect a line finite negatively, but it is not thus understood as positively terminated as is necessary in reality. But if the separation is supposed to be made in reality itself, thus we deny that such separation can be made, because there cannot be in reality quantity finite negatively, that is, not extending further, unless it is also positively terminated and closed by its terms.

41. Whether line, point and surface can be separated among themselves and from body. But someone will insist, if that extreme surface is a thing really distinct, at least by absolute power God will be able to separate it, and conserve the whole remaining magnitude without it; for it was said above that really distinct things can be separated from each other, and conserved separated. Many respond by denying the consequence, because that rule is not so general and certain, that sometimes repugnance cannot intervene, as is in the present, that quantity remain finite in reality and not terminated. Or it can also be said from the distinction that it follows optimally that God can separate one from another and conserve even one without the other, but not in a state including repugnance. And thus God will be able to separate the extreme surface from a body and conserve it separated, with the union to the body removed, and giving it another mode of existing. And conversely He will be able to conserve a body without such a surface, because it is distinguished from it; nevertheless He will not be able to conserve it entirely unterminated, or without any other surface, because this abundantly involves repugnance. I add truly lastly that this repugnance does not seem so clear that it cannot be probably said that a line can be conserved by God without a terminating point, and a surface without a line, and a body without a surface; but in that case, that quantity is finite through negation of further extension, but not through intrinsic and positive termination which it requires according to its connatural mode of

being. Just as, those who think God can conserve a created nature without proper or alien subsistence, say nevertheless that for the connatural mode of existing such a nature postulates a positive term of subsistence. But this natural necessity can be declared in the present a posteriori, because a body lacking intrinsic term would not be apt for physical contact with other bodies, nor for figure and other similar accidents. Hence neither would it be in itself perfectly integral and consummated according to its extension. Therefore it can be rightly understood that such a term is necessary ex natura rei, even if it can be separated by absolute power. Indeed it is also probable that it can sometimes be naturally impeded, as we shall see later.

### *Response to Arguments Against Continuative Indivisibles*

42. First. Second. To the other part of the arguments we say that these indivisibles are also necessary for the continuation of parts of quantity. But to the first impugnation it has already been responded that these indivisibles are also required for termination. And therefore from this head it is not excluded that they are also required for continuation, although by continuing parts they terminate them in their partial quantities. Rather this confirms the reason of necessity. To the second, it has also already been shown that divisible and extended parts cannot be immediately united among themselves according to extension, because they cannot according to any divisible part, whether determinate or indeterminate, be simultaneously in the same space; but it is otherwise concerning an indivisible term; for they can be immediately joined per se to it, and thus by means of it they can be joined and united among themselves. But whether besides the entity of the point and parts of the line, a mode of union between them is necessary, I shall say below.

43. Third. To the third impugnation it must be conceded that there is in the continuous and in any part of it an infinite multitude of

points, nor is that inconvenient, because that whole infinitude of points is only secundum quid, since that whole composes a finite line simultaneously with the parts of the line. Wherefore it does not follow that there can be given an infinite multitude of beings actually distinct, either quantitative, or transcendental, because that would be infinity in act and simply, nor would it be closed by any terms, just as the infinity of points is really closed; for between two points of one line there are infinite other points. Nor between actually discrete things can it be understood that, any one being designated, another immediate cannot be assigned, either in order of position, if they are bodies, or in order of perfection, if they are spirits. But in this multitude of points, any one being designated, none can be designated immediate to it in the same continuous. And since in a line a first can be designated, but not a second, and since there is given an ultimate, but not a penultimate, all of which demonstrate that this infinity is of far different nature from the infinity of discrete quantity; they also indicate that it is imperfect infinity secundum quid and potential, and therefore a sufficient argument cannot be taken thence to show that infinite multitude is possible, even through the absolute power of God. Of which matter it is to be treated elsewhere.

44. Fourth. Whether all points can be separated from a line. To the fourth about the separation of all points from all parts of a line, such separation can be understood to be made in two ways. First, by conserving each of the extremes; second, by destroying one and conserving the other; for if both were simultaneously removed from the nature of things, it would not be separation, but absolute destruction, which would contribute nothing to the force of the argument. Concerning the former mode therefore it can be thought that on the part of neither extreme does this repugn; for concerning parts of the continuous it can be said they would not then remain all actually divided, because although they are naturally united by their continuatives, nevertheless God could unite them in another supernatural mode, just as Soto and others admitting parts of

substance to be formally united through quantity, say God can conserve them united without quantity, uniting them in another preternatural mode. Or just as a little before we were saying, God can conserve quantity without a terminating surface, even if it is naturally terminated through it.

45. But nevertheless regarding this part I think such separation is impossible, so that God would conserve a line without the indivisibles that continue it, because a line could not be conserved without quantitative extension, since this is of its nature; but that extension cannot (as the arguments made above prove) consist with the immediate union of quantitative parts among themselves, and therefore it is necessary that it be made in some indivisible that continues the parts, which on account of this is like a formal cause of their union with respect to both parts; but with respect to the individual parts it relates as another extreme in which the union is made. Therefore, just as God cannot conserve a formal effect without a formal cause, nor a union without the extremes of union, so he cannot conserve the parts of quantity as united without the indivisibles that unite them. Nor can those parts be conserved without any union, because this involves repugnance, since it is of the nature of such parts that they have some divisibility or dimensional extension, which cannot exist without continuation. Whether it can be thought or imagined that God conserves the parts of a line as united by other indivisibles, which are not points but entities of another nature, I leave for others to dispute; for it is a useless fiction and seems impossible to me, because neither would those indivisibles have another mode of entity, nor another formal effect; nor is a line capable of another continuation than this one, which is connatural and quasi-essential.

46. Concerning the other mode of separation, however, there seems to be less repugnance on the part of the other extreme; for since points have no extension, there seems to be no inconvenience that they all remain actually divided, with all parts of the line destroyed. But nevertheless in this we can speak of individual points or of the

whole collection of points. Concerning individuals and concerning any finite multitude of them, almost all who think these indivisibles have proper entity concede that indivisibles can be conserved as separated in this way, both surface without body, and line without surface, and consequently also point without line; and this is more probable, because no open repugnance presents itself. According to which opinion it must consequently be said that a point is not united to a line except through some mode of union distinct from the point by the nature of the thing; for if the entity of the point can remain in the nature of things, and not united, therefore being united adds something to the entity of the point in the thing itself separable from it; therefore it adds a mode of union, for through that it is said to be formally united; but this mode, speaking consequently, will more probably be posited as in itself extensively indivisible and really identified with the point alone, but terminated to the parts of the line as to the extremes of union. But in the parts themselves it is not necessary to imagine other modes of union, because neither are they necessary, nor can they easily be understood to be identified with divisible parts. But someone could say not entirely improbably that a point is so diminished an entity that for its real existence it essentially requires conjunction with a line, and therefore is not united to it through another mode of union distinct from itself by the nature of the thing, but through itself. Whence it consequently follows that a point can in no way be conserved as separated from a line; and the same must be said of a line with respect to a surface, and of a surface with respect to a body. But although what I have said is probable, nevertheless supposing these to be true realities, the former way of speaking is more consequent and more probable.

47. But truly, speaking of the whole collection of points existing in a line, there is greater difficulty. For from what has been said it seems to follow that even in this there is no repugnance; for if a point can be conserved as separated, and just as one is conserved, so can more and more be conserved to infinity, why could not the whole

collection of points existing in a line be conserved? Nevertheless it is more probable that this cannot be done. And the reason can be given from the common opinion that it is repugnant to give an infinite multitude in act, and from the inconveniences and absurdities which are customarily inferred from that position, which I now omit. The reason therefore which seems most probable to me at present is that points cannot be separated from a line except by destroying the parts of the line; but the parts of a line cannot be destroyed without also destroying the points of which it intrinsically consists; for although, as I said, a line or part of a line does not consist of points alone, nevertheless it includes them so intrinsically that it is not possible to conceive a part of a line in which points are not included. Therefore it is impossible to destroy the parts of a line without destroying the points; just as, conversely, it is impossible for a part of a line to remain without the points remaining. For this reason, therefore, it is impossible, with the parts of a line destroyed, to conserve the whole collection of points as separated.

48. Fifth. Whether indivisibles existing in the continuum are actually infinite. To the fifth question about an infinitely extended line existing in a finite continuum, it is answered that the reasoning made there correctly proves that in one continuum there is not a multitude of lines (and the same is proportionally true of surfaces), because all lines which are considered by us as several in that continuum are parts of one line which in infinite ways circles and revolves around that continuum; for they are all continued among themselves by some points. And therefore, as I was saying above, no point can be found in that whole line so terminating it that it does not also continue it. And hence to the other difficulty we respond by conceding that there are in that line infinite equal parts actually united in some point or points, as the argument convinces; nevertheless they do not compose one line actually infinite simpliciter, because they are united among themselves in such a way that they are enclosed within a finite magnitude and within definite terms and are united among themselves in a certain

confused way to circumscribe and compose a finite magnitude. And for this reason it is not inconvenient to give an infinite line closed by extreme points, because that infinity is not simpliciter, but secundum quid, and those points are not simpliciter terminating, but continuing, in the manner in which all points in a circular line relate.

49. But if you insist, because it follows that that line in a foot-long column has as many equal parts as in a two-foot column, because it has as many equal circles in the proportional parts of a foot's length as of two feet's length; for a foot-long column has as many proportional parts as a two-foot column, which are all equal among themselves as to thickness. To this many respond by conceding the consequence, because in infinites they do not think one can be greater or less than another; for these are properties of finite quantity, as Gregory extensively shows, In IV, dist. 44, q. 4; and Scotus, In II, dist. 1, q. 3, and others. And for that reason they say there are as many points in a smaller circle as in a larger one; for if one is included in the other, all lines which can be drawn from the center cut each circle at some point, and yet those lines are infinite simpliciter. But although it is true that one of these infinites cannot be greater than another in some certain proportion, nevertheless I cannot absolutely grasp how there are not more in the whole than in the parts taken individually and separately, because the whole contains whatever is in any part, and something more. Wherefore, in the way that one infinite can be part of another, there is no reason why it should be repugnant that there are more points in the whole than in the part, or more parts of a line in a two-foot column than in a one-foot column. But enough of these things.

### *On the Subject of Points and Other Indivisibles*

50. In the sixth argument it is asked in what subject these indivisibles exist. And the common response is customarily that a point exists proximately in the parts of the line which it continues, and

a line in the parts of a surface; but a surface in the parts of a quantitative body; but the body itself exists immediately in substance. And hence it happens that these indivisibles are in no adequate subject, nor do they immediately inhere in substance, but only the body of the category of quantity. But this response, according to the opinion treated by us above concerning the formal effect of quantity, has great difficulty; for the parts of substance are among themselves as truly and really united as the parts of a body of quantity; but they are not united immediately through quantity, as I proved above; therefore they are united through something substantial, which proportionally corresponds to the surface by which the parts of quantity are united; therefore that will be something indivisible which can be a proportioned subject of quantitative surface.

51. This is declared most clearly by positing that case in which God would conserve a corporeal substance without quantity present to the same space in which it was before under quantity; for then the parts of that substance would remain substantially united; therefore between them there would be an indivisible substantial term by which they would be united; therefore they have the same now under quantity. Nor can it be said that those parts of substance are proximately united among themselves without an indivisible term, because there is the same reason concerning them as concerning the parts of a quantitative body, because the parts of substance are also entitatively divisible, and are not united proximately and immediately in any divisible entity.

52. Furthermore, the substantial body, which underlies the body of quantity, is as much united and quasi-continuous in its entity as the body of quantity is in its own. And the body of quantity quasi-intimately penetrates the substantial body, and continuously coextends itself to it; therefore wherever there is something of quantitative body, there corresponds proportionally something of substantial body; therefore to the parts of one body correspond parts of the other, and to the continuative terms of one body respond the

continuative terms of the other, nor can the continued extension of them be understood otherwise. Just as the surfaces of containing and contained body could not be understood as continuously and adequately coextensive unless parts of one corresponded to parts of the other, and continuatives and terms of one to continuatives and terms of the other. And similarly, if two quantified bodies would penetrate each other adequately and continuously in place, a similar proportion would be necessary, because without it continued extension cannot be understood. And for the same reason, because whiteness, for example, is continuously extended in a surface, it is necessary that in any part of the surface there correspond a part of whiteness inhering in it, and that in the lines continuing the parts of the surface something of whiteness be understood as extended according to length and not according to breadth, by which the parts of that whiteness are united. For they cannot be immediately united through a line of the species of quantity, since it is of a different order, nor can the continued extension of whiteness through the whole surface be conceived in another way. And proportionally, when heat or light is continuously extended through a body according to its depth, it is necessary that, just as in the parts of the body there are parts of light and heat, so in the continuatives of the body there are proper continuatives of light or heat, pertaining to their proper genera or species, because neither can those qualities be formally integrated in their entities through the entity of another category, nor could they be continuously extended through the depth of quantity unless they had in themselves intrinsic integrity and continuity. This is also sufficiently manifested by the successive continuity of change by which such quality is extended through the body; for in this instant heat is extended only up to this term, which it did not reach immediately before this, and immediately after this it will progress beyond, and thus the extension proceeds continuously. Therefore it is necessary that, just as to the parts of quantity correspond parts of quality, so to the indivisibles of quantity correspond indivisibles of quality.

53. And this same reason urges with the same proportion in substantial form; for substantial generation also occurs continuously; as the form of fire is continuously extended or grows in the matter of tow or straw, as I now suppose. And finally in the rational soul it is declared in this way; for it is present to the whole human body; therefore it is whole not only in the whole body and in the individual parts of it, but also in all the terms or continuatives of it; otherwise its presence would not be continuous and without interruption in the whole body; but it is not present except where it informs; therefore under the whole quantity and under all its indivisibles there corresponds proportionally something of matter, which the soul can inform.

54. Thus, to the sixth argument it must be said that the whole quantity has a subject proportioned to itself. For in a substantial body there is an integral composition from parts and substantial terms proportioned among themselves, and this body is clothed (so to speak) with a quantitative body, such that its parts are affected by parts of quantity, and its terms by terms of quantity. In this way it is rendered extended and naturally impenetrable in relation to space. The same principle applies proportionally in every quality, and indeed in every corporeal thing that becomes quantified through adherence to quantity or in some other way. For in every such thing there are indivisibles proportioned to its entity and corresponding to the indivisibles of quantity, as we declared above by way of example concerning certain qualities, and as will be explained more fully a little below when we treat of the continuity of motion and time.

### *The First Difficulty Concerning What Was Said About Substantial Indivisibles*

55. When a substantial body is divided, do the indivisibles of substance perish? Two objections remain. The first is that there cannot be indivisibles of substance in matter, otherwise something of matter

would often be lost and something would be newly made. For through the division of a continuum, one surface that was connecting the parts of the body is destroyed, and two terminating surfaces result. Therefore, if substantial terms proportional to quantitative surfaces correspond to them, it happens that through that division the common term connecting matter is also lost, and two extreme or terminating terms result, for the proportion and reasoning is entirely the same. But the consequence seems false, otherwise it would be necessary that those indivisibles of matter that newly arise be created, and consequently those that cease be annihilated. The inference is clear, because they cannot come to be through eduction, for they are not in a subject; they participate in the essence and nature of the first substantial subject. Hence, although they are united to parts of matter, they are not in them as in a subject, but compose with them one first and adequate subject of quantity and substantial forms.

56. To this difficulty I respond by admitting the first consequence. For if parts of matter are united by their substantial terms when they are divided by disjunction, it is necessary that the term by which those parts were united be destroyed, because it can neither remain whole in each part, nor is there reason why it should remain in one rather than the other. Then those divided parts remain intrinsically terminated substantially, just as parts of quantity do in their order. Therefore it is necessary that substantial terms newly arise, just as quantitative ones do. But how those terms come to be is difficult to explain, for to admit creation or annihilation there is not philosophical. Therefore it seems one must say that those material terminating indivisibles come to be through resultance from the very parts of matter.

57. But someone might press the point, for this resultance involves some efficiency, since through it some new thing begins to exist. But that efficiency is not from parts of matter as from an active principle, because matter is not active, nor is it from those parts as from a material cause, because they are not the subject of such terms. I

respond that it is not inconvenient for matter to have some activity through resultance, as was said above. For this it suffices that the term depend in its being and becoming on the matter to which it is united, for that dependence is referred back to a material cause. Just as theologians say that if the Word should abandon the human body, a created subsistence would result from it; for then from the matter itself a partial subsistence would result through some intrinsic activity and reception of proper subsistence. Or it can also be said that these material indivisibles result from the force of that action by which God conserves matter, and are like a certain concreation, yet not so called because it happens from the force and debt of a preexisting action.

58. What difficulties the indivisibles of extended forms undergo. The other difficulty is that these indivisibles cannot be admitted in forms or qualities that are extended in matter or quantity, because otherwise it follows that two contrary qualities at their maximum degree would be joined simultaneously according to something real and positive of themselves in the same indivisible subject, which involves a contradiction. The consequence is clear, for if in the continuous surface of a wall half the part is maximally white and half maximally black, and those qualities have their proper indivisible terms by which they are continued and terminated, it will be necessary that on that side where they are contiguous they have their proper terms simultaneously inhering in the same line continuing the quantitative surface. By the same reasoning, if wood is hot to degree six on one middle part and cold to degree six on the other, in the continuing surface there will be simultaneously heat and cold according to that whole intensity, although through something indivisible according to extension. From this it further follows that in the same indivisible term of matter there are simultaneously two specific substantial forms according to something indivisible extensively, as in a green and dry rod whose quantity is continuous; in the surface continuing each part there will be an indivisible term of

matter that will be simultaneously informed by each form according to something indivisible of it.

59. To this difficulty, as it concerns qualities, some do not consider it inconvenient to admit the whole consequence, because contrary qualities do not conflict with each other in the same subject by reason of indivisibles, but per se by reason of the forms themselves. Therefore it is not inconvenient that when forms only touch each other in an indivisible of quality through their extreme indivisibles, they do not expel each other from the proportioned subject. But truly concerning substantial forms, they inquire that by the very fact that in extended matter they are forms specifically distinct, which cannot be continued among themselves, the parts of matter and quantity are also not continuous. As in the proposed example of the rod partly green and partly dry, they deny that those parts are continuous. If this is true, the inferred inconvenience ceases, because there will not be two substantial forms in the same indivisible term of matter, but there will be simultaneously two indivisible terms of matter informed by two forms. This opinion in its final part can be taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, ch. 6, insofar as he says those things are one in number that have one matter, and those that are one in number are also one in species. Since therefore that rod is not one in species, neither will it be one in number; therefore it will not have one matter in number; therefore that matter will not be continuous, because continuous matter is one in number. Hence the Commentator, Metaphysics X, comm. 1, says the cause of continuation in individuals is the form itself. From this also comes the common axiom among philosophers that those things that differ in species cannot be continuous, which is taken from Aristotle, Physics V, text 89. This can be persuaded by reason, both because otherwise one accident, namely one surface, would be common to two subjects specifically distinct, since there is no reason why it should be in one part rather than the other; and also because otherwise all bodies specifically distinct, if they were close,

would immediately become continuous, because if the diversity of forms does not impede, nothing impedes.

60. But to begin from this latter part, it is difficult to believe that matter and quantity are necessarily discontinuous if their parts are informed by diverse partial forms, especially if we suppose what we judged more probable above, that the same quantity in number remains in the matter of the generated thing that was in the corrupted one. For if quantity is not varied by the introduction of a new form into part of the matter, there is no cause why it should be made discontinuous. Especially because the generation of substance happens continuously and successively, therefore an instant can be designated in which it is true to say that generation has arrived up to this term and has not proceeded beyond. Therefore the form introduced through generation intrinsically attains that term, and in it the form of the corrupted thing no longer exists. Therefore in it there are not two terms of quantity or matter, but only one. Therefore the parts of quantity and matter remain having one common term; therefore they remain continuous. A similar argument is taken from the fact that an instant can also be designated in which generation arrives at such a term, and immediately before that it had not yet arrived, and yet throughout the whole preceding quantity or matter it had already been made. Therefore at that time immediately before that instant, the form of the corrupted thing was still in that term, and the form of the generated thing had not yet reached it. Therefore the parts of that matter or quantity were continuous, that is, had a common term, even if they were informed by partial forms.

61. Therefore, although forms specifically different from each other cannot be continuous, which Aristotle intends in the cited passage from Physics V, nevertheless that they exist in partial subjects having continuity among themselves does not conflict. Hence Aristotle himself, Metaphysics V, ch. 4, teaches that some things are one by continuation that are not one in form, which passage some explain concerning imperfect and artificial continuation. But since

Aristotle speaks absolutely, nothing prevents it from being understood also of proper and physical or quantitative continuation. The reason for the difference is that the terms continuing each specific form pertain in their own way to the species of that form, as indivisibles of whiteness to the species of whiteness, etc. Therefore forms differing in species cannot have a common term by which they are continued, for such a term can pertain neither to one species nor to the other, both because there is no greater reason for one than the other, and also because it cannot be united to both, but only to that one to whose species it pertains. For the same reason it cannot pertain to some third species, because it would be disproportioned for uniting or terminating such forms. For this cause, therefore, forms specifically distinct cannot be united among themselves. But that they exist in a continuous subject impedes nothing, because parts of the subject can be united among themselves even if parts of the form are not united, but are as it were contiguous, or one is terminated extrinsically where the other is terminated intrinsically, as must happen in continuous generation, as has been declared by the reasons given.

62. Indeed, even those who hold that quantity is varied in the generated and corrupted thing must confess that in individual instants of continuous generation, the quantity of the generated thing is intrinsically terminated by that term to which the action has arrived. But the remaining quantity of the thing that is gradually corrupted lacks an intrinsic term at that instant, for no other intrinsic term could result for the same instant. Otherwise in all instants of that continuous generation, infinite surfaces would successively result and would immediately or at once be corrupted. Likewise those two quantities in individual instants would be truly contiguous and terminated by their proper terms, and yet the whole change would happen continuously. Finally, in each and every instant of that succession, new terminating surfaces would arise and cease in the body that is gradually corrupted, and yet no divisible quantity existing between those surfaces would begin and cease, all of which are impossible. Therefore it must be said,

if generation is continuous, as it truly is, that one form is terminated intrinsically, the other truly extrinsically in individual instants. Therefore, supposing that quantity exists in prime matter, nothing will prevent the subject of those forms from being continuous.

63. From this, therefore, it is easy to respond to the difficulty raised about substantial forms specifically diverse informing parts of the same matter. For I say that in the term continuing those parts of matter there is only one of those forms, namely that one to whose introduction the force of the agent was able to attain intrinsically. The other[50] truly for the time being lacks an intrinsic term, nor is this inconvenient, because it is impeded by the contrary form and agent from being able to result. Thus it does not follow that one surface exists in two subjects, for it exists only in that term uniting parts of matter, which is also informed by only one form or the term of one form, as has been said. In this there can be greater reason for one than the other, due to the greater force of the agent or dispositions. Nor does it therefore follow that any bodies specifically distinct can be continuous, because it is rather very accidental that parts of the same continuum are thus informed by diverse forms, because one is in the way of corruption and gradually passes into another. But properly speaking, things specifically diverse require proper terms if they are in a connatural state, which they do not lose unless some alteration or corruption happens in them. Finally, that composite thing, for example a rod partly dry, partly green, even if its quantity and matter are continuous, is not properly one in number, speaking physically. For although prime matter is one by continuation, nevertheless proximate matter is not one, and especially because numerical unity is taken more from form than from matter. The parts of matter itself, although they have a certain mode of unity by continuation, nevertheless have distinct partial entities according to which they can

[50] another [reading], 1960; alt. Otherwise. "Otherwise in some editions." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 105.

be informed by diverse forms and compose individuals simply diverse, although according to part they are united and continuous.

64. Whether diverse qualities can exist in one quantity according to some indivisibles. According to this doctrine I think one should respond to the other part concerning contrary qualities. For when two such qualities are extended in parts of the same continuous surface, both cannot intrinsically inhere in the line continuing the surface, because just as the whole surface cannot be simultaneously informed by those two qualities in intense degrees, so neither can one line or one point proportionally. For in any continuative element of that quality according to its extension are all the degrees of intensity, which everywhere have the same formal repugnance among themselves. Likewise, because a line is compared to a surface in the same way that a surface is compared to a body. But these qualities, like heat and whiteness, although they can penetrate the whole body and have extension in it according to depth, nevertheless conflict equally in the same surface as in the same body. Therefore they conflict equally also in the same line and in the same point proportionally, that is, according to that in which they can be present in them.

65. Therefore it must be said that of those two qualities one is terminated intrinsically, the other truly extrinsically, whence in that term continuing the surface the term of one quality, whiteness for example, will intrinsically inhere. But the other quality will have no proper term there, but will only attain there extrinsically. If the reason is sought why one rather than the other is thus terminated, it must be sought from the efficient cause, namely because the efficient cause of one of those qualities was able to attain that term more efficaciously than the other, and after that quality has been thus effected, it formally resists and impedes the other from introducing its term there. Nor is this singular or new in physical changes, for if the sphere of activity of an agent is terminated extrinsically, its effect or the form introduced by it must also be terminated intrinsically. Or conversely, if the sphere of activity is terminated intrinsically, the form existing in the remaining

part of the patient will be terminated extrinsically. Or if two contrary agents placed opposite each other act on the same patient according to diverse parts and through opposite lines, it is necessary that if the action of one attains one term intrinsically, the other arrives there only extrinsically, because the same thing cannot simultaneously be moved by contrary motions in intense degrees or those exceeding latitude, as we speak.

66. But you will ask how those qualities or forms are then close, because they cannot be called contiguous, since they do not have ultimate terms simultaneously, nor continuous, because they do not have one common term. Some respond that they are continuous by reason of the subject. But certainly that is very materially. Moreover, Aristotle in Physics V does not call motions continuous, even if they are in the same subject and one immediately succeeds another without interposition of rest, if they are not of the same species and have changed being of the same nature by which they can in their own way be united and continued. Rather, therefore, those two forms approach contiguity, because they do not have a common term and are immediate among themselves. But properly they are not even contiguous for the reason given, but can be called immediately coherent or successive, one after the other. Nor is it necessary that all things that are immediate be continuous or contiguous, unless each is intrinsically terminated. In this, I think, lies the difference between quantity itself, which is quantified per se, and all forms, which are quantified per accidens. For quantity, if it is not continuous with another, always has its intrinsic term, because it results naturally and has no contrary by which it can be impeded. The same reasoning applies to matter, and therefore in these all quantities are either continuous or properly contiguous. But truly forms are quantified per accidens, insofar as they are extended in a quantified subject, in which they can sometimes be impeded by a contrary form or agent from having an intrinsic term, and therefore sometimes they are among themselves immediate without proper contiguity.

*How Parts Are United in a Point*

67. To the seventh argument I respond that these indivisibles that couple do not properly have contact with the parts they continue, but are intrinsically united to them. Nor can an adequate part be assigned in a line to which a point is united, because no part according to its whole self is immediately in a point, otherwise either that part would be equally indivisible as the point, or the point would be quasi-extended or present to an invisible space and line. Therefore a point unites parts of a line indivisibly, uniting itself wholly to each, not adhering wholly to some determinate divisible part, but quasi-intimately assisting each part. This must be said equally necessarily, whether only terminating indivisibles are posited in things, or also continuing ones. I confess, however, that this argument considerably weakens the reason made above about the contact of a globe at a point, or of a plane at a surface. But nevertheless, because that contact is between things not united and cannot exist with any penetration, it seems necessary that it be in indivisible terms. But here, because intrinsic union happens between surface and body, or line and point, it can be better understood that the surface is immediately united through itself to the entity of the body, even if in that entity no whole part can be designated to which it is united. The same applies to a point with respect to parts of a line. But how much efficacy that discourse has (for this is also touched upon in that argument) by which Aristotle in Physics VI proves that an indivisible cannot be moved per se, must be referred to that passage. For whether points are given in act or not, the discourse of Aristotle has the same difficulty, which does not suppose that a separate point is given, but hypothetically inquires whether, if one were given, it could be moved per se. A similar question will be whether, if it is given in a globe, it can be moved per accidens, whether it is given in act or not.

## Section V

### *Testimonies of Aristotle Are Explained*

68. To the other testimonies of Aristotle posited in the eighth argument, the response must be taken from what we said above about the various ways in which these can be said to exist in potency or in act. For Aristotle does not affirm that these indivisibles exist in potency in magnitudes in the sense that he excludes true entity from them. For in Metaphysics I, text 43, he says indivisibles exist in potency just as number also exists in potency in magnitude. But it is established that number exists in magnitude according to its whole entity, and only actual division or termination is lacking to it. Thus therefore he says indivisibles exist in potency, not because they do not exist, but because they are not separate. Hence at the end of that text he concludes thus: "But it is necessary that there be some extremity of these (that is, of lines). Therefore by the same reasoning that the existence of a line is concluded, the existence of a point is also gathered." But when in Metaphysics III he says that a point or surface exists in potency, just as the figure of Mercury exists in stone, he speaks of terminating points insofar as they exist in potency in the middle of a line. The same applies proportionally to surfaces. For, as we said above, these terms truly do not exist until they result, and therefore in all strictness they exist in potency. In the same ways the passage from Metaphysics VIII is explained, where he speaks of parts of a continuum in the same way as of indivisibles, and says they exist in potency in magnitude. The other passages have no difficulty, for in On the Soul III he rather supposes that a point is something positive, although it is declared by us through privation. Hence he equates it with blackness, which we know through the mode of privation of whiteness. Similarly in the book On the Motion of Animals he supposes that indivisible points exist in the heavens, which are poles; yet he denies that they are some substance in which motive power can reside.

## SECTION VI
## WHETHER LINE AND SURFACE ARE PROPER SPECIES OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY DISTINCT AMONG THEMSELVES AND FROM BODY

1. A point is in no way a species of quantity. Up to now we have only shown that such lines and surfaces and points exist in things; now we must explain how they participate in the essence of quantity. This doubt has no place regarding points, for since they are indivisible in every respect, they do not participate in the essential nature of quantity. Therefore everyone supposes that a point is not a species of quantity, nor truly does it constitute another category, but is reduced to the category of quantity as its principle and something incomplete in that genus. Conversely, there is no question about body either, for the opposite reason, namely because if there is any complete species of quantity, this most belongs to body, which is extended in all directions and divisible according to every dimension. From it especially does material substance have corporeal bulk and impenetrability with other bodies.

### *The Difficulty of the Question Is Opened*

2. Concerning line and surface, however, there is a special difficulty. First, because they seem to be incomplete entities in the genus of quantity, for just as a point is the principle of a line, so a line is the principle of a surface, and a surface of a body. Therefore only body is complete quantity, but all the rest are its principles, nearer or more remote; therefore they are all incomplete in that genus. It can be responded that line and surface are divisible in one respect, indivisible in another, and by this latter respect they are not quantities but terms

or principles of quantities; by the former respect, however, they are complete species of quantity, for they are essentially certain extensions. But against this response, which seems to be common, I argue, because since there are three dimensions of quantity—length, width, and depth—either each of these dimensions belongs to the essence of each species, or one dimension belongs to the essence of line, two to the essence of surface, and three to the essence of body. The first cannot be said. If the second is said, it plainly follows that the prior species are compared to the ultimate as incomplete to complete; therefore.

3. The minor is proved regarding the first part, because those dimensions cannot be so abstracted that one does not include another, otherwise it is impossible to distinguish them. For if someone wishes to conceive and explain the extension of width, he will not be able to accomplish this through precisely that which width adds above length, but it is necessary that in the extension of width he intrinsically include length. Therefore in the essence of surface, line is included as length is, and not only as it is indivisible, and the same applies to surface with respect to body. This is confirmed and clarified, for if these dimensions are considered precisely and according to individual divisibilities only, they do not seem to differ formally in the nature of extension. Therefore they are distinguished only according to number (so to speak), insofar as one includes three, or two, or only one dimension. The antecedent is clear, because in a surface, width precisely taken is a certain length, whose sign is that we measure that very width or its quantity by a line. Therefore the extension of line and of width are of the same nature, for measure must be homogeneous with what is measured. Therefore surface seems to be nothing other than extension having double length toward diverse parts or positions, and body will be having triple length, for we also measure depth by length. Therefore these species cannot be distinguished except insofar as one includes another. This is confirmed, for by this reasoning

Aristotle said in Posterior Analytics I that line belongs to the definition of surface, and surface to the definition of body.

4. Regarding the other part, the minor is proved, for first, if all three dimensions belong to the nature of body, then body in its essential nature includes surface and line, not only as they are indivisible, but as they have one or two extensions. Therefore line and surface will not be complete quantities, but incomplete and ordered to composing body according to the dimensions it has. Then at most these three members will be distinguished according to more and less within the same species. For if the dimensions themselves, taken precisely and individually, do not differ formally, they are distinguished only in number, and not as total entities but as partial ones composing one thing. Therefore these differ among themselves only as entities more or less composite within the same nature. Nor does it matter if someone says that specific diversity is caused in numbers by the addition of unity, although all unities are of the same nature. For although this may be admitted in discrete quantity, which just as it is not true being per se, so it does not have true and real species, in continuous quantity this has no place, which just as it is true and per se being, so its species are to be distinguished only from the proper differences of things. Just as continuous quantity is usually distinguished into two-cubits, three-cubits, etc., and yet that distinction is not into true species of quantity really distinct, but only by reason; so therefore it will be in the present case, if those dimensions are not distinguished formally but only materially.

### *Resolution of the Question*

5. Nevertheless it must be said that line and surface are true species of quantity, distinct among themselves and from body. This is the opinion of Aristotle and commonly received by all philosophers and in all schools. Nor is it necessary to prove this opinion otherwise than by solving the difficulty raised, for from this it will be established

how the essential nature of quantity integrally belongs to each of these species; how also in each of them there is formally diverse extension, and therefore they themselves are specifically diverse quantities. This can also be taken from the science of geometry, in which distinct propositions about these species are demonstrated. That there are no other species of continuous quantity besides these will be more established from the following sections. Now in permanent and intrinsic quantity (as some call it) the matter is also common and clear, because no more modes of extremes or continuing terms can be understood besides points, lines, and surfaces. Hence mathematicians, to gather the number of these species, in thought imagine a line described by the movement of a point, a surface by the movement of a line toward the side, a body by the movement of a surface toward width; nor can more differences of these dimensions be conceived. They also demonstrate this because straight lines cannot perpendicularly intersect each other so as to make right angles, except in three ways, namely by describing a cross with two lines, and piercing both with a third through that point in which they intersect; for to these three lines three dimensions correspond, as is established, nor can more be devised. This is also usually shown more physically from the differences of positions, which are only three, corresponding to the three dimensions, namely up and down to length; right and left to width; before and behind to depth. Read Aristotle, On the Heavens I, ch. 1; Ptolemy, book On Dimensions; and our Clavius, in his Sphere, ch. 1.

### *Response to the Reasons for Doubting*

6. To the difficulty therefore proposed, it was correctly responded at the beginning that a line (and the same applies proportionally to surface) is a certain entity having from itself and per se its proper extension, which it communicates to substance, and therefore under that aspect it is a true and complete species of

quantity. Although because such a being is simultaneously also indivisible, under another aspect it can terminate and couple parts of another extension, and as such it can be called an incomplete being—incomplete (I say) not in the whole genus of quantity, but in the species of surface. For a point is incomplete both in the whole genus of quantity, because it has no extension, and particularly in the species of line, because it is its proper principle and is placed in its definition. But a line is something complete in the genus of quantity, yet it is something incomplete in the species of surface, insofar as it is its principle and in some way composes it.

7. Objection. You will say: by this reasoning someone could also respond that prime matter or form is a complete species of substance, for although insofar as they compose one substance they are incomplete, insofar as they are such substantial entities they have their complete natures and essences. And conversely, fire and water could be called incomplete entities, for although according to themselves they are complete in their species, insofar as they compose one universe they are incomplete.

8. Response. I respond that it is neither new nor singular for one and the same entity to be complete and incomplete according to diverse aspects and respects, nor should this be extended to any entities without true reason or foundation. The first is clear, for the same dependence is an incomplete being in the aspect of way and a complete being in the aspect of action in that genus, and other examples were proposed above. This especially has place in accidents, because since they are absolutely incomplete entities in the genus of being, they can easily be complete or incomplete accidents according to diverse respects in relation to diverse species. But the other part is correctly proved by the examples adduced; nevertheless, as concerns the present matter, they are not similar. For matter and form under no aspect participate integrally in the essence of substance, and therefore cannot be called complete entities in that genus. Conversely, water and fire are so complete entities in the genus of substance that by their

nature they are not ordered to composing some complete entity that is truly and per se one in some genus; for neither is the universe such an entity, nor do the entities themselves compose it through true and real union among themselves, but only by a certain order. But a line is properly and per se united to parts of surface, and its nature is instituted for this, nor can it naturally exist in another way, even if otherwise it has a complete extension of quantity. In this there is a great distinction between substance and accidents, as I said. For a substance that is simply complete in the genus of substance (speaking physically) can never be such that by its nature it is instituted or ordered to composing some complete substance formally and through itself, because a being complete in the genus of substance is simply complete in the genus of being. But truly an accident, although it is complete in some species of accident, can under another aspect have aptitude to be instituted for composing another species of accident. Just as also in the genus of quality, both potency and act are complete qualities, and nevertheless one is ordered to another, as potency to act or act to potency, under which aspect each can be considered something incomplete.

### *How the Three Dimensions Are Compared Among Themselves*

9. To the other part or reply against this response, if we consider the manner of speaking of philosophers, it is quite uncertain what they think about these dimensions and about the way in which they are included in these species of quantity. Nevertheless, it seems to me that we should think thus: first, that we say these three dimensions —length, width, and depth—are of diverse natures among themselves. This is easily proved, because length alone, toward whatever part it is extended, upward, downward, and toward all sides, will not produce a plane or width, because width cannot be composed from indivisible lines alone according to that aspect by which they are

indivisible, nor even insofar as they are divisible, because as such they will produce only greater length. Hence neither can lines alone be quasi-continuously extended toward every part unless another genus of extension is interposed among them, of diverse nature from the extension of lines, and we call this extension width. The same proportion exists between width and depth. Nor does the reasoning made above about the measure of length stand against this. From that indication we have only that in surface or body, lines are found on every side and according to every position, and thus these dimensions are so intermixed that no plane or depth can be found in which length is not interposed. From this it happens that every quantity can be measured by length from any part. But that measure is not the formal measure of width or depth, because one is not immediately commensurate or adequate to another; but it can be called a virtual or mediate measure, insofar as from the length of one side and another, the extent of the whole plane can be gathered through principles of mathematics. But when Aristotle said that measure ought to be homogeneous with what is measured, he speaks of formal adequate measure, which through adaptation to the quantified thing makes known its magnitude. In this way we immediately measure plane by plane and body by body, in the way we measure the quantity of wine by an amphora.

10. The formal difference between line, surface, and body. Then it must be said that these species do not properly differ according to the number of dimensions, speaking formally, but quasi-presuppositively. For surface properly differs from line because it has a certain proper extension of diverse nature from the extension of line; and body similarly differs from each, because it has another proper extension. Nevertheless, because the extension of line does not include others, nor even formally suppose them, therefore line is usually defined as quantity of one or first dimension, or having length without width and depth. But truly the extension of surface necessarily supposes and includes in some way the extension of line,

not because it is formally constituted by it, but because it needs lines for the continuation and termination of its parts, and therefore surface is said to be quantity of two dimensions, or having width and length without depth, although it does not include each dimension in the same way. For it includes width formally (so to speak); but length quasi-materially or presuppositively, which others say it includes width directly, length obliquely. For surface can be defined as width continued by length. In the same proportion we must speak of body, for it can be defined as quantity of three dimensions, or having depth with width and length, which must be understood in the same sense.

11. Only in these names must ambiguity be avoided, for these terms are usually taken in another signification commonly. For in a plane of unequal sides, the lesser extension is usually called width, but the greater is said to be length, although, speaking mathematically, in each side there is length of lines and proper extension of width, which pertains to surface. Hence in a square plane, either no side can be called plane or long in that common sense, or equally and at the choice of the speaker each side can be so called. Similarly, height, depth, and thickness are usually called in bodies according to a certain proportion to the human body or to differences of positions. For height is said to be extension or expansion toward the upper place, depth toward the lower; but the extension that is transverse, or according to before and behind, left or right, is called thickness or corpulence, all of which we measure by the mode of length. But properly and philosophically speaking, depth or corpulence signifies the proper extension of body distinct from width and length.

## SECTION VII

## WHETHER PLACE IS A TRUE SPECIES OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY DISTINCT FROM THE OTHERS

## Disputation XL

1. How many things are found in place. I suppose the discussion concerns the place of bodies, in which four things can be considered. The first is that space or interval that a body fills and occupies with its quantity. The second is the presence that the body itself has in that space. The third is the ultimate surface of the containing body. The fourth, Scotus adds (Quodlibet q. 11), namely the relation of the container, which exists in place with respect to what is placed, in which he thinks the nature of place is posited. But we, as concerns the present matter, omit this relation, because either it is nothing or it is posterior and results from the circumscription of place; because concerning it, it is sufficiently known that it is not a species of quantity.

### *Space is Not Quantity*

2. Concerning the first mentioned above, ancient philosophers thought that this interval, which we conceive between the walls of this hall, was true quantity and certain dimensions separated from bodies, as we have from Aristotle in Physics IV, where Philoponus, in his digression on place, reports that the Stoics and Academics were of that opinion, from which he himself does not dissent. According to that opinion, however, that space does not seem to be a species of quantity distinct from the preceding ones, because in those dimensions there would be no other genus of extension besides length, width, or depth.

3. Nevertheless, Aristotle rightly rejects that opinion, and with him all interpreters, especially the Commentator, St. Thomas, Albert, and Themistius, Physics IV, text 36; Simplicius, text 40. Both because either those dimensions would be separated from all substance, and this conflicts with accidents by nature of the thing, as we speak. Or if they were in corporeal substance, that would not be place, but rather something placed. Also because, however those dimensions might be, if they were true quantity, they would rather

impede the entrance of another body into such an interval. Therefore, in order that such an interval can be filled by a body, it should rather be conceived as lacking all real dimension from itself. Concerning space thus conceived, it is certain that it is not a real positive being, and consequently is not a species of quantity. This, besides what has been said, is evident to us because that space is not something created or temporal, but in the way it is conceived to exist, it is eternal; therefore it cannot be a true and real being. Whether it can be called place is perhaps a question of name, but this does not concern us now. Likewise, whether it is only something fictitious and imaginary, or can in some way be said to truly exist, we will say below when we dispute about where and about beings of reason.

### *Presence in Space is Not Quantity*

4. Concerning the second, that is, concerning that presence or mode of existing that a body has in the space it fills, we do not treat now either, but suppose this does not pertain to the category of quantity but to the special category of where, concerning which we will speak below. Such presence indeed has extension in corporeal things, by reason of which it can be called quantified. But nevertheless not from itself, but from the quantity of the subject it has such extension; for which reason we noted above, section 1, that the presence of a spiritual thing in divisible space is not properly quantified, even if it is in some way divisible, because it does not have extension or divisibility from the subject. Therefore, just as other accidents that are in a quantified body, although they are extended according to the quantity of the subject, nevertheless do not have proper quantities but are quantified per accidens, so this mode of presence, as regards the extension it has from the part of the subject, is something quantified per accidens by the quantity of the subject, yet does not constitute a proper species of quantity. But whether through relation or space it has from itself some proper extension that can be

called quantity will be clarified in the following section, together with the extension of motion.

### *The Question Concerns the Containing Surface*

5. Concerning the third, therefore, that is, concerning the containing surface, the question is principally treated. The reason for the difficulty is that Aristotle, Physics IV, ch. 4, concludes that this surface is the true and real place. And yet in the category of quantity he numbers place among the species of continuous quantity and distinguishes it from the three species numbered above. This can be proved by reason, because being intrinsic and extrinsic form are sufficient reasons for distinguishing species, indeed sometimes even for distinguishing categories, as is clear in action and passion. But place is distinguished from surface as extrinsic form from intrinsic; for surface, as it terminates the proper body to which it inheres, has the nature of intrinsic form and is one of the three species numbered above; but as it circumscribes and contains another body, it has itself as the extrinsic form of it. Therefore as such it constitutes a distinct species that pertains to the genus of quantity, because it confers on what is placed a certain extrinsic extension, by reason of which it is both a measure of it and equal to it, which are properties of quantity.

6. On the contrary, however, is that Aristotle, in Metaphysics V, ch. 13, in numbering the species of continuous quantity, omits place. For this reason almost all authors agree that continuous and permanent quantity is divided adequately into those three species under some aspect, and consequently that nature of quantity least belongs to place. But many labor in reconciling these Aristotelian testimonies.

### *The First Opinion is Related & Disproved*

7. A common distinction indeed is that quantity can be considered either in the nature of measure or in the nature of extension or divisibility. In the former way, place is said to be numbered among the species of quantity because it is an extrinsic measure; in the latter way, however, it is not a species of quantity because it does not have peculiar extension, nor does it confer it on what is placed. Nevertheless, the distinction is not necessary, nor does the first part of it contain truth. First, because it has already been shown that the nature of measure is in no way essential to quantity, nor can the species of it be distinguished according to it. Indeed, we have shown that the nature of measure cannot constitute the essence of any thing or category. For if it is taken in act, it is an extrinsic denomination from an act of the soul; if truly it is taken in aptitude, it supposes a proper nature in the thing, by reason of which it is apt to be known through it, which aptitude adds nothing to the entity of the thing but connotes something extrinsic, as has often been declared in the passions of being and in other things.

8. Hence I argue secondly, for surface as it intrinsically terminates its proper body is not a measure of it, because it does not make known the quantity of it, but rather, as far as it is from itself, renders it measurable. Therefore under the aspect of measure it cannot be distinguished specifically from place. Indeed, being a measure, at least in aptitude, is not a property of surface in any other way except insofar as it can be in some way adapted to another body, in which way not only place can be assumed as measure of what is placed, but also what is placed as measure of place; just as we measure quantities of waters through the capacity of a vessel, so through the quantity of water we sometimes measure the quantities of distinct vessels. In this way not only through surface but in some way through the whole bulk of a body we measure the quantity of another, which is most conspicuous in weights. Hence if it is said that weight is not measured by quantity but by gravity, which is a quality, it will be necessary either to constitute another genus of accident for that reason of measure, or

certainly to concede that it is a peculiar species of quantity, because although gravity is a quality, nevertheless it does not measure except as it is in some way quantified, just as some have said about time, as we will see below. A similar argument can be made about line, because although we do not use indivisible lines for measuring, nevertheless when we measure the quantity of cloth with a yard, we use per se only length alone; hence that is not properly a measure of place; therefore it will constitute a distinct species. Therefore the nature of measure in no way distinguishes species of quantity, but just as in general it is a property of the genus, so in determined ways it is a property of individual species.

### *Another Opinion is Disproved*

9. Others therefore distinguish concerning intrinsic and extrinsic quantity and say that the containing surface with respect to what contains is an intrinsic term, but with respect to what is placed it is an extrinsic term, and thus they distinguish diverse species of extrinsic and intrinsic quantity. According to this opinion, place and surface seem to be distinguished also in the nature of extension, for what is placed is in some way extrinsically extended to the extension of place, whence it is also configured to it. But this distinction is also not suitable. For there is no extrinsic quantity if we speak truly and properly about quantity, for through extrinsic quantity no alien substance or quantity is extended in any way. For that what is placed is said to be coextended to place is not because it is formally extended through it, but only through juxtaposition, in which way also place is extended next to the requirement of what is placed, and sometimes place accommodates or configures itself to what is placed rather than conversely, as when water surrounds a tree or column; hence this does not come from the nature of place or what is placed, but from the fact that one body is liquid and easily yields, the other truly resists. By the same reasoning, being an extrinsic term is common to both what is

placed and place, and does not constitute some proper or special nature of quantity or of some accident, unless perhaps of some relation, because being an extrinsic term is not to inform or effect, but either to be juxtaposed or to resist another lest it proceed further.

### *Place Is Not a Proper Species of Quantity*

10. Double consideration of containing place. Therefore I judge it should be said absolutely that place is not a peculiar species of quantity distinct from the rest, but either in no way pertains to quantity, or at most is a certain property of surface or surfaces. This is declared and proved, for place can be considered in two ways: in one way, as containing or placing another only in aptitude; in another way, as actually placing and actually circumscribing another. In the former way, although in the thing itself place is not given with that aptitude without act, because no real empty place is given, absolutely however it does not involve repugnance, and moreover it can easily be considered by us according to that precise nature, in the way vacuum is defined as place or surface apt to be filled by body and lacking it. Therefore in this way place adds nothing to surface in reality, but declares a certain aptitude that surface has through itself, or if (as some wish) it belongs to the nature of place to be a concave surface, at most it will add a certain figure; in the nature of quantity, however, it can add no difference or constitute a species. Just as that surface is apt to receive whiteness, or that it can be equal or unequal, only states a property of surface, distinct by reason. An excellent example is of clothing, which according to its surface is apt in a peculiar way to surround and denominate the clothed person, which aptitude indeed requires a peculiar figure, yet adds nothing pertaining per se to the category of quantity, but at most includes or supposes that aptitude as a certain property of surface, distinct by reason. In the same way, in the surface of what is placed or placeable, a certain aptitude can be considered for being circumscribed by place, even if it is not actually

surrounded by an extrinsic surface, as is usually said of the ultimate celestial sphere. Concerning which aptitude it can also be said proportionally to require a special figure, namely convex; yet not to constitute a special nature of quantity, but at most to explain a property of a certain ultimate surface, distinct by reason from that. Thus therefore place considered only in aptitude can in the nature of quantity only state a certain property distinct by reason from ultimate surface. But I said of surface or surfaces, because it does not belong to the nature of such place to be one continuous surface; for although a tree or man is surrounded partly by water, partly by air, it is considered to have one place consisting of two surfaces contiguous among themselves. Indeed, insofar as place ought to be immobile, according to Aristotle's testimony, various surfaces succeeding themselves at the same distance from the poles are said to be the same place in number, which also declares that physical place is not a species of continuous quantity, both because it does not per se require continuity, and also because no quantity is immobile in that way.

11. Considering place in the latter way, as actually surrounding and denominating the located thing, it can much less constitute a species of quantity; for such a species is either the quantity of the locating body or of the located body; if of the locating body, it is nothing but surface, for that denomination of locating adds no extension or magnitude to that body, nor anything else pertaining to the nature of quantity, but beyond the explained aptitude, adds only proximity of another body or relation to it. Nor indeed can the surrounding place itself be called the quantity of the surrounded body, because although it supposes quantity in it, it nevertheless adds no kind of extension, as has been declared above. Whence it neither formally contributes any effect pertaining to quantity. Therefore, even if we grant that the circumscribing surface is compared to the circumscribed body in some way as its extrinsic form, and as such has some nature, though improper, of accident, nevertheless under that nature it cannot pertain to the category of quantity. First, because

quantity designates a true and proper accident, and consequently inhering intrinsically and properly; but surrounding place can be called an accident of the surrounded body only improperly and by analogy. Second, because the formal effect of quantity, which we explained above, is first different from that quasi-effect, or rather mode of denominating, which the surrounding body has in the circumscribed. This is also excellently shown by the example of clothing given above; for it truly clothes according to its ultimate surface, and as such is an extrinsic form, which as such does not pertain to the category of quantity, but to another. Similar is the case of the whiteness of gypsum compared to itself or to a gypsumized wall; for with respect to gypsum, which it denominates white, it is compared as an inhering form and as such is a proper quality; but with respect to the wall, which it denominates whitened, it is compared as an adjacent form denominating only through an adjoined intermediate body, and therefore as such does not pertain to the category of quantity. To what category all these denominations pertain we shall say below in explaining the categories of where and having.

## *Response to the Foundations of the Contrary Opinion*

12. Therefore, regarding Aristotle in the Categories, it is responded that there he did not exactly examine the proper nature of quantity and its species, but counted those species which were current in the mouths of others, and many quite probably think that there by place he understood space, which the ancients thought to be filled with proper dimensions. To the argument it has already been responded that the containing surface considered as extrinsic form does not pertain to quantity, nor formally confer any extension to the circumscribed body, but either by effecting or by resisting, contributes to its termination. In which way, as I said, even the located thing can

be compared to place itself, and a dividing sword can be said to terminate the divided parts. That this place can be equal and assumed as measure is not founded in the proper nature of place or extrinsic form, but in the proper nature of quantity and surface. A sign of this is that even the located thing, by reason of its surface, has that it can be equal and also be assumed as measure of place itself, if the quantity of the located thing is better known, as we declared above.

## SECTION VIII
## WHETHER MOTION OR ITS EXTENSION CONSTITUTES A PROPER SPECIES OF CONTINUOUS QUANTITY

1. The reason for doubt on both sides is that motion is of the genus of continuous things, according to Aristotle's testimony, Physics III, at the beginning; therefore motion is something continuous and quantified; therefore it has quantity by which it is quantified and continuous; but this is not body, nor surface, nor line; therefore it is a distinct species of quantity. On the contrary, however, Aristotle in this place, Metaphysics V, chapter 13, numbers motion among things quantified per accidens, because it is quantified only by reason of the magnitude over which motion occurs, where he seems particularly to speak of local motion; but maintaining proportion, this is to be understood of all motions. But species of quantity are not multiplied on account of things that are quantified per accidens; otherwise, as many accidents as there would be in substance that are quantified, so many species of quantity would have to be multiplied.

### *The Affirming Opinion*

2. I suppose the discussion concerns motion properly so called, that is, successive and continuous; for concerning change that

occurs in an instant, it is clear that it is not quantified, since it is not divisible; but concerning discrete succession we do not now treat, for this pertains to the following disputation, where we shall discuss discrete quantity. Concerning motion thus taken, it is the opinion of many that, although it is not essentially quantified or quantity, there is nevertheless in it some proper quantity, which is its property, belonging to it per se in the second mode, constituting under the genus of quantity some peculiar species distinct from the three enumerated, and also from time. Thus holds Fonseca, Metaphysics V, chapter 13, question 8. Omitting the prior negative part, of which we shall say something later, because it pertains little to the present purpose, the latter part is proved because in motion there is a peculiar mode of continuity, which in succession is distinguished from all permanent continuity. From the successive continuity of time it is distinguished, because the continuity of motion is usually great when that of time is small, and conversely; for in swift motion there is great continuity of motion and small of time, which happens contrarily in slow motion. Also because the continuity of time is the measure of the continuity of motion, according to the Commentator's testimony, Physics IV, comment 119. The reason for this is that the succession or continuity of time is invariable. This latter part can be confirmed from the former; for the continuity of motion is some property of it existing outside its essence, and this belongs univocally to every motion; therefore it pertains per se to some category; but it pertains to no category except quantity, and in that it cannot be reduced to the other enumerated species; therefore it per se constitutes its own species. Finally, motion has proper parts of extension, namely partial changes; it also has proper continuative principles, which philosophers call "having been changed"; therefore it has proper continuity and quantitative composition distinct from the rest.

*The Contrary Opinion is Proved*
*& the Question Resolved*

3. Nevertheless, I think it must be said that motion is not so quantified per se that on account of it a fourth species of continuous quantity must necessarily be added; I judge this to be Aristotle's opinion, who both in dialectics and in metaphysics says motion is quantified per accidens. Thus think most frequently his expositors, especially St. Thomas, Metaphysics V. To prove this, I suppose that in motion a twofold extension and continuity can be understood: one is on the part of the subject, which is proper to corporeal motions; another is on the part of the terminus or its latitude, which is common to every successive motion, whether corporeal or spiritual. Concerning the former extension and continuity there is no controversy that according to it motion is called quantified per accidens, and therefore does not require a peculiar species of quantity for it, but sufficiently has it from the quantity of the corporeal subject in which it exists. Thus the Philosopher said, On Generation II, text 2, that motion is continuous because of that which is moved; and Physics VI, text 33, he says motion is divided according to the division of the mobile thing; and the whole motion is of the whole mobile thing, and a part of a part. Whence it happens that, just as other accidents which are extended through body are quantified per accidens from the quantity of the subject, so also motion according to this extension is quantified per accidens, for it is extended to the extension of the subject.

4. Whence it also happens that this extension is found not only in motion properly so called, but also in instantaneous change, as when illumination suddenly occurs in a whole body, or vision in an eye, in which it has some extension; for just as light itself, or the act of seeing, as it is a corporeal quality, are extended in the subject and quantified per accidens, so actions or changes that intervene in effecting those qualities have similar extension in the subject, and are also quantified per accidens. From this it is also understood that, although this extension of motion in the subject sometimes happens to occur successively, nevertheless its extension and continuity do not

pertain to a distinct or peculiar species of quantity; for even then that extension arises from the quantity of the subject, joined (as to succession) with the imperfection or will of the agent, which either cannot or does not wish to change the whole subject simultaneously, but one part before another, because the mode or order of acting cannot vary the intrinsic and proper nature of quantity. A sign of this is that if such change is such that the effect produced through it depends on the agent in becoming and being conserved, even if the action itself or change in the first production is successively extended through the subject, nevertheless the whole can be conserved simultaneously thus extended for some time in the subject, as is manifestly clear in illumination; for although a lamp, which is applied through motion, successively extends its action to remote parts of air, afterwards it simultaneously conserves the illumination extended through the same parts of air; therefore that there is that order of succession or simultaneity among the parts of that change as to inception or duration is per accidens and does not arise from some quantity intrinsic to them, but from imperfection, as I said, or will of the agent.

5. Coming to another mode of extension, concerning which there is properly controversy and difficulty, and so that the demonstration may proceed more clearly, let us distinguish the three motions which Aristotle distinguished in Physics VII, namely alteration, augmentation, and local motion; for among them there is some agreement as to the root or capacity of continuation and succession, and also some diversity. They agree indeed because in all the root of succession and continuation is some latitude of the formal terminus; they differ however because in augmentation per se extension of the subject is also necessary, but in alteration not at all; for I speak broadly of alteration for any intension of quality, which is also found in acts or habits of the soul. Local motion also, although physically or materially taken requires extension of the mobile for its succession, nevertheless can absolutely be found in incorporeal things. According to this whole latitude we must consider the succession of

motions, when we contemplate it metaphysically and abstractly. Then we must accurately distinguish between continuation and succession of some change; for these two are not entirely the same nor convertible; for some change can be continuous even if it is not successive, which is evident both in the continuation of extension and also of intension; for if in a moment a whole surface is heated, just as that heating has extension in that surface, so it also has continuation of its parts, even if it does not have succession. The same is true if heating as eight (which is not contradictory) occurs in an instant in some subject; for just as that form has degrees of intension united among themselves, which union by proportion to quantity we call continuation, so in that change there are parts corresponding to the degrees of form and having proportional union among themselves; thus therefore there is in that change continuity without succession; therefore continuation of change differs from succession, and the reason is clear, because succession requires before and after in duration; but continuity only requires union of parts having a common terminus, even if they occur simultaneously.

6. But conversely succession properly taken, as we speak of it, intrinsically includes some continuation; for although some succession is said to be discrete, that is nevertheless not properly in one and the same change, but in diverse ones, from which one is not made except per accidens or by our consideration, as we shall say more broadly in the following disputation, and below, explaining the category of when; but the succession of which we treat here is that which can be found in one and the same motion, and this undoubtedly requires continuation. For the unity of motion, according to Aristotle's testimony, Physics V, depends chiefly on the continuation of time. This continuity consists in this, that parts of change, which do not occur simultaneously, succeed each other immediately and without interruption and are joined by some indivisible terminus, so that before it immediately one part of motion

precedes, and after it another part immediately follows; therefore this continuity is of the intrinsic nature of such succession.

7. Whence, in my opinion, those greatly err who say succession is of the essence of motion, but not continuation, since in proper succession continuation is intrinsically included, as has been declared. Also, because there cannot be succession in general of the essence of motion without determinate succession being of the essence of determinate motion; but every succession is either continuous or discrete, just as motion is; therefore if succession is of the essence of motion, continuous succession will be of the essence of continuous motion, which alone is properly one per se. Therefore we understand only this by the name of motion properly taken, as has been said; therefore in the same proportion we must speak of succession and continuity of succession. Whether such succession is of the essence of motion, we shall say below, explaining the category of passion, and it will also be partly evident from what we shall now subjoin.

## *In Continuity of Intension There is No True Quantity*

8. These things being posited, it must be proved individually that in no motion is there continuity or extension that requires a proper and distinct species of quantity. This is first more clearly evident in intensive change; for in it the continuity of parts can be considered, either existing simultaneously if they occur simultaneously, or succeeding each other continually, if they occur successively. In the former way that continuity does not pertain to extension of quantity, but to intension of quality. Whence, just as intensive latitude is of a different genus from extensive and does not pertain to the genus of quantity, but is reduced to the category and to the genus or species of such quality, as its mode, or as its entitative integrity and composition, in exactly the same proportion it must be

said of change tending to the intension of that quality, and of the continuation of its parts; for it is only an intrinsic mode of it, and composition and entitative integrity of it, pertaining to the same genus. For if change is considered precisely as a way that is reduced to the category of its terminus, the said continuity will also be reduced to it; but if that change is considered in the nature of action or passion, the said continuity will pertain to these same categories; for just as intense quality, and its intension and union, or continuity of degrees of intension, pertain to the same genus of quality, so intense action or passion and its intrinsic composition and union, or continuity in its nature, belong to the proper genus of each.

9. Even in the latter way this continuity taken, even with succession, cannot pertain to the category of quantity; for first this succession is not founded in any quantity, but in the intensive latitude of the form, which is the terminus of change; therefore just as that intensive latitude does not regard the genus of quantity, so neither does the succession that is founded in it. Then the intensive latitude of form alone, although it suffices (so to speak) for the capacity of succession in its intension, nevertheless does not per se and necessarily require that succession, because just as several degrees of intense quality can be simultaneously, so they could also occur simultaneously, as far as the quality itself is concerned. That they do not occur simultaneously but successively comes from the condition of the agent compared to such a patient, that is, either from the will of the agent, if it is free, or from impotence, because it cannot simultaneously overcome the whole resistance of the patient, or from application, because it is applied to the patient more and more successively; therefore that succession does not come from any intrinsic quantity of such change. The consequence is evident, because properly quantitative extension includes some impenetrability, or necessary extension from the force of such quantity; but in the parts of this change there is no intrinsic quantity that renders them mutually impenetrable, either in place, since they occur in the same part of the

subject, or in duration, since they can occur simultaneously as far as they are concerned, and that they do not so occur comes from the condition of the agent. Whence in this respect there is the same reason for succession that is in change to quality according to intension, or according to extension of parts of the subject; for both are added to quality considered in itself, and come from the condition of agent or patient. Therefore just as succession of extension does not come from any species of quantity, so neither does succession of intension. Finally, the extension of succession is not entirely positive, but includes privation; for it consists in this, that action does not occur all at once, but part after part; in which this negation is included, namely that when one thing occurs, another does not yet occur, but afterwards; but this negation does not come from any positive quantity, but from imperfection or application of the agent, as has been declared. This reason can be general for all successions of motions, and therefore we shall examine it more fully below.

### *The Succession of Augmentation Does Not Require A Peculiar Species of Quantity*

10. Then the same can easily be proved of the succession of augmentation, insofar as it can be continuous, as I now suppose; for that whole succession comes from the extension of the subject. Whence if we consider precisely and per se the terminus of that change, although on its part there is capacity or non-repugnance that it occur successively, nevertheless this is not per se and simply necessary from the force of such terminus; for just as parts of quantity are simultaneously, so on their part it is not contradictory to be acquired simultaneously. Thus some have said augmentation occurs discretely through instantaneous changes, so that through each some particle of quantity is simultaneously acquired as a whole. This indeed would not be contradictory, if either on the part of the agent there were sufficient power for acting adequately on a distant part as on a proximate one, or

if on the part of the patient or nutriment there were unequal disposition or resistance in distant and proximate parts; so that by reason of that inequality, compensating namely greater distance with less resistance, they could be equally disposed at the same time. For thus the conversion of some certain part of nutriment could be completed in an instant, and then some regeneration and accretion would occur in an instant, and thus there would be no successive extension in it, but only continuous extension on the part of the subject, which we have already shown does not come from a new species of quantity, but is quantified per accidens to the extension of the subject; for if this holds true even in changes to quality, much more in change to quantity itself. Therefore the successive extension of this change also comes from conditions of agent and patient beyond the latitude of the terminus, and thus there is the same reason for such succession and for succession tending to quality, whether in extension of subject or in intension of terminus. Therefore this extension does not occur per se through proper quantity, but is per accidens, or through another from the quantity of the subject unequally applied to the finite power of a natural agent. Whence it also happens that such extension is not properly positive, but through admixture of privation, because namely the agent, while it acts on one thing, does not act on another, but afterwards one after another.

### *The Succession of Local Motion Does Not Require A Peculiar Species of Quantity*

11. I come to local motion, in which it is necessary to distinguish between motion of bodies and spirits; for although in both there can be extension and successive continuation, nevertheless in very different ways, and therefore they must be spoken of individually. For in the motion of an angel there can be continuous succession, not from necessity of the mobile, since there is no extension of parts in it, but from will; for since it can be present to divisible space, existing

whole in the whole and in its individual parts, it can either be present simultaneously and in one moment to the whole place adequate to it, or gradually and by continuous succession acquire it. Hence it is easily understood that that extension and successive continuity which can be in that motion does not come from any true quantity or species of quantity. First indeed, because in the parts of that change there is nothing that necessarily renders them temporally impenetrable (to declare thus), or that from necessity requires that they not occur simultaneously but successively continuously; for they can occur in both ways according to the angel's choice; therefore that succession, when it occurs, does not come formally from any intrinsic successive quantity, but from extension of another nature, as I shall immediately declare. Just as we said above, that material substance deprived of quantity could be conserved by God as present to divisible and extended space, so that diverse parts of it would be in diverse parts of space; which extension would not be quantitative, because it would not be through impenetrability of parts, but would be either substantial or entitative, or according to local presence alone coming not from intrinsic repugnance of parts, but from capacity coming from their distinction, joined with an acting cause. Thus therefore proportionally is to be understood the succession of that angelic motion.

12. This is declared secondly, because that succession is not founded in any true quantity, but in that extension alone which is in the local presence of the angel, which we said above, section 1, is not truly quantified, because although it is in some way divisible as to designation, through comparison to divisible space, nevertheless neither in space nor in the mobile or located thing does it require any true and real quantity, nor is it divisible in a material way in those things that are in it, etc.; therefore neither can succession of motion tending to such local presence come from any intrinsic and true quantity. Whence it happens that, if we speak properly and rigorously, such a mode is not only not quantified per se, but also not per

accidens, because its extension in no way comes from something quantified per se. Just as also the local presence of an angel is not quantified per se or per accidens, even if it is in some way divisible, as has been declared above. But broadly these can be called quantified per accidens, because their extension either is not, or is not understood by us without some relation to corporeal quantity, or at least to space apt to be filled with corporeal quantity.

13. It remains to speak of the succession of local motion of bodies; for in it there appears some greater necessity of this successive quantity which is attributed to motion, because the parts of this motion from their intrinsic nature have succession, and quasi-impenetrability in duration, in that they occur successively such that it is contradictory, at least naturally, for them to occur otherwise; therefore that intrinsic contradiction and impenetrability seems to come from intrinsic and special successive quantity. Nevertheless even in this motion such quantity is not necessary, because that whole extension comes from the quantity of the mobile and space. Whence with respect to motion it does not exceed the latitude of something quantified per accidens. This is declared first from Aristotle, in the places cited above, saying motion is quantified per accidens, by reason of the magnitude about which it occurs; whence it is evident he speaks especially of local motion of bodies. Second, for local motion of body is therefore successive because the parts of the body that is moved cannot simultaneously be in proximate and remote place; but this contradiction intrinsically comes from the quantity of the body and is thence derived to the parts of the motion itself, which adhere to the parts of the mobile and participate that extension from them; therefore they are extended per accidens, and not per se through proper quantity in the manner of other material accidents. Third, the same is declared because the intrinsic terminus of this motion, which is the presence of body in space, is only quantified per accidens, even if it has its extension and quasi-impenetrability of its parts, because it has all this by reason of the quantity of the subject; but motion

tending to this terminus does not have the said successive extension except by reason of the extension of its terminus and magnitude of its subject; therefore that succession does not come from any special successive quantity of the motion itself. Finally this is confirmed by the argument made above, that this succession is not some true positive extension, but consists in some negation of simultaneous existence of parts of motion; for it is of the essence of succession, as such, that one part be prior and another posterior in duration, and that one follows after another; but in this is intrinsically included this negation, namely that while one part occurs, another is not yet made, or what preceded is no longer. Therefore this mode of extension does not come per se from any intrinsic quantity that is a species distinct from the rest, but comes quasi per accidens from the very magnitude of the mobile and extension of space, insofar as it is in the cause, or rather impedes that the action or passage of the mobile through space occur simultaneously.

### *Satisfaction is Given to Arguments of the Opposite Opinion*

14. To the arguments of the prior opinion it must be said first in general that there can indeed be considered in motion a continuity proper and peculiar to motion itself, that is, pertaining to the proper composition of its entity from its proper parts and continuatives; but from this it is not rightly concluded that there is in motion some peculiar species of quantity; for as is evident from the above, even in substance itself proper substantial continuation is understood, which is nothing other than the union of substantial integral parts, which must necessarily occur through proper substantial termini. And in quality insofar as it is extended in surface or body, proper union or continuation of parts is also understood through proper termini pertaining to the category or species of such quality. According to intension also quality is understood to have its latitude of degrees as if

continuous by proper continuity or union of its degrees, which are as if divisible parts of that latitude, which are joined and terminated by its indivisible terminus. But all these continuities do not constitute proper species of quantity, because per se they do not have quantitative extension, or any impenetrability of parts, but only signify entitative composition of such things; whence in each there is a mode that pertains or is reduced to its species; for in substance it is a substantial mode intrinsically pertaining to the composition or integrity of corporeal substance, and in others in a proportional way. Thus therefore motion, insofar as it is something distinct from other things by nature of the thing, has composition and union of proper parts through proper continuatives; nevertheless that continuity is not quantity per se, but is entitative composition of such being, pertaining to its genus or species, whatever that may be.

15. Just as other material things through union to quantity have impenetrability of parts and quantitative extension, by reason of which they are called quantified per accidens, so also material or corporeal motion can have similar extension from quantity, but it does not have it except from line, surface and body; and therefore does not require a proper species of quantity any more than other quantified and continuous things. For if that extension is through impenetrability of parts, in order to space, it evidently comes from adherence to diverse parts of corporeal quantity, mutually impenetrable naturally. But if that extension is through impenetrability in order to duration, which is properly succession or negation of simultaneous existence, thus such extension is both most improper impenetrability, and is very imperfect, consisting more in negation than in positive mode of extension, which would require quantity; and finally whatever it may be, it comes only from the quantity of magnitude itself. And therefore in whatever way motion beyond entitative continuity is understood to have some quantitative extension, it is no less quantified per accidens than other accidents that inhere in material substance through quantity.

16. But individually to the first reason it is responded by denying the consequence; for succession of motion, as has been declared, does not require any proper quantity. What is touched on in that reason concerning the distinction of time and motion will be treated in the following section, and more broadly below concerning the category of when. To the second it is responded that continuity of motion is an intrinsic mode of its entity, which, as has been said, is reduced to that category to which motion pertains. That what is taken as certain there, namely that this continuity is found univocally in every motion, is not certain, nor perhaps true; for just as the union or continuity that is considered in intense quality, and that which is found in continuous quantity, do not have univocal agreement, but some proportionality, so continuity that is in motion of alteration and in local motion will not be by univocal agreement, but by proportion. Then, even if that univocal agreement is admitted, it is not necessary that that continuity constitute a proper genus or species of some category; for it is not contradictory for things of diverse categories to have some univocal agreement in some intrinsic or essential mode, as has been touched on above. To the third it has already been responded by conceding that motion has in the latitude of its entity proper composition from proper parts and continuatives, and nevertheless in them it does not have quantitative extension per se, but only per accidens from the quantity of the mobile or space, as has been declared, and therefore there is no quantity in motion that constitutes a peculiar species.

## SECTION IX

## WHETHER TIME IS QUANTITY PER SE CONSTITUTING A PECULIAR SPECIES DISTINCT FROM THE REST

1. The reason for doubt on both sides. In this matter we also have dissenting places in Aristotle; for in the Categories, among the species of quantity he places time, attributing to it the last seat. But in this place, Metaphysics V, chapter 13, he numbers time as well as motion among things quantified per accidens, whence he thinks it does not constitute a proper species of quantity. Reasons also for both parts can easily be adduced. For that time is quantity properly and per se seems to be proved from the fact that time is real being and per se extended and divisible; therefore per se quantified; therefore through quantity of a species distinct from the rest; for extension of motion is of different nature from every other extension. The antecedent is evident, because time per se and essentially requires extension; for in this it differs from every other permanent or indivisible duration; whence it is of the intrinsic nature of time that its parts are not simultaneous and have proper indivisible instants by which they are continued; therefore time is per se extended, and consequently per se quantified. On the contrary, however, time is nothing other than the duration of motion; therefore, if motion is not per se quantified, as has been shown, neither will time be per se quantified, and consequently neither does it constitute a proper species of quantity.

*First Opinion Affirming*

2. Because of these things there are diverse opinions: The first simply constitutes time in some proper species of quantity, and in explaining this opinion two diverse modes must be explained. For some say that both time and motion are species of quantity distinct both among themselves and also from the rest, because of the argument made in the superior section, that the extension of motion seems different from the extension of time, and conversely, since when one increases the other diminishes, and contrarily. But this opinion exposed in this way cannot be proved; for this multiplication of species of quantity has no foundation either in Aristotle or in the thing

itself. For time is nothing but the duration of motion; but the duration of each thing is not something distinct from the thing itself by nature of the thing, or from the existence of such thing; therefore it is superfluous to feign two quantities specifically distinct in one and the same thing, one by which the thing itself, another by which its duration is extended. Otherwise, since action and passion are distinguished by reason both among themselves and perhaps also from motion, and each has its extension or succession, it will be necessary to attribute proper quantity to each, or rather two, one that extends the action, another concerning its duration, and so of the rest, which is superfluous. And moreover they act against this explanation all the things we shall say against the following one.

3. Another mode of explaining this opinion is therefore that motion is quantified not per se, but through time; but time is the quantity by which motion itself is extended and formally becomes quantified, and therefore time itself per se constitutes a proper species of quantity. This mode seems more consonant with Aristotle in the Categories on quantity, where numbering action and motion among things quantified per accidens, he gives the reason that they become quantified through time.

### *The Said Opinion is Disproved*

4. Nevertheless this opinion even exposed in this way cannot be proved. First indeed, because in the superior section we showed that in motion there is no proper quantity by which it becomes quantified; therefore time cannot be quantity of this kind. Second, because time is nothing but the duration of motion; but the duration of no thing is its quantity, because in the thing it is not other than its existence; but according to reason it can at most be conceived as some property of it, which is such as is the existence which it accompanies; for if existence is permanent, so also duration; but if existence is successive and continuous, similarly duration; therefore no duration is

a special quantity of the thing enduring. Whence I argue third; for if there is any proper quantification (so to speak) in motion, it is chiefly continuous succession; for this seems to be the extension most proper to motion; but motion does not have this extension from time, but rather time from motion, insofar as those two are conceived as distinct; therefore time neither is the quantity of motion, nor is per se quantified, but per accidens, by much greater reason than motion; for if time does not extend motion, but rather is extended to the extension of motion, and motion is only quantified per accidens, a fortiori time also. The minor proposition (for the other things are all clear) is expressly Aristotle's, in this chapter 13, book V of the Metaphysics, where he concludes that time and motion are quantified per accidens, because motion is quantified by reason of magnitude, but time by reason of motion. And the reason he indicates there is excellent, in these words: "These things are called quantified and continuous because those things of which these are passions are divisible." Therefore time is some passion of motion, and has proportion with it; whence because motion occurs successively, therefore its duration is successive, and is called time; therefore time has succession from motion, and not conversely. This can also be declared from the definition of time handed down by Aristotle, Physics IV, where he says it is the number of motion according to before and after. From which all conclude that before and after in time are taken from before and after in motion.

### *Second Opinion Using Distinction*

5. There is therefore a second opinion distinguishing quantity, either under the nature of measure, or under the proper and essential nature of quantity. In the former way it says time is a species of quantity, and therefore was numbered by Aristotle in the Categories. In the latter way, however, it denies it is a species of quantity, or per se quantified, as Aristotle speaks in Metaphysics V.

This is the common opinion of the Commentator, St. Thomas and other interpreters, Metaphysics V, and also in the book of Categories. This distinction was indeed invented to reconcile in some way the sayings of Aristotle. Concerning the latter part of this opinion we have no doubt; concerning the former, however, it must be noted that the said authors do not speak of measure taken passively, or the measurable, but of active measure, or that which measures. Concerning which it must be further noted that, although in every motion there is proper and intrinsic duration, because every motion circumscribed from any other has per se and intrinsically its duration, nevertheless not any duration of any motion is an accommodated active measure of duration, or motion, because duration (as we now suppose, from what we shall say concerning the category of when) is not the proper active measure of that thing whose duration it is, because it is neither better known than it, nor has anything in it that it measures, except itself; but no thing can be the measure of itself. Therefore time, which is called the measure of motion, is not the measure of that motion whose intrinsic duration it is, but of others, as time which is in the motion of the sun is indeed the measure of other motions, but not of the very motion of the sun itself, unless perhaps insofar as through one part of that motion we measure the whole; where there is already a distinction in the thing between measure and measured; if however we wish to measure some certain part of that motion, it is necessary for us to use another motion. Therefore this nature of measure according to which time is said to pertain to quantity is the nature of extrinsic measure, because we measure one motion through another, or through its duration. For undertaking this nature of measure, not any motion (as I was saying) is accommodated, but some determinate conditions are required, namely that it be uniform and regular, and better known; indeed if we speak of measure according to proximate aptitude, it is necessary that such motion, although continuous in itself, be as if divided into parts through an act of the soul, or (which is the same) through human institution, and

according to a determinate part be destined that through its repetition it may serve for measuring, just as we in the diurnal motion of the sun divide hour, day and year. Thus Aristotle said, Physics IV, chapter 14, that time according to its complete nature depends on the soul, because that numbering and institution of time under this nature of measure depends entirely on the operation of mind, and is either a being of reason, or extrinsic denomination. And of this time Aristotle speaks openly, not only in Physics IV, but also in the chapter on Quantity, where among other things he says thus: "If anyone should assign how great the action of time is, he will define the measure of the year."

### *The Second Opinion is Not Proved*

6. From these things therefore it seems manifest that time is most improperly said to pertain to species of quantity according to that nature, because that nature of measure, taken according to its complete institution, is not a real being intrinsic to things, but is completed through being of reason or extrinsic denomination coming from an act of the soul, which, as was said above, pertains properly to no category, much less to the category of quantity. But if that nature of measure is taken according to remote aptitude, by reason of which such motion or its duration is apt to be assumed and instituted as measure, thus also it cannot pertain to a species of quantity, because first that aptitude is also through some denomination or relation to an act of mind, insofar as such motion can be a medium for knowing the durations of others, or for being destined to this office, which is entirely extrinsic. Finally, because that aptitude that something be instituted in the nature of measure can be found not only in quantity per se, but also in a thing quantified per accidens. For since measure ought to be homogeneous with the measured, if the thing that is measured is only quantified per accidens and as such is measured, it will suffice on the part of the measure that it be quantified in the same

way, that it can be designated for the office of measuring, if it has the other required conditions, which are also very accidental to the nature of quantity, such as are uniformity of motion or velocity.

7. These reasons (as we note in passing) also prove that motion or its duration, insofar as it has the nature of passive measure, or insofar as it is measurable, cannot constitute some certain species of quantity; and therefore although time is taken under this nature (which some wish), it is not a species of quantity. First, because that measurability is only some denomination in order to reason, insofar as the thing is cognizable through such medium, or through comparison to extrinsic measure. Second, because the foundation that is supposed on the part of the thing that it be measurable or cognizable in such way is not always that it be per se quantified, but it suffices that it be a thing quantified per accidens, or even that it imitate quantity in some way. For thus Aristotle above says whiteness, insofar as it is quantified, is measured by surface. Indeed for measurability of this kind it suffices that it be conceived according to proportion or some imitation in the manner of quantity. For gravity also is measurable; for thus weights are also instituted for measuring, and nevertheless they are not quantities per se, but rather regard quality; therefore if time, or duration of quantity under the nature of active measure or measurable is considered, it does not pertain to species of quantity per se.

### *Time is Not a Peculiar Species of Quantity*

8. It remains therefore that we say time is not a peculiar species of quantity. This opinion the ancient expositors truly intend, in Metaphysics V, for what they added concerning the nature of measure was only that they might in some way explain the opinion of Aristotle in the Dialectics, chapter on Quantity, where Cajetan sufficiently indicates the same opinion; nor does Soncinas dissent from it, Metaphysics V, question 24. Although he adds that time under the nature of discrete quantity is in some way quantity per se, in that in the

definition of time it is posited that it is number. But this was not rightly said, because time is not simply number which is discrete quantity; for we treat of continuous time, of which Aristotle spoke. Whether there is any discrete time, we shall say below, in the disputation on durations. But continuous time is not number simply, but number of parts of the same continuum, which in reality is only number in potency, but in act only through operation or numbering of the soul. Therefore time is not discrete quantity per se; that it is not a species of continuous quantity per se either, the arguments made against the two prior opinions sufficiently prove, nor is it necessary to add more.

9. Nor does the opinion of Aristotle in the Categories stand in the way, for he seems to have either amended or declared it in the Metaphysics. For in the Dialectics he did not exactly investigate the natures of things, and therefore numbered more species of quantity according to the common mode of speaking, which are not truly and essentially quantities. Nor also does it stand in the way that in time there are proper parts, and proper indivisible continuatives, which are called instants. For besides that these are distinguished only by reason from the parts and indivisibles that are in motion, they do not have proper extension per se, but participate it from motion, and therefore time cannot have extension either more real or more per se than motion has.

### *Satisfaction is Given to the Principal Foundation of the Contrary Opinion*

10. It must be necessarily distinguished that there is a twofold time. To that reason which is the strongest foundation of the contrary opinion, namely that the extension of time varies otherwise than of motion, since in swift motion there is small extension of time and great of motion, and in slow motion conversely, it must be said that there is twofold time to which motion can be compared: one is

extrinsic, another intrinsic. The former is the duration of celestial motion with respect to other motions, and of this it is true what is assumed; but from this is concluded only that the extension or duration of one motion is distinct from the extension or duration of another. Intrinsic time is the proper and intrinsic duration found in each successive motion, which can also be considered in two ways. First, absolutely and according to its real entity, and composition of its parts, and union or continuation, and in this way it is false that there is less time in swift motion of the same mobile through the same space than in slow motion, because truly there are as many parts of duration in one as in the other, and they are of equal latitude, as is evident in heating as eight, swift or slow. In another way that duration of motion can be considered through comparison and quasi-coexistence to imaginary succession, which we apprehend as infinite, and in this way duration that is in swift motion through equal space is less, and in slow motion greater, because it coexists and quasi fills (so to speak) a greater or lesser part of that imaginary time. But this is not because the duration of motion has another extension or succession from the motion itself, but because just as the parts of swift motion are somehow more united among themselves and quasi condensed (so to speak), so also the parts of its duration are proportionally quasi compressed, so that therefore they consume a smaller part of that imaginary time.

11. From this, however, it can rather be inferred that the extension of time follows, in our mode of conceiving, and imitates the succession of motion and its mode. Just as material substance from continuous quantity has to fill and occupy imaginary local space, but that the same quantity fills greater or less space does not come from quantity alone considered nakedly, but under such mode of condensation or rarefaction, so successive motion from its real duration and succession has that it occupies (so to speak) and fills that imaginary time; but that the same motion, having the same real duration, consumes a greater or lesser part of that time does not come

from the latitude of motion taken absolutely, but with such mode of velocity or slowness. Whence, just as extension that is in place itself, or in local presence, comes from magnitude, and is quantified per accidens by reason of it, so extension that is in intrinsic duration of motion comes and is quantified per accidens by reason of motion itself, or rather by reason of that magnitude or latitude whence motion itself has that it is also quantified per accidens.

12. From all these things therefore it is concluded that all continuous quantity per se is permanent; for everything successive and continuous is either motion or time, under motion comprehending action and passion, which are also joined to occur continuously and successively; indeed whenever motion is successive and continuous, in it action and successive and continuous passion are joined; nevertheless as far as the present question pertains, these are comprehended under motion, either because the same reason holds for them since they are distinguished from motion only by reason and some respect, or certainly because motion is passion with proportion taken; they are the same; but action responds proportionally to passion. Whence those do not speak sufficiently consistently who say motion is quantified per se, but call transient passion and action quantified per accidens, since nevertheless the same reason of continuation and succession is found in all these. Therefore it is said better and more consistently that, motion being excluded from the nature of quantity per se, action and passion are also excluded, and consequently also time and finally every successive continuum; for besides these no other can be thought of. It remains therefore that there is no quantity per se except permanent, of which there are only the three species numbered above, line, surface and body; therefore these only are proper and true species of continuous quantity.

# DISPUTATION XLI

# ON DISCRETE QUANTITY AND THE COORDINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF QUANTITY AND ITS PROPERTIES

After having discussed continuous quantity, it follows that we must speak of discrete quantity, concerning which there is a particular difficulty, on account of the lesser unity which it seems to have in itself. From the clarification of this part, however, it will easily be established what is the supreme genus of this category and what genera or species are to be acknowledged under it; and finally it will also easily become apparent how those properties which are usually attributed to it belong to quantity. Since, however, quantitative or numerical unity is the principle of discrete quantity, we ought first to discuss this kind of unity, except that in disputation IV, section 9, we explained these matters in order to compare transcendental unity with quantitative unity. Therefore, with those things which were said there being presupposed, it remains to treat of number itself or discrete quantity.

## SECTION I

## WHETHER DISCRETE QUANTITY IS A PROPER SPECIES OF QUANTITY

*Arguments for the Negative Position*

1. The reason for doubt is that what is not a being per se is not a quantity per se; but discrete quantity is not a being per se; therefore it is not a quantity per se; but what is not a quantity per se cannot be a species of quantity; for being which is divided into ten categories is being per se; for accidental beings, just as they do not have definition, so neither do they have genera or species, nor are they placed in the categories; therefore. The minor premise of the principal argument is proven, in which lies the entire difficulty, because whether you consider the subject of number or the things numbered, or the form or formal nature which can constitute number, as number, in neither is found sufficient unity to constitute a being per se. The first part seems evident per se, because such a subject, if considered remotely, consists of integral substances, sometimes differing in number, sometimes in species, which in no way compose one being per se. If, however, such a subject is considered proximately, it consists of several quantities, which although each is continuous in itself, nevertheless among themselves they have neither continuity nor any other real union; therefore they can in no way constitute one subject per se. And from this the other part is proven, because in such a subject, or rather aggregate of subjects, there can be no formal accident which is per se one with true and real unity, because it would either be one with the unity of simplicity, and this is not the case, whence one simple entity cannot be in subjects so distinct; or it would be one with the unity of composition; but this also cannot be said, because just as among those subjects there is no union or real composition, so there is nothing in them or in any one of them which has real union with others, and consequently there is nothing which can make real composition.

2. An evasion is blocked. You might perhaps say from Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Quantity, that there is a certain order among the units of number, insofar as one is first, another

second, another third, by reason of which the prior units are compared to the ultimate as indeterminate to determinate, and conversely the ultimate unit is said to be compared to the rest by way of form, Metaphysics VIII, chapters 3 and 6, and this is sufficient to compose one being per se in the genus of quantity, because equal unity is not to be required in all things. Against this it stands, first, because the unity of order alone does not suffice to constitute a being per se and categorical, as is clear in an army and similar things. Second, it stands even more that this unity is not actually found in number, but only in our apprehension or numbering; for if you consider a group of three men in themselves, in none of them is there a first unity, second, or third; for no reason for such order can be assigned among them; therefore that order, if there is any, is only of reason; therefore it does not suffice for real unity which a real accident requires.

3. Third is the principal argument, because so far is number from being constituted by some union of its parts, that rather it requires the negation of such union, and includes that negation in its essential nature, which is a new argument showing that number, as number, is not a real being, nor true quantity. The antecedent is clear because actual division and discretion of units belongs to the nature of number; but actual division includes negation of union, as is established from what was said above about unity and multitude, in disputation III, and from the definition of Aristotle, saying that discrete quantity is that whose parts are not joined by a common term. The consequence is proven, both because real being or quantity cannot be constituted by negation, and especially by negation of real union, since what is one, which is not simple, can arise only from union; and also because it is against the nature of quantity to be actually divided, since it belongs to its nature to be divisible; for what is actually divided is not, as such, divisible; therefore as such it will not be quantity, but quantities.

4. Whence finally I argue fourth, because transcendent multitude, or of other beings, neither is something per se one, nor

does it constitute any species among beings; therefore neither does multitude of quantities constitute any species per se one in the genus of quantity; but discrete quantity is nothing other than multitude of continuous quantities; therefore. The major premise is established from what was said above, disputation III. And it is sufficiently evident per se, both because many and one as such are opposed; and also because multitude of beings is not being, but beings, as Aristotle signified, book X, chapter 9. The consequence is proven by parity of reasoning, for just as multitude absolutely consists of units, each of which is undivided in itself, but is divided from any other, so discrete quantity consists of quantitative units undivided in themselves and divided among themselves. Whence also multitude taken absolutely seems to be compared to discrete quantity by way of genus, or superior predicate essentially, as is also taken from Aristotle, Metaphysics X, chapter 9, where he defines number through multitude, as St. Thomas and others have noted; therefore there cannot be greater unity or true species of being in discrete quantity than in any other multitude of things.

### *Arguments for the Opposite Position*

5. On the contrary, the opinion of Aristotle seems to be, both in the Categories, chapter on Quantity, and here in Metaphysics V, and wherever he speaks of quantity; for he always divides it into continuous and discrete, and holds that it is a division of genus into species, since from that division he constitutes categorical coordination, and therefore here he first premises the description of quantity in general, which he holds applies equally to continuous and discrete. He also judges that the properties which he assigns to quantity belong equally to discrete as to continuous, such as being equal or unequal, being finite or infinite, and being measure; indeed, this last is thought to belong to discrete quantity before continuous; according to the opinion of Aristotle, Metaphysics X, in the beginning.

Finally, if we consider the essential nature of quantity, which is to have extension whereby one part is outside another, this seems to belong most properly to discrete quantity, since quantitative units are so related that one necessarily exists outside another.

*Contrary Opinions Are Reported*

6. Because of these things there are various and extremely opposed opinions. The first simply affirms that number is a proper species of quantity, so that, although number taken materially seems to be a being by aggregation, nevertheless formally it designates one accident existing partially in several subjects. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, I, q. 11, a. 1 and 2, and q. 30, a. 3. And the Thomists commonly follow this, as is clear from Capreolus, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, concl. 5, where he reports other testimonies of St. Thomas; Soncinas, X Metaph., q. 6; Cajetan and Soto in Logic. The same opinion is held by Argentinus, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, where Scotus, q. unica, remains doubtful in this matter; but in V Metaph., q. 9, he follows this opinion; and Henry, I p. Summ., a. 29, q. 7, where he cites Avicenna, lib. III suae Metaph., c. 5, and with him confesses it is difficult to find this unity belonging to number, as consisting of several units. The foundations of this opinion have been touched upon in the arguments proposed in the second place.

7. The second opinion is extremely contrary to the preceding, namely, that discrete quantity, although it exists in things, nevertheless does not have in things real unity which suffices to constitute some true species of real accident. So holds Albert, lib. VIII Metaph., tract. I, c. 8; and Aureolus, according to Capreolus, In I, dist. 24, where the same is held by Gregory, q. 2, a. 2; and Marsilius, In I, q. 1, a. 37; Ockham, dist. 24, q. 2; which is also followed by Fonseca, V Metaph., c. 13, q. 4, although in manner of speaking he says it is not to be denied that number is a species of quantity. Averroes also favors this, III Phys., text. 68, saying that number is a heap of units. To which

opinion there is almost equivalent another, which Aristotle has, X Metaph., c. 3, where he says number is multitude of units. And to confess the truth, as far as the matter is concerned, I do not doubt that this latter opinion is true; for the arguments made in the first place, which confirm it, seem to me plainly convincing. It is necessary, however, to explain it more fully, and to distinguish the more certain things from the less certain, and finally, as far as possible, to accommodate this matter to the common way of speaking.

### *First Supposition for Resolving the Question*

8. I suppose therefore first as certain, that quantitative unity adds no peculiar real or positive accident over and above the thing which is quantified and continuous, as such. This has been sufficiently proven above, disputation III. I say, however, "as such," because, as I said there, quantitative unity attributed to substance adds quantity to it, which in itself pertains to some species of continuous quantity; but now we do not speak thus, but we compare quantitative unity, which we suppose to be the principle of number, to continuous quantity itself, insofar as it is in some way distinguished from it, and thus we say it adds nothing to that thing, nor is distinguished from it by anything positive, but at most by negation of actual division, keeping proportion to transcendental unity, as was declared more fully in the place mentioned. And in the matter Giles agrees, IV Metaph., c. 6, as to this part, that quantitative unity adds nothing to the thing, nor differs in reality from continuous quantity. Although the way in which he explains the distinction of reason between them does not please me. For he says that quantity, as it absolutely perfects a thing in itself without comparison to parts, has the nature of unity; but insofar as it perfects the thing through comparison to its parts, it has the nature of continuous quantity. This way (I say) of distinction is not approved by me. First, because that relation of form, which is to perfect a thing in itself absolutely, does not pertain to the nature of unity, but rather to

the nature of entity constituted by form. Second, because if that relation taken abstractly is not proper to quantity, but pertains also to quality and to substantial form, and in these it does not have the nature of transcendental unity, precisely from the fact that it perfects the subject, unless the notion of indivision is added. If, however, that relation is considered as it peculiarly belongs to quantity, thus it can scarcely be conceived that continuous quantity perfects the subject in itself without comparison to parts, since its formal perfection consists in some extension of parts, as was declared above, and much less can quantitative unity be understood without comparison to parts, since that unity, as such, is not simple, but results from union or joining of such parts. More truly therefore it is said that quantitative unity is nothing beyond continuous quantity itself as undivided.

*Second Supposition or Assertion*

9. What number adds to numbered things. From this I take second as certain, that although number, which is discrete quantity, exists in things, nevertheless it does not add to the things themselves which are numbered any accident really distinct from them taken collectively. The first part is noted per se, because every real multitude is in things; but number is real multitude, since it arises from real units. Likewise this number arises from division of continuous quantity, as is said III Phys., c. 6 and 7. Whence lib. III Metaph., c. 2, and lib. VI, c. 1, Aristotle shows that mathematical beings, among which numbers are counted, are not separated from natural things; and finally II de Anima, c. 6, and lib. III, c. 1, number is placed among common sensibles. Therefore number is in quantified and sensible things themselves. Whence Plato, in the Sophist, says number is to be counted among those things which are in things.

10. No less certain seems to me the other part, although some Thomists seem to doubt about it; but it is taught by Gabriel, Marsilius, and others cited above; and Major, In I, dist. 24, q. 2, and it is plainly

gathered from Aristotle, X Metaph., c. 3, where he says number is multitude of units. It is also taken from that place III Phys. that number arises from division of the continuous, for from division there results no entity beyond the intrinsic terms of the individual parts. Whence III Phys., c. 7, text. 68, the same Aristotle says number is several or some units. And similarly III Metaph., c. 9, text. 20, he says number is many ones. And lib. VIII, c. 3, text. 10, he says: Either number is not one, but like a heap, or if it is, it must be said what that is which makes one from many; holding that one is not made except through the ultimate unit, which is taken only in order to reason. Moreover, from this the first reason can be constructed; for just as continuous quantity is understood to be one precisely from indivision, so discrete quantity is understood to be number precisely from division of individual continuous parts, which division adds only negation of a common term over and above the terms of individual quantities; therefore number as such does not add a real and positive accident beyond the units or quantities of individual units.

11. Second, because individual units do not add any thing to individual quantities; therefore neither does the whole number add any thing to all the units taken together. The antecedent was proven above. The consequence is evidently true, both because, with the units posited, and any other thing removed, either by the intellect or by divine power, there cannot not be number; and also because number properly so called is related to quantitative units just as any multitude of things is related to transcendental units; and finally because that added thing would either be one altogether and the same in all units taken together and in each of them, or it would be only one by collection, positing something in individual units. The first is plainly impossible; for how can one simple entity be in subjects really distinct and distant and united in no way? The second, however, contradicts the prior supposition, for if in individual units number posits some thing distinct from its quantity and from every entity of other units,

therefore that entity pertains to the nature of such unity beyond quantity; which has been proven false.

12. Finally it is confirmed, because the same unity is apt to compose binary, ternary and any number to infinity; therefore either it is apt through itself without any addition, and this is what we intend; for from this it plainly follows that number adds nothing over and above units taken together; or each unity is apt to compose number through something added to it, and thus for composing individual numbers it will need a peculiar addition of distinct nature, which is sufficiently absurd; otherwise those entities would have to be multiplied to infinity. And the consequence is clear, because individual numbers are held to be of diverse natures. A similar argument is that number can be composed not only from simple units, but also from other numbers, insofar as each is one in number, as there is given binary ternary, etc.; but no one will imagine that such number adds anything of reality over and above the numbers taken together; otherwise, since this kind of reflection and composition can go on to infinity, the addition of things would also be infinite; therefore neither does number consisting of simple units add anything to them.

13. Some authors indicating the contrary are explained. Against this part, however, seem to think Capreolus, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, concl. 1; and Soncinas, X Metaph., q. 11; and they cite various places of St. Thomas, namely, I, q. 30, a. 3, and In I, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, and Quodl. X, a. 1, and q. 9 de Potentia, a. 2. Nevertheless, these authors, if they are read attentively, do not hold that ternary, for example, adds some accident really distinct over and above all the units, as they are units and taken together, nor do they bring forward any probable reason for persuading this in this sense, to which it is necessary to respond. But therefore they say that quantitative number adds something to numbered things, because they think that individual quantitative units add something to the thing which is thus one; which is only true comparing this unity to the substance to which undivided quantity is added, so that through it it becomes one in this way; and

thus we say St. Thomas is to be explained, whatever others may think. But that beyond this quantity any other positive thing is necessary in individual units is improbable.

*Third Assertion*

14. In what the formal nature of number consists. From this I further gather and add third that number over and above individual continuous quantities and units taken together does not add any real mode, but in reality itself consists precisely in the collection of so many units. This I also take from Aristotle and the Commentator, in the places cited. And it seems to me equally efficaciously proven by the reasons made in the superior assertion; for those prove that number not only does not add over and above units taken together a really distinct thing, but neither even a real mode distinct from the nature of the thing. Because either that mode can be separated from units existing together, or not. If it is not separable, it is feigned as distinct in reality without foundation, as is clear from what was said above about distinctions in general. If, however, it can be separated, let us suppose it is separated; but then two units existing would no less be binary than now; therefore it is a sign that binary is not constituted through that mode distinct from the nature of the thing. And the same argument, equally efficacious, will be made through separation or precision of the intellect; for if, with such mode being precinded, binary is understood as existing, if two units exist, therefore it is a sign that it is not constituted formally through that mode, for, with the formal constitutive being precinded, the constituted thing cannot be understood. Likewise it cannot be explained in what subject that mode would be, because it cannot be in only some unit, because there is no greater reason for one than for others. Nor can it be in all together, for either it would be whole in each, and this is impossible; or it would be, as is noted per se, partly in each, and this is also easily disproven from what was said, because then in individual units

something real and distinct from the nature of the thing would be added over and above continuous and undivided quantity, which has been shown to be false.

15. And it is then declared in this way: for if number designates a special real mode existing partially in individual units, I ask if there is only one unity in the nature of things, whether that partial mode is in it, or is added when another unity comes to be. For neither can be said with probability. The first is clear, both because whenever one composite results from many through a peculiar mode of composition, with the other extreme being destroyed, that mode is entirely removed, as is established by induction in every composition, whether through true union or through any relation; therefore the same in the present case, if composition of number is made through a special mode. And also because, if there is only one body in the nature of things, it cannot be imagined what is in it in order to compose number, beyond its undivided quantity; for aptitude either for division or for composing number is nothing beyond quantity. The other part is easily proven, for if there is only one body in the nature of things, from the fact alone that another is made, binary arises, and yet from the fact alone that that one is made, nothing of reality is added to the other body, unless perhaps a relation of similarity or equality, which is irrelevant to the nature of number. Finally, by induction it can easily be shown that there is no such real mode added to units taken together for composing number, because there is neither any real union, nor order, nor position, nor anything of this kind, because all these are accidental to constituting number, and nothing beyond the existence of units is required.

### *Fourth Assertion, & Proper Resolution of the Question*

16. Fourth, finally, it seems plainly to be gathered from what was said that number considered in reality itself is not a proper and

peculiar species of being or accident, because in reality it is not being or accident, but a collection of beings or accidents. Nevertheless, however, insofar as it is conceived by us by way of one, it can be said to have some unity sufficient that we may speak of it as of one species of being, and that under such denomination it may be placed in the category of quantity. The first part is manifest from what was said, because two quantities of two bodies are two accidents and not one; and binary number adds nothing of reality to those two quantities, as has been shown; therefore in those things there is nothing which is truly one being or one accident from the side of the thing; for the collection itself of units in reality is not one by special real unity, but by collection alone or (which is the same) coexistence of units. This part also is convinced by the arguments proposed at the beginning of the section.

17. The other part of the conclusion, however, has been posited to explain the common way of speaking about number in discrete quantity, lest we depart from it entirely; for in these matters, although it is often necessary to think with few, one ought to speak with many. But that part can first be confirmed from the fact that discrete quantity as such is the object of a certain mathematical science, namely, arithmetic; but the object of science is taken as something one, concerning which properties are demonstrated; therefore number is conceived by us as having in some way one essence and species. Moreover, we conceive individual numbers as constituted of so many units and not more or fewer, and we attribute their properties to them, as, if such number is odd, that it is not divisible into two equal parts, and other things of this kind; therefore in order to our conception number has some unity, by reason of which it can be denominated one quantity. Then this can be declared from St. Thomas, VII Metaph., lect. 17, letter F, where, distinguishing those things which are one simply or in a certain respect, he places number in the first order; but he adds that number has its unity not from multitude or heaping up of units alone, but with some order. Which,

expounding further, lib. VIII, lect. 13, letters L and M, he says number is per se one insofar as the ultimate unit gives species and unity to number. But it is established that units of some number in themselves do not have real order among themselves, nor is there any ultimate or first among them; therefore it is necessary that these be taken in some way in order to our conception.

18. Some objections are satisfied. You will say: therefore number as number and as something one is a being of reason and not of reality, and consequently it cannot be called real quantity. Likewise, therefore number will not be actually number unless when it is actually numbered, which is plainly false, because one numbering does not make number, but knows it. Whence not only intellect, but also sense knows number, although sense does not make beings of reason. To this some do not fear to concede absolutely both consequences, as can be understood from those things which Capreolus reports from Aureolus, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 1, in the arguments made in place of quantity against the first conclusion, and from Scotus, in arguments against the fifth conclusion. For, although multitude of units, as multitude, is from the side of the thing, nevertheless as having some unity per se, according to some order or constitution, it is only through intellect and dependently on intellect. Whence discrete quantity, although it is real as to subtracted multitude, as to the formality of number which relates as per se one, is only by denomination from conception of mind, nor under that aspect does it fall under sense, but only as it is a collection of several things.

19. Second, however, it can be responded that number, as such, does not designate something actually numbered, but numberable, and under that aspect it does not depend on actual numbering by the soul, but only designates the foundation which is in the units themselves, so that they may be conceived under such number or may be numberable in such way. But some think this numerability is a mode or real formal nature existing in the units themselves, by reason of which number can be said to have real and

per se unity in things without any order to the soul. But in truth that numerability beyond the foundation of several quantities diverse among themselves is only a certain denomination from the faculty of soul able to number or measure multitude of units, or to conceive them by way of one number. Which Aristotle taught not obscurely, IV Phys., text. 131, c. 14, when he says if that which ought to number cannot be, neither can anything be numberable. Therefore by reason of that numerability number does not have greater real unity than it has from itself by reason of several quantities. Because that extrinsic denomination neither confers real unity to it, as is noted per se, nor supposes it in it, since mind can conceive those things which are several in themselves by way of one, and many things as many can number or measure. Nevertheless, that relation or aptitudinal denomination confers, even if it connotes order to the faculty of soul, that number, even as number, may be said to be in things, when it is not actually numbered or thought. And this mode of unity suffices that there can be science of arithmetic concerning number, insofar as it is such, which indeed does not consider the formal unity of it, what kind and how great it is; for this it leaves to the metaphysician; nor does it consider whether it has true and real essence, which is also the task of the metaphysician; but it considers certain proportions among numbers themselves, which, insofar as they are in things, do not require proper unity in them, but rather discretion and multitude. But insofar as they fall under one science, it suffices that individual numbers be conceived by way of one and compared among themselves.

### *Response to Arguments for Doubt*

20. The arguments therefore made in the first place at the beginning of the section correctly prove that in discrete quantity, insofar as it exists in things themselves, there is not true and proper real and per se unity; and I think that as to this part it cannot have

convenient solution. Nor do the arguments made in the second place proceed against this. For Aristotle numbered discrete quantity among the species of quantity, not because it has true unity in reality, but because in reality it has its mode of extension or multiplication, and is commonly conceived by way of one having its definition and properties; which is sufficient that it be constituted in categorical coordination. For not all things which are placed in categories have proper and per se unity in things. And that Aristotle intended nothing else can be established from his other places which we cited above. To the reason we concede that the formal nature and properties of quantity belong in their way to discrete quantity, but in such way that they do not require true real unity in it. For the extension of this quantity is only a certain multiplication of units; but multiplication as such does not require real unity among those things which are multiplied. Likewise divisibility of this quantity is not in order to real separation of those things which in reality were one, but in order to designation of mind, which can separate and divide units from which it understood number to coalesce. Again equality or inequality among numbers insofar as it is a property of quantity is not some one relation which is found in the whole one number with respect to another, but is the multitude itself of units, insofar as in one number it is greater or lesser than in another. In which way also a heap of wheat or stones can be equal or unequal to another. Moreover, although number is properly finite, nevertheless this denomination or property also does not require real unity, but only definite multitude of units. Whence also magnitude is called finite otherwise than multitude; for magnitude is finite because in reality itself it is closed by an extreme term, either one or several; but number does not have in reality any designated term, for its parts do not have order or position in reality, nevertheless in order to mind it always has ultimate unit, by which its numeration is finished. Finally, even if the nature of measure most properly belongs to number, nevertheless that property, as I said

above, is more of reason than real, and therefore does not require true real unity in number.

## SECTION II
## WHETHER DISCRETE QUANTITY IS FOUND IN SPIRITUAL THINGS

1. From the resolution of the preceding question this can easily be expedited, which some authors treat very extensively, and there are diverse opinions on it.

### *First Opinion Affirming*

2. For the affirming part is defended extensively by Marsilius, In I, q. 27, a. 1 and 2; Gregory, In I, dist. 24, q. 2, a. 3; and the same was held there by Aureolus, as Capreolus reports, and there Major, Ockham, and Gabriel, which Richard also insinuates, In I, dist. 19, a. 3, q. 1, ad 4, and dist. 24, a. 1, q. 1, and more clearly a. 2, q. 1. And Augustine favors this opinion, II lib. de Libero arbitrio, c. 16, where he expressly proves that number is something intelligible, and is found in all things. Damascus also, lib. III de Fide, c. 8, says number is in all things which differ among themselves. Whence he concludes that the two natures of Christ pertain to discrete quantity. The common way of speaking also favors this opinion; for we say there is such number of angels, and there is greater or lesser number of men. Finally the definition of number which Aristotle posits favors this, Metaphysics X, in the beginning, namely, that it is multitude numberable by unity; but quaternary of angels is true finite multitude measurable by unity, for that multitude keeps the same proportion to its unity as multitude of bodies to its own.

3. And it is confirmed finally, because every nature of discrete extension, and similarly every nature of unity which is found in

number of corporeal things, is also found in number of spiritual things; for that extension is only division of one from another; but unity is numerability up to such unity, which is conceived as ultimate in such number; and the formal nature of number seems to consist in these two. But that individual units are continuous and extended and divisible in themselves seems to be something material to the nature of number, because units do not compose number as divisible, but as indivisible. Whence just as three grains of wheat no less compose ternary number than three huge bodies, so three separated points no less compose ternary than three grains of wheat; therefore by equal reasoning three angels and any other three beings will compose true ternary, since they are species of discrete quantity. Whence concerning that ternary all things can be demonstrated which mathematicians demonstrate concerning quantitative ternary; and the same concerning every other number.

*Second Opinion Denying*

4. Foundation of the preceding opinion. But the contrary opinion is common in the school of St. Thomas, which he himself teaches I, q. 3, a. 3. And In I, dist. 24, q. 1, a. 3, and q. 9 de Potentia, a. 7, and Opusc. 48; Capreolus, In I, dist. 24, q. 1; and there Deza, Giles, and others; Soncinas, X Metaph., q. 13; Javellus, lib. VIII, q. 11; and without doubt Aristotle, wherever he treats of number or discrete quantity, attributes it to material things alone; and therefore he says III Phys., c. 6 and 7, that number arises from division of continuous quantity. And II de Anima, c. 6, he places number among common sensibles; and wherever he treats of mathematical sciences, he teaches that quantity is their object, and they do not abstract from matter according to reality, but only according to abstraction of mind, as is clear III Metaph., c. 2, and III Phys., text. 41; and the Commentator notes, V Metaph., comment. 2. And the foundation of this opinion is that in spiritual things there is no true quantity; for in this especially

they differ from corporeal things, that they lack quantity. Likewise and especially because transcendent one as such does not pertain to the category of quantity, nor to any special category, since it is a property convertible with being; therefore neither does multitude, insofar as it arises from transcendental units, pertain to the category of quantity, for multitude is also equally transcendent to all beings, and corresponds with proportion to unity. Moreover, because just as transcendent one adds nothing to being except negation, so multitude consisting of transcendental units as such only adds to several entities negation whereby one is said not to be another, in which entitative distinction or division consists; therefore transcendental multitude no more constitutes any species of being than transcendental unity; indeed it can constitute less, the less the true nature of unity can be found in multitude, as such. Finally, if we argue theologically, in the three divine persons such nature of ternary number is not found, which can be called discrete quantity, as all confess; and this does not come from the infinity of individuals; for this is irrelevant to the nature of number, for, although they are infinite in perfection, nevertheless their number is finite. Whence also concerning that ternary all things can be shown which arithmeticians demonstrate about ternary; therefore if that ternary does not pertain to discrete quantity, it is only because the unity of each person is not quantitative, but transcendental; which reason has place in all spiritual things.

*Resolution*

5. But this controversy seems to be almost about the way of speaking, for in reality it is established that, if by the name of quantity corporeal bulk is signified, thus it cannot be attributed to the number of spiritual things. If, however, someone stubbornly contends that by the name of discrete quantity only any multitude of things whatsoever is signified, he will easily defend that discrete quantity is found in angels. But those who speak thus first abuse the word quantity, since

this word taken absolutely signifies corporeal bulk in the usage of all philosophers, and therefore no philosopher will absolutely concede that there is quantity in angels; but when that difference "discrete" is added, it is not held to be a condition diminishing the nature of quantity, but is taken rather as specifying or diversifying its unity. Therefore, speaking properly, discrete quantity can no more be attributed to spiritual things than quantity absolutely. Then, even admitting that use of such word, it is falsely said that discrete quantity so accepted, that is, multitude as such, pertains to some determinate categorical genus; for this is correctly convinced by the arguments of the latter opinion. For multitude as such does not have true unity, nor is it being, but beings, as was treated above, disputation IV; but in that way by which it has some nature of unity, it is not determined to any category but wanders through all, not as a real accident which can be in all others, but as a certain negative attribute or one including negation. And not as univocal, but as analogous, just as transcendent one; for if one is not univocal, how will multitude be univocal?

6. Wherefore it must be said absolutely that number taken properly for discrete quantity is not found outside quantified and material things. But we cannot deny, if in number we consider only what is of reason, namely, intellectual numeration or numerability, and a certain order of units, among which first and last are held, and thus we conceive number as something one, that as to all these things (I say) number can equally be found or considered in angels as in stones. Nevertheless since precise consideration is a certain denomination of reason, that alone does not suffice that such number be constituted in the category of quantity, for discrete quantity is not held to be real quantity on account of that consideration or denomination of reason taken precisely, but as founded in true and real quantity of individual units. Which can be declared in this way. For the formal nature of quantity in general is corporeal extension, which we have declared through impenetrability; therefore discrete quantity is not placed under quantity, unless insofar as it participates this nature in its units;

in them therefore it requires such discretion which not only makes entitative distinction and disjunction, but also local separation or impenetrability among them from its nature. Whereby it happens (that we may note this in passing) that matter and form, and all accidents which are in the same composite and are extended by the same quantity, do not compose proper number which pertains to discrete quantity, which will be declared more in the following sections. And through these things satisfaction has been given to the reasons of the first opinion.

## SECTION III

## WHETHER SPEECH IS A TRUE SPECIES OF QUANTITY RESOLUTION

1. What is understood by the name of speech. This question also is resolved from what has been said; for it must be said that speech is not a true and real species of quantity. For by the name of speech here we understand any articulate voice consisting of several syllables; for it is not necessary that it consist of several words or terms, in the way dialecticians are accustomed to interpret the name of speech. But in such voice many things can be considered, from which such voice or word is artificially composed and produced. In all of which nothing will be found which pertains per se to any species of quantity; therefore neither can the whole speech composed from them constitute any proper species of quantity. The antecedent is proven, for first speech and any syllable of it is a certain sound, which per se does not pertain to quantity, but is a certain quality. Then, in producing or completing that sound there intervenes a certain motion, and consequently some succession and delay of time; but nothing of these pertains per se to quantity, as is established from what was said in the superior disputation, where we showed that motion and time are not per se continuous quantities; but in speech

although the whole word is produced by discrete motion and time, nevertheless individual syllables are made by continuous delays and successive changes; therefore individual syllables are not quantities per se, but quantified per accidens, just as any other continuous motion is by its time. Whence, although one syllable is long and another short, and thus they are measurable by time, from this it only follows that they are quantified in some way, at least per accidens, in the manner of other motions.

2. Finally in speech can be considered the whole word, as composed from several syllables, in a certain order and with certain little delays, and thus it has nothing proper which pertains to a true real species of quantity. First indeed, because that is not true and real composition, but a certain numeration and discrete succession; but we have shown that discrete quantity as such does not have true and real unity of quantity. Then, because if each syllable is not per se quantified, but only per accidens, there cannot coalesce from all a peculiar species of discrete quantity; for it has been shown in the superior section that discrete quantity ought to consist of continuous quantities, and consequently those things which are quantified per accidens do not per se compose discrete quantity, but only by reason of continuous quantity from which such thing has that it be quantified. Moreover, because in that way by which discrete quantity can be composed from several syllables, within the genus of quantity it cannot be other than the species of number, what will be, for example, binary or ternary of syllables; for what an artificially composed word adds, namely, that those syllables are produced in such order that the first is short, the second long, or something of this kind, this (I say) all refers nothing to the nature of quantity, but is from certain human institution or use of producing this or that word thus, so that it may be apt for this or that signification from human imposition also, or so that it may be produced more conveniently or heard more pleasantly. But this human institution adds nothing to the number of syllables, except relation of reason of prior and posterior, or extrinsic denomination of

such measure or measured. Therefore speech, insofar as it is something artificial arising from all these, is not a proper and peculiar species of quantity. Indeed neither is it some one real and per se being pertaining to any category, but an accidental being, partly from many things or motions, partly from relations and depending on human institution. And Aristotle favors this opinion, here Metaphysics V, where in reviewing quantities he made no mention of speech; where Albert the Great follows this; and Cajetan and others in Categories on Quantity; but St. Thomas, Alexander of Hales, the Commentator, entirely omit this species, just as Aristotle.

### *Objection & Its Solution*

3. Nevertheless a common objection is taken from the same Aristotle, chapter on Quantity, where he numbers speech among the species of discrete quantity, and also confirms by reason, because speech from its proper nature has length and shortness of syllables of which it consists; whence it is intrinsically measured by them. To which objection the common response is that speech is numbered among the species of quantity under the aspect of measure considered, although according to the proper essence of quantity it is not a peculiar species. Which response admits in reality what we intend; nevertheless we have often said that the nature of measure is neither a real property which can constitute any species of things, under whatever real aspect it is considered, nor is it a property of quantity alone per se, but it belongs also to things quantified per accidens. I add moreover, that in speech a peculiar nature of measure is not found, but measure of time and number is joined with a certain order defined by men for measuring it. And thus, either there is not peculiar measure per se there, but a congregation of several measures; or if from those some measure is made in some way one, it is only according to reason, not according to any distinct and real species of any accident. Therefore, as I have often said, Aristotle in the

Categories and in reviewing those species, followed then the vulgar way of speaking and more received opinion, as Albert there, and the Commentator, V Metaph., comment. 18, noted. Nor is the reason taken from measures of syllables of any moment, because from this it only follows that in each syllable there is intrinsic delay, which is nothing but a certain intrinsic time measurable by extrinsic time. Whence from this part it neither is quantity per se, nor differs essentially from time; but from elsewhere it includes many things which neither effect one being per se, nor all pertain to the nature of quantity, as has been declared.

## SECTION IV
## WHAT KIND IS THE COORDINATION OF GENERA AND SPECIES OF QUANTITY

1. The resolution of this question also can be briefly gathered from what was said in this and the preceding disputation. For first it is established that quantity per se and complete is the supreme genus of this category, whose common nature or description we declared with Aristotle in the first section of the preceding disputation. But quantity is divided immediately and sufficiently into continuous and discrete; for among these there is the first and greatest diversity which can be thought in this genus. It is also sufficient, because it includes contradictory opposition.

### *Whether Quantity is Genus to Continuous & Discrete*

2. But that is difficult according to what was said above, how this division can be of genus into species, if discrete quantity is not per se and really one quantity. For what is not per se and really one being, is simply not being; therefore what is not per se and really one

quantity, is simply not quantity, therefore quantity as true genus cannot be contracted to such member. And it is confirmed from a similar case, for being is not divided univocally by one and many; therefore neither is quantity divided as genus by continuous and discrete. Therefore someone could say that quantity taken rigorously for true real quantity is not genus, but something analogous to continuous and discrete, as to quantity one by unity of thing or reason. According to which opinion it could consequently be said that Aristotle, in this book V Metaph., does not deliver only univocal acceptations or divisions of individual categories, but also analogous acceptations of those words by which individual categories are signified. Which is sufficiently established, both from his intention throughout book V Metaph., and from the discourse of individual chapters; for in all he declares analogous significations of various words, as we have annotated in the Aristotelian index at the end of this work[51]. Therefore that in chapter 13, explaining significations of quantity, he numbers continuous and discrete, is not sufficient argument that that is partition of genus into species.

3. From dialectic, however, a less efficacious argument can be taken, because, as I have often said, there he does not number species according to truth of the thing, but according to vulgar way of speaking. Nor were there lacking grave and ancient authors, who have insinuated this way of speaking; for Albert, in Categories on Quantity, signifies that number according to true essence of quantity is not a species of it, but is placed there under the aspect of measure, from which opinion St. Thomas does not much differ, opusc. 48, tract. III, chapters 1 and 2; and among moderns, Fonseca, lib. V Metaph., c. 7, q. 5, sect. 2, says number truly does not have place in the category of quantity, as true genus or species, but because it relates in the manner of genus or species, and is more conveniently and usefully thus treated

[51] In some editions the Index locupletissimus was at the end. In this one it is included at the beginning, before the first disputation.

and considered, therefore it is divided under quantity as species under genus. And he repeats the same c. 13, q. 4, throughout.

4. And perhaps in reality this opinion does not differ from truth; nevertheless, lest we depart from the common and received way of speaking, it must be said absolutely that the category of quantity is constituted first from division of quantity in general into continuous and discrete, and these two are the first subaltern species contained under the supreme genus. And for this it suffices on the part of discrete quantity (for concerning the other member there is no difficulty), that in reality it has its mode of quantitative extension, distinct from that which is in continuous quantity, and that under that aspect it has some mode of unity, according to which it can be conceived by us and scientifically treated in the manner of one being per se. For thus genera and species which are placed in categories do not have real unity as genera and species, and nevertheless by reason of their real essences they are placed in categories. In accidents also, which are imperfect beings, proper and perfect real unity is not always required, but sometimes unity of order suffices, either according to itself or in order to our mode of conceiving, as will be established from the discourse of those things which we will say in some qualities and other categories.

### *Continuous Quantity as Subaltern Genus Is Divided into Line, Surface & Body, as into Ultimate Species*

5. Second, continuous quantity is divided into line, surface, and body. Concerning the distinction and sufficiency of whose members enough has been said in the superior parts. Nor can it be doubted that this is division of genus into species, according to what was said above. But it can be doubted whether these are ultimate species of this category according to this subordination. And the reason for doubt can be that sometimes various species are accustomed to be numbered under these members, namely under line

that it be of one foot or two feet, two cubits or three cubits, circular or straight; for these St. Thomas seems to distinguish as distinct species, I, q. 7, a. 3, ad 2, and I-II, q. 52, a. 1. But others, like Soto, in Categories on Quantity, distinguish concerning quantity under its proper and essential nature, or under the aspect of measure, and in the first way they say these are ultimate species of quantity, but in the latter way they are subaltern species, and can be subdivided according to various natures of measure. Which could easily be sustained, if by these species of measure were understood not some real species, but intentional or by extrinsic denomination from human imposition. But truly, speaking simply of real species of quantity, it must be said that those are ultimate species of continuous quantity; which is the common opinion, and can be taken from St. Thomas, q. 9 de Potentia, a. 7, and V Metaph., lect. 8, letter C, and lect. 15, letters B and C. From which is taken the reason a priori, for since the essential nature of quantity consists in extension, which is explained by us through divisibility, it cannot be essentially contracted, except through modes of extension or divisibility essentially diverse; but in various lines such modes of extension or divisibility essentially diverse cannot be found or thought; for there is always extension or divisibility only into parts of length. But that these parts, if they are proportional, are greater or lesser, or that they are more or fewer, if they are equal, is accidental to continuous quantity, as is evident per se, and the same proportionally is in surface and body.

6. Whence all divisions which are attributed to these are plainly accidental, as that line be straight or circular; for those two modes pertain to the category of quality; whose open sign is that the same line can be made from straight circular, and conversely. Similarly that line is of such or such length is accidental; just as it also happens to fire that it is of greater or lesser magnitude. Whence from any greater line several smaller ones can be made, and conversely, any smaller ones can be continued, and compose one which will be homogeneous according to all parts; therefore all lines are of the same

species. Whose sign also is that all points among themselves are of the same species; for no essential difference can be assigned in them; therefore all parts of line continuable by points are also of the same species, because these keep proportion among themselves; but any line, as much as it is from itself, is continuable by point to another line; therefore all are of the same species. And from this again the same can be concluded by similar argument concerning surfaces, because any surfaces are continuable among themselves by line; and the same proportionally is concerning body. But I say as much as it is from itself, because quantities of natural things often cannot be continued; but this comes from the subject and is accidental to quantity according to itself.

7. Infinite line of what genus and species it would be. But someone will press: therefore even if infinite line were given (and the same is concerning surface and body), that would be of the same species with other finite ones. The consequent is false; therefore. The consequence is clear, because even in that line all points would be of the same nature, and any part separated from it would be finite line and continuable to others. But the falsity of the consequent is clear, because infinite line, according to probable opinion, involves repugnance in itself. It is responded by conceding the consequence, as all teach; and St. Thomas touched this, I, q. 85, a. 8, ad 2; Soncinas, V Metaph., q. 15, who cites Avicenna, lib. II suae Metaphysicae, and Aristotle, VI Topics, saying that, although line were infinite, still the definition of line would belong to it. Wherefore from the force of essential nature of line it cannot be concluded that it is repugnant to give it actually infinite; but whether from other causes it is repugnant, and what those are, is disputed ex professo in the book of Physics and On the Heavens.

8. Inference from what has been said. Finally from what has been said it is gathered that in this series and coordination only one supreme genus is found, and another intermediate, and three ultimate species. But if it is true, considering things according to themselves,

that quantity is not genus to discrete and continuous, it will consequently be that in this genus of accidents there is only one genus immediately containing under itself three ultimate species, which seems to some a great inconvenience, because between supreme genus and ultimate species there ought to be some subaltern genus. But I do not see from what principle this is simply necessary, for, since these genera and species are abstracted according to conveniences or similarities of things, why cannot it happen that three species among themselves have one generic convenience, and first diverse from other genera? Therefore from the terms I see no repugnance in this, nor any inconvenience. Nevertheless, because from elsewhere we suppose that convenience can be abstracted from continuous and discrete quantity, sufficient to constitute categorical coordination, therefore the genus, in which the other species agree, is held to be not supreme, but subaltern.

*Third Division of Discrete Quantity into Its Species*

9. Whether all differing numbers differ essentially. Third, discrete quantity or number is divided into various species of numbers, by which division the other series and coordination of this category is completed. Concerning which division some things, which are of lighter moment, can be inquired. The first is whether all numbers unequal in units differ specifically in this category. And the reason for doubt can be that they differ only according to more and less in the same genus of extension. For why in lines is there not distinction according to species that it be two cubits or three cubits, and in numbers is there essential difference that it be binary or ternary? Second, because otherwise either there will be no species of number in the world except one only, that, namely, which arises from all quantitative units existing in the world; or certainly each unit will at the same time compose very many species of things; but both seem

inconvenient. Indeed that also follows, that one species is composed from other complete ones and contained under the same genus.

10. Number is subaltern species. Nevertheless both arithmeticians and philosophers all speak of those numbers as of distinct species; whence in that way by which we suppose number to be species of quantity, consequently it must be said that it is not ultimate species, but subaltern, and all numbers unequal in multitude of units are specifically diverse. For thus must be said of all, or of none, because there is no greater reason of some than of others; but no one has yet said that all numbers are of the same species. But the reason of distinction seems to be that addition of unity formally diversifies extension or divisibility of number. Whose sign is that from even it makes odd, and conversely. Likewise from this it happens that one number is divisible into two equal parts, and not another; and one only into units, another also into numbers; another partly into unity, partly into number. And similar various properties and proportions are considered in numbers by the arithmetician. Because of these things therefore a more formal distinction is held to be among unequal numbers than among equal ones; since therefore these differ in number, those are deservedly held to differ in species.

11. But if someone attentively considers these reasons, and those which were made to the contrary, he will easily understand that this whole composition of numbers, and specification, and distinction, is not without order to reason. From which the doctrine delivered above in section 1 is not a little confirmed. And in this way the prior reasons are easily solved; for diverse numbers in their mode of extension and divisibility do not only differ according to more and less, but also according to diverse nature of extension or numerability, which does not so happen in line two cubits or three cubits; for this numeration is entirely accidental to it insofar as it is continuous. Finally in order to reason it is not inconvenient that the same unity compose several species of numbers. And in this way also it can easily be understood that there are several numbers in things, either

specifically or numerically distinct, even if from the side of the thing there is not greater union among units of one number among themselves than with units of another. And by similar reason it is not properly said that one species of number is composed from others, speaking formally, but only materially. In which way Aristotle said, V Metaph., c. 14, that six is not twice three, but once six.

### *How Ultimate Unity Is Said to Be Form of Number*

12. And from this another doubt which pertains to this place is easily expedited, whether and how ultimate unity is said to be form of number; which is disputed extensively and seriously by many authors, as if it were a matter of some moment, when nevertheless it is posited only in names and in a certain metaphorical speech. By which speech indeed St. Thomas used, VIII Metaph., around text. 10; and therefore Thomists fight for it, Capreolus, In I, dist. 24, q. 1, concl. 5; and Javellus, VIII Metaph., q. 10; Soncinas, X Metaph., q. 6, although Soncinas also holds a certain middle and more probable way of explaining that speech. But others impugn it, like Aureolus, according to Capreolus above; and Major, same dist. 24, q. 1. But it must be said briefly that ultimate unity is not said to be form of number because in things themselves there is some first or ultimate unity, or any real order among those units, which Soncinas correctly notes and proves, even if Capreolus seems to think otherwise in solutions of arguments. And it is clear briefly, because in things themselves there cannot be order, except either of perfection, or of position, or distance from heaven, or of time, or of causality, or of nature. But all these orders are per accidens, and irrelevant to composition of number, as will easily be established to one running through individuals; therefore. It ought therefore necessarily to be understood in order to reason, which in individual numbers conceives order of units, among which that which

is ultimate is held to complete number and distinguish it from others, and therefore is said to be compared to it as its form.

13. In which it is second to be considered that it was not St. Thomas' sense that this is form properly said, but by analogy and a certain proportion, which has now almost been explained, namely, because form is what completes the essence of a thing and distinguishes it from others and constitutes it in a certain order and grade as indivisibly; but all these things ultimate unity confers to number in its way. On account of which also Aristotle said that species of things relate as numbers. Whence also multitude of prior units seems to be compared to the ultimate as something actualizable by it. And finally through addition or subtraction of ultimate unity the species of number is changed; in all these therefore ultimate unity is assimilated to form or ultimate difference, which is sufficient for that analogical speech. Which Javellus and others amplifying say that, if in ternary, for example, the integral formal nature arising from three units is considered, that is the form of the whole or total; but ultimate unity is form of the part or physical, all of which can be admitted under the same proportionality. And yet to understand or defend with propriety, or also with reality, or real composition seems most inept to me; for the reasons of Aureolus and others, which Soncinas briefly gathers, and have already been insinuated, openly demonstrate the contrary, or from this alone that in things there is no order no union or composition among these units rather than among others. Wherefore it is not fitting to linger longer in this matter.

14. Division of number into even and odd of what kind. Another doubt could be here whether number immediately descends to all species, or can be divided more immediately through two differences, as, for example, into even and odd. For many attribute this disjunct to number as its property; but others, and perhaps more probably, think they are divisive differences. But since these and similar things depend very much on relation to reason, various differences of this kind and conveniences can easily be thought up; for

thus also numbers are accustomed to be divided into simple and composite, and in other ways which are delivered by mathematicians.

## SECTION V
## WHAT PROPERTIES ARE ATTRIBUTED TO QUANTITY

1. Concerning the present question Aristotle delivers almost nothing in this place V Metaph.; nevertheless in the Categories, c. on Quantity, he attributes three properties to it, of which the first two are rather certain negations than positive properties.

### *Quantity Does Not Have Contrary*

2. The first is that quantity does not have contrary. Of which this reason can be assigned, that contrariety supposes specific difference; for it is opposition of those things which are maximally distant under the same genus; but among quantities which differ specifically there is not contrariety, because they do not expel each other from the same subject, but rather from nature of the thing they necessarily ought to be conjoined; indeed according to reality they have such subordination, that one is principle of another; all of which fight with true contrariety. Whence it is of no moment if someone objects that divisible and indivisible according to the same nature are contraries; but surface and line are opposed as divisible and indivisible, according to latitude. For it is responded that divisible and indivisible, taken formally, are opposed only privatively; but divisible and indivisible thing are not properly opposed in any way, but are distinguished specifically, or as principle and principled. Therefore among quantities specifically distinct there is not contrariety; nor truly can there be among quantities of the same species, because proper contrariety supposes specific distinction, as was said.

3. An objection is satisfied. But immediately an objection occurs, for augmentation and diminution are contrary motions; therefore they tend to contrary terms, for contrariety of motions is taken from contrariety of terms; but terms of those motions are quantities of the same species, namely, greater or lesser body; therefore among quantities of the same species there is contrariety. Aristotle posited almost this objection chapter on Quantity, saying that great and small, which pertain to quantity, seem to be contraries; for great and small seem to be terms of augmentation and diminution. And he responds that great and small are not opposed contrarily, but relatively, for the same can be great and small with respect to diverse things. And into almost the same returns what he says here, that great, namely, and small, greater and less, long and short, and similar, are not per se quantities, but affections of quantity, which all are reduced to the third property immediately to be declared concerning equality and inequality; for all the aforesaid relations are comprehended under inequality.

4. But still the argument made presses[52], because contrary motions are not to opposite relations; therefore augmentation and diminution do not tend to great and small quantity as they are relations; therefore they tend to them as they are absolutely contrary forms. Some respond that great and small can be considered either precisely, as they pertain to quantity, abstracting from substance, or insofar as they are natural terms of substance, especially living, to which certain terms of augment or decrement are given by nature; and under this second aspect great and small are terms of contrary motions, and as such do not pertain to quantity, but rather are reduced to substance as its terms. But this response does not please, both because it is no less repugnant to substance to have contrary, than to quantity; and also because, although substance requires greater or lesser quantity, nevertheless motion itself is held to tend to quantity; just as although substance is what postulates place above and below,

[52] Soto, in Logica, II de Anim., text. 41.

nevertheless motions upward and downward tend formally to places themselves. Two things therefore seem to be said. First, for contrariety of motions proper contrariety of terms is not always required, but latitude[53] or distance suffices, by reason of which, with the mode of tending of diverse motions also being adjoined, insofar as, namely, the term from which of one is the term to which of another motion, and conversely, contrariety arises in motion itself; for thus local motions are contraries, although in places themselves there is no other proper contrariety except distance and diversity. This therefore same can be said concerning augmentation and diminution.

5. But second, more particularly it is said that augmentation and diminution, if the matter is considered attentively, are opposed more privatively than contrarily. For in both of these motions (as is delivered more broadly in philosophy) two changes are conjoined: one is acquisition of some quantity from one part; another is loss of some quantity through resolution, which is made from another part of the living thing through reaction of the contrary. And if it happens that acquisition of quantity is made without any loss, or with lesser, then it is called augmentation; but if only loss of quantity happens or with lesser reparation, it is called diminution. If therefore in both motions we consider acquisition of some quantity, they are not contrary to each other, even if through one more through another less is acquired; both because from this rather is had that one is way to another and the other perfection of the other, like intense and remiss heating; and also because, speaking per se, both acquisition would suffice for augment, if from elsewhere loss were not conjoined. But loss of quantity is not opposed contrarily to acquisition, but privatively, just as corruption to generation; because therefore diminution is not opposed to augmentation, except on account of adjoined loss of greater quantity, therefore there is not properly contrary opposition there, but privative.

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[53] atitudinem, 1960; altitudinem alit. "altitudinem en otras ediciones." Cf. BHF, t. VI, p. 184.

*Quantity Does Not Receive More or Less*

6. The reason why quantity does not receive more and less. The second property of quantity posited by Aristotle is that it receives neither more nor less, namely, according to intension; for according to extension it is clear that one quantity is more extended than another; but intensively this cannot happen. Of which the reason is usually assigned from the preceding property, because intension and remission of form usually comes from admixture of the contrary; and therefore since quantity does not have contrary, neither can it be intended, nor remitted. But the reason is not universal, for often quality can be intended which does not have contrary, as is clear concerning light, science, vision, etc. The reason therefore can be given, either from the fact that quantity follows matter as its proper property; and therefore, as to intensive latitude, it has indivisible entity, just as matter itself; or from the part of formal effect, to which quantity is ordered per se primarily, which is extension of parts of substance, to which effect intension is irrelevant, indeed it could not be understood how it could have place concerning such effect. Which the examples of Aristotle optimally declare, for, with greater extension being excluded, more or less cannot be understood among two quantities; as a thing of one foot cannot be more quantified than another also of one foot; just as one binary cannot be more or less number than another binary.

7. Quantity is capable of condensation and rarefaction. Although, however, quantity does not receive intension or remission, but continuous quantity is capable of condensation or rarefaction; which change St. Thomas sometimes calls intension, as is clear in I-II, q. 52, a. 2, ad 1, and II-II, q. 24, a. 5, ad 1. Nevertheless this is not to be understood properly, but by analogy and imitation; for just as intension of qualities is made without addition, or simply, or without addition in new part of subject, according to various opinions, so

rarefaction is made without addition of new quantity, especially according to the opinion of St. Thomas, concerning which it must be said later.

8. A question is answered. But you will ask why Aristotle did not place this among properties of quantity, namely, that it can be condensed and rarefied, just as he placed among properties of quality that it can be intended and remitted? I respond first, that Aristotle did not number all properties, as will be clear from what will be said. Then to be condensed and rarefied does not belong to quantity by reason of itself, but by reason of natural substance in which it is, and therefore it is not numbered among peculiar properties of quantity. For, that quantity itself is proximately susceptive of density and rarity, which are certain qualities, is not another property from that which can be attributed to quantity with respect to other qualities or corporeal accidents, namely, that it is immediate subject of them; concerning which I will say a little below.

9. Otherwise it can be objected against this and the preceding property, for heavy and light are affections of quantity, Aristotle witnessing, this lib. V Metaph., c. 13; but heavy and light are properly contraries, and receive intension and remission; therefore. It is responded by denying the antecedent, for gravity and levity are certain qualities; but Aristotle in that place, as St. Thomas and all expound, adduced that example according to the opinion which was then circulated, that gravity is nothing other than multitude of surfaces.

### *How Equality and Inequality Is a Property of Quantity*

10. Equal and unequal has twofold consideration. The third property assigned by Aristotle is equality or inequality, which he says is most proper to quantity, signifying that it is so proper to quantity, that by reason of it other things are called equal or unequal. Concerning which property it is first to be noted that equal and

unequal can be taken in two ways. First, according to propriety; second, by translation. In the first way two lines are called equal; in the latter way two men are called equal in science, or in bodily strength; indeed even two divine persons are called equal in perfection. For equality is a certain convenience; but convenience between any things of the same nature intervenes by way of a certain formal unity, which in substance is usually called identity, in quality likeness, but in proper quantity equality properly taken; but in other categories it does not have a peculiar name, but retains the generic one of convenience or specific unity. But because this convenience or disconvenience among quantities is better known to us, therefore that word has been transferred to signify any perfect convenience in perfection, intension, or virtue. In the present therefore Aristotle speaks of equality properly taken; for thus are properties to be assigned to things in every science. Although if we wish to speak universally, we will say that every equality follows quantity, but with proportion; for proper equality follows quantity properly taken; but metaphorical equality follows similar quantity. For there is quantity of bulk, which is proper quantity; and there is quantity of perfection or virtue, and to it follows equality said by translation; insofar as they admit this name, insofar as they are conceived or named by way of quantity.

11. But by quantity of bulk is not to be understood only magnitude or extension of body, but every corporeal dimension; for all that is properly called quantity, and according to all that bodies are most properly called equal or unequal. And finally in corporeal bulk all those dimensions are included. But under quantity of perfection we understand not only perfection of substance, but also of qualities, whether perfection of being or virtue of acting is considered in them, which is usually called quantity of virtue, nevertheless it is comprehended under quantity of perfection. And in this latter way motions are called equal in velocity; but in the first way they will be called equal in extension, for they have velocity from perfection, but extension from quantity. Similarly two weights are called equal or

unequal by reason of multitude according to propriety; but by reason of intension according to metaphor; as if a great stone is said to be equal in gravity to three or four smaller ones, the locution seems to be according to propriety, because that equality comes from multiplication, or extension of parts, which pertains to quantity. But when cold water is said to be unequal in levity to hot water, for through heating water becomes lighter, thus the locution is metaphorical, because that inequality does not come from multitude or extension, but from remission of gravity.

12. How equality and inequality taken for relation relate to quantity. Second it is to be observed that equality and inequality are taken in two ways: first, for actual and real relation; second, for proximate aptitude to such relation. In the first way it is not necessary that equality and inequality follow to every quantity. For if there were only one body in the world, it would be equal or unequal to none; and if there were only two, those would either be only equal, or only unequal, but nevertheless not at the same time equal and unequal; for these cannot belong at the same time except with respect to diverse things. Therefore with equality being taken for actual relation, it does not necessarily belong to quantity. Unless someone wishes to say that every quantity necessarily has parts; and therefore inequality of whole and part, and equality and inequality of diverse parts among themselves, necessarily belongs to it. In which way some think that time, since it is only one, does not have another equal or unequal; but in this total time there are several partial and unequal, or equal ones; thus day is equal to day and unequal to hour. Which is probably considered: although concerning such equality or inequality of parts of the same continuous, or of whole to parts, whether it ought to be held as real equality, or through real relation, or of reason only, is a question to be treated below. And in time not only can equality or inequality be considered in that way, but also with respect to other durations which are found in other motions besides the celestial. In the latter way therefore, that is, according to aptitude, the nature of

equality or inequality properly and per se belongs to quantity; for as much as it is of itself, every quantity is apt to be equal to one and unequal to another.

13. What equality and inequality add to quantity. Whence it is understood in passing that this property adds nothing in reality to quantity itself, nor is it any mode distinct from the nature of the thing from it; for quantity through itself, from the fact precisely that it has such extension, with every other mode or real addition being excluded, is apt to be equal or unequal to another; therefore this property is distinguished only by reason, insofar as this equality is conceived by way of a certain aptitude to such relation.

14. Finally it is to be observed that not only are quantities themselves properly denominated equal and unequal, but also things which are extended through quantities and made quantified, as we were saying above about weights, as to extension or multitude; and the same is concerning times or motions, and substances, figures, and other things of this kind. Nevertheless, just as these are not per se quantified, but through quantity, so they receive denomination of equal or unequal by reason of quantity. And thus it happens that this property, insofar as it can belong to something per se and by reason of itself, is deservedly attributed to quantity. I see only that it can be objected concerning equality of discrete quantity; for that is proper equality or inequality, and does not always belong by reason of quantity, of bulk or extension; for two sixes of angels are as properly equal as two sixes of stones. But to this we have already said above, that although multitude of immaterial things is not properly quantity, nevertheless as to the mode of unity in order to apprehension or numeration of reason, it entirely imitates discrete quantity. And therefore it is not wonderful that according to that nature it also participates denomination of equal or unequal. But many think that the denomination itself attributed to discrete quantity cannot be taken from proper real relation or from its foundation, both because such relation cannot be in the whole number, nor in only one unit, nor in

each; and also because the unity which equality supposes is not so proper and real in discrete quantity as in continuous, as was seen above; but concerning this matter we will see below.

### *Other Properties Are Explained, Especially Being Finite or Infinite*

15. Besides these properties others are attributed to quantity, namely, being divisible, either to infinity with respect to continuous quantity, or into units with respect to discrete. Which property we sufficiently explained in the preceding disputation, declaring the definition of quantity and the formal nature of quantity, with which this property of divisibility is immediately connected; and therefore it is almost not usually distinguished from it, but is declared through it, as we said there. Again it is assigned as property of quantity to have or be able not to have the nature of measure. Concerning which we have said enough above, section 2. Moreover it is attributed to quantity to be finite or infinite, from Aristotle, I Phys., c. 2, text. 15, and III Phys., c. 4, text. 24. Which property has difficulty by reason of the latter member, for rather infinity is held to be repugnant to quantity; therefore not finite or infinite, but only finite according to extension will be property of quantity. Which can be confirmed from Aristotle, V Metaph., c. 13, saying that it belongs to the nature of number to be finite multitude, and to be able to be numbered; and to the nature of magnitude that it can fall under measure; which is to be finite. Whence St. Thomas there, lect. 15, says that if there were infinite multitude, it would not be number; and infinite length, would not be line. And I, q. 7, a. 3, he says that it belongs to the nature of continuous quantity to have some figure, and consequently to be finite, because figure is what is closed by term or terms; since therefore to be finite per se follows to every quantity, that property seems to be undeservedly assigned under the said disjunction.

16. To be finite or infinite how proper to quantity according to Scotus. In two ways therefore that member can be understood, namely, concerning infinite in potency, or concerning infinite in act. In the first way Scotus understood this property, II Metaph., q. 9, and thus the objections cease. But in that sense that property ought not to be assigned under disjunction, but copulatively, for to be actually finite and potentially infinite belong to quantity at the same time. But it can be responded that that particle was posited under disjunction, either to indicate that those members are taken not in the same, but in diverse senses; or certainly it was so posited on account of discrete quantity, which is only finite, and not infinite, even in potency, because it is not divisible to infinity, just as continuous quantity is. Although in another sense infinite in potency can be so taken, that it belongs to discrete as well as continuous quantity. For quantity can be called infinite in potency, because from itself it prefigures or determines no certain term to itself, which manifestly belongs to any continuous quantity, and therefore it can be called either finite, because actually it always has some term, or infinite negatively or by power, because it is not repugnant to it to transcend any definite term. But number, although, if it is taken in any determinate species, it is so finite that it cannot be augmented without changing species, nevertheless taken absolutely it can always be augmented without term within the latitude of discrete quantity. And in this sense also infinity in potency can in some way be attributed to it.

17. If infinity were, it would be property of quantity. But if that member is understood concerning infinite in act, and we suppose as true opinion which denies such infinite to be possible, consequently it must be denied that such member pertains to true property of quantity, which Scotus indicated, in the place cited; and Cajetan also holds, I, q. 7, a. 3, around solution ad 2. But as it pertains to Aristotle, in the first place he does not intend absolute sense, namely, that infinite in act can in some way belong to quantity; but he speaks under condition or from hypothesis, if infinite is, that it ought to pertain to

quantity, for infinite (he says) uses nature of quantity. And this is most true; according to which interpretation we can also say, because it is not certain that quantity cannot be infinite, therefore under disjunction that property is assigned and understood, as to that member concerning infinite, through non-repugnance from force of quantity, as such, as St. Thomas signified, in the said solution ad 2, saying that infinite is not against the nature of magnitude in general. But in the other place III Phys., Aristotle treats at the same time of magnitude, motion and time, each of which, he says, is necessary to be either infinite or finite. But according to his opinion it is not repugnant to give infinite in act, at least in motion and time; and therefore either on account of that cause he could use that disjunction. Nevertheless speaking absolutely, and according to true opinion, every quantity, even motion and time, is finite.

18. Figure is property of continuous quantity. Finally to these properties others can be added, which do not belong to quantity as such, but either to continuous, or to discrete, as figure can be numbered among properties of continuous quantity, although this is placed in its proper category, because it includes special nature of accident. Likewise it is attributed to continuous quantity, that its parts have position in the whole, whose opposite is attributed to discrete quantity. To which also is assigned as property, that it be even or odd; all of which are clear from the superior things nor do they need new interpretation.

## DISPUTATION XLII

## ON QUALITY AND ITS SPECIES IN GENERAL

1. Why the consideration of quality follows immediately upon the treatment of quantity. Various meanings of the word "quality." Although Aristotle in the Dialectics, in the order of predicaments, treated relation before quality, perhaps because the predicament of relation is in some way more general (for it befalls all other beings in some way), nonetheless in Metaphysics V he changed the order, disputing first about quality and afterwards about relation. This order is more consonant with the perfection of things, for quality far surpasses relation in perfection. And in the same place, chapter 14, Aristotle recounts several meanings of this word "quality," among which (as he says there) two are principal: one is that by which essential difference is usually called quality, in which way Porphyry said that difference is predicated as "of what kind," and Aristotle declares this from the manner of questioning and responding, for when someone asks what kind of animal man is, the usual response is that he is rational.

2. Another meaning of this word is that by which it signifies an accidental affection of a thing. And according to these two meanings, there is no doubt that this word is analogous. And although regarding the thing signified, essential difference is principal, nevertheless the name "quality" seems to have been imposed primarily

to signify accidental affection and determination, and then transferred by proportionality to signify difference, insofar as it is the form of a genus and outside its essence. For difference is not called the quality of the species it constitutes, but of the genus it contracts. And therefore Aristotle does not say that to the question "what kind is man" one responds through the difference of man, but to the question "what kind of animal is man," because it relates to the genus as quality.

3. Hence this word is also used to signify substantial form, not only in Plato in the Timaeus, but also in Aristotle, Metaphysics IV, chapter 5, where he calls prime matter quantity, but form quality, insofar as it affects and determines matter. Indeed, even in the Predicaments, in the chapter on substance, and Metaphysics VII, chapter 3, he seems to call second substance quality with respect to first substance, insofar as he says second substance signifies "a certain kind of what," namely because second substance is in some way compared to first substance by way of form.

4. Setting aside all these analogical meanings, here there is discourse only about accidental quality. But it must be further considered that sometimes every accident is called the quality of that thing to which it happens, in which way Porphyry, in the chapter on genus, says that all accidents are predicated as "a certain kind of what," that is, as "a certain kind of thing" - for that particle "what" must be explained when taken in such generality. However, this meaning is also very analogous, insofar as every accident is a certain affection, mode, and determination of its subject and outside its essence. Nevertheless, other accidents of other predicaments have peculiar modes of affecting substance, and according to these they are called by proper names. But the name "quality" in its most proper meaning has been used to signify a certain genus of accidents having a determinate mode of affecting substance, of a different nature from other genera of accidents. Concerning quality taken in this mode, the present disputation is instituted. Concerning this, first it must be inquired in general what it is and what species or properties it has. Then in

particular, some species or properties that contain greater difficulty and properly participate in metaphysical abstraction must be discussed.

## SECTION I
## WHAT IS THE COMMON NOTION OR ESSENTIAL MODE OF QUALITY

1. The reason for the difficulty is opened. It is indeed difficult to explain in general wherein consists that mode and quasi-difference contracting or determining accident in general to the being of quality and distinguishing it from other genera of accidents. Hence Aristotle in Metaphysics V employs no common definition of it. In the Predicaments he says: "I call quality that by which certain things are said to be qualified." This definition, although it seems essential in that respect that it is given through relation to the formal effect which every form essentially regards, nevertheless as far as we are concerned, the proper notion of quality remains equally obscure to us. Just as if quantity were defined as "that by which we are said to be quantified," although the effect and denomination of quantity would be confusedly indicated, nevertheless it would remain equally unknown what it is in us to be quantified, or what quantity confers to the quantified thing. So therefore in the present case, it remains equally unknown what it is to be qualified, or what peculiar mode of affection is explained by this word. For to one inquiring what "qualified" is, it will also be well answered that it is what is affected or constituted by quality. Nevertheless, unless it is otherwise supposed as known what quality is, the whole matter will be left equally unknown. Add that it is sometimes most obscure to discern whether a thing is denominated as qualified or not by some denomination, as when a man is said to be loving or seeing - but it is uncertain whether that denomination is of the qualified sort or of another nature. Moreover, when a thing is said

to be wise, in a creature this is considered a denomination of the qualified sort, but not in the Creator. Likewise, when a thing is said to be white, it is a denomination of the qualified sort - why then will it not be the same when it is said to be whitened? Or what difference of this matter can be assigned?

*Various Descriptions of Quality in General*

2. Therefore some have attempted to declare some common notion of quality in various ways. First, quality is usually said to be an absolute accident following form. This notion can be taken from the common sufficiency of predicaments of accidents, in which it is supposed that an absolute accident intrinsically inhering, if it follows matter, is quantity; if it follows form, is quality, as is clear from St. Thomas, Metaphysics V, lecture 9, and Physics III, lecture 5, and Summa III, question 77, article 2, and In IV Sentences, distinction 12, question 2, and there Scotus, question 2, and other authors frequently. But against this it can be objected that action also follows form. This, however, does not press much, because action does not follow form as inhering, but as emanating. But quality is said to follow form as inhering in it or in the composite from it insofar as it is such. It seems more to obstruct that some qualities do not follow form but matter, like figure. Others follow neither matter nor form, like the light of air, for example. Finally, there are other accidents accompanying form that are not qualities, like natural place and motion toward it, and position. And many also think that quantity follows form, and at least regarding the limit of magnitude or smallness this is clear, especially in living things.

3. Second description of quality. Others say that quality is a mode of substance determining its potency to peculiar accidental being. This opinion is taken from St. Thomas, I-II, question 49, article 2, where he says thus: "Properly quality imports a certain mode of substance; but mode, according to Augustine's testimony, is what

measure prefigures; hence it imports a certain determination according to some measure. And therefore, just as that by which the potency of matter is determined according to substantial being is called quality because it is the difference of substance, so that by which the potency of the subject is determined according to accidental being is called accidental quality." Hence St. Thomas seems to collect this common notion of quality: Quality is a mode or determination of the subject according to accidental being. But immediately an objection presents itself, because when quality is called a mode of substance, if mode is taken in that rigor in which it is distinguished from proper accidental entity, the assumption is false. For it is established that many or almost all qualities are proper entities affecting substance. But if it is taken more broadly (as it is really taken) for a form determining the capacity of the subject, then that definition applies not only to quality but also to quantity - indeed, to other accidents too, especially those properly inhering. For quantity also determines the subject according to accidental being, and passion, and where, and position. Seeing this objection, Cajetan, on the cited passage, says that those words are not to be taken universally but limitedly, because there is no discourse about accidental determination absolutely, but about that which has usurped for itself the common name of accidental difference, namely quality. But this is precisely what we are investigating: what is that determination which is signified by that name. Nor is that about accidental difference universal, for sometimes accidental difference can be taken from action or passion.

4. Opinion of some others. Therefore others think that this common notion cannot be explained by us through positive difference, because we do not know the proper notion of quality, but it is to be declared by negation in the manner in which Aristotle said in this chapter that absolutely everything that is present in substance besides quantity is quality. For although he speaks especially about numbers, we can extend this to all qualities of substance,

understanding that everything absolute that is present in substance according to itself and in quiet and perfect being is quality, so as to exclude both relations and all the final predicaments. And this exposition is probable.

*Resolution of the Question*

5. But we can further declare this matter by saying that, since all accidents are in some way affections of substance and are joined to it on account of some imperfection of it or to supply some defect of it, quality has this peculiarity in this genus: that it is instituted primarily per se to adorn intrinsically and perfect substance, so that it may be suitably affected in its being or in its power of acting. For quantity is given to corporeal substance for this peculiar effect, which is to have corporeal bulk and extension and impenetrability of parts. But relations (if they are anything) are not intended per se, but result, because they consist only in relation. Action likewise and passion are only ways to a term, and action, as action, has the most improper notion of accident. But passion is not so much perfection as a way to the perfection of substance. But the remaining four predicaments are either improperly accidents, adjacent rather than perfecting substance, or if any is intrinsic, like where, it is only a certain mode following upon its limitation, rather than something added to it for consummating its perfection. Therefore quality seems to be a certain absolute accident, adjoined to created substance for the complement of its perfection, both in existing and in acting. For because created substance is very limited, it cannot have through itself the complement of perfection. For this end, therefore, quality is primarily instituted, and therefore from its genus it is the most perfect of all accidents, and it accompanies created substance by the very fact that it is such, and not only according to some peculiar reason.

6. Hence it can also be rightly explained why quality is said in a peculiar way to follow form. For because form is what completes and

perfects the essence of a thing and confers the principal power of acting, therefore quality, which is adjoined for the complement of both perfections, is said to follow form, either through emanation or through some suitable proportion. Nor does it matter that some qualities are unsuitable to some subjects, for they exist in them accidentally. But per se they are instituted to complete the perfection of some substance. Hence also figure, although according to material capacity and entity it seems to follow quantity, nevertheless insofar as it pertains to the ornament of substance and can in some way serve natural actions or motions, it follows form. But quantity is said in a peculiar way to follow matter, because matter is the first root of this corporeal bulk, for constituting or completing which quantity is peculiarly ordered.

7. Again, according to this peculiar reason it is to be understood when quality is said to be a mode of substance determining its potency to some accidental being according to due measure. For it is to be understood concerning intrinsic and absolute accidental being per se ordered to the complement of formal perfection (so to speak) of the substance itself. And for the same reason, the name of quality has been attributed by antonomasia to this accident. For quality is usually said of everything that affects or determines another by way of act and form, and taken simply explains something outside the substance of the thing, modifying it. And therefore this name has been attributed in a peculiar way to this genus of accidents, which from its nature has this peculiar office, as has been declared.

8. And from the same root it comes about that all differences of things that cannot be assigned through their proper essence are regularly assigned through qualities. For these are what in some way complete created things in their perfect being. And although sometimes such accidental differences are taken from effects or actions, this is only insofar as diverse qualities or properties of things are indicated by these. Finally, if we consider the almost infinite variety

of qualities, from whose agreement the most common genus of quality is to be abstracted, we can easily understand, I think, that it cannot be otherwise declared by us in what that most general agreement consists. Therefore the common notion of quality is explained in this way to some extent, and other ways of explaining this are almost reduced to harmony in such a way that no new difficulty occurs in this declaration.

## SECTION II

## WHETHER QUALITY IS CONVENIENTLY AND SUFFICIENTLY DIVIDED INTO FOUR SPECIES

1. Aristotle, tacitly dividing quality in the Predicaments, numbers four species of it, constituting each of them as bimembral or binomial, namely: habit and disposition, natural potency and impotency, passion and passive quality, figure and form. But truly, in Metaphysics V, chapter 14, he delivers the division more obscurely, because he seems to have omitted natural potency and impotency, unless we understand that he comprehended it under the virtue of operating well or badly. He also explains figure only in numbers and attributes it especially to immobile things, that is, mathematical ones. And finally he rather recalls that acceptance of quality to that signification which is said of substantial difference. In this he either speaks according to Pythagorean doctrine, that mathematical things are really separate and immobile, or certainly he speaks of these things as they are considered by mathematicians, who consider them in the manner of substances and think of these qualities as their substantial differences, as St. Thomas interprets. Therefore the division given in the Predicaments is more perspicuous, and therefore it is commonly received, and consequently it is to be explained by us. In its explanation, however, those things which can be briefly expedited, both in general and in particular, we shall touch upon here. But some

things which require longer treatment we shall reserve for proper disputations.

### *First Difficulty Concerning the Amplitude of The Division*

2. Four principal difficulties occur in this division. The first is that many things seem to be comprehended under those members or terms which are not qualities. For habit is said to constitute a special predicament. Disposition also pertains to position, for sitting or standing is a certain disposition of the body. But if disposition is said comparatively, insofar as one thing disposes another to another, then quantity also is a disposition of matter to receive form or other accidents. And action or operation is a disposition to virtue, or motion to health, or passion to corruption. Again, if potency is taken for passive potency, it is indifferent to substance, quantity, etc. Indeed, many think it wanders through all genera, so that in each there is proper passive potency corresponding to proper act. But if it is taken for the power of acting, substance also through itself is potency for acting, as was said while disputing about efficient cause. But impotency, since it is a certain privation, is undeservedly numbered among qualities. Moreover, passion constitutes a proper predicament distinct from quality. But if it is taken not for the way itself but for the term of passion, not only quality but also quantity and where will be passions, because they come to be through physical passions. But what passive quality adds beyond the common notion of quality is most obscure. Nor is it less hidden what is signified by the name "form" in the fourth species, since this word is common not only to all qualities but also to accidents and substantial forms. Finally, figure, since it is only a certain terminus of quantity and its mode, would seem rather to be reduced to quantity.

## *Second Difficulty Concerning The Distinction of Those Members*

3. The second difficulty is that these very members, insofar as they can pertain to quality, do not seem to be sufficiently distinct among themselves, but confused and intermixed. For habit is often active; therefore in that consideration it has the true nature of potency, for from action potency is best inferred. Therefore, in the way that habit acts, it has potency or is a potency of acting. This difficulty has place especially in certain habits, about which theologians teach that they confer power of acting, such as habits infused per se, and in the opinion of many, character. Intelligible and sensible species also can be placed in this order, because they confer such power of acting that without it the act cannot take place. Nor does it matter that that power is partial, both because in its genus, that is, from the part of the object, it can be called total, and also because, speaking simply, even the power of intellect or sense is partial, and nevertheless those qualities are absolutely called potencies. Moreover, among those qualities which Aristotle calls passive, many are which truly and properly are active potencies, like gravity and lightness, which Aristotle numbers among passive qualities in Metaphysics V, chapter 14. Likewise heat and cold, both there and in the Predicaments, are placed among passive qualities, although they are true potencies for heating or cooling. Indeed, whiteness and blackness and other objects of the senses which are numbered by Aristotle among passive qualities, because they cause passion in the senses, under that same notion are true active potencies, because they truly effect that passion or species in the senses. Just as heat also can be called passive quality, that is, effective of passion in wood or water, and nevertheless under that notion it is true active potency. For it does not matter that the passion which whiteness effects in sense is intentional, since that is not outside the latitude of true efficiency. Otherwise neither would the agent

intellect be true active potency, because its action is intentional - indeed, even every action of intellect or sense can be called intentional in that way.

4. Moreover, Aristotle attributes to the first species that it affects the subject well or badly. If this is understood of moral good and evil, it is too limited, for thus sciences and opinions will not be habits or dispositions. But if "well or badly" are the same as affecting it suitably or unsuitaably according to the nature of the thing, thus it applies not only to the first but maximally also to qualities of the third species. For heat affects fire well, that is, suitably to its nature, and cold affects water, and so of others. Indeed, figure also can affect the subject well in this way, in which way beauty is a good disposition of the subject. Finally, every connatural quality, even if it is potency or disposition, suitably affects the subject, as intellect affects soul, light affects sun. Indeed, those two modes of affecting extend to other genera of accidents, for thus also motion is violent or natural, insofar as it is suitable or unsuitable to the nature of the subject, and the same is true of place and similar things. From which it is understood that that difference is not apt for discerning qualities. And the reason seems to be that it is transcendental, pertaining to transcendental good. Hence it also happens that those two members can apply to the same species of quality with respect to diverse subjects.

### *Third Difficulty Concerning the Sufficiency of the Division*

5. The third difficulty is that there are many qualities which do not seem to be comprehended under those species. First, immanent acts are qualities, since they formally confer ultimate act and perfection, and yet they do not pertain to any of the said species, as will easily be clear to one running through the individual ones. Second, intentional species are qualities according to everyone's opinion, and yet according to common opinion they are not habits, as

we shall see below. Nor are they dispositions, since they are with difficulty removed from the subject by themselves. Nor are they potencies, since they are present in potencies. And concerning the other species it is clearer that they do not apply to them. And there is another singular thing in these qualities: that all those species of quality numbered by Aristotle so affect the subject that they denominate it. But intentional species so affect that they do not denominate, as is maximally clear in visible species existing in air or mirror. Therefore it is a sign that they pertain to a new genus of quality, distinct from others. Third, rarity and density, roughness and smoothness are qualities, and yet they are not contained in the aforesaid species, as will easily be established by one running through them.

6. Seeing this, Aristotle in the Predicaments, chapter on quality, denies that these are qualities and reduces them to position or position of parts, because rarity and density seem to be nothing other than distance and proximity of parts. But roughness and smoothness are equal (so to speak) and unequal position of parts. But this response of Aristotle is not without difficulty, because although these arise from the position of parts, they do not formally consist in that position itself, but are certain peculiar modes which can pertain only to quality. Otherwise, figure would not pertain to quality either, for a triangle, for example, arises from such a disposition of lines, and beauty from such a disposition of parts. Likewise, by the same reasoning health would not pertain to quality, for it arises from a certain proportion and quasi-position of humors, which are in their way parts of the animal. Finally, density or rarity is not quantity but a mode of quantity, and it is not mere relation, as is evident per se, because it comes about through proper action and disposes the subject well or badly in order to its conservation or connatural mode of being. Therefore it can only be quality.

## *Fourth Difficulty Concerning the Bimembral Distinction of Individual Members*

7. The fourth difficulty is why Aristotle proposes individual species of this predicament with a double name. For either each signifies the same thing or essence, or different. But neither can be conveniently said. Not the first, both because that multiplication of names would have been useless and would create confusion, and also because it cannot be verified of all. For how can potency and impotency, which seem to be opposed privatively, signify the same species of quality? Nor can the second be said, both because either eight species of quality should have been immediately numbered and not four, or if each pair of those species has a peculiar proximate genus, those four genera or four species should have been named and declared. And also because this cannot be true in all cases, for passion and passive quality cannot differ essentially, since they differ only in brief or longer duration, which do not indicate diversity of essence, since they can come about from intrinsic causes or from greater or lesser intension of the quality. And almost the same reasoning applies to habit and disposition, for they also are said to differ because disposition is easily removed, habit with difficulty, which is much the same. In figure also and form that distinction cannot easily be imagined, since figure itself is a certain form.

8. But on the contrary is the opinion and authority of Aristotle, which other philosophers have followed, according to which it must be asserted that the aforesaid division has been rightly given, and that all those members are true qualities distinct among themselves and comprehending the whole latitude of quality. That this assertion may be proved and satisfaction given to the difficulties touched upon, it is necessary to speak about individual members one by one, and that we may proceed more distinctly, we shall distribute individual points into various sections.

## SECTION III
## WHETHER ALL THE AFOREMENTIONED SPECIES INCLUDE UNDER THEMSELVES THE TRUE AND ONLY QUALITIES

1. First, it must be said that nothing is counted among or contained within these species that does not have the true notion of quality. This claim depends in great part on the meanings of the words, which therefore must be carefully distinguished, for they can conceal equivocation.

### *The Various Meanings of the Term Habitus*

2. To begin, the noun habitus and the verb "to have" (habere) or "having" (habendi) are variously distinguished by Aristotle in the last chapter of the Categories and in Metaphysics V, chapters 20 and 23. Generally speaking, the word habitus can be taken either with the force of a participle or with the force of a substantive. Taken with the force of a participle, it descends from the verb "to have," and can be said in as many ways as "to have" itself. But the verb "to have" is highly equivocal. Sometimes it signifies dominion or possession of a thing, as when someone is said to have money or a kingdom; in general, whoever has a right over a thing is said in some way to have it—thus a man is said to have a wife and a wife to have a husband. Again, anything that in some manner contains another is said to "have" it: a subject is said to have accidents, a whole to have parts, matter to have form, a vessel to have water. Aristotle also says that what holds something back so it does not move or descend by its own inclination is said to have it, as a wall has a roof. Hence in diverse respects two things can be said to have one another: matter has form because it is receptive of it, and form has matter because it in some way dominates

it. Thus Aristotle says that a fever is sometimes said to "have" a man, especially when it clings to him with great force; so too a kingdom is said to have a king because it is subject to him, and conversely the king to have a kingdom because he holds power over it.

3. Since "to have" is said in so many ways, habitus too, taken in the participial sense—or rather the thing had—can be said in the same ways. In that signification it clearly does not signify any determinate category; for, materially speaking (so to say), both substance and an accident of any category can be "had" and be denominated as the thing had. Formally, however, that denomination or relation of "being had" is sometimes nothing real, but only a relation of reason or a denomination from human will or estimation; sometimes, again, it is a moral power arising from that, as is human ownership or jurisdiction, by reason of which someone is said to have a house, subjects, and the like. At other times it signifies a peculiar relatedness belonging to some category and can, in this way, range through various categories: when matter is said to have form, that "having" signifies nothing other than being informed by the form; when fire is said to have an action, that "having" signifies not information but the emanation of action from the fire; when a man is said to have clothing, that "having" can signify merely possessing it—in which sense he is said to have it even if he keeps it in a chest, and so it does not express a real mode of any category but only a moral relation, as I said—or it can signify being clothed with it, and then to have clothing is the same as to be adorned and, as it were, informed by clothing, which pertains to the category of "having" (habitus). In the present discussion, therefore, habitus is not taken in this signification, that is, with the force of a participle; although this denomination can also befit proper habits, for we truly say that a man has the habits of science, virtue, and so on, in that common way of speaking by which a subject is said to have accidents; and conversely a habit can be said to have the man, especially if it is deep-rooted and intense, because it in some way dominates him.

4. In another way habitus is taken as a substantive, and in that sense it also has multiple meanings. For present purposes three principal meanings seem most relevant. First, the word signifies any disposition of a thing or manner of being disposed, and thus it is said of any form and especially of any quality; in this way it is commonly applied both to parts of the body and to inanimate things: one speaks of the habitus of a place, of the mouth, and so on. It is especially so called insofar as it disposes a subject well or badly, either in itself or with a view to some use, as the Philosopher notes in Metaphysics V, chapter 20; in this sense health is called a habitus of the body. Second, habitus signifies clothing or a bodily garment—an everyday usage—and this pertains to the special category of "having." Aristotle, in the passage cited, observes that habitus in this sense signifies not so much the thing itself, namely the garment, as, so to speak, the "habitation" itself—that is, the sort of information or configuration the man receives from the garment—by reason of which the man is said to be "habituated" (i.e., clothed), and the garment is called a habitus as something in act, not merely in aptitude. Nevertheless, if we attend to the common usage of the word, it is taken equally to signify the garment itself, which is as it were the form in the abstract of the category of "having," whether or not it is actually exercising its function; although, philosophically speaking, it is usually taken in a special way for that concrete or quasi-formal effect signified by those words, namely being clothed. Third, habitus is taken to signify a form that confers facility and readiness for acting; and because acting follows upon being, this signification is extended to qualities that dispose a thing well or badly in its being—thus health is called a habitus, and physicians call the natural disposition of the body the good or bad habitus of the body, from which it comes about that all its organs and parts perform their functions well or badly. In this third signification a habitus is always some quality, or a temperament of qualities. I judge, however, that even here there is some proportional analogy; therefore, properly speaking, habitus signifies a form that

confers promptitude upon a power for acting, and thus it is always a quality; and under this aspect I think that habitus, properly taken, constitutes the first species of quality, as will become clearer from what follows.

### *On Disposition & its Meanings*

5. A well-known division of "disposition" may be clarified. Aristotle says in Metaphysics V, chapter 19, that disposition is the order of a thing that has parts. This can be understood in two ways: first, as the very relation of order that arises among the parts of a thing that has parts, from the fact that each is set in its proper place; second, as the constitution of the whole and, as it were, the form that arises in the whole from the placing of the parts in their proper places. In this latter sense the name "disposition" seems to be taken most properly; thus among rhetoricians the disposition of a speech is the fitting collocation of its parts in their proper places and with due proportion; and among dialecticians the figure of syllogizing is called the due disposition of the terms; similarly, in the human body the fitting collocation or proportion of parts or humors is called a good bodily disposition. Hence health and beauty are reckoned good dispositions. Aristotle distinguishes this disposition into three members, saying that the order of parts can be either according to place, or according to power or faculty, or according to form. The first member seems to pertain to the category of position (situs), for that disposition appears to be nothing other than the mode that results in the whole body from the fact that its parts are placed thus in space, which is the notion of the category of position, as we shall see. The other two members seem to pertain to quality, but in different ways. The order of a thing having parts according to form seems to pertain to bodily dispositions such as figure, which Aristotle is wont to call "form," as is clear from the category of quality. Thus beauty can most aptly be called a disposition, for it is a form resulting from the due order of parts in themselves; and

the due organization of the body may in this way be called a disposition. Indeed, if we extend the name "parts," even health and every similar bodily form arising from the due order and proportion of parts can be called a disposition belonging to this member.

6. The other member—namely, "according to power"—seems to refer to dispositions of the soul; hence it is harder, in this sort of disposition, to explain which parts are being ordered. It can first be expounded of the potential parts of the soul itself, that is, its powers, which are reduced to a fitting order by their due dispositions; thus such a disposition does not result from the order of parts but rather itself constitutes the due order in the soul, which is said to have parts "according to potency." This exposition is favored by Aristotle, for immediately in the following chapter (Metaphysics V, chapter 20) he says that habitus is in one way called a disposition that makes one well or ill affected, or some part of this disposition, whence it happens (he says) that the virtue of the parts is a certain habitus—where by "parts" he seems to understand the powers of the soul, whose individual virtues are called their dispositions; for although no one of them taken by itself is an adequate disposition constituting an integral order in these powers, nevertheless each is a part of this disposition. Alternatively, one may explain that each habitus of the soul is said to have parts according to potency, from whose order or constitution the disposition arises. This can be understood either formally or only virtually. Formally, if we suppose that a habit of the soul is not a simple quality but arises from the due coordination of several habits; thus an integral science will be called a disposition, because it is as it were a certain order of something having parts according to potency—that is, of partial habits ordered among themselves. Of these parts one may also understand what is said in chapter 30: the parts of this disposition are also called a habitus or disposition. Virtually, however, a habit of the soul can be said to consist in this order of parts, even if in itself it is a simple quality, which on the side of the object establishes a certain due order; for example, the parts of prudence can be said to be

deliberation, judgment, and command, in which prudence establishes the due order; and the parts of liberality can be said to be giving money and retaining it when one ought, between which liberality establishes the due order.

7. St. Thomas explains these two members differently (I–II, q. 49, a. 1, ad 3), where he refers these last two modes of disposition to dispositions of the soul, such as virtues and sciences: insofar as they are begun and imperfect they are said to be "according to potency"; insofar as they are complete and perfect they are said to be "according to species," as he renders it. Yet St. Thomas does not explain how these virtues are an "order of a thing having parts"; and those Aristotelian words "according to potency" and "according to form," judging from the context, do not seem to be referred to the disposition itself, but to the subject of which it is the disposition—that is, as having parts according to potency or according to form. Finally, the Greek words are κατὰ δύναμιν and κατ' εἶδος, which are not correctly explained as "imperfect being" and "perfect being." Therefore the former interpretation is more probable, which St. Thomas himself follows in Metaphysics V, and which almost all the other interpreters follow.

8. According to these meanings of the word, it is clear that disposition is not found only in quality but also in other categories—either in position, or even in quantity, as many hold; for the placing of parts in a whole, which is proper to continuous quantity, can also be called a disposition, and many think it pertains to the third member mentioned above. Likewise, insofar as disposition looks to quality, it may include not only a single species but all of them under the general signification given, as is clear from the examples adduced and can be confirmed by others. For the soul's very powers can be called dispositions fitting the soul and can order it according to potency and, in a way, according to the parts of virtue, insofar as there is in the soul itself a radical power and potency for other acts and functions; in this respect partial inclinations and powers can be considered in the soul itself, by which it is ordered through the powers themselves. Likewise,

each power has, as it were, partial inclinations toward diverse objects, according to which it is ordered toward habits. Hence all habits are also dispositions. Likewise, in a proportional way, intentional species —which determine powers or habits—can for that reason be called dispositions. Likewise, ultimate immanent acts can be called dispositions, either insofar as they are effects of habits and thus constitute a peculiar order in the power with respect to the habit, or, taken in themselves, insofar as they confer the ultimate actuality upon the power and thus finally perfect it according to a certain order. Again, concerning the fourth species we have already explained how it can be called a disposition. Finally, all passible qualities can be called dispositions, insofar as either on the side of matter they constitute a determinate order toward such a form, or on the side of form they confer a fitting order in the power of acting. Thus Aristotle, in the chapter on Quality, lists heat and cold among dispositions; and in common and ordinary speech all such qualities are called dispositions, either as preparing matter for form, or as adorning and perfecting the subject, or at least as adversely affecting it. Therefore, as regards the first difficulty we are treating, disposition, insofar as it is numbered among qualities, does not denote only the position of bodily parts in a place or in a whole, but denotes an affection of body or soul that orders it according to form or power; and thus it is manifest that it pertains to quality. How it is a special species of quality will be explained below.

### *On Power & the Meanings of this Word*

9. The name "power" (potentia) is also equivocal or analogical, as Aristotle teaches in Metaphysics V, chapter 12, and at the beginning of book IX. Power in one sense is taken with respect to the possible in the widest sense; "possible" in this way is whatever does not involve a contradiction. Aristotle says in Metaphysics IX, chapter 3: what is possible is that from which, when posited in act,

nothing impossible follows. For since the impossible is that which cannot be on the part of the thing, and what is in act in reality has being, it plainly involves a contradiction that, when a possible is posited in act, something impossible should follow. In what is called "possible" two elements seem to be included. One is, as it were, negative, namely the non-repugnance to being; this is usually called "logical possibility," and the corresponding "logical power" is so called because it consists not in some simple and real faculty but only in the non-repugnance of extremes, and thus is more evident in relation to the mind's composition and division, which belongs to logic. Hence this logical power contributes nothing to the constitution of any category, as is clear. The other element found in what is possible as such is the positive denomination by which something is called possible, taken from some real power, either active or passive; in this sense "possible" is what is contained within the power of something, and "impossible" what exceeds a thing's power or is not contained in it. Concerning the definitions of both kinds of power that Aristotle gives in the places cited, we have spoken above.

10. From these considerations it can also be seen that real or physical power extends very broadly; for in general it can and is wont to be said of any force for acting or capacity for receiving. In this way it is said not only of accidents but also of substances: in God there is active power, and in matter there is receptive power, which are substantial; and the substantial form, insofar as it has a force for acting, is a principle of changing another—which is the definition of power given by Aristotle. More strictly, however, according to philosophical usage, "power" is taken for a proximate principle, connatural to a created agent, for doing something; in this sense it is always some accident, for a substantial form is not the proximate but the principal principle, as was said above. Taken in this way, power pertains only to quality; for only qualities are the proximate principles of acting in creatures, as was explained in Disputation XVIII, sections 2 and 3. Whether all the qualities that are principles of acting belong

to the second species of quality, which is called "power," will be discussed below. What has been said of the proximate principle of acting is to be understood proportionally of a proximate principle of receiving accidents, if there is any per se destined for this office; perhaps, indeed, there is none that is not also a proximate principle of acting, although conversely there are many proximate principles of acting that are not of receiving. Therefore, under the general appellation "proximate principle of acting," this whole genus of power can be comprehended; we shall speak more at length of it in the next disputation.

### *On Impotence*

11. The origin and meanings of the name "impotence." If we attend to the force of the word, "impotence" signifies the privation—or rather the negation—of power; one is called impotent who lacks power, even if he cannot have it. In this signification it is clear that impotence does not belong to the genus of quality, indeed not even to any genus of being, since it consists wholly in a negation. In another sense, "impotence" means a certain positive weakness or unfitness for doing or undergoing something: such is dullness of mind for apprehending, or weakness of memory for retaining; likewise, a certain bodily complexion by which one is constituted unhealthy or infirm. Thus, for example, in wax softness is called an impotence to resist division. These are the common examples of this meaning.

12. These cases present no small difficulty. For every species of quality, like that of any thing, is to be evaluated by what belongs to it per se and not by what follows upon it consequentially and, as it were, per accidens. But no quality per se has the effect of rendering its subject weak or unfit for some task. If it is an active quality, per se it confers the strength required for its own work; if it is not active, per se it confers only its formal perfection or effect. That an impediment to other actions or passions follows therefrom is per accidens. There is

therefore no reason why it should on that account be called "impotence," or at least no reason why, on account of that denomination, it should be numbered among the species of quality. Otherwise every quality that is a power for one act would be an impotence for the opposite: hardness, which is a power to resist division, would be an impotence for division itself, and conversely; just as the soft is said to be impotent to resist division, so it will be said to be powerful for being easily divided or terminated. Likewise, moisture of the brain will be called "impotence" insofar as it brings weakness to the memory for retaining, and it will be called "power" insofar as it confers facility for apprehending. Furthermore, this weakness for acting or undergoing often does not proceed from one quality, but from different ones, or from the aggregate of many: dullness of wit sometimes proceeds from one complexion, sometimes from another, and this is even more evident in sickly bodies, which result from various and many dispositions. Therefore that weakness does not per se pertain to quality, but is an impediment per accidens arising from various qualities, whether singly or many together.

13. We reply that these arguments demonstrate that "impotence" is not constituted under quality formally insofar as it is impotence, and consequently that weakness of strength, dullness of mind, and all similar things that merely denote an impediment to acting or receiving, neither constitute nor require, formally and under that aspect, any special notion of quality. For although that impediment often proceeds from a quality or from qualities, nevertheless it does not per se belong to the nature of such qualities, but is something consequent and, as it were, per accidens. Impotence, therefore, is numbered under quality only insofar as it is some kind of power instituted per se for some act. Because sometimes such a power is so feeble in exercising its act, or so easily impeded that it cannot execute it, from this it takes the denomination of "impotence." Whence such a power has this character we shall explain below when treating the fourth difficulty.

*On Passion, its Meanings, & on the Passive Quality*

14. The name "passion" also has several meanings, as is clear from Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 21. Two, however, are principal. One is that it is said, in general, of any change or reception of something that actually takes place in a subject; in this way passion constitutes a special category. In that sense one is most properly said to suffer (pati) when one receives something contrary and harmful to one's nature, by reason of which one is deprived of a perfection owed to him; St. Thomas notes this, following Aristotle in the same place, and adds that it is then especially called passion when it brings pain or distress. Hence the affections of the soul are called passions. Because this sort of passion is best known in sensible alteration, the name was further extended to signify the quality that is produced by such a passion and sensible alteration. Aristotle placed this signification first in the chapter cited, and in it he numbered passion among the species of quality. Because the alteration by which this quality is produced is sometimes sudden and quickly passes away, so that together with it its term is dissipated or destroyed—as is evident in the redness of the face aroused by shame or some similar occasion—while at other times, by alteration, a stable and lasting quality is produced, Aristotle therefore assigned the name "passion" in a special way to the quality produced in the former manner. For "passion" seems to signify something in becoming rather than in accomplished being. He did this in order to mark that those qualities, even if they seem imperfect and transient, are nonetheless true species of quality. The others, which are more enduring, he called passive or passible qualities, because they are apt either to be produced by passion or to produce by passion, yet they do not always consist, as it were, in an actual passion.

*On Figure & Form*

15. Finally, the name "figure" has a more determinate signification. To pass over other improper and metaphorical uses, such as the figure of a syllogism or a rhetorical figure, properly speaking it signifies a certain mode that results in a body from the termination of magnitude. This mode pertains to the genus of quality, because, in the ratio of affecting and perfecting a subject, it agrees with the other qualities. The name "form," although otherwise very general, yet insofar as it is numbered among these species, signifies nothing other than figure itself, because figure is, as it were, the outward form that appears in bodies. Hence the two words seem to signify the same thing, except that by the name "figure" it is signified in a mathematical way, abstracting from matter—on which account Aristotle said in Metaphysics V that quality in this mode is found in immobile things—whereas by the name "form" it is signified in a physical way. And it is not improbable to me to say that "form" in this sense denotes figure, not just any figure, but figure adorned with accidents, especially colors, as Boethius indicated in his work on the Categories. Thus the sensible image seems to belong to this species by reason of its form. It is true that such a form seems to include not one quality but many; yet, just as in other cases an artificial unity, or that of some proportion or subordination, is judged sufficient to constitute in some way one quality, even if it arises from many—as is clear in health, beauty, and similar instances—so the same may be said of such a form. In this way it is also probable that beauty itself pertains to this species, because it chiefly arises from figure.

16. Nor does it matter, as Soto objects in his work on the Categories, that beauty pertains to the first species because it expresses a thing's fittingness. For he could have made the same argument about many other qualities, which he himself assigns to different species for different reasons. We shall speak of this in the following section.

17. Finally, it should be noted concerning this species that Aristotle in the Metaphysics attributes it especially to composite

numbers, which among mathematicians are those that arise from the multiplication of the same number by itself or by another, as the number nine from three times three, or six from two times three, and so on. To these numbers, therefore, mathematicians attribute "figures," by a certain analogy to the figures of magnitudes, insofar as they arise from the multiplication of an equal or a larger or a smaller number. I judge this whole account of "figure" to be metaphorical and to exist more objectively in the intellect than in reality; therefore I do not think it properly belongs to the species of quality.

*Conclusion of the Question & its Resolution*

18. From these considerations, then, the assertion placed at the beginning of the section is sufficiently proved. And a sufficient answer has been given to the first difficulty of the preceding section; for it rests entirely on an equivocation of terms. Once this is clarified, it is clear in what sense all these are constituted under quality.

## SECTION IV
## WHETHER THE FOUR SPECIES OF QUALITY ARE ALTOGETHER DISTINCT AMONG THEMSELVES

1. Although there is diversity of opinions in the mode of distinction of these species, as we shall touch below, nevertheless all hold that they are distinct. And therefore it must be said briefly that these four species of quality are distinct and unmixed among themselves, either according to the thing or at least according to formal reason. This conclusion taken in general is proved from the general reason or condition of good division, in which the members ought to be opposed, and consequently distinct. Otherwise it will not be division but nugatory and useless repetition. Likewise, this is

maximally necessary in division of genus into species, for things that differ specifically differ essentially. Therefore they cannot apply to the same according to the same reason. If therefore the said division is conveniently delivered and is of genus into species, as we suppose, it is necessary that the dividing members be distinct and unmixed. But I call them unmixed because no thing constituted in one species can be placed under another, because one species cannot be placed under opposed genera, or so distinguished that they are not placed subalternately.

*Various Opinions*

2. How many modes of distinction are conceivable among these species. First opinion. But that we may explain this and solve the arguments posited to the contrary in section 2, second difficulty, it should be noted that the distinction of these species and (so to speak) their non-mixture can be understood in two ways. First according to the thing, that is, so that none of those that are placed under one of these species can be constituted under others. Second, so that they are understood to be unmixed species only according to their proper formal reasons, but not always as to the things themselves. Therefore the common interpretation seems to be that this distinction neither ought nor can be understood in the prior way, but only in the posterior way. For that the prior way cannot be universal seems to be convinced by the arguments proposed in the second difficulty. But setting aside that prior way, it is necessary that the posterior be true, because no other remains in which both this second conclusion can be true and the division itself can consist. And this interpretation has great foundation in Aristotle, who places the same things under diverse species of quality. And St. Thomas supposes the same opinion, I-II, question 49, article 2, ad 1 and 2, where he says that figure and passible quality, as it suits the nature of the subject, pertain to the first

species of quality. And this opinion is frequent among authors, especially more recent ones.

3. Judgment is passed on the first opinion. But this opinion, although perhaps it can be sustained for distinguishing dialectical predications or denominations, nevertheless does not seem apt or suitable for metaphysically distinguishing species and essences of these qualities, because it cannot happen that one and the same thing be constituted essentially in diverse and opposed species of the same genus. Nor is it enough to respond that this is true according to one formal reason, yet according to diverse ones it is not inconvenient. This (I say) does not satisfy, because either those formal reasons are actually distinct on the part of the thing, at least from the nature of the thing or modally, or only by reason. The first cannot be said in the present case, both because those two cannot be distinguished on the part of the thing in heat, for example, which relate as thing and mode, for the same heat according to the same simple entity, according to which it is passible quality, is also proximate power for heating and affects the subject well or badly, nor can all these reasons be separated from that quality. Therefore a distinction from the nature of the thing among them would be feigned altogether gratuitously. And also because, that distinction being posited, both of those reasons could not be essential to such entity, but only that one which in the thing would not be distinguished from the entity, because the essence of form is not distinguished from the form itself. But the modal reason would be accidental, or at most by way of proper passion with respect to such entity, although it can be said to be essential to the mode itself, as it is something distinct from the entity. But if those two formal reasons are said to be distinguished only by intellect, and both are said to be essential to that entity, it follows that opposed and dividing differences from the higher genus equally apply essentially to constitute the same indivisible quality, which was the inconvenience inferred and plainly repugnant.

4. Second opinion. It is disproved. On account of this there were not lacking those who said that those four members are not divided among themselves as diverse species of quality, but as accidental modes or various relations of qualities, so that the division is not of genus into species, but quasi of subject into accidents. Scotus holds this, in Predicaments on Quality, question 1, and In IV Sentences, distinction 6, question 10. And it is a more ancient opinion, for Albert mentions it in Predicaments, treatise on Quality, chapter 3. But this opinion does not seem approvable. First, because Aristotle expressly calls these species or genera of quality, nor in another sense would he have rightly constituted and divided the predicament of quality. Then, because otherwise no way would be left for constituting essential distinction among some qualities. For if all differences numbered in these species are accidental or do not indicate essential distinction, no differences of qualities are known to us from which we can have essential distinction. And moreover the argument made returns, because either these modes are distinct from the nature of the thing from their qualities, or only by reason. The first cannot be said, because no foundation of such distinction can be found in such things, as was declared. But if they are only distinct by reason, why are they called accidental, since essential difference is also distinguished by reason from the thing, and otherwise these modes are as intrinsic and absolute with respect to such qualities as essential difference can be, as I shall explain immediately? Finally, if in that way essential difference is not assigned among qualities, we investigate this very thing: by what reason, namely, the common genus of quality is to be divided into essentially diverse species.

*Resolution*

5. I think therefore, first, that the genus of quality can have proper species essentially diverse, which is known per se, since this belongs to the nature of every genus. Second, I think that, proper and

adequate essential differences of qualities being assigned, constituting essentially diverse species, these distinguish not only by reason but in reality the qualities they constitute, and thus one and the same quality cannot in reality be constituted by several differences so dividing the genus of quality. This the reasons made sufficiently prove, as I think. For one quality can only be one entity, and of one entity there is one essential constitution under one genus. Likewise, because one quality is not only mode or accident of another quality, distinct in reality or reason from another quality. Therefore differences essentially constituting quality also distinguish really the very entities of quality. Finally, although we might admit that several differences or modes of qualities can be conjoined in one and the same entity, distinct either from the nature of the thing or by reasoned reason, it would be necessary that in that entity there be some first and essential difference, which could not be but one ultimately constituting such essence, because, as I was saying, of one simple entity there can be only one essential constitution. Therefore we here investigate these essential differences, since it seems certain that the genus of quality can be divided into its species through such differences. For if it has them, why will it not be able to be divided according to them?

6. Third, I think the aforesaid division of quality can be excellently explained in this mode, as Simplicius and Ammonius seem to have explained it in the Predicament of Quality. And this assertion will be easy to persuade, either from the solution alone of arguments that are proposed in the second difficulty. For if there is no quality constituted in some of these species that is necessary to be constituted under another, neither according to the same nor according to diverse formal reason, it will be sufficient argument that these species, metaphysically speaking, are unmixed not only according to reason but also according to the thing. And since division is more real (so to speak) in this way and more apt for explaining essences of qualities, it is to be declared thus. The consequence is manifest and the antecedent

is declared by running through individual species and through individual instances that were touched in the second difficulty.

### *Response to the Prior Part of the Second Difficulty Concerning Natural Potency*

7. What principles of acting pertain to this species. And the first difficulty indeed depends on declaration of the second species, which is potency or impotency, which, as I touched above, is to be understood chiefly of active potency, but can also comprehend passive potency, and therefore it will be explained in both. Therefore those faculties pertain to this species that are given per se primarily by nature so that they may be proximate principles of acting, so that they are primarily ordered to this end and thence have their proper reason and specification. For that such faculties are given by nature to created agents is sufficiently established by experience and from what was said above in disputation XVIII concerning principles of effecting of created causes. But that those faculties are qualities is common consensus of all philosophers, who also assert generally that there is no created and proximate principle of acting that is not quality, as was seen in the same disputation XVIII, and can also be easily collected from the general reason of quality declared in the preceding section. Finally, that that second species is excellently explained in that mode is clear, first from the very name of natural potency or impotency. Second, from Aristotle's explanation in the Predicament of Quality, where he expressly declares this concerning faculty given by nature and excludes that which is acquired by use or art. Third, because, formally speaking, this quality alone has per se primarily the reason and specification of potency.

8. Why habits are not in the species of natural potency. And thence it happens that, although habits are also principles of acting and therefore can in their way be called active virtues, they nevertheless pertain in no way to the second species, because they are

not faculties given by nature so that they may be proximate principles of operations, but are qualities acquired and superadded to potencies so that they may as it were aid them or make them easy for their operations. Therefore operative habit is distinguished essentially from potency in this, that it is not first proximate and connatural principle of operation, but is quasi-determining or affecting the principle itself. And thus not only acquired habits but also those infused per se are excluded. For although these seem to imitate potencies, because they give not only facility in operating like acquired habits, but also the very ability, nevertheless they essentially suppose potency that is proximate principle, which they elevate to new genus of operations, yet so that they suppose some efficacy of it, either natural or obediential, and complete it in its order. Again, sensible or intelligible species are excluded, because although they not only confer facility of operating but are also necessary in their order for operation, they nevertheless do not give first proximate faculty of operating, but determine it and in some way complete it, and therefore they pertain rather to the first species than to the second, even if they are infused per se, as in angels or the blessed, as we shall say more broadly below.

9. Moreover, first qualities, like heat and cold, even if they are qualities connatural to elements or mixed things and are also proximate principles of acting, nevertheless do not properly pertain to the species of natural potency, nor are they ever placed in it by Aristotle, because they are not faculties per se primarily instituted for acting, but per se primarily are certain forms formally affecting their subjects, to which end they are first and per se instituted, and so that they may suitably preserve the union of form with matter or dispose to it. But that they are principles of acting they have quasi-concomitantly from the fact that they are such forms that can effect things like themselves, from which they do not have peculiar specification or transcendental relation to their proper effects. For since they are forms of the same species and absolute, one cannot take species from relation to another. And by this reasoning we distinguished in what

went before twofold activity: one pertaining per se primarily to some entity from its primary end; another concomitantly from its perfection. Therefore we think the second species of quality is constituted by the prior kind of activity, but active qualities that are in the third species have activity only in the posterior way, and therefore neither are constituted in the second species nor under that notion have peculiar specification in the genus of quality.

10. Objects of species effective are excluded from the species of natural potency. And I think the same concerning qualities that are proper objects of senses, insofar as they can effect species in sense. For that activity also is concomitant. For those qualities are not per se primarily instituted for that efficiency, as seems known per se, but so that they may affect their subjects in such manner and with such formal perfection, which that activity accompanies. And in this I think there is great difference between agent intellect and any objects productive of their proper species. For agent intellect is per se primarily instituted for the office of effecting species, and therefore it is most properly active potency pertaining to the second species of quality. But cognoscible objects are not per se primarily so that they may produce intentional species, because they are not per se primarily so that they may be known or sensed, but so that they may have or confer to their subjects their formal perfections, and thus concomitantly they have that they can be known or sensed. Therefore whiteness and blackness and similar qualities are not active potencies because they can effect intentional species—indeed, under that notion they have no peculiar specification in the genus of quality.

11. Satisfaction is given to the objection. Nor does it matter that Aristotle in the Predicaments says that these are passive qualities because they are apt to effect passion in sense, both because he could describe quality through some effect, and maximally because there he seems to explain not the nature and essence of the thing but the etymology and imposition of the name. Hence he says that other similar qualities are called passive from elsewhere, namely because

they are made through passion, although the common essential reason ought to be the same in all. Therefore he acts in that interpretation not so much concerning essential reason of the thing as concerning origin of the name.

12. A greater doubt indeed I have concerning gravity and lightness, whether they ought to be numbered in the second or rather in the third species. For they seem truly to be most properly active potencies and primarily instituted for this office, so that they may move and carry their bodies to proper natural places. And it is confirmed, for impulse impressed on the projected thing by the impeller is placed in the second species, because it is per se primarily instituted only for this, so that it may be instrumental active virtue of the projector. Why therefore will not the same be said with greater reason concerning gravity? But if anyone wishes to defend this, let him respond to Aristotle in the Metaphysics that there he did not distinguish natural potency from other species, as we noted, and therefore he numbered indistinctly all qualities that either effect passion or are effected through passion. But if anyone wishes to attribute to these qualities no other kind of activity than to heat, and say that they are per se primarily formal dispositions of subjects, having that activity concomitantly, he will not sustain this with difficulty.

13. And according to these things it must be said proportionally concerning passive potency. For first there is no discourse about substantial potency per se primarily ordered to substantial act, for that is not accident but substance. Therefore it can only be understood concerning potency to accidental act. Concerning which again we said in what went before that it sometimes applies to some thing only concomitantly, and not because it is per se primarily ordered to this office, as it applies to surface, for example, to be receptive of color or light. And such potency or capacity does not pertain to this species—indeed, it does not per se pertain to any accidental genus, for that thing to which such capacity applies does

not have thence any proper specification or new reality or real mode, but per se is capable of such act or accident. Hence as to this the reason is the same for passive and active potency. If therefore any passive potency pertains to this species of quality, it is necessary that it be entity per se primarily ordered to receiving some accidental act. For such accidental potency will be, and from relation to that act it will have proper specification, which can pertain neither to another predicament nor to another species of this predicament. But whether there is given in the nature of things such accidental potency that is purely passive, I shall say in the following disputation.

14. A passage of Aristotle in the chapter on Quality is explained. But from this I collect that certain qualities that are usually called passive because they do not have activity but dispose the subject to receive some act or to resist it—these (I say) qualities do not pertain to this species, if we consider its essence metaphysically and really. But if sometimes they are reckoned in this species, it is either only on account of common manner of speaking or on account of some dialectical consideration or denomination. An example is in hardness and softness, which Aristotle in the chapter on Quality places in this genus, to which he also alludes in Metaphysics V, chapter 12, where among other acceptations of potency he numbers habits by which things are altogether free from passion, etc. But I think that, although by the name of potency or impotency such qualities are sometimes signified, truly and according to essential reason of this species they do not pertain to it, because they are neither active potencies, as is clear per se, nor passive, since they are not ordered to receiving any act in themselves. But if they dispose the subject to receive another act or form, they only accomplish this by informing and actuating the potency in some way, with adjoined connection or natural proportion that they have with another act, or sometimes they are said to dispose only because they cannot resist, as rarity or softness disposes to easy division. Just as also, conversely, sometimes they dispose to opposite act, or render the subject incapable of such act,

only through their information without relation to such act, but rather through concomitant resistance, which therefore does not pertain to special genus of potency, as we shall show below. And in this way hardness is compared to division. Hence Aristotle, On Generation II, chapter 2, among other qualities of the third species, numbers hardness and softness, although he confesses there that they have drawn their name from passion. Therefore, when in the chapter on Quality he uses this example in declaring the second species, he did not so much care about exact truth of the example as about similarity and proportion, so that he might declare the manner of speaking about potency and impotency, as Fonseca also noted, Metaphysics V, chapter 14, question 1, section 4.

### *Response to the Other Part of the Second Difficulty, Concerning Habit*

15. It remains to resolve the other part of that second difficulty by declaring the essential nature of habit and disposition; for although Aristotle numbered these in the first species of quality, nevertheless according to the way of declaring these species that he follows, potency is naturally prior, and therefore had to be declared first. By the name of habit, therefore (under which we always include disposition), we believe are signified those qualities that dispose natural potencies and actuate or determine them to their acts, or to their objects. This interpretation of this species is consonant with Simplicius and Ammonius, in Categories on Quality, and Scotus seems to follow it there. It is briefly declared, for we both suppose as known from experience that there are in things certain accidents that affect potencies in this way, and it will be shown more broadly below, in distinction XLV. That such accidents are qualities is evident, both because they can be placed under no other genus, and also because the definition of quality declared above manifestly fits them. Furthermore, that such quality has its own specific and essential nature distinct from

the nature of potency explained above seems manifest, both because natural potency proximately follows nature, speaking regularly and per se; but this quality is acquired or superadded to nature; and also because this quality or disposition is the act of the potency itself, which it determines and reduces to act in some way; therefore it is a distinct species. And for almost the same reason it is distinguished from qualities of the third or fourth species, because none of them pertains to this peculiar function of affecting or determining potency.

16. To dispose well or badly, as an attribute of habit. From this one understands how disposing well or badly the subject in which it inheres is peculiarly attributed to this species, for because habits are added to potencies to dispose them to their acts, they therefore by their nature have the capacity to make potency easy toward operation, and because the perfection of a thing consists in operation, habit is therefore said to dispose the thing well in order to its ultimate perfection. However, because operations of a potency are sometimes opposite, therefore while one habit gives facility to one act, it renders the exercise of another more difficult, and conversely. And because among opposite acts one is fitting to the subject, another unfitting, therefore habit is said to dispose the subject well or badly, either because one and the same habit disposes well and badly with respect to different things, for while it confers facility to one act, it renders another more difficult; or certainly because that habit which disposes to a fitting act is said to affect well, but that one badly which inclines to a less fitting act.

17. From this it follows that this disposing well or badly should not be understood of moral good or evil, for although this is also comprehended, and perhaps the denomination is chiefly taken from this, nevertheless the name of habit embraces more, and Aristotle signified both in Metaphysics V, chapter 14, in his final words saying: "But especially good or bad signify quality in living things, most of all in those that have choice." Then it is concluded that this good and bad should not be taken for any fitting or unfitting

disposition of a thing; for this notion taken in its full breadth is transcendental, and can belong to quantity, action and passion, and others, and restricted to the genus of quality can be attributed to all qualities, as was rightly objected in the second difficulty. It should therefore be taken for good or bad disposition in order to the ultimate perfection of the thing, which is operation; and that difference should be understood with a certain precision, so that through it this species is distinguished from natural potency, because, namely, habit or disposition does not confer the radical or proximate ability itself, but presupposes it, and affects it well or badly. And thus that entire second difficulty is resolved; for no quality of the third or fourth species pertains to the first species explained in this way, as is sufficiently evident per se.

### *Various Objections Are Resolved*

18. Nevertheless objections arise from elsewhere and as if from another extreme; for first we suppose habit to be operative, which however not all admit, as is evident from Scotus, In I, distinction 16, question 2, and others. But this causes us no trouble, because we believe this to be not only true, but also certain, as we will show more broadly in disputation XLV.

19. Whether there is any habit that is not operative. But second, more difficulty opposes, because we seem to suppose that no habit exists which is not operative, or if we speak more broadly, which is not an affection or disposition of an operative potency, which however seems to conflict with both philosophy and theology. The first is evident, because health is a certain habit, whence it is placed by Aristotle in Physics VII, chapter 3, in this first species, and there he places beauty in the same species, which is evident not to be an operative habit. Likewise heat and cold are placed by Aristotle in the same species, although they are not dispositions of other potencies. The second is evident, for grace is said by theologians to be an infused

habit, and yet it is neither in an operative potency nor per se first ordered to operating, but only to formally confer participation in the divine nature. Nevertheless it is answered that habit properly taken, and as it is distinguished from other species of quality, is an operative quality, not which gives the first power of operating, but conferring on the potency (so to speak) ability to operate.

20. Health is not a simple quality. Primary qualities are not properly habits. To the contrary instances I respond that health, according to the true opinion, is not a simple quality, distinct from the temperament of the humors or of the whole body, as the more accurate opinion holds, because there is no necessity or reason for feigning such a quality, nor is there any effect that would show it; but temperament is not some quality per se one, but is an aggregate, or (so to speak) an artificial composition of primary qualities reduced to a certain moderation and proportion. Hence health can no more be a habit than the primary qualities themselves. But primary qualities like heat and cold can only very improperly and in a common sense be called habits, as is evident from the common use of this term. They are called dispositions insofar as they prepare matter for form, or insofar as they affect the composite fittingly according to its nature. But this notion, as I said, is not proper and specific to the first species and disposition, as it is peculiarly accommodated to this species; but it belongs to any connatural quality, because according to it the subject is well disposed in itself.

21. Therefore when Aristotle, explaining the first species of quality, gives examples in heat and cold, in disease, and similar things, he does not do this to teach that these are true qualities of that species, but only to declare by a certain analogy to sensible things how internal and true habits dispose the potencies of the soul, and are easily or difficultly removed. For thus Albert, Alexander, Simplicius, and others have expounded Aristotle's mind. And this is sufficiently indicated in Aristotle's words, who first says these are dispositions in some way, and then adds that because of their duration they can also be called

habits, signifying that they are not properly habits, but participate in the appellation of habits because of a certain imitation.

22. Beauty is not one quality. And I think we should philosophize about beauty in the same way; for first it is not properly one quality per se, but coalesces from figure and color or colors; and therefore perhaps by itself it does not have a proper place in these species, but is reduced to the simple species of which it consists, or, if according to the unity it has it pertains to some species, it is best placed in the fourth, as was declared above. Nor is there any true and proper real reason according to which it should be placed in the first species; for that notion of fitting or unfitting is very transcendent, as I have often said. Therefore only by analogical denomination can beauty be called a habit, because it adorns the body, just as virtue adorns the soul.

23. In what species of quality is habitual grace. Concerning habitual grace, supposing that it is in the essence of the soul and that it is not per se first operative (both of which are uncertain), I deny it is a quality of the first species, but of the third (although such a genus of quality was unknown to Aristotle and the philosophers), because it is per se first ordered only to perfecting and qualifying the substance through its formal being, which I think is the proper nature of the third species, as I will declare more in the following section. Grace is called a habit, however, by the common appellation by which every good disposition that is permanent of itself, added to body or soul, is usually called its habit, because through it the thing is well disposed in itself.

24. Conclusion of all that has been said. According to this manner of interpretation, therefore, it is explained with great facility and clarity how these species are really distinct and unmixed; and therefore (speaking metaphysically) I judge it to be true, and most apt for declaring adequately the essence of each quality and the proper function for which it was instituted by nature. I do not deny, however, that, speaking dialectically and prescinding in mind these qualities and

their essences through inadequate concepts or various respects, the prior way of speaking can be sustained, because it also serves to explain various denominations, which are sometimes usually taken from the same quality numerically.

## SECTION V

## WHETHER THE DIVISION OF QUALITY INTO FOUR SPECIES IS SUFFICIENT

1. There are not lacking those who doubt Aristotle's opinion in this matter, because after the enumeration of those species, he added these words: "And perhaps indeed some other mode of quality might seem to exist; but those which are chiefly said to be such are about these."

2. Affirmative resolution of the question. But nevertheless it must be said that there is no quality which does not pertain to the said species, and therefore the division is exact. I think this is the mind of the Philosopher, who did not add those words because he thought there were other species of quality. For why would he have omitted them, if he had recognized them? Or how could he be excused for having made an insufficient partition? Let Aristotle therefore confess that he does not recognize other modes of quality; nevertheless, because the genus of quality is very broad, and he had not demonstrated, nor perhaps had found the sufficiency of that division, therefore for the sake of modesty he added those words. As if he said he did not so much positively know or had demonstrated that there are not more species, as negatively, that is, he had not found more. If we add that even after Aristotle no other species of quality has been discovered, this will be a sufficient argument that the division is sufficient. We will show the assumed proposition sufficiently by solving the arguments made in the third difficulty.

*First Sufficiency of the Division*

3. But first we will try to show positively the sufficiency of this division, which Simplicius first delivered in Categories on Quality, in this manner. Every quality is either natural or adventitious; the latter is habit or disposition; the former either affects according to potency, and constitutes the second species, or according to act, and this is either in the surface alone, and constitutes the fourth species of figure, or in depth, and this constitutes the third species. St. Thomas rejects this sufficiency, because also in the third and fourth species there are adventitious qualities, and in the first (he says) there are natural dispositions, like health and beauty. But to this latter part it could be responded according to what was said above, that health and beauty do not properly and according to reality pertain to the first species. Hence to the former part also it could be responded that the intended difference is that the first species per se and intrinsically has that it is an adventitious quality, because it is acquired by acts, or infused from outside. Nor will an exception be found in this in inferior, or sensible, or human things. In angels, however, intelligible species seem to be connatural, although they pertain to the first species; also the act by which an angel intuits itself is natural, although it also pertains to the first species, as I will say below. Nevertheless even those species can be called adventitious, because they do not emanate from intrinsic nature, but are infused by God, even if they are given according to the proportion and due of nature; also the act of cognition is acquired through proper efficiency, and from this part can be called adventitious or acquired; but qualities of other species have from themselves that they can be connatural, especially if they are in proper subjects; that they can be adventitious in foreign subjects is accidental; hence it does not vary their natures. And in this way the sufficiency is probable.

*Another Reason for Sufficiency*

4. Others propose the reason for sufficiency in this way; for quality is either in the surface alone of substance, and thus constitutes the fourth species; or it is also interior; and this again is either sensible per se as the proper object of some sense, and this constitutes the third species; or it is insensible, and this again is either innate, and constitutes the second species, or adventitious, and constitutes the first. This reason is also probable, although through differences which can belong not only to those species to which they are attributed, but also to others. For being an innate quality belongs not only to potency, but also to passible quality; being also insensible per se belongs to several qualities. And (what is more difficult) those differences do not seem to be adequate to these species; for first passible qualities do not all seem to be per se sensible, as proper objects of the senses; for density or rarity is a quality of the third species, and is not sensible per se first as a proper object; and the same is true of roughness and smoothness, which are no more per se sensible than figure. Moreover it is likely that there are in natural things several qualities affecting them in a connatural way, which are not per se sensible, nor are they per se first potencies for acting, but only accidental forms ordered to adorning and perfecting the subject, which is likely not only in corruptible bodies, but much more in celestial ones. Likewise in spiritual qualities there are some possible ones, which agree with passible qualities in this mode of affecting, and pertain to the third species, as we said above about grace, and many theologians think the same about character. Then, what is said that figure is only in the ultimate surface, if it is understood that it only appears and is terminated in it, is true; nevertheless this is also common to colors, as is evident from Aristotle, in the book On Sense and Sensible; but if the sense is that figure is only in the surface alone and precisely, it can seem uncertain; for a circular body is circular according to its whole

self. Nor did Aristotle say anywhere that figure is in the surface alone, but that it is terminated in it, so that without any terminus it does not have a certain and determinate nature or species of figure, as is evident from Metaphysics III, chapter 5, text 17, although there he proceeds more by doubting and arguing on both sides than by defining. Likewise if density and rarity pertain to this species, they are not in the surface alone, but are certain modes intimately affecting the body of quantity according to its whole self. But nevertheless, as I said, this reason is probable; because some of the doubts against it can easily be spoken to, others however do not positively show that the assigned differences are inadequate, although they show that from the force of that sufficiency it is not proved that they are adequate; for what is supposed in that sufficiency, that all passible qualities are per se sensible, is not proved in it and is very uncertain to me.

### *Third Reason for Sufficiency from St. Thomas*

5. St. Thomas offers another reason for this sufficiency, I-II, question 49, article 2. For quality (he says) is a mode of substance according to accidental being; but this mode can be taken, either in order to the nature of the subject, or according to action and passion, or according to quantity. In the first way the first species of quality is constituted; in the third way the fourth is constituted; but in the second way the second and third are constituted; for if it is a mode of substance, as a terminus of action, the third is constituted; if as a principle, the second is constituted. Although St. Thomas does not declare this, nevertheless Cajetan, in the chapter on Quality, and interpreters, in I-II, expound it in this way, and it was per se manifest, because those two species could not otherwise be constituted under that common difference. This reason for sufficiency is also very probable.

## Section V

### *Difficulties Concerning the Said Reason Are Proposed*

6. But this is difficult in it, that according to it no distinction of these qualities is assigned according to their real natures, but according to various reasons conceivable by us, so that the same quality really according to diverse respects would be placed in diverse species, which St. Thomas consequently admits or supposes; this however has the difficulties touched on in the preceding assertion. And moreover, even if we want to admit that the same quality according to reality can under diverse reasons pertain to distinct species of quality, nevertheless those assigned differences do not always seem sufficient, even for this formal distinction pertaining to the genus of quality; for when it is said, for example, that the third species is constituted because it is a quality terminating motion, this does not seem consonant with Aristotle, who in the chapter on Quality said not every passible quality is such because it is made through passion, but either because it is made through passion, or because it causes passion in sense. Then, when this quality is said to be a terminus of motion, I ask whether this is understood of motion properly and rigorously taken, or of any mutation or action; if the first is said, it follows that the light of the sun, for example, is not a passible quality, indeed nor is the light of air, because it is not made through proper motion, although it most greatly causes passion in the senses. If however the second is said, it follows that operations of intellect and will, and universally all qualities that are made through proper action, pertain to the third species; and thus all acquired habits will be placed in it. Again I ask, when it is said this genus of quality is a terminus of motion, whether this is understood of a terminus per se first properly terminating action or motion, and thus whiteness will not be a passible quality, because it can never be made thus, but insofar as it results from some action, as from heating, cooling, or some mixture.

Or is also comprehended a secondary terminus resulting from the primary terminus of motion; and thus also figure will be a passible quality, because it is made through motion in this way, and natural potencies also can terminate motion in this way. Finally I ask, when it is said quality is constituted in this third species, insofar as it is a terminus of motion, whether this is understood formally that under the nature of terminus it is constituted in that species, and this is impossible, because this nature of terminus either expresses pure relation, or denomination from motion, which are outside the formal nature of quality. Or it is taken (as it truly should be taken) materially or fundamentally, namely, so that that quality is understood to be of the third species, which is apt to terminate motion; and in this way such a difference does not indicate a diverse formal nature of quality from that which the difference attributed to the first species indicates, namely, that it is a mode of the subject in order to its nature; for the same quality which by its nature is acquirable through motion, can be acquirable for this end, that it affect the subject according to its nature; these differences therefore distinguish not only things, but not even formal natures of quality. Just as that substance is producible of itself only through creation, and that it is an intellectual nature, does not vary the formal nature of substance. And similarly in quantity, that it is apt to affect the subject thus and that it is producible through augmentation, are not two formal natures of quantity. And a similar argument can be made about that difference, which is being a mode of substance in order to the nature of the subject, that is, as fitting or unfitting to it (for thus it is understood). For either this difference is understood formally, or materially. The first cannot be said, both because that, as I have often said, is more a transcendental difference pertaining to the nature of good, than conferring determinate specification of being; and also because that nature is respective, or extrinsic denomination; for the same quality can be fitting to one nature, unfitting to another. If however that difference is taken materially, it cannot suffice for making formal and specific diversity in

the genus of quality, both because, if there is any distinction of formal natures among these species, it cannot be in one and the same quality as to material entity, but as to some formality; and also because that material thing which underlies the respect and is declared through it, is common to every quality. Nor through that respect is any peculiar mode of affecting substance explained or indicated which would require some proper nature of quality.

### *Fourth Reason for Sufficiency of The Same Division*

7. Another reason therefore occurs for explaining this division and its sufficiency, which can be taken from the diverse end to which qualities are ordered, and consequently from the diverse mode of affecting substance. For we said in the preceding section that quality is an accident, instituted by nature to be as it were a complement of created substance, in those things that pertain to its operation, or conservation, or ornament. Quality therefore can come to substance, either per se first by reason of operation, or only by reason of its formal being, namely, that it is ordered only to adorning and formally perfecting the substance itself, which two members adequately divide quality, as is evident per se, because in no thing is anything found other than being and operation, and those things that are ordered to the perfection of both. Again, quality of the prior genus could be divided in this manner: for either it is operation itself, or the proximate principle of operation. And again the principle is either connatural and proceeding from within, and finally first constituting the thing as able to operate in the nature of a proximate principle; and in this way the second species of quality is constituted, which is potency. Or it is a principle superadded to potency, determining or assisting it, or giving facility in operating; and thus the first species is constituted, which is habit. But if operation itself pertains to quality, as we will say shortly, it pertains to the first species also, insofar as it is

disposition. And in this way those two first species embrace all qualities that can be attributed to substances per se first by reason of operation. For besides the principal principle of operating, which is not quality but substance, only those three things can be found in things that pertain to operation, namely, potency, habit and operation itself, as is taken from Aristotle, Ethics II, chapter 5. Moreover, quality, which per se first is ordered only to this, that through its formal being it adorn or affect substance, either is only a certain mode consequent upon quantity and as it were terminating and informing it, and this constitutes the ultimate species, which is figure or form, which differs much from the rest, both because it is only a certain mode of quantity, but others have their proper entities; and also because others follow form, but this rather seems to follow from the nature of matter, although it also receives mode and determination by reason of form. Therefore every other quality, which thus follows form or imitates it, so that it has its proper entity, and is not operation nor ordered per se first to operation, but to formally perfecting and adorning substance, pertains to the third species of quality, which is called passion or passible quality, because through these signs or effects it is chiefly known by us in sensible things, not because the formal nature of that species is explained through those words, nor even because it is necessary that every quality of that species have that nature or relation, from which that term is taken; for it is one thing from which a name is imposed, another what it signifies.

8. This sufficiency thus expounded I think becomes probable per se, either from its sole proposition and declaration. Then, when it is compared with the prior ones, it certainly has much fewer difficulties, and is more apt for explaining the proper essences of individual species of quality; for it is also taken from differences more intrinsic and more diverse, which can be conceived by us within the genus of quality. Hence they do not distinguish those species according to relations and considerations of the intellect, but according to reality; and thus we can place each quality simply and

absolutely in its species, and attribute to it its simple essence, which according to other opinions cannot be done, but it is always necessary to distinguish respects or formal natures, so that every quality is placed under one in one species, and under another in another which is laborious. And it is per se difficult to believe that there is no quality having one simple constitution in one series of categories, up to the ultimate species. The aforesaid differences are also entirely adequate to their members, and most apt for comprehending and coordinating all genera of qualities, which according to the first reason delivered above is done with difficulty. This reason for sufficiency therefore seems sufficiently probable, and preferable to the rest.

### *The Reason for the Order of Species of Quality*

9. The reason is given for the fourth species. And according to this way of explaining this sufficiency we can give some reason for the order and enumeration of these species, although it is not necessary that an order or enumeration of this kind always contain some mystery. The fourth species therefore deservedly obtained the last place as the lowest of all, both in perfection and in mode of entity, so that to some it seems scarcely to deserve the name of quality univocally. Therefore omitting that species, the other three could certainly be numbered in contrary order under some consideration. For insofar as being is supposed to operating, passible quality, which is per se ordered to the perfection of being itself, could be constituted in first place, and because potency is supposed to habit and operation, habit and disposition could be numbered in third place after potency, and potency could retain second place, although under a diverse relation. But according to another consideration pertaining to the order of perfection and greater actuality, they have been numbered with excellent reason; for a thing is then most perfect when it is in ultimate act, to which habit approaches proximately, which two are comprehended in the first species. After those, however, potency

follows, which constitutes the second species. In the third species, however, are placed qualities, which either have no power of acting, or are not per se first ordered to this function, but only to being.

10. This order can also be attended according to dignity on the part of subjects; for the first species, as explained by us, has place only in living and knowing things, especially in intellectual things; for only these things can perfect themselves and rightly dispose themselves by their acts and habits which they acquire through them, or receive for eliciting them. But potency extends more widely; for it is common also to inferior and inanimate things, at least to those which can operate something through transient action. But passible quality can be found also in inanimate things, which have no virtue per se first ordered to acting.

11. Something worthy of note. Although there is in that species, as expounded by us, something else worthy of note, namely, that this genus of quality (at least according to the natural order of things), is found only in bodies; for spiritual substances besides intellect and will, which are their natural potencies, are not capable except of habits or dispositions of the same potencies. And the reason can be given, because since those substances lack matter and are per se certain incorruptible acts, they need qualities neither for conservation, nor for ornament, nor for natural beauty of their being, but only for operation, which is otherwise in material and especially corruptible things, and therefore more passible qualities are found in these. For which reason St. Thomas said, Metaphysics V, lecture 16, that qualities of the third and fourth species are found in corporeal things alone, which is manifest concerning the fourth species. Concerning the third, however, according to our way of speaking it is sufficiently probable and consonant with reason.

12. But I said speaking from the nature of the thing, because supernaturally a spiritual substance can be affected by qualities, which per se first are ordered to giving or perfecting being, which agree with qualities of the third species in that nature and should be constituted

in it. And the reason is because, although these substances as to their natural being do not need that perfection, they can nevertheless be elevated to participating in being of a higher order, and be adorned and perfected with superior beauty, and therefore through elevation to the supernatural order they can receive qualities of this kind. But because the metaphysician does not attain these qualities, therefore he places passible qualities in the inferior order of corporeal qualities. And for the same reason we will not consider more things in particular about that third and fourth species, because since they are material, they do not pertain to the object of metaphysics except insofar as is necessary for delivering the division of qualities; but concerning habits and potencies we will institute proper disputations, because they abstract from matter of themselves.

### *The Difficulties Proposed at the Beginning are Satisfied*

13. Whether immanent acts are proper qualities. And from the sufficiency delivered we will easily respond to the instances posed in the third difficulty. The first was about immanent acts, which many resolve by denying that they are qualities, but only actions, which among Thomists seems to be a very received opinion, as we will see below, treating of the category of action. But although it is true that in the effecting of immanent acts true action intervenes, as we will show there, nevertheless it cannot be denied that that action has some intrinsic terminus which is made through it, as we will show in the same place; but that terminus can be nothing but quality, as will easily be evident by running through the other categories. Likewise according to these acts we are truly said to be of such a kind, namely good or bad, knowing, loving, angry, etc. Likewise these acts are forms ultimately actuating and perfecting the substances in which they inhere; therefore the common nature of quality assigned above belongs to them. And this opinion is common among authors; St.

Thomas holds it, Opusculum 48; and Soncinas, Metaphysics V, question 36, and more broadly, book IX, question 21; Ferrariensis, II Contra Gentiles, chapter 82, and II De Anima, question 22; Hervaeus, Quodlibet IX, question 8; Aegidius, treatise On the Measure of Angels, question 10. And Scotus is in the same opinion, In I, distinction 3, question 6, § "Here are," and Quodlibet, 12, § "To the third principal," whom the Scotists follow, especially Antonius Andreas, Metaphysics IX, question 4; and Durandus and Gabriel think the same, In I, distinction 27, question 2.

14. A difficult passage of Aristotle is explained. Nor do I see any probable reason against this opinion that it is necessary to solve. Only a difficult passage of Aristotle can be objected, Ethics X, chapter 3, where he says thus: "But neither if pleasure is not quality for this reason is it not good, nor are operations of virtue qualities, nor is happiness itself." But it is evident that pleasure, happiness and operations of virtue are immanent acts. And thus St. Thomas and others teach there absolutely, not otherwise interpreting Aristotle's words. I think however it needs some moderation, namely, that pleasure or happiness is not pure quality, which does not necessarily consist in actual operation of him who is affected with pleasure or made happy, because no one can either be affected with pleasure or made happy, unless by actually doing something; nevertheless it cannot be denied that what makes is quality.

15. Therefore supposing that these acts are qualities, it might seem to someone that they should be placed in the third species, both because they are termini of their actions, and also because Aristotle places passions of the soul in that species, like anger, joy, etc., which nevertheless are immanent acts. But these reasons do not press; for we have already said that being a terminus of action is not the adequate or essential nature of that third species. But passions of the soul per se themselves, as they are immanent acts, do not pertain to the third species, but according to that from which they take the name of passion, namely from the alteration which they effect in the body, and

from its terminus. It should therefore be said that these acts or qualities of the first species, and most properly are comprehended under the name and nature of disposition. Thus the cited authors who teach that these acts are qualities think more frequently, and according to all the reasons of sufficiency adduced above this can be shown. For these acts according to themselves are internally qualities and adventitious, for they are not innate; therefore according to Simplicius's opinion, they should be placed in the first species. Again these qualities are most fitting or unfitting according to nature, and through them we are made good or bad; therefore they pertain to the first species, according to that second opinion, as Fonseca noted, book V, chapter 14, question 1, section 3, because they are neither objects of senses, nor termini of motion or passion properly taken. According to the ultimate reason of sufficiency, given by us, the matter is manifest, because these acts are ultimate perfections of potencies; but in the first species are placed all qualities that are instituted for actuating and determining potencies; therefore such acts pertain to it. Moreover habits are compared through acts; hence through acts potency is disposed, so that it may have facility in operating; therefore these acts are excellently constituted under that species, which is disposition. Nor do I find any difficulty of moment in this.

16. What place intentional species obtain among qualities. The second instance was about intentional species, which those who admit them do not doubt are all qualities, because they cannot participate in another genus of accident. Concerning these therefore it should be said that they pertain to the first species, and, speaking regularly, are comprehended under the name of habit, although concerning species of external senses there can be some doubt, perhaps more about the name than about the thing, as I will declare in the following section. Intentional species therefore, insofar as they are per se first ordered to operating, pertain to one of the two first species; but because they do not give the first power of acting, but presuppose and determine it, they are referred not to the second, but to the first

species, and because they do not actuate potency as its ultimate acts, but as first acts, which are principles of second ones, therefore in that species they are comprehended under habits. Hence as much as is from itself, they can be permanent and difficultly movable. Nor does it matter that in the intellect these species are usually distinguished from habits, for in these names there can be multiple signification. For there are in the intellect judicative habits, which hold themselves on the part of potency and are distinguished from species according to the more common opinion. There are also apprehensive habits, which hold themselves on the part of the object, and these are not distinguished from species, which are therefore frequently called habits by St. Thomas. When therefore species are usually distinguished from habits, the discourse concerns judicatives, to which the name of habit is usually attributed simply, because those are properly the ones that give facility in operating to the intellective potency. Nor does it matter that intentional species do not seem to confer denomination on their subjects; for in reality they do confer it, since they inform them, but it is unnamed, which happens in many other qualities, and especially in those which both are not per se sensible, and are made only as if to carry instrumental virtue. Nevertheless however with respect to potencies this denomination is explained in some way, insofar as potencies are said to be constituted in first act through these species.

17. Whether rarity, density, roughness and smoothness are qualities. The third instance was about rarity and density, roughness and smoothness, which Aristotle simply rejects from the genus of quality; which if it is true, the difficulty ceases. But Gilbert, in the book On the Six Principles, chapter on Position, seems to contradict Aristotle absolutely, and constitutes all these under quality. And indeed Aristotle, Physics VII, chapter 2, text 11, numbers rarity and density among qualities to which there is alteration, and at least concerning rarity and density it is usually so judged more frequently. And it seems simply more probable, because density and rarity do not seem to consist principally in the position of parts, but in a certain

property and such a mode of being disposed, by reason of which much matter can be under small dimensions, as St. Thomas says, In IV, distinction 12, question 1, article 1, question 3, to 6. Which I understand of small intension of quantity in order to occupying place. But roughness and smoothness seem more to consist in equal or unequal position of parts. But nevertheless just as figure arises from position of parts, so roughness and smoothness can be qualities arising from position of parts, and thus Averroes, Albert and others think more frequently, interpreting and limiting Aristotle, that he spoke only of these insofar as position of parts is discerned in them. Therefore supposing that these are qualities, they should be placed in the fourth species, namely, roughness and smoothness, because they truly consist only in a certain figure. Nor does it matter by what sense they are perceived, because they are not perceived as proper sensibles, but as common ones, just like figure, as is evident from De Anima II, chapter 5. And so much concerning the sufficiency of this division.

## SECTION VI
## WHETHER THE DUPLICATED TERMS BY WHICH THE SAID SPECIES ARE PROPOSED SIGNIFY ESSENTIAL OR ACCIDENTAL DIFFERENCES OF THEM

1. Although Aristotle numbers only four species of quality, he nevertheless proposes each under a double name; he calls the first habit and disposition; the second, potency or impotency; the third, passion or passible quality; the fourth, figure or form. Hence it is deservedly doubted what kind of difference exists between the individual members of the said four pairs.

### *Various Opinions*

2. In this matter three ways of speaking can be devised: The first is that all those things differ only accidentally, so that through the individual pairs of those names the same species or essence is signified under a diverse accidental mode. The reason can be because that division, as delivered by Aristotle, is only into four members; therefore it is necessary that the individuals are simple species of quality, otherwise if in individual members two species were immediately contained, the division would be into eight essential members.

3. The second way of speaking is that any two members of those species can be reduced to one proximate species in which they agree, and thus there is a four-membered division, and thus it was proposed by Aristotle so that he might indicate that the individuals among those members, which are divided into two others, have special unity and agreement in themselves; nevertheless however in the individuals two proximate species are given that are essentially distinct, which are signified by those paired names, and in this sense it is a division of eight essential members.

4. The third opinion will be intermediate, that those members partly differ accidentally, partly essentially. And this opinion is true, although the first does not greatly distant from truth, because essential difference does not intervene, except between habit and disposition under a certain consideration, as we will explain.

### *The Second Opinion is Rejected*

5. We will therefore show that the second opinion is not true universally by running through the individuals of those species. And to begin with the clearer ones, concerning figure and form there is no reason for doubting that they do not differ essentially, and thus there is no diversity of opinions about them among authors, because it is evident that figure is a certain quasi-external form of a quantified thing; but nothing else in reality can be signified by the name of form in that species. Therefore between the significations of those terms

there seems to be not even accidental diversity on the part of things, but only in the mode of signifying of the terms, because the same thing is signified by the name of figure, abstracting mathematically from matter; but by the name of form it is signified in a physical mode, connoting matter in some way, to which form expresses relation. And this is what Albert said, that form signifies figure itself, insofar as it inheres in a natural thing or belongs to it by reason of form. But if, as we said above from Boethius, form does not express naked figure, but as adorned with colors, in which beauty consists, thus either form is not one simple species of quality, but is considered only as one artificially composed from many natural species, or certainly so that it is in the fourth species, it should not include the quality of color itself, but only the figure, which arises from the boundaries of that color or of several colors. Therefore from the force of those terms of figure and form there is no essential diversity in that species.

6. But by another reasoning several essentially diverse species can be numbered under that member; for mathematicians multiply species of figures through the number of angles, or lines, or surfaces, or through their proportion. By the former mode a triangle differs from a quadrangle, and a circle from both, because it lacks every angle, and is concluded by one line or surface; by the latter mode however a square differs from a quadrangle. But physically several figures of natural bodies, or even artificial ones, can be distinguished. But if under this species is comprehended every mode of quantity pertaining to quality, thus it can be divided into a mode affecting intimately the whole quantity, as density or rarity is, or only externally in its boundary, as roughness and smoothness is, and universally figure, as the more common opinion holds.

7. Passion and passible quality are distinguished only accidentally. Concerning passion and passible quality Aristotle himself expressly teaches that they do not differ essentially, but only accidentally. For they differ through brief or lasting permanence, as the same philosopher declares; but brief or lasting permanence,

speaking per se, does not distinguish the essence of a thing, as is evident per se. And in the proposed case (Aristotle says) it can happen that the same color, which is caused from shame or another similar passion in one man and quickly passes, is connatural and permanent in another, because the disposition which now, while he is ashamed, emerges around the body, can be made the same even in natural constitution. And thus in this also all interpreters agree. Only someone can doubt about certain qualities, which by their nature are quickly passing, like sound, light, and if there is any other similar one. I respond first, whatever may be the case about this, nevertheless here by the name of passion are not signified qualities of this kind, but all those which are made through sudden and briefly passing alteration, so that for the time being they absolutely denominate the subject to be such. Hence it is said second that qualities of the third species do not have from themselves that they quickly pass or remain, but from their causes and from the dependence which they have from them. For there are certain qualities which depend on their proximate causes in being made and in being conserved, others however which depend only in being made; which diversity is an evident sign of essential diversity of such qualities, not because one is passion or passible quality, for both these denominations can be found in individual qualities, but because the mode of dependence indicates the nature of the thing.

8. Therefore when quality depends only in being made on its cause, even if the cause quickly passes, it can leave a permanent and durable effect. And thus notwithstanding the brief permanence of the cause, the quality made can be passible. But it happens sometimes that, although quality per se does not depend in being conserved on its cause, nevertheless when it is removed, the quality made immediately perishes, because of the action of surrounding contraries, as happens in a hand heated by sun or fire, and then that same quality will be called only passion. Where it is evident clearly that there is only accidental distinction between those two.

9. But when quality depends in being conserved on its cause, then much more intrinsically it will have lasting or brief duration according to the mode of application or duration of the cause, and thus the same light in air, and also in the moon, will be through the mode of passion; but in fixed stars, for example, it will be through the mode of passible quality. Finally if there is some cause of some quality which by its nature is transient, or is not applied except transiently, then that quality will always be made through the mode of passion, and of this kind seems to be sound; nevertheless from this it cannot be concluded that passion and passible quality as such differ in species, but that there is some passion, which cannot arrive at the state of passible quality, and consequently, that there is also some passion which differs in species from every passible quality; which also differs in species from other passions which have causes of diverse nature, and therefore can, as much as is from themselves, obtain the state of passible qualities.

10. Whether potency is essentially distinguished from impotency. In third place it should be said about potency and impotency, about which there is somewhat greater controversy; for many want impotency to be essentially distinguished from potency, because they are ordered by their nature to contrary acts; for since potency is a quality giving faculty of operating, impotency is a quality which rather impedes the faculty of operating or receiving. Or (and it comes to almost the same thing) that is called potency which gives faculty to some act; but impotency, which gives faculty to the opposite act, and because the acts themselves are compared among themselves with respect to the subject as positive and privative, or as perfect or imperfect, therefore that is called impotency which provides aptitude to an imperfect act; as health is potency, but weakness is called impotency.

11. If however those things are considered which we said above about the signification of these terms, it is more probable that this is one species, which could be adequately signified by the name of

potency. For if we speak formally and per se, nothing is placed in this species insofar as it impedes or renders more difficult or less apt the faculty of operating (for these things are per accidens), but insofar as it positively gives faculty or capacity for act; for this is what quality can per se confer, and what formally pertains to this species, as has been sufficiently declared. But Aristotle added the name of impotency, so that he might signify that those faculties which either are weak in their species, or are ordered to acts contrary to nature or subject, are also contained under the species of potency, insofar as they in some way give the ability to operate. But that potencies are sometimes ordered to opposite acts, of which one is more perfect than another, can indeed contribute to some specific distinction of potencies, nevertheless the proper distinction of potency and impotency, as such, is not taken from this; for gravity and levity are distinguished in that way, and neither has the nature of impotency. And the same genus of distinction is found in habits, as is evident in science and error, virtue and vice, and yet they do not distinguish two general natures of habit, one positive, another as it were privative, but all are contained under the general nature of habit, and afterwards are specifically distinguished through proper acts and objects; the same therefore is proportionally in potency.

12. In what way habit and disposition are distinguished. First opinion. Finally concerning habit and disposition there is still greater difficulty and dissension of opinions, but perhaps it is posited in words rather than in reality. For that those two terms of habit and disposition signify the same essence according to diverse accidental states, Albert Magnus, Scotus, Aegidius, and some others teach, in the chapter on Quality; and St. Thomas favors this, question 7 On Evil, article 2, to 4, where he says thus: "Difficultly movable is not a constitutive difference of habit; nor are disposition and habit diverse species; otherwise one and the same quality, which was previously disposition, could not afterwards become habit; but easily movable and difficultly movable are related as perfect and imperfect about the same thing."

And in these words is contained the foundation of this opinion, to which Aristotle greatly favors, in the same chapter on Quality, for first he says habit differs from disposition because it is more permanent and more lasting. Hence, when below he had numbered certain dispositions, he adds: "Unless indeed some of these itself has been turned already into nature and cannot be moved, or can be changed with utmost difficulty. Which indeed for this reason someone would now call habit"; and therefore below he concludes that every habit is disposition, but not conversely, because, namely, habit expresses the essence of disposition and adds accidental perfection which disposition as such does not require.

13. Second opinion. But the same St. Thomas, I-II, question 49, article 2, to 3, although he thinks the said opinion probable, nevertheless thinks it more consonant with Aristotle's intention that habit and disposition differ essentially, because those two differences, easily and difficultly movable, do not signify diverse states of the same thing according to perfect and imperfect being, but indicate essential differences through order to diverse causes, which diverse qualities require. For some dispositions are such that per se from their nature they have from the force of their causes permanent and difficultly movable being from the subject, and these are essentially habits, even if it happens accidentally that they do not long remain or can be easily moved. Others however are dispositions, which per se from the force of their causes are easily transmutable; and these are never essentially habits, even if accidentally they are sometimes difficultly moved. For thus explained these differences plainly indicate diverse essences; for things which by their nature claim for themselves opposite and proper conditions and per se causes of those, it is necessary that they have diverse natures, from which this may come.

14. And from this some infer according to this opinion that science is habit essentially, even if it is imperfectly acquired, and the same should be said about moral virtues, justice, prudence, etc. Which Aristotle thinks in the said chapter, saying science is habit, because it is

moved with difficulty, even if someone acquires it moderately. And he adds: "Similarly also virtue, as justice, temperance, etc." But error (according to this opinion) is never essentially habit, even if it seems to be maximally rooted, and difficultly lost because of too much custom of the subject, because since it rests on false principles, as much as is from itself, it can always be easily moved. And the same is thought about moral vices; for these, since they are contrary to rational nature, as much as is from themselves, can be easily lost, although from the condition of the subject they sometimes become more lasting. Hence further, as to the use of terms, they say the name of disposition is taken in two ways: in one way generally, and thus it is genus to disposition and habit; in another way specifically and with precision, and as such it signifies a species co-distinct from habit; which distinction is consonant with Aristotle saying every habit is disposition, but not conversely; and thus Aristotle, Metaphysics V, chapter 20, defines habit through disposition as through a genus. Finally they say habit and disposition are said in two ways, namely, according to reality and according to mode; so that science or virtue little rooted accidentally has the mode of disposition, but in reality it is true habit; but when it is already rooted, it is habit according to reality and mode; but error or vice is never habit according to reality, although sometimes on the part of the subject it has the mode of habit. And thus specific and essential diversity is constituted between habit and disposition according to reality.

### *The Author's Judgment*

15. This latter opinion, as to the intended conclusion, is approved by me, namely, that habit and disposition under a peculiar and contracted signification can be distinguished in species; nevertheless the proposed mode of explaining does not please me as to all things. Therefore I suppose from what has been said, that in this species under the name of habit and disposition are comprehended

only qualities perfecting potencies of the soul; for in qualities of body there is not that peculiar nature which constitutes the said species, as explained by us. Hence in the way that using the name of habit improperly or broadly, it is attributed to qualities of body, it is never essentially distinguished from disposition, but accidentally through greater intension, or other causes of firmer adhesion to the subject, in which way hectic fever, or firm health will be called habit, and so of others. Again in potencies of the soul we can distinguish ultimate or second acts, from first ones, which are principles of second ones with the potencies themselves. Of these, second acts can be called dispositions; but first ones are called habits by proper and peculiar nature. And both is evident from the common mode of speaking of all. And the reason is because through acts potencies are disposed to habits, and to obtaining facility in operating, which habit confers. Likewise second act from its genus, because it depends on actual influx and attention of vital potency, does not have entirely fixed and permanent being, but is easily transmuted; but first act of itself and by its nature has permanent being; for even if potency ceases from operating, it can be conserved in it, unless it depends from elsewhere on an extrinsic agent, through whose absence it ceases to be, as happens in intentional species of external senses.

16. Using those terms in this sense, therefore, it is most true that habit and disposition differ specifically and essentially, for habit and act, by consensus of all, differ in species, as is evident from the mode of attaining the object. For act per se and immediately attains it and is as it were formal and proximate union to the object; but habit only attains by means of act, and therefore is said to be for the sake of act and to be only radical union to the object, after the potency itself, as principle of act. This essential diversity can also be declared through those differences: Easily and difficultly movable from their nature and from proper causes. For quality, which by its nature depends on actual influx of potency and from this has that it is easily transmutable, essentially differs from quality which by its nature does not have such

dependence, and therefore as much as is from itself, has permanent and durable being; but habit and disposition differ in this way according to the aforesaid interpretation; therefore. The minor is evident from what has been said, and the major seems per se known, because the nature of each thing cannot be better judged than from relation to its causes. And according to this interpretation also it is most truly said that the name or concept of disposition can be taken generically and specifically. For in the prior way it is the same as act perfecting and actuating operative potency, as it abstracts from first and second act, and as such it constitutes this first species of quality, insofar as it is a simple certain subaltern species, which is further divided into first and second act, as into habit and disposition strictly and specifically taken. And thus this distinction lacks all difficulty.

17. Something worthy of observation. But taking habit and disposition as these terms can be attributed to first act of intellect or will, I do not think there is specific distinction between habit and disposition, speaking per se and insofar as they are such. For all first acts of these potencies are from themselves permanent and difficultly movable, especially if they acquire their perfect state; and conversely, all those, either from imperfection of state, or condition of subject and other extrinsic causes, can sometimes be easily moved; so that science itself, which seems to be most adherent in the intellect, can sometimes be easily lost and have the mode or state of disposition, as Aristotle expressly taught, in the chapter on Quality. And in the will charity, which seems to be the most powerful habit, is easily lost from the condition of the subject.

18. Opinions, errors, vices, are true habits. Finally (to touch the matter itself in which there can be diversity) in the intellect not only sciences are habits, but also opinions, whether true, or false and erroneous, and in the will not only virtues, but also vices are true habits, which is the express opinion of Aristotle, Physics VII, chapter 3, text 17, saying: "Of habits some indeed are virtues, others however are vices." It is also the opinion of St. Thomas, I-II, question 51, article

3, where he says the habit of science is acquired through one act, but the habit of opinion through several; and question 54, article 13, he distinguishes habits into vices and virtues, as they dispose potency to good or bad act; and question 57, article 2, to 3, he distinguishes intellectual habits into those which are virtues, and which are not virtues, like opinion. And the reason is because all these qualities are by their nature permanent and difficultly movable in the sense explained above; and if habit is properly taken, insofar as it can be acquired from itself through many acts, there is none which on the part of its cause is not difficultly movable, insofar as custom is second nature, which therefore is difficultly changed. Hence not only from the condition of the subject, but also from the force of the acts themselves or custom it is difficult for man, not only to be transmuted from vice to virtue, but also from virtue to vice, and in the intellect also the custom itself of error renders difficult science itself, or intelligence of truth. Therefore all these habits agree in that general nature, of being difficultly movable. But that among these habits some have firmer or more immovable causes than others, can serve for further specific distinction of the habits themselves; for thus in the intellect virtues can be distinguished from non-virtues, and in the will virtues from vices; nevertheless this is not sufficient so that these qualities are excluded from the true and proper nature of habit. Especially since they have the same general mode of affecting potency and giving facility to operating proper acts, which is properly signified by the name of habit. Finally there is no doubt that these qualities have among themselves special agreement, which they do not have with second acts, insofar as they agree in the nature of proximate principle, giving potency faculty or actuation to second act, by reason of which the habits themselves are more properly and formally opposed among themselves, than with acts; that nature therefore is properly signified by the name of habit. And thus all these qualities are true habits according to reality and essence, even if according to greater or lesser perfection, or accidental or sometimes even essential, they can

participate in that common nature. And these things are sufficient about the distinction of these species, from which the fourth difficulty proposed in the second section is satisfied.

## SECTION VII

## WHAT PROPERTIES BELONG TO QUALITY

1. After it has been said about the essence and species of quality, it can be desired that we speak about its causes and effects. Nevertheless nothing peculiar occurs to be said about these, because, speaking in general, the causes of qualities are the same as those of other things; but in particular individual qualities have proper causes and accommodated to themselves, knowledge of which pertains to particular sciences, in which the properties and qualities of individual things are treated. And the same is to be said proportionally about effects; for the most proper effect of each quality is the formal effect itself, which it confers per se first; but some beyond this have other effects in the genus of efficient cause; about which matter was said peculiarly above, when we disputed about efficient cause. Often also one quality is the end of another thing or quality, and thus also can have effect in the genus of final cause, and again, insofar as one can be the proximate subject of another, it can have effect in the genus of material cause, all of which things are clear in general from what was said above, in the disputation on causes, but in particular they pertain to various sciences, and in the two following disputations we will touch on some things.

2. Likewise about the properties of quality scarcely anything can be said in general; nevertheless for the complement of this material and so that we may prepare the way to those things which we are going to dispute below, a few things should be noted from Aristotle in the Categories, chapter on Quality, where he assigns three properties.

*Concerning the First Property, Which is Contrariety*

3. The first property is that proper contrariety is found in qualities, which Aristotle so declares that he teaches it does not belong to every quality. For it is evident that not all qualities have a contrary; as figure properly has no contrary, nor does natural potency; indeed Aristotle adds that neither do intermediate colors have a contrary, which should be understood of most proper contrariety, which is between extremes. Whether this property is found in the genus of quality alone, is doubtful; for to substance, quantity and relation Aristotle attributes the opposite property, which is not to have a contrary; but to action and passion he attributes the same property, namely, to have a contrary; but about the remaining four categories he says nothing himself. But Gilbert in all of them seems to deny contrariety, which has some difficulty in "where." But all these things depend on what is exactly understood what proper contrariety is, and how it differs from any other opposition, or repugnance and incompossibility of forms. But this matter requires a peculiar disputation, especially since Aristotle devoted book X of his Metaphysics to declaring it, and therefore after the two following disputations we will deliver it.

*Concerning the Second Property, Which is Intension*

4. The second property of quality is that it receives intension and remission, or that it receives more and less, which property Aristotle also declares does not belong to all qualities, which is also certain. But he seems to leave in doubt whether this property belongs to qualities in the abstract, or only to concretes or subjects participating in these qualities, so that one whiteness, for example, is not said to be more whiteness than another, but the white thing itself is said to be whiter than another, or more to receive or participate

whiteness; but this question requires that we declare the nature of intension, and in what way it is made, about which matter we will institute disputation XLVI, where we will treat and explain this property ex professo.

### *The Last Property*

5. The third property is that according to quality something is said to be similar or dissimilar, which he says is most proper to quality, because it belongs to it alone, and can belong by reason of any quality. But this property should be explained in the same way and same proportion as we declared the similar one about equality of quantity; for the reasoning is entirely the same. Hence nothing occurs to be added beyond those things which we will deliver below about proper relations of similarity and dissimilarity, while disputing about relations.

R.P. FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

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